Tag: United States

Henry Huiyao Wang: A Xi-Trump-Putin summit in Shenzhen could kick-start peace in Ukraine

CCG’s President says there will be no diplomatic masterstroke in Ukraine’s absence, but serious consideration of a ceasefire can lay the groundwork for peace

[from the Center for China & Globalization, 31 October 2026]

Below is the latest opinion column by Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and President, Center for China and Globalization, published in the South China Morning Post.

At the recent Valdai Discussion Club, I asked Russian President Vladimir Putin if he would be open to meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Shenzhen. I also asked, more broadly, what role China could play in promoting peace in Ukraine, mediating and contributing to peacekeeping.

Putin was receptive, warmly welcoming the idea of a China-hosted meeting. Trump, too, has expressed a willingness to meet Xi and Putin. These expressions of openness offer an opportunity we must seize in pursuit of peace.

Some in the United States and Europe question the value of such a summit. They may fear restoring Putin’s standing or normalising the conflict without yielding any real progress towards an end to the war. That risk is still real but these largely Western fears must be tempered by the very real, very human cost of letting the war continue unabated.

From the very beginning of the war, I have been arguing that China has a constructive role to play. In March 2022, less than three weeks into Russia’s invasion, I wrote an article in The New York Times titled “It’s Time to Offer Russia an Offramp. China Can Help With That.”

In August last year, I extended that train of logic in Foreign Policy, where I proposed a seven-party format for peace negotiations and suggested that a peacekeeping force include troops from European and BRICS countries. A meeting of the three leaders in Shenzhen could help lay the groundwork for these broader diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts.

Without Ukraine’s participation, such a meeting is unlikely to produce a diplomatic masterstroke that ends the war. But the three leaders need not put the war to rest at a table in Shenzhen to make progress. Serious consideration of a ceasefire along the current line of contact—an approach Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has supported—could give peace efforts fresh momentum, leaving the final status of disputed territories for subsequent negotiations.

Further agreement could be sought on the protection of nuclear facilities, or a mutual end to strikes on energy infrastructure, new prisoner exchanges or improved humanitarian access. Of course, issues of sovereignty, security guarantees, Russia’s security concerns and Europe’s security commitments would remain. But these need not all be resolved at once before a ceasefire can begin.

Already, years of war have inflicted immense suffering on both Russia and Ukraine. Neither side achieved its objectives, and both need a dignified way out that protects their core interests. Thus, we must open a path towards peace without requiring either side to concede defeat. China could help bridge this gap by bringing Xi, Trump and Putin together in Shenzhen to explore how a ceasefire and wider negotiations involving Ukraine might work.

The United Nations could stand at the core of such an arrangement by monitoring any ceasefire and preventing a return to fighting by physical peacekeeping if the parties are so inclined.

For a broader negotiation on settlement, I find myself returning to a seven-party format that would bring together the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, Britain and the U.S.—alongside Ukraine and the European Union. An understanding reached in Shenzhen could give momentum to this broader negotiating process and free up the Security Council for action.

A peacekeeping force composed entirely of NATO or European troops might be unacceptable to Russia. Yet a mission without European participation would struggle to reassure Ukraine and its neighbours. Any workable arrangement would need to address both concerns.

In my Foreign Policy article, I proposed a peacekeeping force drawing troops from five European countries—Germany, France, Britain, Poland and Italy—and five members of the BRICS grouping, such as China, India and Brazil. And while the exact formulation, from the composition and mandate to the terms of deployment, would need to be negotiated with the consent of Russia and Ukraine, and the agreement of the contributing countries, the core idea remains sound.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the largest contributor of peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent members, China is well positioned to help. Its distinctive role in the global economy and dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, the U.S. and Europe, give it channels through which to coax the parties towards peace. But this process must begin somewhere, and that somewhere could be Shenzhen.

Nor should APEC be the end of the diplomatic effort. With an understanding reached by the leaders in Shenzhen, the Security Council may pick up the momentum by advancing ceasefire and peacekeeping proposals. The Group of 20 could then join the effort to rally support from major economies with an interest in maintaining the deal. Each would play a different role and would not be tasked with settling the entire conflict.

China’s role in the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in 2023 showed Beijing’s ability to open a door after years of enmity. The Ukraine war is different, and there can be no guarantee of a similar outcome. But diplomacy must begin somewhere, particularly when fighting has brought such destruction.

The central question is whether such a meeting could help bring the war to an end. In that light, any gain in prestige for an individual leader is almost irrelevant. And if the three leaders could agree on practical steps towards peace, they would give the United Nations and the wider international community a material basis upon which peace could be built.

Japan Inc. Now Sells No Yen to Invest Abroad

Earnings on Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) reached 103% of new FDI in 2022–25. With dividends and retained earnings counted together, Japan Inc. now needs to sell little yen to invest abroad.

[by OKUBO Takuji]

Key takeaways

  • Foreign affiliates now earn about as much as Japan invests abroad each year. Reinvested earnings, dividends and interest together reached 103% of new outward FDI in 2022–25, against 48% in 1996–2000.
  • Dividends from foreign affiliates account for a growing share of Japanese corporate profit. We estimate that foreign affiliates contributed 13.4% of Japan Inc.’s earnings in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.
  • Corporate investment abroad now involves little net yen selling. After dividends and interest paid home, the estimated outflow has been close to zero since 2022, down from about ¥5 trillion a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s.

Japan’s FDI stock now earns 103% of new investment

It is often said that Japan’s ageing population and slow growth give its companies too few investment opportunities at home. A Japanese government report in 2024 included the following passages.

“Japan’s ageing and shrinking population depresses expected demand at home. Expected returns remain higher abroad, so Japanese companies have accelerated outward direct investment” (my translation). — MATSUBAYASHI Yōichi [松林 洋一], MOF PRI, chapter 8, p.136.

“Companies invested abroad because they saw no promising investments in Japan; they are unlikely to bring back every return. On a cash-flow basis, the external balance is in deficit and is one factor behind the weak yen” (my translation). — KARAKAMA Daisuke [唐鎌 大輔], MOF PRI, chapter 10, pp.178 and 175.

However, my review of recent data shows that while their premise of low growth prospects in Japan is probably still right, the direct investment Japan has accumulated abroad has reached a level where it earns enough to cover Japan’s new investment abroad. This changes the exchange-rate implication even if Japan keeps investing abroad.

As chart 1 shows, earnings on the accumulated investment stock rose from 48% of new outward FDI in 1996–2000 to 103% in 2022–25.

Chart 1

Overseas affiliates pay interest and dividends to their parent companies in Japan. Those dividends have become a sizable part of corporate Japan’s income: we estimate that they made up 13.4% of Japanese corporate profit in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.

When foreign affiliates retain their earnings on their balance sheets, Japan’s balance of payments statistics record them as FDI from Japan, even though no money crosses the border. While the companies receiving FDI dividends and the companies paying for new FDI are not necessarily the same, Japan Inc. as a whole is now financing its FDI almost entirely from the earnings of its overseas affiliates. At the current level of FDI, little new yen needs to be converted into foreign currencies as Japan goes about investing abroad.

In the rest of this report, I explain how foreign direct investment by Japanese companies evolved, and its near-term outlook. This report is the third in a series on the yen repatriation theme that I have published over the past few weeks, following “Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale”, on capital flows through Japan’s national pension funds, and “Mrs Watanabe No More”, on Japanese households’ assets invested abroad.

A strong yen helped drive Japan’s first outward FDI boom

Japan’s outward investment was heavily restricted after WWII, requiring case-by-case permission from the government. Approvals became more and more automatic over the years until outward investment became “free in principle” in 1980. Trade friction with the US-led Japanese carmakers to restrain their exports from 1981, pushing them to build factories abroad. The rapid appreciation of the yen was also a factor. The yen strengthened from ¥242 per dollar before the Plaza Accord in September 1985 to ¥121 by the end of 1987. Japanese producers had to move lower value-added work abroad. The strong yen also gave Japanese financial institutions sizable purchasing power for a while, until the stock and property bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991.

All of these factors contributed to a rapid increase in outward FDI through the 1980s and 1990s (chart 2).

Chart 2

Even after the bubble burst, the strong yen kept pushing manufacturers to move abroad. In 2005, manufacturers accounted for 60% of the FDI stock. As Japanese manufacturers expanded their supply chains abroad, Asia’s share of outward FDI rose from about 12% in FY1986–90 to 19% in FY1995–99, and Asia held 23% of the FDI stock by 2005 (chart 3).

Chart 3

Japan’s outward FDI stock rose to 56% of GDP

The next phase was sustained by a different pressure. With weak growth and low interest rates at home, Japan Inc. kept investing abroad, across a broader range of industries. Between 1995 and 2025, the stock of FDI rose from 9% of Japan’s GDP to 58% (chart 4). In 2025, it is as large as about 38% of the private sector’s domestic fixed capital, on our estimate.

Chart 4

By industry composition and by destination compositions changed over time. Manufacturing’s share of the FDI stock had fallen to 37% by 2025, giving Japan’s FDI more breadth. By destination, we are seeing a revival of FDI toward the United States. It accounted for 34% of the stock in 2025, Europe 29% and Asia 25% (see earlier chart 3).

Thus, after decades of overseas investment, Japan’s FDI stock is now large enough that its earnings are sufficient to finance new investment abroad, at least for now. In the next section, I consider whether this will continue, and in particular whether Japanese companies may bring an even larger share of their overseas earnings back to Japan, given the weak yen, higher borrowing costs in yen and possibly better investment opportunities at home.

The weak yen has slowed offshoring, not reversed it

The real depreciation of the yen over the past 15 years made production in Japan more competitive. There is some evidence that manufacturers are considering bringing production back to Japan. The 2023 manufacturing white paper found more firms shifting production back from China than moving there, and they named the weak yen as one reason. We see some signs of reshoring. Japanese manufacturers’ overseas production ratio rose from 18.0% in FY2011 to 27.2% in FY2023, but it may have started to decline or at least stabilize. The ratio fell to 26.7% in FY2024. A Cabinet Office survey of listed manufacturers puts the ratio at 24.5% in FY2025, and their plan for FY2030 is broadly unchanged at 24.7%. The weak yen seems to have stabilized the wave of offshoring, but I see no firm evidence of a move back onshore yet.

Domestic investment has grown slowly despite the weak yen

There are tentative signs that domestic capital spending is starting to grow again. For three decades it grew at a very low speed. In real terms, private business investment rose only 26% between FY1997 and FY2025, less than 1% a year. In comparison, capital spending grew by about 4% a year on average in the United States. In my view, a weak currency is only one of the factors manufacturers weigh in designing their global production chains. The weak yen makes production in Japan competitive today, but they have also seen the exchange rate swing violently within short periods. Japan also has a shrinking population problem. It started to address it by opening a door to immigration, but the door is only tentatively open. Overall, my view is that the weak yen alone is unlikely to give Japan Inc. sufficient incentive to bring its capital back to Japan and to the yen.

Economic security is bringing some production home

The government is pushing harder than the currency, mostly in the name of economic security, even before the Takaichi government came along. The government currently has a ¥250 trillion domestic investment target for FY2040 and named AI and semiconductors among its 17 strategic fields. Semiconductors are where the money has gone furthest. In November 2024, under the Ishiba government, Japan committed more than ¥10 trillion of public support to AI and semiconductors by FY2030, aiming to draw more than ¥50 trillion of public and private investment over ten years. Japan managed to lure a TSMC plant to Japan, backed by a sizable subsidy. Rapidus, a government-supported Japanese semiconductor maker, has received a sizable subsidy and is building a factory in Hokkaido. Japan’s production of integrated circuits and discrete semiconductors rose from ¥2.7 trillion in 2019 to ¥4.1 trillion in 2025.

Under the name of economic security, the Japanese government is promoting other industries such as batteries, shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals. Defence spending adds to the push. Japan’s defence budget rose from about ¥5 trillion in FY2022 to ¥9.0 trillion in FY2026. Some defence contractors, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, have doubled their defence revenue.

Japan’s industrial-policy record gives reason for caution

The Japanese government and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the key agency behind Japan’s industry policy, may claim some expertise in their industrial policies. Empirical studies in the past paint a poor track record, though. Rapidus, the most ambitious semiconductor project, has had no independent cost-benefit assessment (Negrine et al., 2025). While defence and economic security-driven policies have a different logic, I doubt that these industrial policies will succeed in bringing large-scale manufacturing investment back to Japan so long as macro factors such as Japan’s demography remain unfavourable.

FDI no longer appears to drive yen weakness

The weak yen and non-economic geopolitical factors do point to a halt in Japan’s four-decade offshoring trend, although it is a stabilization, rather than an economy-wide reversal of past offshoring. Japan Inc. will continue to invest more abroad, rather than within its borders. Given the sizable growth in the stock of cumulative FDI, Japan Inc. no longer needs to convert yen into overseas currency to keep investing abroad though. Net of dividends and interest paid home, Japan’s FDI sold about ¥5 trillion of yen a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s; since 2022 the net flow has been close to zero. There is also an interesting development in an effort to allow more share-exchange based M&A for cross-border deals that will further reduce the need for Japanese companies to spend their yen to purchase overseas assets. In my view, Japan Inc.’s FDI is no longer a factor to drive the yen weaker.

References

Chance and Necessity

If you free-associate the word “chance,” you may arrive at “I’ll take my chances” before potentially arriving at Thomas Bayes’ “Doctrine of Chances”. Jacques Monod was an early explorer of the collision of probability and chance in biology.

THE PRINCE OF CHANCE

Jacques Monod grew up just down the coast from Monte Carlo in Cannes, France, another town famous for its casinos and, later, its film festival. Graced with movie star looks—one prominent French journalist described him as a “prince” who resembled Hollywood icon Henry Fonda, as well as considerable musical talent, and an exceptional intellect, Monod struggled to decide on a career path through his twenties. After distinguishing himself in the French Resistance, Monod rose to fame not as an actor or musician, but as a brilliant biologist. He shared the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for seminal discoveries about how genes work.

A pioneer in the field of molecular biology, Monod was privy to the blizzard of discoveries in the 1950s and early 1960s about the molecules that determined the characteristics of living things—what Monod and others dubbed “the secrets of life.” He kept close company with a relatively small international community of leading researchers. For example, when James Watson and Francis Crick cracked the structure of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in 1953, Monod was one of the first with whom Watson shared the breakthrough.

But as a Frenchman steeped in his culture’s deep philosophical traditions, Monod was interested in science for more than just science’s sake. After the war, Monod befriended France’s leading philosopher-writer Albert Camus, and the two men pondered questions of human existence in Left Bank cafés. Monod felt that the public misunderstood the principal purpose of science as being the creation of technology. Rather, Monod believed technology was merely a by-product. He said, “the most important results of science have been to change the relationship of man to the universe, or the way he sees himself in the universe”—a relationship of equally intense interest to his friend Camus.

Monod thought that there were profound philosophical implications of the new molecular biology, particularly in the realm of heredity, which had gone largely unnoted in the broader culture. Several years after his Nobel Prize and Camus’ untimely death, he decided to write a book to try to bring the meaning of modern biology to laypersons.

“[T]he ‘secret of life’…has been laid bare,” he wrote.

“This, a considerable event, ought certainly to make itself strongly felt in contemporary thinking.”

Monod used several chapters to describe the insights that had very recently emerged from the study of DNA and the deciphering of the genetic code. He understood this knowledge would be unfamiliar to most readers, so he included an appendix with chemical structures of proteins and nucleic acids, and a primer on how the genetic code worked.

In a matter-of-fact style, he explained genetic mutations as accidental alterations—substitutions, additions, deletions, or rearrangements—in the text of DNA, in the sequence of the long strings of chemical bases (ACTTGATAA, etc.) that make up genes.

Then, almost without warning, he turned to the broader implications of how mutations arise in DNA. It is worth quoting him at length for after 111 pages of background, he delivered one of the most powerful ideas in five centuries of science (all italics are original):

“We call these events accidental; we say they are random occurrences. And since they constitute the only possible source of modifications in the genetic text, itself the sole repository of the organism’s hereditary structure, it necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere.

“Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one that squares with observed and tested fact. And nothing warrants the supposition—or the hope—that on this score our position is likely ever to be revised.

“There is no scientific concept, in any of the sciences, more destructive of anthropocentrism than this one.”

In essence, heretofore obscure discoveries in biochemistry and genetics (largely studied at that time in simple bacteria) had upended two millennia of philosophy and religion that put humans at the center or apex of creation. “Man was the product of an incalculable number of fortuitous events,” Monod wrote. “The result of a huge Monte Carlo game, where our number eventually did come out, when it might not well have appeared.”

Le Hasard et la nécessité (Chance and Necessity) appeared in France in October 1970. It was a fairly technical book with several chapters on philosophy and genetics, and those appendices full of chemical diagrams. A first-time author, Monod did not know what reactions to expect.

The merde hit the fan.

The book received dozens of reviews across France and quickly became a bestseller—second only to the French translation of Erich Segal’s Love Story (this was France after all. After it was translated into English, reviews and interviews with Monod were featured in several of the most prominent British and American newspapers and magazines.

Many commentators immediately recognized the threat chance posed to traditional ideas of humanity’s origins and purpose. To Arthur Peacocke, a British biochemist turned prominent theologian, Monod had put forth “one of the strongest and most influential attacks of the century on theism.” A flurry of articles and books appeared with titles such as Anti-Chance: A Reply to Monod’s Chance and Necessity, Beyond Chance and Necessity, and God, Chance, and Necessity. Monod was invited to debate philosophers and theologians both in France and abroad, on television, radio, and in print.

American Calvinist theologian and pastor R.C. Sproul summed up the high stakes posed by chance in the first page of his book Not A Chance:

“It is not necessary for chance to rule in order to supplant God. Indeed, chance requires little authority at all if it is to depose God; all it needs to do the job is to exist. The mere existence of chance is enough to rip God from his cosmic throne. Chance does not need to rule; it does not need to be sovereign. If it exists as a mere impotent, humble servant, it leaves God not only out of date, but out of a job.” More than two hundred pages later, Sproul concluded:

“Chance as a real force is a myth. It has no basis in reality and no place in scientific inquiry. For science and philosophy to continue to advance in knowledge, chance must be demythologized once and for all.”

Sproul and other critics argued that what scientists perceived as chance merely reflected a lack of knowledge of true causes. Perhaps that was the expression of hope to which Monod alluded—the hope that as scientists learned more, our position on the role of chance would somehow be revised.

A SECOND CHANCE

The ensuing fifty years have not played out as either Monod or his detractors hoped. The Frenchman thought that the new insights from molecular biology should be a turning point for modern society-away from traditional beliefs about causes in the natural world toward one that embraced randomness and our chance existence.

Ha! Fat chance. The excitement and fuss stirred by Chance and Necessity simmered down, and Monod passed away a few years later. Surveys reveal that the majority of Americans, for example, continue to believe that everything on earth happens for His reasons.

But Monod’s critics should take no comfort. The province of chance in the biosphere and human life has been revised, although not at all in the scope or direction that they hoped.

The domain of chance has expanded into realms neither Monod nor anyone else imagined.

As we have learned much more about the history and workings of the planet, we have been startled to discover how the course of life has been buffeted by a variety of cosmological and geological accidents—without which we would not be here. As we have explored human history, we have seen how pandemics, droughts, and other civilization-changing episodes have been triggered by random, singular events in nature that easily might not have happened. And as we have probed human biology and the factors that impact our individual lives, we have caught chance red-handed, reigning over the often-thin line between life and death.

This book tells the stories that Monod could not—of astonishing discoveries from the planetary to the molecular scale, from great upheavals across the globe to the machinery of chance that operates within every cell of every creature, including ourselves. And while these discoveries vaporize the comforts of anthropocentrism, the story of chance, I hope you will come to agree, is much more than highfalutin philosophy or the refutation of theologians’ wishful thinking.

I hope that you are awed—awed by the power and the drama of asteroids slamming into the planet, of continents colliding, and of the rapid rising and falling of ice and oceans; awed by the realization that we live on (and are at the mercy of a planet that is far more unstable than our short lives perceive; awed by the knowledge of how random chance is at the source of all of the beautiful and wondrous creatures with whom we share the planet; awed by the unique invisible accidents that made each one of us; and awed by the fact that we humans, recent descendants of bands of hunter-gatherers who persevered through a period of exceptional chaos, have in just the last fifty years or so, figured all of this out!

My goal here is to be comprehensible without being comprehensive. It is almost trivial to claim that the world is the way it is or that we are here because of a long chain of chance, albeit fortunate, events. The explanatory power I seek comes from specificity. It is essential to unpack some of those events to appreciate how they shape the direction of life. The layout of the book follows a simple three-part logic. I’ll begin with inanimate, external chance events that have shaped the conditions for life (Part One, “Stuff Happens”), and then turn to the internal random mechanism within every creature that generates the adaptations to those conditions (Part Two, “A World of Mistakes”). Then, I bring the story to the personal level (Part Three, “23 and You”) and how chance impacts our natural lives, as well as our deaths. Our chance-driven existence shatters long-held beliefs about humanity’s place and raises challenging questions about the meaning and purpose of our lives. In the Afterword, I’ll offer some possible replies with the help of some special guests.

This is a relatively small book for a really big idea. Science has given us a handful of really big ideas over the centuries, but they have been received in funny ways. Darwin had a huge idea that was very simple to understand, and even though the evidence is massive and everywhere, many refuse to believe it. Einstein had a brand new idea, and even though few understand it or the evidence for it, most everyone seems to believe it. Monod had a great idea, but these days most people (other than scholars) have not heard of it, or of him.

My greatest hope, then, is that this short book might be chance’s second chance.

Sean B. Carroll, A Series of Fortunate Events: Chance and the Making of the Planet, Life, and You, Princeton University Press, 2020, pp. 6-12.

Modern biology as described by Monod pushes the linkage of probability, randomness and chance to the center. At the time, this was a very radical and profound way of looking at biology. If we combine Monod’s biology with theoretical physics like Lawrence Krauss’ A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing, we realize that accidentality is the bedrock on which our knowledge of the universe is built.

Economics-Watching: Bank of Japan Updates (June 25th)

[from the Bank of Japan (日本銀行), June 25, 2026]

Economic Activity, Prices, and Monetary Policy in Japan

Speech at a Meeting with Local Leaders in Hyogo

TAMURA Naoki [田村 直樹], Member of the Policy Board, June 25, 2026

Read the full translated speech [Archived PDF]

Flow of Funds Accounts (Retroactive Revision and 1st Quarter 2026, Preliminary Figures)

The Bank released the following data today.

The Overview of Japan, US, and the Euro area is renewed once a year after the Flow of Funds Accounts is released in June.

The Bank of Japan retroactively revises data for the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA), in principle once a year, to reflect information updates, such as newly obtained source data and institutional changes, and to incorporate revised estimation methods. The retroactive revision of 2026 was implemented on June 25 and data from the first quarter of 2005 onward has been updated accordingly. The majority of the revision contents are unchanged from the Planned Retroactive Revision to the Flow of Funds Accounts [Archived PDF] released on May 25, 2026.

To download the retroactively revised data, please use the BOJ Time-Series Data Search.

Monthly Report on the Services Producer Price Index

Read the full May report [Archived PDF]

Updates to the Bank of Japan’s statistical data are available at BOJ Time-Series Data Search.

Japan-Watching: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

First Meeting of the Study Group on Strengthening Japan-Africa Economic Partnership

At TICAD 9 held last August, Mr. ISHIBA Shigeru (石破 茂), then Prime Minister of Japan, announced the establishment of the “Study Group on Strengthening Japan–Africa Economic Partnership” as one of the concrete initiatives of the Japanese Government’s policy on Africa. The first meeting of this study group is scheduled for June 18 in a hybrid format.

Under the framework of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”, this study group will address African economic integration, a top priority for the African Union (AU). Through strengthening economic cooperation between Japan and Africa, the study group aims to support business expansion of Japanese companies in the African market. To this end, the study group will discuss various topics including measures to promote regional economic integration in Africa, review of trade and investment between Japan and Africa, and the strengthening of economic relations between Japan and Africa. The study group will prepare a report by the end of the fiscal year 2027, which will be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Reference 1) Japanese Members

Prof. WATANABE Yorizumi (渡邊 頼純), Professor Emeritus, Keio University; Dr. KIMURA Fukunari (木村 福成), President, JETRO Asian Economic Research Institute; Mr. FUJITA Ryoji (藤田 亮二), Executive Officer, Toyota Tsusho Corporation (Representative from Keidanren); WATANABE Tatsuro (渡邉 達郎), Managing Executive Officer, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (Representative from Keizai Doyukai); IGARASHI Katsuya (五十嵐 克也), Director and Head of International Department, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

(Reference 2) African Members

Mr. Lacina Koné, Director General and CEO, Smart Africa Alliance; Mr. Kulekani Mathe, CEO, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA); Dr. E. Olawale Ogunkola, Professor of Economics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; and representatives from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, and the African Union Commission (AUC).

(Note) In addition, relevant Ministries, agencies, and individuals with expertise are expected to attend depending on the agenda.

(Reference 3) Attachment

Establishment of the Study Group on Strengthening Japan-Africa Economic Partnership [Archived PDF]

G7 Evian Summit

Working Session on “Reviving a Balanced, Shared and Sustainable Economic Growth”

On June 17, commencing at 10:30 a.m. (local time. 5:30 p.m. on June 17, Japan time.) for approximately 120 minutes, Ms. TAKAICHI Sanae (高市 早苗), Prime Minister of Japan, attended the G7 Evian Summit Working Session on “Reviving balanced, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth for the benefit of all”. The overview of the session is as follows.

  1. Prime Minister TAKAICHI stated that the G7 and like-minded countries should maintain close communication to reduce uncertainty in the global economy.
    Prime Minister TAKAICHI also stated that it is a common challenge for many countries to promote self-sustaining growth, by addressing non-market policies and practices (NMPPs) and the resulting excess capacity which are drivers of widening global imbalances.
  2. Furthermore, Prime Minister TAKAICHI stated that G7 members and the countries participating in this session should also demonstrate their contribution to reducing imbalances for their own balanced growth as well as for the stability of the global economy and financial markets. Prime Minister TAKAICHI added that making use of data-driven, objective analyses and policy advice by the IMF and the OECD is extremely beneficial in advancing these efforts.
  3. Prime Minister TAKAICHI expressed her hope that the G7 and like-minded countries would lead the global economy through frank discussions. She also stated that she looked forward to discussions at the G20, chaired by President Donald Trump of the United States, on reducing uncertainty in the global economy and becoming stronger and more prosperous together.

Situation in Iran (Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran)

(Message from Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu [茂木 敏充])

On June 18 (Japan Standard Time), the United States and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding and the cessation of hostilities was declared. Japan once again welcomes the fruition of the diplomatic efforts made by the parties as well as the countries that played a role in mediation.

Hereafter, it is important that free and safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is swiftly reestablished through the steady implementation of this MoU by all parties. Japan also considers it of critical importance that vessels be able to transit the Strait of Hormuz without being subject to additional costs, as has been the case thus far.

Japan strongly hopes that a final agreement on matters such as Iran’s nuclear issue will be achieved as soon as possible through further negotiations between the United States and Iran. Japan will also support the peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue including through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After the conclusion of a final agreement, Japan intends to play an active role in the reconstruction and recovery of the region. Japan will also continue to make every diplomatic effort, in close coordination with the international community, toward the realization of peace and stability throughout the Middle East region.

Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs ERI’s Visit to the United States

From June 21 to June 24, Ms. ERI Arfiya (英利 アルフィヤ), Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, will visit New York, United States.

During her visit, Parliamentary Vice-Minister ERI will attend the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS and deliver a statement in the meeting. She will also hold meetings with representatives of international organizations.

(Reference) Schedule
June 21Departure from Tokyo
 Arrival at New York
June 22Participation in the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, etc.
June 23Meetings with representatives of international organizations, etc.
 Departure from New York
June 24Arrival at Tokyo

The 7th Japan-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue

On June 18, the 7th Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue was held in Tokyo, Japan.

  1. This whole-of-government meeting was co-chaired by Mr. MIYAKE Fumito (三宅 史人), Ambassador in charge of Cyber Policy and Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, and Ms. Jessica Hunter, Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia, with the participation of officials from, on the Japanese side, MOFA, National Cybersecurity Office (NCO), National Police Agency (NPA), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and on the Australian side, DFAT, Department of Industry and Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and Department of Home Affairs (DHA).
  2. At this dialogue, following the enactment of Japan’s Cyber Response Capability Strengthening Act and Necessary Arrangement of Relevant Acts last year, as well as the adoption of its new Cybersecurity Strategy, the two sides exchanged views on broad range of topics, such as each country’s respective cybersecurity strategy and policy, and cooperation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
  3. Furthermore, building on the “Japan–Australia Strategic Cyber Partnership” which Ms. TAKAICHI Sanae (高市 早苗), Prime Minister of Japan and the Hon. Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia concurred on launching at the Japan–Australia Summit Meeting in May of this year, the two sides exchanged views on efforts and cooperation in a wide range of areas including the defense and deterrence of cyber threats, capacity-building, public-private partnerships, and artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity.
  4. Both sides confirmed that they will continue to work closely together in the field of cyber, including through the Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue.

[from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18-19 June, 2026]

Science-Watching: From Ignition to Energy

[from Science & Technology Review July/August 2025 Research Highlights, by Noah Pflueger-Peters]

Achieving ignition at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) proved that harnessing the power of the Sun in a laboratory may be possible. The Sun’s extreme temperatures and pressures cause light elements to fuse together to create heavier ones, releasing enormous energy and sustaining conditions for more thermonuclear reactions. NIF replicates these conditions with inertial confinement fusion, in which lasers compress and heat a target capsule filled with deuterium and tritium (DT), “heavy” isotopes of hydrogen that contain extra neutrons. When the isotopes fuse, they create helium and a neutron, and the lost mass is converted into inertial fusion energy (IFE), which can be harnessed for energy production.

Nuclear fusion produces significantly more energy than either nuclear fission or burning fossil fuels for equivalent amounts of fuel. Since the input materials for fusion energy are plentiful on Earth, an IFE power plant could produce safe, abundant, power grid-compatible energy without highly radioactive byproducts.

Although significant work remains to harness fusion energy, pursuing the development and deployment of IFE is crucial for the nation’s energy security, enabling the United States to shape implementation worldwide, avoid technological surprises from adversaries, and influence technical leadership in other energy-intensive technologies such as AI, machine learning (ML), and supercomputing.

IFE research stretches back to the early days of Lawrence Livermore, and today the Laboratory is fostering the overall fusion ecosystem. Livermore’s unique capabilities, expertise, and connections will be critical to laying the technical, logistical, and legal groundwork to make IFE possible. “IFE is a grand scientific and engineering challenge, something that is so incredibly difficult and high-risk and takes enormous expertise,” says Tammy Ma, Livermore’s IFE Institutional Initiative lead. “This challenge makes it the right kind of problem for national laboratories to pursue.”

This artist’s rendering shows the concept for an inertial fusion energy (IFE) power plant design, with a cutaway to show the plant’s target chamber in the center. Livermore researchers are laying the groundwork for private fusion companies to build similar designs. (Illustration by Eric Smith.)

Designing for Viability

NIF is the only facility to date to demonstrate the ignition and burning plasma conditions that are prerequisites for IFE, but it is an experimental facility for stockpile stewardship research, not a power plant. To be commercially viable and produce the energy to offset costs and meet demands (baseload power), IFE plants will need to generate more than 30 times the energy they deliver to the fusion target on every shot while firing 10 or more shots per second, compared to NIF’s rate of one or two shots per day.

The Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) study, conducted between 2008 and 2013, aimed to build directly on technology developed for NIF to achieve IFE and took a systematic approach to this requirement by developing the Integrated Process Model (IPM). (See S&TR, April/May 2009 [archived PDF], pp. 6-15.)

IPM is a technoeconomic model of an IFE power plant with detailed technical and cost breakdowns and interdependencies of key systems and subsystems. “The work done under LIFE was fantastic,” says Ma. “IPM lays out engineering and physics requirements for the entire system to test out different scenarios and see the impact. Now, we not only get to expand on all that but also leverage 15 years of new data from NIF, better codes, and high-performance computing (HPC), as well as new work in AI, ML, advanced manufacturing, diagnostics, and nonproliferation across the Laboratory.”

IPM describes an IFE power plant that requires a solid-state laser driver system to “pump” lasers with optical energy using laser diodes instead of flashlamps as at NIF. The plant will also need to fabricate and fill target capsules onsite and send them into its target chamber at a high enough frequency to produce baseload power. “We will have to repeatedly inject targets into the chamber, so the targets must be able to withstand and survive that process,” explains Ma. “Then, the lasers will track the moving targets, and when one gets to the center of the chamber, they would fire on the centered target, repeating 10 to 20 times per second.”

The facility would convert fusion energy into heat and then electricity via steam turbines, sending most of the electricity to the power grid and recycling the rest to power operations on subsequent shots. Neutrons from the reaction would produce tritium needed for the DT fuel by bombarding lithium isotopes in a “breeding blanket” material lining its target chamber. By closing both the power and fuel cycles, IFE plants are expected to be self-sustaining.

Thanks in part to IFE STARFIRE (IFE Science and Technology Accelerated Research for Fusion Innovation and Reactor Engineering), a Department of Energy (DOE)-funded multi-institutional IFE research and development hub, researchers across the Laboratory are working to meet the new system’s demands. IPM can help identify key challenges, test the viability of new designs, and direct future research. “Many technical models and cost models exist for IFE, but very few, if any, pair systems and cost models together at the same depth as IPM,” says Mackenzie Nelson, a technoeconomic systems analyst in the Computational Engineering Division. “This type of tool offers such an advantage because we can assess design choices from both a technical and economic standpoint and create blueprints for what an IFE plant could look like.”

(left to right) Livermore researchers Bassem El Dasher, Claudio Santiago, and Mackenzie Nelson discuss a 3D model of a proposed IFE power plant design alongside the Integrated Process Model (IPM). IPM has more than 270 potential user inputs that researchers and collaborators can use to assess different IFE design choices to see the technical and cost impact on the entire design.

Operational Demands

NIF’s target capsules are extremely precise, fragile, and can take weeks to fabricate, fill, and position. Researchers are trying to reconcile that factor with the estimated demand of more than 800,000 capsules per day produced at less than $0.50 each to achieve IFE plant viability. To do this, they are examining optimal target designs for IFE and exploring advanced manufacturing methods such as microfluidics, volumetric additive manufacturing, and two-photon polymerization. (See S&TR, April/May 2025 [archived PDF], pp. 16-19.) Additional projects involve developing diagnostic instruments that can collect, analyze, and combine data with other diagnostics at the 10 to 20 shot per second frequency and use it to improve lasers in real time.

Fusion energy systems such as IFE are also a regulatory challenge, as they generate high-energy neutrons capable of breeding plutonium or uranium-233 and rely on large quantities of tritium. “Pure fusion energy systems do not require fissile material, but there are still ways to misuse these technologies that pose proliferation risk,” says Yana Feldman, the associate program leader for international safeguards. Bad actors may only need small amounts of tritium to make nuclear weapons, and some breeding blanket designs may inadvertently produce traces of plutonium that may be diverted for military purposes.

Nuclear fission reactors are regulated through international agreements and export control rules, and the independent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies that nuclear material and facilities are only being used for peaceful purposes. Neither treaties nor the IAEA address fusion energy, and no consensus has been reached on whether fusion energy systems need an international verification program. Verification methods for safeguarding tritium are also far less developed than for plutonium and uranium and focus more on contamination and transfers than analytical accounting for discrepancies. The precise scale of allowable tritium unaccounted for without posing proliferation risk is also unclear.

Fusion systems can be designed for proliferation resistance, but not having an existing design remains a challenge.

International security analyst Anne-Marie Riitsaar and her colleagues are exploring these complexities and starting conversations with international fusion experts and private industry to raise awareness. Riitsaar also plans to collaborate with the IPM team to map tritium diversion vulnerabilities and identify high-risk points where researchers could incorporate surveillance methods into plant designs to detect and prevent potential misuse. “People sometimes ask me why I’m thinking about fusion energy regulations and proliferation risks at this point, but it’s not too early,” says Riitsaar. “Reaching a multinational consensus on regulating sensitive technologies takes considerable time and effort.”

The National Ignition Facility is an experimental facility and not a power plant, so a commercial IFE plant design has vastly different requirements—many of which are being studied by Livermore researchers and their collaborators.

NIFViable IFE plant (estimated)
Repetition rateOne shot per day10 to 20 shots per second
Energy gain4.13 times (as of April 2025)30 times (minimum), 50 times to 100 times (ideal)
How lasers gain energyFlashlampsDiode pumping
Target fabrication and fuel fillingFabricated offsite over several weeks and filled manually in 1 to 5 daysMass-manufactured and filled in a target factory within the facility
Target deliveryPositioned manually within the Target ChamberShot into the plant’s target chamber approximately 10 to 20 times per second
Laser alignmentComputationally in real time, taking up to 8 hoursIn real time
Power cycleOpen, requiring outside energy sourcesClosed, applying reused energy to power laser and ancillary plant operations
Fuel cycle (tritium)Produced offsiteBred onsite

The Laser Driven Fusion Integration Research and Science Test Facility (LD-FIRST) is a proposed blueprint for a proof-of-concept IFE facility that will test all the key IFE subsystems in an integrated fashion. A public-private partnership will likely be necessary to build the facility and will help the IFE community address the main subset of risks and the technological challenges of building a commercial plant.

Converging on a Solution

The team seeks to make IPM as accurate and comprehensive as possible by meeting with subject matter experts across the Laboratory to incorporate the latest research. “We’re trying to evolve the model so it has the same level of high detail across every single functional area to tell us where we can focus research and help us find optimized solutions that we could propose to industry,” says Nelson.

Computer scientist Claudio Santiago and his colleagues also modernized IPM by porting its framework from Microsoft Excel to Python in December 2024, making it compatible with AI, ML, design optimization, and HPC to further inform designs. “Once we think about all the forcing functions such as minimum shot yield and materials requirements pinning us in from every direction, we end up with an optimized solution space. As we sharpen the pencil more with these tools, that optimized solution box gets smaller until eventually we’ve converged on a point design,” says IFE lead systems engineer Justin Galbraith. Galbraith and his team’s point design is called the Laser Driven Fusion Integration Research and Science Test Facility, or LD-FIRST, a proof-of-concept physics demonstration facility for IFE. “That point design, we anticipate, will serve as the foundation for a future public-private partnership that would facilitate building and realizing a physical facility to focus the IFE community in pursuit of fusion power on the grid,” says Galbraith.

Livermore is leading the charge in IFE, helping the United States develop a technological roadmap, growing and coordinating science and technology efforts within the Laboratory, and fostering partnerships across the fusion industry, academia, and government.

Ma chaired DOE’s “Basic Research Needs for IFE” workshop and report in 2022 and co-chairs the subcommittee providing recommendations on the nation’s fusion activities through DOE’s Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee. She and her team travel often to Washington, D.C., working with DOE and legislators to expand fusion energy research and advocacy in the nation. Livermore also leads a “Collaboratory” with other DOE national laboratories to connect research project leads and facilitate public-private partnerships. The Collaboratory has hosted multiple events with industry, and the Laboratory has partnered with three private companies who aim to design pilot IFE plants.

Meanwhile, Galbraith and other IFE leaders have served as technical advisors for engineering design teams at Texas A&M University and given them IFE-relevant problems to solve, including advanced chamber and blanket design. Galbraith is working with Nelson to develop the IFE plant design portion of a high-energy-density science summer school program, which Nelson is leading in 2025 at the University of California at San Diego, and they have developed IFE curriculum that has been deployed at six universities starting in spring 2025. “We’re hoping we can get a group of students really excited about fusion and start to build up the next generation of engineers and scientists that will make fusion a reality,” says Galbraith. The team has led IFE strategic planning exercises at the Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore will stand up a new fusion institute—named “LIFT,” for Livermore Institute for Fusion Technology—a research and development center that will coordinate and centralize institutional fusion energy research.

Harnessing IFE will be a massive undertaking, but Livermore’s broad and deep expertise, facilities, and capabilities put the Laboratory in a unique position to lead and play an impactful role. “If we can set it up correctly, IFE will be a big piece of the Laboratory’s long-term vision,” says Ma. “IFE plays off of our history and all of our strengths, and it is critical for long-term national security.”

History of Global Antagonisms: China

The famous Yale historian, Paul Kennedy, is well-known for two major works, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860–1914. The former starts with a very powerful line:

“Rome fell. Scarsdale will fall.”

This gives us the theme of anxiety over national destiny and trajectory, which currently preoccupies the American mind.

In the second book, this antagonism question involves real and imaginary threats, and all of these anxieties and antagonisms are related. The masterpiece series, Downton Abbey, depicts a scene that takes place in the garden, where the Lord announces that they are at war with Germany, and his audience is perplexed, thinking, “How can we be at war? Germany is our biggest trading partner.” This teaches us that wars and the antagonisms that precede them are not solely based on rational factors like trade volumes.

Let us turn our attention to China. We are all aware, however vaguely, of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. In the recent PBS television series, American Masters, the episode “Tyrus” (season 31, episode 7, aired September 8, 2017) has the artist Tyrus Wong recounting the story of his father, with whom he immigrated to California in 1920 at the age of 9. It is hard for us to believe that, as people of Chinese descent, they were forbidden from owning property outside of Chinatown. He describes his struggle with the hassles of overt racism. He did not gain his American citizenship until 1946, after the act was repealed. He came to fame with Disney’s Bambi, where he was the film’s lead artist.

This anti-China xenophobia was just as virulent in Europe, going back to the 19th century. Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II popularized the phrase “yellow peril” to demonize the Chinese and encourage the European empires to invade, conquer and colonize China. Another instance of this sentiment in its European guise was the writing of Theodor Fontane. His classic novel, Effi Briest, can be thematically compared to other novels on 19th-century marriage from a female perspective, such as Anna Karenina and Madame Bovary, which are also adultery tragedies. In the novel, there are discussions of people from all ethnicities crowding into German cities and towns.

“…But all the people who live in the little shipping and trading towns along the coast are immigrants from far away, who care little about the Kashubian hinterland because there’s nothing there for them, their concerns are elsewhere. What concerns them is where their trade is, and since they trade with the whole world and are in communication with the whole world, you find people among them from all corners of the globe. Which goes for Kessin too, backwater though it is.”

“But this is delightful, Geert. You keep calling it a backwater, but now, if you haven’t been exaggerating, I find that it’s a completely new world. All sorts of exotic things. Isn’t that right? That’s what you meant, isn’t it?”

He nodded.

“A whole world, I say, with perhaps a Negro or a Turk, or perhaps even a Chinaman.”

“A Chinaman too. What a good guess. We may still have one, we certainly did have; he’s dead now, buried in a little plot with a railing round it next to the churchyard. If you’re not afraid I’ll show you his grave sometime. It’s in the dunes with just some marram grass round it and a little immortelle here and there, and the sound of the sea all the time. It’s very beautiful and very eerie.”

“Yes, eerie — I would like to know more about it. Or maybe rather not, I invariably start imagining things and then I have dreams, and I don’t want to see a Chinaman approaching my bed tonight when I hope I’ll be sleeping soundly.”

“Well, he won’t.”

“Well, he won’t. Listen to that. How odd it sounds, as if it were somehow possible. You’re trying to make Kessin interesting for me, but you’re rather overdoing it. Are there many foreigners like that in Kessin?”

“A great many. The whole town consists of foreigners like that, people whose parents or grandparents lived somewhere else altogether.”

“How very peculiar. Tell me more, please. But nothing sinister. A Chinaman, I think, is always a bit sinister.”

Theodor Fontane, Effi Briest, Penguin Books, translated from the German by Hugh Rorrison and Helen Chambers, 1967, page 33.

Notice the quote, “…I don’t want to see a Chinaman approaching my bed tonight when I hope I’ll be sleeping soundly.” This character echoes similar sentiments several more times above.

This “othering” of the Chinese in the novel continues:

Innstetten laughed. “We’re seventy miles further north than Hohen-Cremmen here and you have to wait a while for the first polar bear. I think you’re feeling the strain of the long journey, what with the St. Privat panorama and the story of the Chinaman and everything?”

“You didn’t tell me any story.”

“No, I just referred to him. But the mere mention of a Chinaman is a story in itself…”

Theodor Fontane, Effi Briest, Penguin Books, translated from the German by Hugh Rorrison and Helen Chambers, 1967, page 35.

“What was it all about?”

“Oh, some nonsense: an old ship’s captain with a granddaughter or a niece who disappeared one fine day, and then a Chinaman, who may have been her lover, and in the hallway there was a little shark and a crocodile, both suspended on strings and always in motion. Makes a marvellous story, but not now. There are all kinds of other things flitting through my mind.”

Theodor Fontane, Effi Briest, Penguin Books, translated from the German by Hugh Rorrison and Helen Chambers, 1967, page 177.

All of this global antagonism-watching and paranoia is disconcertingly related to our current situation. Donald Trump and the Republicans are essentially entrepreneurs of hatred. As is widely misattributed to Mark Twain, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”

Economics-Watching: Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers?

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 9 October, 2025]

by Stephan D. Whitaker, Senior Policy Economist

The United States has lost millions of manufacturing jobs in recent decades, but a variety of policies have been enacted to incentivize the creation of manufacturing jobs in America. This District Data Brief analyzes where manufacturers might find US workers to fill these roles.

Introduction

The announcement of new tariffs this year has reignited the discussion of whether the United States can expand its manufacturing employment by millions of workers. Reversing decades of manufacturing job losses is one explicit goal of the new higher tariffs. This District Data Brief presents measures of employment and demographics as context around the current and potential employment in US manufacturing. Raising manufacturing employment by 4 to 6 million workers would constitute a large increase relative to current levels. However, an increase of this scale would not be large relative to the global growth of manufacturing employment in recent decades, the current US labor force size, or the number of US adults not engaged in high-paying work.

With different priorities and approaches, policymakers have spent much of the past decade addressing issues related to the loss or absence of manufacturing in the United States. For example, America’s dependence on imported manufactured goods was highlighted at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic as supply chain disruptions led to shortages of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, microchips, and other products. The CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act featured tax breaks and subsidies to expand US manufacturing capacity for semiconductors, electric vehicles, and renewable energy equipment.

At the same time, economists have been documenting the loss of work opportunities and earning power by workers without college degrees as manufacturing employment has declined. In 2013, David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson published a study that estimated the labor market impacts resulting from increased trade competition following China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization, an effect often referred to as the “China shock.” Dozens of studies have since used the regional variation in job and income losses caused by the China shock to measure the adverse impacts of job displacement on family structures, crime, health, and other social indicators. Some supporters of industrial subsidies and higher tariffs have expressed the hope that these dynamics can be put into reverse.

Read the full article [archived PDF].