Zheng Yongnian (郑永年) on How to Address Western Public Opinion on China: Facts, Science and Reason

[from Pekingology at the Center for China and Globalization (CCG)]

“Be open, open, and more open,” especially to businesses, investors, media, universities, and research institutions. And tit-for-tat doesn’t work, the professor says.

by Zichen Wang, Shuyuan Han, and Li Huiyan

Professor Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), the Founding Director of the Institute for International Affairs at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, on January 28 published an article on how China should address Western public opinion on China. His advice is in the last part of the article, and below is a translation.

(Emphasis by Pekingnology.)

First, we need to understand how such narratives are formed. Historically, China held a bias due to its self-isolation and limited knowledge of the West. Despite losing the two Opium Wars, Chinese intellectuals at that time still saw Westerners as uncivilized. It was not until China was defeated by Japan, a neighboring country once considered as China’s student, that they realized their ignorance and a need for reform. Before China’s Reform and Opening up, Chinese people barely knew anything about the West. They always assumed Westerners were in deep distress, repeating the same lack of understanding of the West.

Similarly, the West’s uncertainty and fear towards China’s rise stem from a lack of understanding and even fear of the country, and their ingrained ideology would lead to misconceptions.

China is the world’s second-largest economy. The externalities and influence of its economy on the West are obvious. Upon joining the WTO, some Chinese people also felt unsettled by the externalities of the West. Some said, “the wolf is coming.” Now it is the West that is experiencing such worries.

It is crucial to recognize the significant impact of the Western hypocritical narratives against China, even if they are based on ideology rather than facts. We must also acknowledge that ideology-based public opinion from the West can exert a powerful influence on their policies toward China.

Historically, the West tended to demonize others while presenting themselves as morally superior, which enabled them to apply Social Darwinism to international politics easily and thus legitimizing conflicts and even wars with other nations. Given the Soviet Union’s failure in the ideological arena during the Cold War, we should by no means ignore any ideology-based public opinion toward China from the West.

Second, to make rational responses to the Western ideology-based criticisms, we should draw lessons from the history of the world economy, such as the lessons of the Soviet Union, as well as our practices, such as the rhetorical battle with the West in the past few years. Coming up with an externally-facing public opinion based on a different ideology is not the most effective in addressing public opinion attacks based on an ideology. Empirically, tit-for-tat is ineffective and can worsen the situation. Again, the failure of the Soviet Union is a prime example, as its battle with a Western ideology failed. When faced with China-demonizing based on ideology from the West, we need to do the simplest thing, namely resorting to facts, science, and reason.

Third, and most importantly, China needs to prioritize its sustainable development, which ultimately benefits the country itself. It is important to recognize that the foundation of the government’s governance lies in its citizens, not Western praise. The support from its people is crucial for both the nation’s longevity and stability., China’s sustainable development also benefits the world economy by boosting its growth. As mentioned above, China has been the largest contributor to the growth of the world economy since it joined the WTO.

It is crucial to prioritize the building of a knowledge system based on China’s practical experiences. Regarding global soft power, we need a knowledge system based on our experiences rather than a certain ideology. While there has been a proposal for an autonomous knowledge system, continuous effort is still required.

Fourth, given the substantial externalities of our economy, we must further communicate and coordinate with other countries on economic policies, regardless of their respective sizes. Our duty is to fulfill the responsibility as a major player in the international community, which also benefits China.

After the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, China promised not to devalue its currency, and that commitment became an international public good in Asia. Similarly, after the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2008, China made similar contributions. As China re-opens its economy after the pandemic, it is important not only to take note of the hypocritical comments from certain quarters in the Western world but also to recognize the positive evaluations and high expectations from many international organizations.

Fifth, we must be open, open, and more open. Despite China’s efforts, there remains a persistent ideological camp in the West that views China through an ideological lens, a situation made worse by the past three years of the pandemic. The pandemic was so severe that it hindered travel across borders; as a result, some Western media and scholars tend to assess China through ideology since they couldn’t come here to see the facts with their own eyes.

The assessment of China through a uniform ideological lens appears to have strengthened the original Western ideological camp. However, the United States and the West have more than one ideology, and not all people believe in the prevailing ideology in the public opinion sphere. China’s openness provides a “seeing is believing” opportunity for different groups in the West. China should increase its openness to Western groups, including businesses, investors, media, universities, and research institutions. The changes in their understanding could render those ideological-based public opinions less effective.

Facing the Global South: Building a New International System by Yang Ping

“If you raise [the development of the BRI] to the strategic level, there are countries where … you will have to lose money and there are countries where you will be free to make money.”

by Thomas des Garets Geddes, Sinification

Dear Everyone,

How to respond to the growing political divide between China and the West marked by partial decoupling, security alliances, and the risk of sanctions, amongst other things, continues to be a major topic of discussion among China’s intellectual elite. As already evidenced in previous editions of this newsletter, opinions vary considerably. Those presented here so far have ranged from Da Wei (达巍) stressing the importance of preserving if not strengthening ties with the West and Shen Wei (沈伟) arguing in favor of reforming the WTO and building up a network of free trade agreements to Ye Hailin (叶海林) emphasizing the need for China to demonstrate its military might to demobilize U.S. allies and Lu Feng (路风) calling for self-reliance and greater assertiveness in the field of tech. A certain amount of overlap certainly exists among these perspectives but the differences are nonetheless striking.

Today’s edition of Sinification looks at a speech made last month by Yang Ping (杨平), head and editor-in-chief of the highly regarded Beijing Cultural Review (文化纵横, hereafter BCR). Yang is also director of the Longway Foundation (修远基金会) which publishes BCR. The foundation describes its publication as “the most influential magazine of intellectual thought and commentary in China” and sees itself as having a key role in helping shape the direction of intellectual debates in China (“议题的设置就是意识形态斗争成功的一半”). Indeed, BCR often republishes old articles at key junctures as so often highlighted by David Ownby’s wonderful Reading the China Dream.

The following are excerpts from an edited transcript of a speech by Yang made at an event hosted by Renmin University’s Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, which was attended by China’s Vice-minister of foreign affairs Xie Feng (谢锋). In his speech, Yang advocates building a new international system led by countries in the Global South (which, of course, includes China) rather than the West. His ideas are not particularly novel but are nevertheless noteworthy in that they represent yet another viewpoint in the ongoing debate over how China should respond to the increasing tensions that characterize its relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Next week, I will be sharing a somewhat longer piece that proposes a way of protecting China from the growing threat of Western sanctions.

Yang’s speech in a nutshell:

  • Capitalist politics” are no longer in line with “capitalist economics.” The former now undermines globalization, while the latter supports it.
  • Sanctions, export controls, friend-shoring and alliance-building are damaging the world economy and further alienating China from the current U.S.-led international order.
  • China must respond to this growing trend by building a “new type of international system” with other countries in the Global South.
  • BRI projects should be increasingly focused on achieving this goal and thus allow more room for loss-making endeavors.

Capitalist politics ≠ Capitalist economics

“Since 2022 and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, our main focus and topic of discussion has been China’s construction of a new type of international system.

“The most important feature of today’s world is the beginning of a separation between capitalist politics and capitalist economics. The capitalist political order and the capitalist economic order do not support each other [any longer].

“We have witnessed two typical manifestations of the separation of politics and the economy and the impact of politics on the economy:

  1. The first is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the West have reached unthinkable, abominable [令人发指] and unimaginable proportions. Under established international rules, it was understood that such sanctions could not possibly occur, but now they have. These include the fracturing of the financial system, the expropriation and seizure of Russian private assets and the freezing of Russian foreign exchange reserves. These are all abominable and unimaginable forms of confrontation. At the same time, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has led to serious disruptions in global food and energy systems and supply chains, with massive food ‘shortages’ and soaring food prices, particularly in developing countries. Sanctions and political repression [政治打压] have severely disrupted the [world’s] economic order.
  2. The second is the conflict between the U.S. and China. Since the Trump era, the U.S. has been engaged in a trade war against China, mainly by raising tariffs. Basically, this was simply about balancing trade [with China] and used mainly economic means. But under Biden, it [has become] a war that mixes politics with economics. Biden’s strategy towards China can basically be summed up in just a few words: one, friend-shoring, [i.e.] only allowing friendly countries into [parts of] its supply chains; two, alliance politics, [i.e.] continuously forging an alliance system involving NATO, the European Union, Japan, AUKUS and the four Asia-Pacific countries [I assume he is referring to South Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia taking part for the first time in a NATO summit last year] and constantly opposing China [不断应对中国]; three, its so-called ‘precision strikes’, [i.e.] its radical crackdown on China’s high tech [industry], especially our chip industry.”

China is being pushed out of the U.S.-led international system

“The information I have seen so far is that the number of Chinese companies included in the U.S.’s ‘entity list’ has risen from 132 under Trump to over 530 now. The scope of such point-to-point [点对点] precision strikes is constantly expanding. With such a political impact on the economy, we can feel the [world’s] economic order being disrupted across the board. The world is moving inexorably in the direction of decoupling. The phenomenon of politics affecting the economy and the capitalist political order no longer upholding the capitalist economic order are extremely striking.

“In such a context, the challenges now facing China are extremely serious and varied. We have the pressures of dealing both with containment in the Indo-Pacific and with the U.S.-led politics of alliances across the world. More importantly and fundamentally China faces the strategic task of building a new type of international system [新型国际体系] … The existing Western-dominated international system used to be one in which we tried hard to blend [so as] to become one with it. During this process, we [sought to] absorb the West’s advanced technologies and management [practices] and thus complete our mission of industrialisation and modernization.

“But once you enter the existing international system, he [who is already inside] does not want to play with you, and even wants to drive you back out. He wants to divide both supply chains and the economic system into two parts [搞成两套] and desperately wants to contain and suppress you. This is not something that can be determined by your own subjective preferences. He has made up his mind: you have already become his ‘fated opponent’ [命定的对手]. He has to suppress you and drive you out of the existing system.”

Building a new international system with the Global South

“It is at this point that China is faced with the task of constructing a new type of international system that is not dominated by the West. In today’s so-called strategic quadrangle consisting of the U.S., Europe, Russia and China, how to construct such an international system appears particularly difficult [逼庂 literally means ‘narrow’ or ‘cramped’ rather than ‘difficult’].

“But if we look a little further south, we will find a vast number of developing countries, the Third World and the countries of the global South. They should be our strategy’s depth [我们的战略纵深]. That is to say, [we should] build a new type of international relations and a new type of international system that has strategic depth and in which China and the countries of the global South are jointly integrated. [This] is, in my view, an important strategic task for China’s international relations in the coming decades.”

BRI projects: Strategy trumps profitability

“For China today, especially for businesses and governments at all levels [within China] that are currently working hard to develop BRI trade, there is a very important point to which they should be alerted or reminded about: the development of the BRI has to go beyond mere business, beyond the general export of [China’s excess] production capacity, beyond the partial thinking of industry and the partial thinking at the regional level, or the simple economic way of thinking of business. The development of the BRI should be considered at the strategic level. That is, it should be included into China’s strategy when thinking about Africa, South America, Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

“If you raise [the development of the BRI] to the strategic level, there are countries where you won’t be able to make money and will have to lose money, and there are countries where you will be free to make money. You have to unite the two within your organic strategy.

“The strategic task of building a new type of international system is, in my view, a strategic proposition that Chinese think tanks and research institutes should pay very close attention to with regards to international relations.

“Time is limited today. I just wanted to make a start here. I hope to receive your corrections and criticisms. Thank you!”

[Subscribe to Sinification]

The recessive importance of the Global South was previously explored by Richard and his partner Larry, with input from Supratik Bose, many decades ago as shown here.

Japanese Philosopher KARATANI Kōjin (柄谷 行人) Awarded the 2022 Berggruen Prize

An expansive thinker who crosses boundaries.

[from Nōema Magazine, by Nathan Gardels, Editor-in-Chief]

KARATANI Kōjin has been named this year’s laureate for the $1 million Berggruen Prize for Culture and Philosophy. An expansive thinker who straddles East and West while crossing disciplinary boundaries, Karatani is not only one of Japan’s most esteemed literary critics, but a highly original mind who has turned key suppositions of Western philosophy on their heads.

In Karatani’s sharpest departure from conventional wisdom, he locates the origins of philosophy not in Athens, but in the earlier Ionian culture that greatly influenced the so-called “pre-Socratic thinkers” such as Heraclitus and Parmenides. Their ideas centered on the flux of constant change, in which “matter moves itself” without the gods, and the oneness of all being—a philosophical outlook closer to Daoist and Buddhist thought than to Plato’s later metaphysics, which posited that, as Karatani puts it, “the soul rules matter.”

In the political realm, Karatani contrasts the form of self-rule from Ionian times based on free and equal reciprocity among all inhabitants — “isonomia” — with what he calls the “degraded democracy” of Athens that rested on slavery and conquest. He considers the former the better foundation for a just polity.

In a novel twist on classical categorizations, Karatani regards Socrates himself as fitting into the pre-Socratic mold. “If one wants to properly consider the pre-Socratics, one must include Socrates in their number,” he writes. “Socrates was the last person to try to re-institute Ionian thought in politics.”

A Degraded Form of Democracy in Athens

For Karatani, Athenian democracy was debased because it was “constrained by the distinctions between public and private, and spiritual and manual labor,” a duality of existence that Socrates and the pre-Socratics sought to dismantle. As a result, by Karatani’s reading, Socrates was both held in contempt by the “aristocratic faction,” which sought to preserve its privileges built on the labor of others, and condemned to death by a narrow-minded mobocracy for his idiosyncratic insistence on autonomy and liberty in pursuit of truth.

Appalled at Socrates’ fate, Plato blamed democracy for giving birth to demagoguery and tyranny, radically rejecting the idea of rule by the masses and proposing instead a political order governed by philosophers. In Karatani’s reckoning, Plato then “took as his life’s work driving out the Ionian spirit that touched off Athenian democracy”—in short, throwing out the baby with the bathwater but maintaining the disassociations, such as citizen and slave, that follow from the distinction between public and private grounded in an apprehension of reality that separates the spiritual from the material.

In order to refute “Platonic metaphysics,” Karatani argues, “it is precisely Socrates that is required.”

Turning Marx On His Head

In his seminal work, The Structure of World History, Karatani flips Marx’s core tenet that the economic “mode of production” is the substructure of society that determines all else. He postulates instead that it is the ever-shifting “modes of exchange” among capital, the state and nation which together shape the social order.

For Karatani, historically cultivated norms and beliefs about fairness and justice, including universal religions, compel the state to regulate inequality within the mythic commonality of the nation, which sees itself as whole people, tempering the logic of the unfettered market. As he sees it, the siren call of reciprocity and equality has remained deeply resonant throughout the ages, drawing history toward a return to the original ideal of isonomia.

Expanding the Space of Civil Society

Not an armchair philosopher, Karatani has actively promoted a modern form of the kind of reciprocity he saw in ancient Ionian culture, which he calls “associationism.” In practical terms in Japan, this entails the activation of civil society, such as through citizens’ assemblies, that would exercise self-rule from the bottom up.

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, Karatani famously called for “a society where people demonstrate” that would expand the space of civil society and constrict the collusive power of Japan’s political, bureaucratic and corporate establishment. Like other activists, he blamed this closed system of governance that shuts out the voices of ordinary citizens for fatally mismanaging the nuclear power industry in a country where earthquakes and tsunamis are an ever-present danger.

An Expansive Mind

Along with The Structure of World History (2014) and Isonomia and The Origins of Philosophy (2017), the breadth of Karatani’s interests and erudition are readily evident in the titles of his many other books. These include Nation and Aesthetics: On Kant and Freud (2017), History and Repetition (2011), Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (2003), Architecture As Metaphor: Language, Number, Money (1995) and Origins of Modern Japanese Literature (1993).

The prize ceremony will be held in Tokyo in the spring.

3rd Harvard Korean Security Summit: “Korea—A Catalyst for Global Trends” [Zoom]

[from Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, part of Harvard University]

Tuesday, July 19Thursday, July 21

RSVP REQUIRED FOR EACH DAY

During July 19-21, 2022, the Korea Project will convene the 3rd Harvard Korean Security Summit. Our theme of “Korea—A Catalyst of Global Trends” explores how quickly various Korea-related functional issues play out with global implications. Korea cases provide unique insights into global trends ranging from ongoing efforts to change leader-level calculus (2017 Korean Missile Crisis) to the ROK’s designs for bolstering tech supply chain resilience to the DPRK’s expanding use of cryptocurrency theft for funding the regime.

Day 1: Tue., July 19, 2022 | 5:00 – 7:30 PM ET  (RSVP for Day 1)
Day 2: Wed., July 20, 2022 | 5:00 – 7:15 PM ET  (RSVP for Day 2)
Day 3: Thu., July 21, 2022 | 5:00 – 7:15 PM ET  (RSVP for Day 3)

Day 1 Agenda (Tuesday, July 19)

5:00 – 5:05 PM ET: Day 1 Overview

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:05 – 5:10 PM ET: Korea Foundation’s Opening Remarks

Dr. Geun Lee (President, Korea Foundation)

5:10 – 5:15 PM ET: Belfer Center’s Opening Remarks

Natalie Colbert (Executive Director, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:15 – 5:20 PM ET: Congratulatory Remarks

The Honorable Dr. Park Jin (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea)

5:20 – 7:25 PM ET: Panel 1: Enhancing Security on the Korean Peninsula

Panelists

General (Ret.) Vincent Brooks (Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School & Former Commander, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command)

Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service)

General (Ret.) Leem Ho-Young (President, Korea Association of Military Studies & Former Deputy Commander, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command)

Dr. Sue Mi Terry (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center)

The Honorable Dr. Yoon Young-kwan (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea)

Moderator

Nick Schifrin (Foreign Affairs and Defense Correspondent, PBS NewsHour) – TBC

7:25 – 7:30 PM ET: Day 1 Wrap-Up

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

Day 2 Agenda (Wednesday, July 20)

5:00 – 5:05 PM ET: Day 2 Overview

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:05 – 5:15 PM ET: Day 2 Keynote Remarks

Tami Overby (Senior Director, McLarty Associates & Former President, U.S.-Korea Business Council)

5:15 – 7:10 PM ET: Panel 2: Building Mutual Prosperity Through Resilient Technology Supply Chains

Panelists

The Honorable Dr. Taeho Bark (Former ROK Minister for Trade & President, Lee & Ko Global Commerce Institute)

Ambassador Mark Lippert (Executive Vice President, Head of U.S. Public Affairs, and Chief Risk Officer, Samsung Electronics & Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea)

Damien Ma (Managing Director, MacroPolo, Paulson Institute)

Naomi Wilson (Vice President of Policy, Asia, Information Technology Industry Council)

Moderator

Dr. Francesca Giovannini (Executive Director, Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

7:10 – 7:15 PM ET: Day 2 Wrap-Up

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

Day 3 Agenda (Thursday, July 21)

5:00 – 5:05 PM ET: Day 3 Overview

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:05 – 5:15 PM ET: Day 3 Keynote Remarks

Jean Lee (Host of BBC Podcast Series, The Lazarus Heist)

5:15 – 7:05 PM ET: Panel 3: Addressing North Korea’s Cybercriminal Statecraft Activities

Panelists

Jason Bartlett (Research Associate, Energy, Economics, and Security Program, Center for a New American Security)

Ashley Chafin-Lomonosov (DPRK Cybercrimes Expert, Chainalysis)

Saher Naumaan (Principal Threat Intelligence Analyst, BAE Systems Applied Intelligence)

David Park (Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Department of the Treasury)

Moderator

Alex O’Neill (Coordinator, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

7:05 – 7:10 PM ET: Day 3 Wrap-Up

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

7:10 – 7:15 PM ET: Closing Remarks

Consul General Kijun You (Korean Consulate General in Boston)

Speaker Biographies

Dr. Taeho Bark is the first president of the Lee & Ko Global Commerce Institute (GCI), newly established in September 2017. Together with the GCI team members working under his supervision, Dr. Bark monitors new developments and trends in global trade and investment, analyzes major international trade dispute cases and provides in-depth advice and strategic insights to Korean and foreign enterprises in connection with their trade and investment-related planning and concerns. Dr. Bark is an internationally renowned trade expert and, among other accomplishments, is a Seoul National University (SNU) Professor Emeritus, who has lectured extensively on international commerce and related subjects, and former Dean of the SNU Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). In addition to his academic career, Dr. Bark has extensive experience serving as a public official working on trade policy and negotiation matters, having served with distinction as Minister for Trade of the Korean government (December 2011 – March 2013), as well as serving as the Ambassador-at-Large for International Trade and as the Chairman of the International Trade Commission of Korea.

Jason Bartlett is a Research Associate for the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He analyzes developments and trends in sanctions policy and evasion tactics, proliferation finance, and cyber-enabled financial crime with a regional focus on North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. He also researches the U.S.ROK alliance and international security issues, such as North Korean military provocations and cybercrime. Lastly, Bartlett leads research and writing for the CNAS Sanctions by the Numbers series. Prior to joining CNAS, Bartlett worked at various nonprofit research organizations such as C4ADS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in South Korea. He also spent several years volunteering at human rights-focused NGOs resettling North Korean defectors in the United States and South Korea. Bartlett was a 2018-2019 Boren Fellow and Critical Language Scholarship (CLS) recipient in South Korea for Korean language immersion through the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, respectively. He holds a master’s degree in Asian studies and a graduate certificate in refugee and humanitarian emergencies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He received a B.S. in Spanish language and literature and a B.A. in international studies from SUNY Oneonta. He also graduated from the Korean Language Institute at Yonsei University in Seoul. Bartlett is fluent in Korean and Spanish. Outside of CNAS, Bartlett is a contributing author for The Diplomat, where he writes on the intersections of cyber, culture, and security in Asia. He is also a member of the North Korea Cyber Working Group at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. His commentary and analysis have appeared in The Wall Street Journal, Government MattersBusiness InsiderYahoo! FinanceThe Wire China, NK News, Inkstick Media, Radio Free Asia, Voice of America – Korean, The National Interest, and El País.

General (Ret.) Vincent K. Brooks is a career Army officer who retired from active duty in January 2019 as the four-star general in command of over 650,000 Koreans and Americans under arms. General Brooks is a 1980 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which was the first class to include women. He led the 4,000 cadets as the cadet brigade commander or “First Captain.” A history-maker, Brooks is the first African American to have been chosen for this paramount position, and he was the first cadet to lead the student body when women were in all four classes. He is also the eighth African American in history to attain the military’s top rank – four-star general in the U.S. Army. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; a Master of Military Art and Science from the prestigious U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; was a National Security Fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. General Brooks also holds an honorary Doctor of Laws from the New England School of Law as well as an honorary Doctor of Humanities from New England Law | Boston. He is a combat veteran and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In retirement, General Brooks is a Director of the Gary Sinise Foundation; a non-resident Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; a Distinguished Fellow at the University of Texas, with both the Clements Center for National Security and also the Strauss Center for International Security and Law; an Executive Fellow with the Institute for Defense and Business; and the President of VKB Solutions LLC.

Ashley Chafin-Lomonosov is a Cybercrimes Investigator with Chainalysis, the blockchain data company that serves the public and private sectors globally in order to enable investigations and compliance in the crypto space. Prior to joining Chainalysis, Ashley served in the U.S. government. She leverages the past 10 years of developing financial threat intelligence analysis skills to investigate nation state activity on the blockchain. She specifically focuses on East Asian issues, spending the majority of her time studying DPRK’s tactics, techniques, and procedures on the blockchain. Ashley holds a Master’s in Business Administration and a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism & Public Relations.

Emma Chanlett-Avery is a Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. She focuses on U.S. relations with Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Thailand, and Singapore. Ms. Chanlett-Avery joined CRS in 2003 through the Presidential Management Fellowship, with rotations in the State Department on the Korea Desk and at the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Bangkok, Thailand. She also worked in the Office of Policy Planning as a Harold Rosenthal Fellow. She is a member of the Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Japan Network for the Future, Vice-Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Japan America Society of Washington, and the 2016 recipient of the Kato Prize. Ms. Chanlett-Avery received an M.A. in international security policy from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and her B.A. in Russian studies from Amherst College.

Natalie Colbert is the Belfer Center’s Executive Director. Before coming to the Belfer Center, Colbert served in the Central Intelligence Agency for 13 years. Most recently, she was Director of Analytic Resources and Corporate Programs for the Near East Mission Center, where she led strategic management of analytic personnel resources and created a career development seminar for mid-level analysts. Prior to this role, Colbert led multiple analytic teams to produce intelligence assessments covering fast-paced issues in the Middle East for the President and other customers in the policymaking, intelligence, and military communities. Colbert previously served as an intelligence analyst covering conflict zones in Africa and Latin America. Across her CIA career, Colbert has earned awards for leadership excellence and in 2021 received the Near East Mission Center Award for Excellence in Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Colbert is a 2008 graduate of Harvard Kennedy School, where she earned a Master in Public Policy. She graduated in 2006 from New York University, majoring in International Relations and Francophone Studies.

Dr. Francesca Giovannini is the Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. In addition, she is a non-residential fellow at the Centre for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Dr. Giovannini served as Strategy and Policy Officer to the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), based in Vienna. In that capacity, she oversaw a series of policy initiatives to promote CTBT ratification as a confidence-building mechanism in regional and bilateral nuclear negotiations, elevate the profile of CTBT in academic circles and promote the recruitment of female scientists from the Global South. Prior to her international appointment, Dr. Giovannini served for five years at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston as Director of the Research Program on Global Security and International Affairs. Working to leverage academic knowledge to inform better policies, she led and promoted countless academic research on issues such as bilateral and multilateral arms control frameworks, regional nuclear proliferation dynamics, and nuclear security and insider threats. With a Doctorate from the University of Oxford and two Masters from the University of California, Berkeley, Dr. Giovannini began her career working for international organizations and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Geun Lee was appointed President of the Korea Foundation in September 2019. Prior to joining the Korea Foundation, he was a professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, and former Dean of Office of International Affairs, Seoul National University. From 2015 to 2016, he was visiting Super Global Professor at Keio University in Japan. He is also former Chair of the Global Agenda Council on the Future of Korea at the World Economic Forum (Davos Forum), and currently a member of the Global Future Council of the World Economic Forum. Before joining the faculty of Seoul National University, he served as a professor at the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (which is now part of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy). He also served as President of an independent think tank, Korea Institute for Future Strategies from 2003-2007. His publications include “Clash of Soft Power between China and Japan,” “A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy,” “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” “U.S. Global Defense Posture Review and its Implications on the U.S.-Korea Relations.” He co-authored The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security. Dr. Lee received his B.A. in political science from Seoul National University, and M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Jean Lee is a veteran foreign correspondent and expert on North Korea. Lee led the Associated Press (AP) news agency’s coverage of the Korean Peninsula as bureau chief from 2008 to 2013. In 2011, she became the first American reporter granted extensive access on the ground in North Korea, and in January 2012 opened AP’s Pyongyang bureau, the only U.S. text/photo news bureau based in the North Korean capital. She has made dozens of extended reporting trips to North Korea, visiting farms, factories, schools, military academies, and homes in the course of her exclusive reporting across the country. During Lee’s tenure, AP’s coverage of Kim Jong Il’s 2011 death earned an honorable mention in the deadline reporting category of the 2012 Associated Press Media Editors awards for journalism in the United States and Canada. Lee also won an Online Journalism Award in 2013 for her role in using photography, video, and social media in North Korea. Lee is a native of Minneapolis. She has a bachelor’s degree in East Asian Studies and English from Columbia University, and a master’s degree from the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism. She worked as a reporter for the Korea Herald in Seoul, South Korea, before being posted with AP to the news agency’s bureaus in Baltimore, Fresno, San Francisco, New York, London, Seoul, and Pyongyang. Lee served as a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and Global Fellow before joining the Asia Program as Korea Center program director. She has contributed commentary and feature stories to the New York Times Sunday ReviewEsquire magazine, the New Republic and other publications. She appears as an analyst for CNN, BBC, NPR, PRI, and other media, and serves frequently as a guest speaker on Korea-related topics. She is a member of the National Committee on North Korea, the Council of Korean Americans, the Asian American Journalists Association, and the Pacific Council. She serves on the World Economic Forum’s Global Futures Council on the Korean Peninsula. She is co-host of the Lazarus Heist podcast on the BBC World Service.

General (Ret.) Leem Ho-Young is the President of the Korea Association of Military Studies, a nonprofit think tank operating under the auspices of the ROK Ministry of National Defense. He is also the Vice Chairman of the Korea Defense Veterans Association and Vice President of the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation. Previously, General Leem was the Commander of the Ground Component Command and Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command from 2016 to 2017. General Leem has served as the ROK Army’s Director of Audit and Inspection and the Director of Strategy and Planning for the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has been a lifelong Infantry officer since his graduation from the Korea Military Academy, Class Number 38.

Ambassador Mark Lippert has had a distinguished career in the U.S. government that spanned approximately two decades and included a series of senior-level positions across multiple agencies. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea, based in Seoul. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (2013-2014) and as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2012-2013), the top official in the Pentagon for all Asia issues. Lippert also worked in the White House as chief of staff to the National Security Council in 2009. Lippert served in the uniformed military. An intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy, he mobilized to active duty from 2009 to 2011 for service with Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) Development Group that included deployments to Afghanistan and other regions. From 2007 to 2008, he deployed as an intelligence officer with Seal Team One to Anbar Province, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Earlier in his career, Lippert served as a staff member in the U.S. Senate, where he worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for then-Senator Obama; the Senate Appropriations Committee State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee for Senator Leahy, and for other members of the Senate. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal for his service in Iraq, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Basic Parachutist Badge. He is also the recipient of the Department of Defense’s Distinguished Public Service Award and the Department of the Navy’s Distinguished Public Service Award. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford University with a B.A. in political science and holds an M.A. in international policy studies from the same institution. He speaks Korean and also studied Mandarin Chinese at Beijing University.

Damien Ma is Managing Director and co-founder of MacroPolo, the Think Tank of the Paulson Institute. He is the author or editor of the books, In Line Behind a Billion People: How Scarcity Will Define China’s Ascent in the Next DecadeThe Economics of Air Pollution in China (by Ma Jun), and China’s Economic Arrival: Decoding a Disruptive Rise, published by Palgrave Macmillan. He is also adjunct faculty at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. Previously, Ma was a Senior Analyst at Eurasia Group, the political risk research and advisory firm. At Eurasia Group, he mainly focused on the China and East Asian markets, covering areas that spanned energy and commodities and industrial policy to elite politics and U.S.-China relations. He also led work on analyzing Mongolian politics and its mining sector. His advisory and analytical work served a range of clients from institutional investors and multinationals to the U.S., Japanese, and Singaporean governments. Prior to joining Eurasia Group, he was a manager of publications at the U.S.-China Business Council in Washington, D.C., where he was also an adjunct instructor at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Early in his career, he worked at public relations firm H-Line Ogilvy in Beijing, where he served multinational clients. In addition, Ma has published widely, including in The AtlanticNew York TimesForeign AffairsThe New RepublicForeign Policy, and Bloomberg, among others. He has also appeared in a range of broadcast media such as the Charlie Rose Show, BBC, NPR, and CNBC. In addition to media appearances, Ma has keynoted or spoken at various industry, investor, and academic conferences, including CLSA and Credit Suisse Latin America. Ma was named a “99under33” foreign policy leader by the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. He speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese.

Saher Naumaan is Principal Threat Intelligence Analyst at BAE Systems Applied Intelligence. She currently researches state-sponsored cyber espionage with a focus on threat groups and activity in the Middle East. Saher specialises in analysis covering the intersection of geopolitics and cyber operations, and regularly speaks at public and private conferences around the world, including SAS, Virus Bulletin, FIRST, and Bsides. Prior to working at Applied Intelligence, Saher graduated from King’s College London with a Master’s in Intelligence and Security, where she received the Barrie Paskins Award for Best MA dissertation in War Studies.

Alex O’Neill is Coordinator of the Korea Project and an Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is also a Co-Founder of the Belfer Center’s North Korea Cyber Working Group. As Coordinator, Alex helps oversee all Korea Project events and initiatives, including the annual Harvard Korean Security Summit. He previously worked as Research Assistant to Prof. Matthew Bunn at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom. Alex’s work focuses on North Korean financially motivated cyber operations, as well as links between North Korean and Russian-speaking criminals. His most recent research publication is “Cybercriminal Statecraft: North Korean Hackers’ Ties to the Global Underground.” Alex is a member of the Advisory Board of the International Refugee Assistance Project and of the Young Professionals Briefing Series at the Council on Foreign Relations. He speaks fluent Spanish and has advanced proficiency in Russian. Alex holds an M.Sc. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford and a B.A. in History from Yale University.

Tami Overby is Board Director for The Korea Society and Senior Director at McLarty Associates, where she advises clients on Asia and trade matters, with a particular focus on Korea. She has three decades of Asia work, including 21 years living and working in Seoul. Her most recent experience includes eight years leading the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Asia team while also serving as President of the U.S.-Korea Business Council. Ms. Overby’s extensive experience helps American companies compete and prosper in Asia. She attended many of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) negotiating rounds, often leading the American business delegation to help ensure U.S. firms’ priorities were well understood by the negotiating partners. She oversaw the U.S. Coalition for TPP, an alliance led by the U.S. Chamber, the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Farm Bureau, and the Emergency Committee for Trade.

David Park is a Senior Policy Advisor in the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC). He advises senior leadership on policies and strategies that utilize Treasury’s tools to compete against China in the national security context, including in the technology, economy, and military spheres. He is also responsible for developing polices and strategies that seek to counter Chinese illicit financing, money laundering, financial crimes, corruption, and human rights abuses to advance U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific. Previously, David was the first U.S. Treasury Representative to Korea. While there, he advised U.S. government (USG) senior officials and agencies on North Korea sanctions, economy, and illicit financing and sought ways to work cooperatively with ROK institutions to enhance the USG’s pressure campaign on North Korea. Before his assignment to Korea, David was Senior Advisor to the Acting Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for TFFC, advising her on countering terrorist financing, proliferation financing, money laundering, corruption, and financial crimes issues. David began his Treasury career as a Policy Advisor, responsible for developing Treasury’s strategy and policy to counter North Korean illicit financing, financial crimes, and sanctions evasion. Before Treasury, David served in the Office of U.S. Senator Joe Donnelly as a Defense and Foreign Affairs Legislative Staffer. In this role, he advised the Senator on his Senate Armed Services Committee work and advanced U.S. national interests through the annual National Defense Authorization Act. David began his public service career as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. In the Air Force, he served with service members from all the service branches, the ROK Air Force in Korea, and NATO nations in Belgium. David earned his B.A. with honors from the University of California, Berkeley, MPA from the University of Oklahoma, and MA from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Dr. Park Jin is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. He previously served four terms as a Member of the National Assembly (16th, 17th, 18th, 21st), including as a member of the Science, Technology, Information and Communication Committee (2002-2004), a ranking member of the National Defense Committee (2004-2006), a member of the Intelligence Oversight Committee (2004-2006), a member of the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee (2006-2010) and a ranking member of the Knowledge Economy Committee (2010-2012). He served as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs, Trade and National Unification Committee from 2008-2010. In that capacity, he passed the KORUS FTA, Korea-EU FTA, North Korea Human Rights Act, ODA Law and PKO Law. He was also actively involved in parliamentary diplomacy with the U.S., the U.K., China, Japan, ASEAN, Central Asia, Israel and the Middle East. He previously served as the Presidential Secretary for Press Affairs and later Political Affairs under the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998) before being elected parliamentary member in August 2002 in Seoul. During his private life, Dr. Park led the Asia Future Institute (AFI), an independent policy think-tank established in 2013 and designed to conduct research on economic, political and strategic issues in Asia and promote Korea’s role in the Asia-Pacific region. He also served as the Chairman of Korea-America Association (KAA), which was created in 1963 to promote mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation between Korea and the United States. He served as a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. from 2014 to 2021. Dr. Park also taught as an endowed Chair Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Previously he led the Korea-Britain Society as the Executive President (2007-2017). With great affection for the sea, he served in the Korean military as a Navy officer, Lieutenant JG (1980-1983) lecturing naval cadets in the Korean Naval Academy in Jinhae. Dr. Park graduated from the College of Law at Seoul National University (B.A.), Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (MPA), New York University Law School (LL.M.) and received a doctorate degree (D. Phil.) in politics from St. Antony’s College, Oxford University.

Dr. John Park is Director of the Korea Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is also a Faculty Member of the Committee on Regional Studies East Asia, an Associated Faculty Member of the Korea Institute, and a Faculty Affiliate with the Project on Managing the Atom. His core research projects focus on the political economy of the Korean Peninsula, nuclear proliferation, economic statecraft, Asian trade negotiations, and North Korean cyber operations. He previously worked at Goldman Sachs and The Boston Consulting Group. Dr. Park presented a TEDxPaloAlto talk in 2019 titled “How North Korea Inc. Evades Sanctions Through Innovation.” Dr. Park’s key publications include: “Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences,” (MIT Security Studies Program, 2016 – co-authored with Jim Walsh); “The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle,” The Washington Quarterly (Fall 2014); “Assessing the Role of Security Assurances in Dealing with North Korea” in Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford University Press, 2012); “North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activities” (USIP Working Paper, May 2009); and “North Korea’s Nuclear Policy Behavior: Deterrence and Leverage,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008). Dr. Park received his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, where he was a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellow. He completed his pre-doctoral and post-doctoral training at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center.

Nick Schifrin is the foreign affairs and defense correspondent for PBS NewsHour, based in Washington, D.C. He leads NewsHour’s foreign reporting and has created week-long, in-depth series for NewsHour from China, Russia, Ukraine, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, Cuba, Mexico, and the Baltics. The PBS NewsHour series “Inside Putin’s Russia” won a 2018 Peabody Award and the National Press Club’s Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence. In November 2020, Schifrin received the American Academy of Diplomacy’s Arthur Ross Media Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis of Foreign Affairs. Prior to PBS NewsHour, Schifrin was Al Jazeera America’s Middle East correspondent. He won an Overseas Press Club Award for his Gaza coverage and a National Headliners Award for his Ukraine coverage. From 2008-2012, Schifrin served as the ABC News correspondent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2011, he was one of the first journalists to arrive in Abbottabad, Pakistan, after Osama bin Laden’s death and delivered one of the year’s biggest exclusives: the first video from inside bin Laden’s compound. His reporting helped ABC News win an Edward R. Murrow Award for its bin Laden coverage. He has a Master of International Public Policy degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), with a concentration in Strategic Studies.

Dr. Sue Mi Terry is Director of the Asia Program and the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Dr. Terry served in a range of important policy roles related to both Korea and its surrounding region. Formerly a Senior Fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), she served as a Senior Analyst on Korean issues at the CIA (2001-2008), where she produced hundreds of intelligence assessments – including a record number of contributions to the President’s Daily Brief, the Intelligence Community’s most prestigious product. She received numerous awards for her leadership and outstanding mission support, including the CIA Foreign Language award in 2008. From 2008 to 2009, Dr. Terry was the Director for Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs at the National Security Council under both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. In that role, she formulated, coordinated, and implemented U.S. government policy on Korea and Japan, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania. From 2009 to 2010, she was Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council. In that position, she led the U.S. Intelligence community’s production of strategic analysis on East Asian issues and authored multiple National Intelligence Estimates. From 2010 to 2011, Dr. Terry served as the National Intelligence Fellow in the David Rockefeller Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Since leaving the government, Dr. Terry has been a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute (2011-2015), where she taught both graduate and undergraduate courses on Korean politics and East Asia. She holds a Ph.D. (2001) and an M.A. (1998) in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a B.A. in political science from New York University (1993).

Naomi Wilson serves as vice president of policy, Asia at the Information Technology Industry Council. Prior to joining ITI, Naomi served at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where she most recently held the position of acting director for Asia-Pacific. In that capacity, she played a leading role on cybersecurity, law enforcement, and customs cooperation issues related to Asia and served as a senior advisor to Secretary Jeh Johnson. During her tenure at DHS, Naomi led development and implementation of priority policy initiatives for DHS engagement with China, including secretarial engagements and agreements. She worked closely with interagency colleagues to negotiate and implement agreements stemming from the September 2015 State visit between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, including managing the U.S.China High-Level Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues for DHS. Prior to joining DHS, Naomi served as a staffer on the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs and as a research assistant at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Naomi holds a Bachelor’s degree in English and Master’s in International Affairs & National Security. In 2011, she completed intensive Chinese language training at Peking University. Naomi speaks advanced Mandarin and French and is a native of Connecticut.

Dr. Yoon Young-kwan served as the inaugural Senior Visiting Scholar with the Korea Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also served as the 2021 Kim Koo Visiting Professor at the Korea Institute at Harvard University. He is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea from 2003 to 2004. Before he joined the faculty of Seoul National University in 1990, he taught at the University of California at Davis. He served as Korea’s Eminent Representative to, and co-chair of, the East Asia Vision Group II from September 2011 to October 2012. He has published several books and some 70 articles in the fields of international political economy, Korea’s foreign policy, and inter-Korean relations, some of which appeared in World Politics, International Political Science Review, Asian Survey, and Project Syndicate. Dr. Yoon received his doctoral degree from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Consul General Kijun You serves in the Korean Consulate General in Boston. His previous positions in the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs include: Director-General for International Legal Affairs; Deputy Director-General for International Legal Affairs; Minister-Counsellor, Korean Embassy in the Republic of Kenya; Counsellor, Korean Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York; Director, Territory and Oceans Division, Treaties Bureau. Consul General You received his B.A. in French Language and Literature at Korea University, Master of Law from Korea University, LL.M. from the University of Edinburgh, and LL.M. from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

India and the Russia-Ukraine War: The Paradox of Military Dependence, Traditional Loyalty and Strategic Autonomy

[from India in Transition, published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) of the University of Pennsylvania, by Arndt Michael]

India, long-established as the world’s most populous democracy, has been quite instrumental over the years in assisting various countries dealing with democratic struggles. This support has included a blend of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and especially economic development projects. Yet, India’s recent attitude toward the Russian attack on Ukraine and its concomitant behavior in the United Nations Security Council (as a non-permanent member) seems to contradict its support of democracy. By abstaining, rather than explicitly voting in favor of UN resolutions condemning Russian aggression at the beginning of the war, India angered several UN member-countries.

In order to substantiate its abstention from voting, India felt compelled to issue a so-called “Explanation of Vote” (EoV). In it, India asked for a “return to the path of diplomacy” and an immediate cessation of “violence and hostilities.” Crucially, India stated in the EoV that “the contemporary global order has been built on the UN Charter, international law, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states…all member states need to honor these principles in finding a constructive way forward. Dialogue is the only answer to settling differences and disputes, however daunting that may appear at this moment.” 

While these statements and the call for dialogue are in accordance with India’s professed stance toward the relevance and objectives enshrined in the UN Charter, the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice is still conspicuous. At first glance, a “good” relationship with Russia seems to be more significant than the expectations of the world-community as represented in the United Nations. And, more importantly, by abstaining, India seemingly violated one of its central foreign and strategic policies: to always strive for strategic autonomy.

However, from a strategic perspective, India is precisely replicating what it did when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. For India, its own national security is at stake, as well as its current and future geostrategic influence in Asia and the world. The military dependence that currently exists between India and Russia is nothing short of gigantic and has created a dangerous conundrum. Since the “Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” was signed in 1971, defense agreements and long-term supply contracts have been in place. And while India and Russia have shared a strategic relationship since October 2000, this was upgraded in December 2020 to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” 

Although there was a marked reduction of Russian imports in past years, official data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveal that between 1996-2015, the Russian proportion of Indian military imports was almost 70 percent, and between 2016-20 it still hovered around 49 percent. In fact, 70 percent of all Indian military equipment currently in use has been directly produced in Russia, was manufactured with the majority of parts coming from Russia, or licensed by Russia. In 2020, this included the majority of Indian tanks, the only aircraft carrier (the INS Vikramaditya, a heavily modified Kiev-class aircraft carrier) with all of its combat aircraft MiG-29s, six frigates, four destroyers and the only nuclear-powered submarine. Additionally, eight out of fourteen Indian Navy submarines belong to the Russian Kilo-class. The Indian Air Force flies Sukhoi Su-30MKIs and Mil Mi-17s, which, respectively, constitute the largest share of the combat aircraft and utility helicopters, in addition to Russian tanker planes. India also just recently purchased the S-400 missile system.

Even though India has begun to reorient itself militarily toward other countries—the U.S., Israel, France and Italy—and has substituted foreign imports by slowly developing its own capabilities, a large number of new Indo-Russian projects are in the conceptual or implementation stages. In December 2021, in the frame of the so-called “2+2 Dialogue” (foreign and defense ministers), India and Russia began a new phase in their militarytechnological cooperation. Incidentally, India has used this very format for furthering cooperation in strategic, security and intelligence issues with four of its key strategic partners: Australia, the U.S., Japan and the newly added Russia. Russia and India agreed upon a further deepening of mutual military relations for ten years (until 2031). What is new is that next to the traditional purchase of Russian weapons systems, many common research projects and the development of new weapons systems—with their production taking place equally in both countries—have been agreed upon. This production includes new frigates, helicopters, submarines, cruise missiles and even Kalashnikovs

The depth of this mutual engagement, and especially India’s dependence, highlights a huge dilemma that might not only have drastic strategic consequences, but also long-lasting regional repercussions. The worldwide sanctions issued against Russia aim at the Russian economy and military. When it comes to the procurement of such crucial components as microchips or airline parts, Russia is soon expected to face shortages, essentially crippling its capacity to repair, construct, or have spare parts available (let alone construct new equipment). Unless other countries, such as China, circumvent international sanctions and step-in, the expected Russian inability to take care of its own military will have a spill-over effect. Russia is unlikely to be able to fulfill its contractual obligations toward India, and the lack of spare parts also has the potential to cripple India’s own military with regards to the Russian weapons equipment. The procurement agreements and common projects are, hence, all in jeopardy and India, now more than ever, depends on Russian goodwill. 

Next to military dependence, there are other concomitant effects in the economic and political sphere that influence Indian voting behavior. The worldwide sanctions have already led to dramatic increases in oil and gas prices, with India relying on imports of up to 80 percent. India will, therefore, have to pay much more for such crucial imports. Military imports from other countries aimed at substituting Russian equipment will also be much more expensive. All of this deals the Indian economy another blow—an economy that has been especially hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. And politically, Indian hegemony in South Asia has been markedly under pressure, in no small part because of the ChinaPakistan axis. In the eyes of India, this axis poses a serious threat to an already highly volatile IndoPakistan relationship. In addition, the IndoChina relationship reached a new low in May 2020 when Chinese infrastructure projects along the Himalayan borderlands led to fighting and the killing of soldiers. In addition, the Chinese claims to the South China Sea are categorically disputed by India. Chinese overtures toward Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and especially Pakistan in the frame of the Road Initiative are also regarded with growing discontent, as India claims that China is following a policy of encircling India.

In its 75th year of independence, India is following a classic realpolitik in trying not to alienate Russia while pledging rhetorical support for Ukraine. The contradictory consequence is that Russia has now offered more discounted oil, gas, and investments, while at the same time, the UK has suggested its military relationship with India could be upgraded—and has offered weapons made in the UK. For the Indian political establishment, India cannot forgo Russian support, militarily or as a producer of cheap oil and gas. Going forward, India’s military will need to protect its national security and project Indian influence and power well beyond its borders.

Arndt Michael is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg (Germany), author of the multi-award-winning book India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), and co-editor of Indien Verstehen (Understanding India, Springer, 2016). His articles have been published in Asian Security, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Harvard Asia Quarterly, India Quarterly and India Review.

World-Watching: Global Energy Tracker

[from the Council on Foreign Relations]

by Benn Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca

The Global Energy Tracker allows you to gauge trends in energy use across the globe through time.

The charts on the tracker page compile data on energy-consumption trends in seventy-nine countries going back to 1990. Each chart shows how much energy a given country consumes from nine different sources.

The charts display each country’s consumption data for each energy source by the amount of exajoules consumed, by exajoules consumed per capita, and as a share of that country’s total energy consumption. (Exajoules are a measure of energy; one exajoule is roughly equivalent to California’s annual electricity use.)

As the legend indicates, five energy sources covered by the trackercoal, oil, natural gas, biofuels, and other (unclassified)—emit high levels of carbon dioxide. Four others—solar, wind, nuclear, and hydroelectric—are low-carbon emitters.

Together, the charts reveal significant trends in global energy usage. They show, for example, that high-carbon energy sources—especially oil—are the world’s dominant source of power. On average, 83 percent of tracker countries’ energy comes from high-carbon sources, and 37 percent specifically from oil.

Low-carbon sources, however, are on the rise, particularly in developed countries. Since 2010, the United States’ low-carbon consumption share climbed from 12 to 16 percent, the United Kingdom’s from 10 to 19 percent, and Germany’s from 14 to 19 percent. China, the world’s largest energy consumer, saw its low-carbon share rise from 9 to 15 percent. Rapid cost declines for low-carbon sources such as wind and solar, beneficiaries of technological innovation, explain much of the change. Still, low-carbon power’s share has actually declined in some rich countries, such as Japan—where it has fallen from 18 to 11 percent.

Some tracker countries rely highly on low-carbon energy. Twenty-five percent of Canada’s energy and 29 percent of Brazil’s, for example, comes from hydroelectric—compared with 9 percent for tracker countries on average. France derives over a third of its energy from nuclear. Other countries remain heavy users of higher-carbon sources. China derives 56 percent of its power from coal—although that figure is down from 70 percent a decade ago.

View the Global Energy Tracker.

Shipping and the World

[from Seatrade Maritime News]

Asyad Dry Dock Expanding Capacity As Demand Grows

Oman shipyard Asyad Dry Dock is expanding its capacity by 20% with a new floating dock as its current facilities are fully utilized.

by Marcus Hand

The shipyard, formerly Oman Drydock Company, is now part of the Asyad Group, the logistics arm of the Oman government. Management of the yard has been combined with shipowner Oman Shipping Company, and overseen by Dr. Irbahim Al Nadhairi, Chief Executive Officer, Shipping & Drydock.

“We have integrated the shipping and drydocking as the shipping service. The companies are still two legal separate entities but then we share the same executive team to be more efficient,” Dr. Ibrahim told Seatrade Maritime News in an interview at Posidonia 2022.

On the shipping side of the business the group owns a fleet of 65 ships with plans to increase the fleet to over 100 vessels over the next five years. He explains that with such a size of fleet the shipowner needed a quality shipyard so it made sense to work together.

Asyad maintains most, if not all its fleet at the shipyard in Oman, accounting for around 15% of its business. While part of the same group Dr. Ibrahim says it does not send its ships to the yard “by default,” and they have to make sure it is competitive as it needs to be for their third-party customers.

Business has been growing for the shipyard and it experienced a spike in the first half of this year as Chinese capacity has been taken out of the market by COVID restrictions pushing work to yards in other parts of the world. “So, we could see there was a big hike in the number of ships, not only for Asyad Dry Dock, but the entire region as well,” Dr. Ibrahim said.

“The next 12 months I believe the ship repair industry will still continue to flourish on our side.”

The shipyard’s two 600,000 DWT drydocks are already operating at full capacity and this year sees it adding a floating dock with the capacity to handle vessels up to Panamax size.

“We’ve recently acquired a floating dock which is of Panamax size and we reckon that about 40% of the business in ship repair is within that Panamax size. The floating dock gives us around 20% extra capacity,” he said. It will increase the number of ships the yard can repair from 200 to around 240.

The floating dock is expected to arrive in Oman in the next six weeks, and following some dredging works be operational by the start of Q4 this year.

Greek owners are major clients of the shipyard and account for around 40% of business, and Dr. Ibrahim said they added two more Greek clients last week. “It seems we have a good reputation in the Greek market and between now and end of Q3 we have 27 ships in orderbook from the Greek market.”

Globally its customer base includes MSC, AP Møller-Mærsk, CMA CGM S.A., Hapag-Lloyd, and Mitsui OSK Lines (株式会社商船三井). Maersk currently has currently two vessels in the yard.

Being able to deliver services efficiently and on time is of critical importance in the financially booming container sector.

“Today when you talk about bringing a container ship into a shipyard time really is money,” Dr. Ibrahim said. If a container ship owner says a ship will be in the yard for 15 days the owner will expect work to be completed in 12 days.

‘Further Action Is Needed’ As MEPC 78 Gets Underway

IMO Secretary General Kitack Lim hailed the 78th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee as an opportunity to be brave and lead by example on decarbonization.

by Gary Howard

MEPC 78 has a packed agenda with the opportunity to consider and progress IMO’s work on cutting greenhouse gas emissions from ships.

At the last MEPC meeting, a revision process was agreed to strengthen the IMO’s initial GHG strategy which was adopted in 2018. A strengthened version of that initial strategy is due in mid-2023 at MEPC 80.

Speaking to Seatrade Maritime News in May, Stamatis Fradelos, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs at ABS said that important influencers in the IMO like the United States, EU, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand are calling for net zero emissions from shipping by 2050 and introducing a level of ambition for 2040.

“Whilst progress has been made on many of the measures set out in the Initial Strategy, I am sure that we can all agree that further action is needed. Your discussions this week will chart the way forward for the decarbonization of international shipping,” said Lim.

“It is therefore of utmost importance that IMO continues to deliver concrete progress in transitioning international shipping from fossil fuels to low and zero-carbon alternatives.”

Member states at MEPC 78 will also consider adoption of guidelines to support short-term measures on GHG emissions, including correction factors for carbon intensity, EEXI calculation methodology and revised SEEMP.

Calculations on the GHG impact of fuels will be discussed, as ISWG-GHG 11 reports progress on developing lifecycle GHG assessment guidelines. Well-to-wake and tank-to-wake calculations are in scope, with the aim of giving fuel users a full picture of the impact of the production and use of the fuels they choose.

“Your constructive discussions on these topics will enhance the Committee’s evidence-based decision making when further considering proposals for mid-term GHG reduction measures,” Lim told Member States.

“I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest appreciation to all Member States, and observer delegations, and especially the Chair of the Working Group on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, Mr. Oftedal of Norway, for the extraordinary effort and dedication in ensuring the successful outcome of both intersessional meetings.”

Houston Begins $1.1Bn Ship Channel Widening

The Port of Houston kicked off its the long-awaited billion dollar dredging scheme, the Houston Ship Channel Widening and Improvement Project 11 last week.

by Michele Labrut

The $1.1bn expansion of the Houston Ship Channel, which has been in planning for more than a decade is finally underway.

After more than a decade of planning, Project 11 will allow the ship channel to accommodate an additional 1,400 vessels per year and could generate up to $134bn more annually in economic impact once completed. The channel currently accommodates about 8,200 vessels and 215,000 barges each year, hauling more than 247m tons of cargo.

“This project will enable Port of Houston to continue to grow and respond effectively to whatever the future demand in the supply chain has to offer,” Port of Houston Executive Director Roger Guenther said in a statement.

Port of Houston is a 40-2 km-long complex of nearly 200 private and public industrial terminals along the 583.6 km-long manmade Houston Ship Channel, which connects the port to the Gulf of Mexico.

Project 11 will widen the Houston Ship Channel by 51.8 m along its 41.8 km Galveston Bay reach, to 213.3 m wide. It will also deepen upstream segments from a current depth of 13.7 m to a depth of 14.7 m. Dredging began last week. The Houston Ship Channel winds from the Gulf of Mexico through shallow Galveston Bay and up through the port.

“This project is important on many levels, including improving the efficiency of our nation’s supply chains, promoting navigational safety, and creating environmental benefits through the innovative use of dredged material,” Michael Conner, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), said in a statement.

Port of Houston and the Army Corps of Engineers signed an agreement in August giving the port permits to start dredging the federal waterway. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. was awarded a $95m contract in October, which also includes oyster mitigation and construction of a bird island. The channel widening and deepening project is scheduled to be completed in 2025.

EU Transport Commissioner Focuses on ‘Solidarity Lanes’ and Sanctions

As the global food crisis deepens and millions of tons of Ukraine’s grain remain blocked in the Black Sea, EU Transport Commissioner Adina-Ioana Vălean has declared that all transport modes will be considered in setting up new Solidarity Lanes that bypass the Black Sea.

by Paul Bartlett

Her comments come as disrupted grain movements risk a global food crisis.

Speaking to journalists immediately prior to yesterday’s opening ceremony at Posidonia, she said that trucks, tracks, trains, transshipment and storage facilities will all contribute to new supply chains to ensure that exports from one of the world’s largest grain exporters can resume, at least in part, as soon as possible.

She said that the setting up of Solidarity Lanes would have important commercial implications for shipping and could even lead to changes in the sector’s business models

Vălean also rejected criticism from prominent Greek shipowners who had claimed earlier in the day that sanctions imposed on Russia in the wake of its invasion on Ukraine won’t work. At a Maritime Leaders Summit staged by Capital Link on Monday, George Prokopiou and Evangelos Marinakis had both said that sanctions against Iran and Venezuela had been shown not to work and similar moves against Russia would not be effective either.

However, other sources pointed to the scale of the sanctions package that has severely impacted the Russian economy by disrupting key revenue generating sectors. Energy exports are the most obvious example and although Russian oil is still easily sold in India and China, for example, it is at deep discounts to global prices.

Meanwhile, LNG exports have also been hit and development of Arctic LNG supply chains have also been severely affected. Within the next few months, Vălean said that Russian oil exports would be further disrupted by the withdrawal of insurance cover on shipping and transport arrangements.

Education and the Historical Swirl: Part II

We concluded Part I on this topic with the following comments which we wish students to incorporate into their educations, irrespective of the major, field or concentration:

The gold standard itself, dominated from London led to intricate problems: Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (published in 1992) by Barry Eichengreen, the leading historian of monetary systems, shows the downstream pitfalls of the gold standard.

In other words, the de facto emergence of Britain/London as the world commercial and policy center and the relation of this emergence to empire and international tensions and rivalries, means it is very problematical for any country to steer a course other than staying in tandem with British moods and ideologies, such as free trade. Any country by itself would find it difficult to have a more independent policy. (Friedrich List of Germany, who died in 1846, wrestles with these difficulties somewhat.) The attempts to find “autonomy and autarky” in the interwar years (Germany, Japan, Italy) led to worse nightmares. The world seems like a “no exit” arena of ideologies and rivalries.

The “crazy dynamics” and the semi-anarchy of the system, which continues to this day and is even worse, means that policy-making is always seen through a “dark windshield.”

History in the globalizing capitalist centuries, the nineteenth and the twentieth, is a kind of turbulent swirl and not a rational “walk.”

Here’s a bizarre but necessary comment on this sense of turbulent and surprising swirl propelling history forwards and backwards and sidewards at the same time:

The historian, Barry Eichengreen (mentioned above), is a distinguished analyst of world monetary systems at U.C. Berkeley and perhaps the leading expert today on the evolution of such systems.

From movies such as Shoah and Last of the Unjust by the great filmmaker Claude Lanzmann, we know that Barry Eichengreen’s mother was Lucille Eichengreen, a Jew born in Hamburg, Germany (1925) and deported to the Łódź Ghetto in Poland during World War II. She survived through many miraculous accidents and contingencies, then wrote about her experiences.

We get a deeper insight into “the way of the world” by seeing that the Holocaust itself has as a backdrop the anarcho-craziness of the world. The Fascists and Nazis were jumping from the “frying pan into the fire” by imagining that world conquest and world-murdering could “stop the world.” They and their favored populations could “get off” and step into a racial dreamworld. They were taking today’s concept of “gated community” and applying it to the “racial community” (Volksgemeinschaft, in German).

This led to the phenomenon depicted in Goya’s famous aquatint: The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters.

The perceived madness of the world and the madness of leaders that this perception leads to have never been analyzed together.

The fact that the behavior of world leaders could be “crazy like a fox” (half-insane, half-opportunistic, or Machiavellian “clever”) is a complicating factor or twist from Mussolini until today.

Japan-Watching: Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s Special Lecture

[from Columbia Business School’s Center on Japanese Economy and Business]

Japan’s Inflation Dynamics and the Role of Monetary Policy (April 22, 2022)

by Haruhiko Kuroda (黒田 東彦), Governor, Bank of Japan (日本銀行)

Education and Seeing the “Swirl” of History

The tempo and rhythm of world events and world history are not captured in the linear and bland books one reads in schools and colleges where the sense of the stormy forward turbulence of the world is not communicated. Here’s an example that does communicate this “crazy dynamics”:

The leading historian, James Joll, in his excellent Europe Since 1870: An International History talks about gold and the gold standard in this way:

“The world supply of gold was diminishing, as the effects of the gold rushes in California and Australia in the 1850s and 1860s passed. This coincided with the decision in the 1870s of many of the leading countries to follow Britain’s example to use gold rather than silver as the basis of their currencyGermany in 1871, France in 1876 for example — so that the demand for gold rose just as the supply was temporarily declining. This in turn led to some doubt about the use of a gold standard and to much discussion about ‘bi-metallism’ and about the possibility of restoring silver to its place as the metal on which the world’s currency should be based, though this movement had more success in the United States than in Europe, where gold has now established itself firmly. By the 1890s however the discovery of new gold deposits in South Africa, Western Australia and Canada put an end to these discussions and uncertainties, as far as currency was concerned, for some fifty years.”

(James Joll, Europe Since 1870: An International History, Penguin Books, 1976, page 35)

These twists and turns and accidents or contingencies don’t communicate the real semi-turmoil surrounding all the decisions, which we can infer from the comment by a German politician in 1871, “We chose gold, not because gold was gold, but because Britain was Britain.” (Ian Patrick Austin, Common Foundations of American and East Asian Modernisation: From Alexander Hamilton to Junichero Koizumi, Select Publishing, 2009, page 99.)

Professor Joll delineates the emergent primacy of England:

“The establishment of London as the most important center in the world for shipping, banking, insurance-broking and buying and selling generally, as well as the growth of British industry, had been based on a policy of free trade.”

(James Joll, Europe Since 1870: An International History, Penguin Books, 1976, page 34)

The gold standard itself, dominated from London led to intricate problems: Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (published in 1992) by Barry Eichengreen, the leading historian of monetary systems, shows the downstream pitfalls of the gold standard.

In other words, the de facto emergence of Britain/London as the world commercial and policy center and the relation of this emergence to empire and international tensions and rivalries, means it is very problematical for any country to steer a course other than staying in tandem with British moods and ideologies, such as free trade. Any country by itself would find it difficult to have a more independent policy. (Friedrich List of Germany, who died in 1846, wrestles with these difficulties somewhat.) The attempts to find “autonomy and autarky” in the interwar years (Germany, Japan, Italy) led to worse nightmares. The world seems like a “no exit” arena of ideologies and rivalries.

The “crazy dynamics” and the semi-anarchy of the system, which continues to this day and is even worse, means that policy-making is always seen through a “dark windshield.”

History in the globalizing capitalist centuries, the nineteenth and the twentieth, is a kind of turbulent swirl and not a rational “walk.”