When I was first introduced to computers, programming languages like COBOL, Fortran, and Pascal were standard. None of them were particularly user-friendly, especially for someone like me who isn’t a natural coder. Over time, new languages and tools appeared, making programming more accessible.
Programmable payments are automated transactions that occur when specific conditions or events are met. Unlike traditional payment methods, which can rely on manual approvals or fixed schedules (think monthly softwaretransactions), programmable payments offer a more dynamic approach. For instance, a programmable payment might only occur when a product is delivered or a service is completed.
Transparency and security are other significant advantages, particularly when programmable payments are powered by blockchain. Each transaction is recorded on a decentralized ledger, providing a clear, auditable trail of activity. This can help reduce the risk of fraud and create a more secure system for managing payments.
As the Internet of Things expands, integrating programmable payments could allow devices to handle payments autonomously. Imagine a car that automatically pays for tolls or parking, or a smart refrigerator that orders and pays for groceries when supplies run low. The possibilities for real-time, automated payments between connected devices are enormous.
Despite all the potential, programmable payments face challenges. The technology—particularly blockchain-based systems—can be complex and requires specialized expertise, which can increase upfront costs for businesses. In addition, the regulatory environment around programmable payments is still evolving, especially for cross-border transactions. This creates uncertainty for businesses.
Both point to a future where systems execute tasks on their own, based on rules set by users. The goal is simple: Once the conditions are established, the system handles the rest.
Programmable payments are reshaping the future of finance. It’s an exciting future that promises smarter and more streamlined and efficient financial operations.
[from the International Monetary Fund, by Patrick A. Imam, Kangni R Kpodar, Djoulassi K. Oloufade, Vigninou Gammadigbe]
This paper delves into the intricate relationship between uncertainty and remittance flows. The prevailing focus has been on tangible risk factors like exchange rate volatility and economic downturn, overshadowing the potential impact of uncertainty on remittance dynamics. Leveraging a new dataset of quarterly remittances combined with uncertainty indicators across 77 developing countries from 1999 Q1 to 2019 Q4, the analysis highlights that uncertainty in remittance-sending countries negatively affects remittance flows. In contrast, uncertainty in remittance receiving-countries has a more complex, dual effect. In countries with high private investment ratios, rising domestic uncertainty leads to a decline in remittances. Conversely, in countries with low public spending on education and health, remittances increase in response to uncertainty, serving as a social safety net. The paper underscores the heterogeneous and non-linear effects of domestic uncertainty on remittance flows.
[from NBK Group’s Economic Research Department, 21 November, 2024]
Kuwait: Solid credit growth in October driven by household credit. Domestic credit increased by a solid 0.4% in October, driving up YTD growth to 2.9% (3.2% y/y). The recovery in household credit continued, with growth in October at a solid 0.5%, resulting in a YTD increase of 2.4%. While y/y growth in household credit remains a limited 2.3%, annualized growth over the past four months is a stronger 4.7%. Businesscredit inched up by 0.2% in October, pushing YTD growth to 3.6% (2.9% y/y). Industry and trade drove businesscredit growth in October while construction and trade are the fastest growing YTD at 17% and 8%, respectively. In contrast, the oil/gas sector continued its downtrend, deepening the YTD decrease to 13%. Excluding the oil/gas sector, growth in business credit would increase to a relatively good 5% YTD. Looking ahead, the last couple of months of the year (especially December) are usually the weakest for businesscredit, likely due to increased repayments and write-offs, but it will not be surprising if the recovery in household credit is generally sustained, especially given the commencement of the interest rate-cutting cycle. Meanwhile, driven by a plunge in the volatile public-institution deposits, resident deposits decreased in October, resulting in YTD growth of 2.4% (4.2% y/y). Private-sectordeposits inched up in October driving up YTD growth to 4.5% compared with 10% for government deposits while public-institution deposits are a big drag (-14%). Within private-sector KD deposits, CASA showed further signs of stabilization as there was no decrease for the third straight month while the YTDdrawdown is a limited 1%.
Chart 1: Kuwait credit growth
(% y/y)
Chart 2: UK inflation
(%)
Egypt: IMF concludes mission for fourth review, sees external risks. The IMF concluded its visit to Egypt after spending close to 2 weeks, holding several in-person meetings with the Egyptian authorities, private sector, and other stakeholders. The IMF released a statement mentioning that the current ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region in addition to an increasing number of refugees have affected the external sector (Suez Canal receipts down by 70%) and put severe pressure on the fiscal front. The Fund acknowledged the Central Bank of Egypt’s commitment to unify the exchange rate, maintain the flexible exchange rate regime, and keep inflation on a firm downward trend over the medium term by substantially tightening monetary policy. It also highlighted that continued policy discipline was also a key to containing fiscal risks, especially those related to the energy sector. The Fund, as always, re-iterated the need for promoting the private sector mainly through an enhanced tax system and accelerating divestment plans of the state firms. Finally, it also said that the discussions would continue over the coming days to finalize the agreement on the remaining policies and reform plans. However, the release did not provide any clear hints about the conclusion on the government’s earlier request to push the timeline of some of the subsidy moves.
Oman: IMF completes article IV with a strong outlook for the economy in 2025. Oman’s economy continued to expand with growth reaching 1.9% in the first half of 2024 (versus 1.2% in 2023), despite being weighed down by OPEC+ mandated oil production cuts as non-oil GDP grew a stronger 3.8% y/y in H1 (versus 1.8% in 2023). The fiscal and current account balances remain in a comfortable situation evident by a decline in public sectordebt and the recent rating upgrade to investment grade. The Fund expects Oman’s economic growth to see a strong rebound in 2025, supported by higher oil production. It also believes that fiscal and current account balances will remain in surplus but at lower levels. Key risks to the outlook stem from oil price volatility and intensifying geopolitical tensions. The IMF also mentioned that further efforts are needed to raise nonhydrocarbon revenues through more tax policy measures and the phasing out of untargeted subsidies which should help in freeing up resources to finance growth under the government’s diversification agenda.
UK: Inflation rises more than forecast, reinforcing BoE’s caution on rate cuts. UKCPIinflation increased to 2.3% y/y in October from 1.7% the previous month, slightly above the market and the Bank of England’s forecast of 2.2%. On a monthly basis too, inflation rose to 0.6%, a seven-month high, from September’s no change. The steep rise was mainly driven by an almost 10% rise in the household energy price cap effective from October. Core inflation also accelerated to 3.3% y/y (0.4% m/m) from 3.2% (0.1% m/m). While goods prices continued to fall (-0.3% y/y), service prices rose at a faster rate of 5% from 4.9%. Recently, the Bank of England had cautioned about inflation quickening next year (projecting a peak rate of 2.8% in Q3 2025), citing the impact of higher insurance contributions and rising minimum wages as outlined in the latest government budget. Therefore, with inflation rising above forecast, the bank will likely slow the pace of monetary easing after delivering two interest rate cuts of 25 bps earlier, with markets now seeing only two additional cuts by the end of 2025.
Eurozone: ECB warns of fiscal and growth risks in its latest Financial Stability Review [archived PDF]. In its most recent Financial Stability Review (November) [archived PDF], the European Central Bank warned that elevated debt and fiscal deficit levels and anemic long-term growth could expose sovereign debt vulnerabilities in the region, stoking concerns of a repeat of the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. Maturing debt being rolled over at much higher borrowing rates raising debt service costs poses risks to countries with little fiscal space and leaves certain governments exposed to market fluctuations. The bank also emphasized the risks of high equity valuations, low liquidity and a greater concentration of exposure among non-banks. Moreover, it sees current geopolitical uncertainties and the possibility of more trade tensions as heightening risks. The Eurozone’s current government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 88%, but the underlying data suggest a much more precarious situation with Greece, Italy, and France’s ratios at 164%, 137% and 112%. Recently, concerns about France’s high fiscal deficit (around 5.9% of GDP) and elevated debt levels saw yields on the country’s bonds rise steeply, widening the spread gap with Germanbonds to the highest level in over a decade.
Disclaimer: While every care has been taken in preparing this publication, National Bank of Kuwait accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential losses arising from its use. Daily Economic Update is distributed on a complimentary and discretionary basis to NBK clients and associates. This report and previous issues can be found in the “News & Insight / Economic Reports” section of the National Bank of Kuwait’s web site. Please visit their web site, nbk.com, for other bank publications.
Among the 369 largest counties, 348 had over-the-year increases in average weekly wages. In the second quarter of 2024, average weekly wages for the nation increased to $1,390, a 4.4-percent increase over the year. Hamilton, IN, had the largest second quarter over-the-year wage gain at 33.4 percent. (See table 1 [archived PDF].)
Large County Average Weekly Wage in Second Quarter 2024
Hamilton, IN, had the largest over-the-year percentage increase in average weekly wages (+33.4 percent). Within Hamilton, an average weekly wage gain of $2,161 (+139.6 percent) in professional and business services made the largest contribution to the county’s increase in average weekly wages.
Essex, MA, had the largest over-the-year percentage decrease in average weekly wages (-2.1 percent). Within Essex, an average weekly wage loss of $644 (-25.7 percent) in professional and business services made the largest contribution to the county’s decrease in average weekly wages.
All of the 10 largest counties had over-the-year percentage increases in average weekly wages. In the second quarter of 2024, King, WA, experienced the largest over-the-year percentage gain in average weekly wages (+10.4 percent). Within King, professional and business services had the largest impact, with an average weekly wage increase of $774 (+24.5 percent).
For More Information
The tables included in this release contain data for the nation and for the 369 U.S. counties with annual average employment levels of 75,000 or more in 2023. June 2024 employment and second quarter 2024 average weekly wages for all states are provided in table 3 [archived PDF] of this release.
Over-the-year changes of employment and wages presented in this news release are adjusted and may differ from unadjusted data used in BLS data tools and interactive charts. More information is available in the QCEWTechnical Note.
The County Employment and Wages full data update for second quarter 2024 is scheduled to be released on Thursday, December 5, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. (ET).
The County Employment and Wages news release for third quarter 2024 is scheduled to be released on Wednesday, February 19, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. (ET).
* 40-year JapaneseGovernment Bonds to be issued in July will be a reopening issue of the May 2024 issue. The auction method is Dutch-style-yield-competitive auction at intervals of 0.5bp.
Kicking off a new CGD series of policy proposals to inform the European Union’s upcoming development agenda, Mikaela Gavas and W. Gyude Moore suggest a reset of the EU’s international relations narrative. Explore their ideas for how the EU can position itself as a global development player while staying true to its values and focusing on the common good.
The same applies to aid flows. The figure below shows data on total aid disbursements from the US depending on who is in power: the solid blue line is Democratic control of the presidency and both branches of Congress, the blue dashed line is Democratic control of the presidency and one or neither branch, the solid red line is Republican control of the presidency and both chambers, and the red dashed line is control of the presidency and one or neither chamber. There’s only one data point for each year, of course, but the lines connect between them. The broad picture strongly suggests the trend matters more than who is in power (indeed, remember the Surprise Party?).
Figure 1: US aid disbursements by party control (Current $m)
The potential good news from this is that despite substantive disagreements over topics including the Mexico City Policy, bipartisan cooperation on aid might still be more possible than it might appear from a close-up perspective in the midst of partisan rancor. To repeat the bad news: much of the recent bipartisan movement on foreign economic policy has been to the detriment of developing countries. And there is certainly some talk of sweeping changes, including cuts, that might mean the past is no guide. But perhaps there still space for elements of a positive agenda around aid for the legislative sessions of next year, one that could appeal to at least some people on both sides of the aisle. Examples might include:
Advancing localization: Spending more US aid finance in recipient countries rather than on US contractors has been a hallmark of Samantha Power’s tenure at USAID. But it has Republican antecedents. The Trump administration followed a localization strategy for PEPFAR that significantly increased the number of local partners and a New Partnerships Initiative at USAID designed in part to do the same. And in 2021, US SenatorsMarco Rubio (R–FL) and Tim Kaine (D–VA) introduced legislation to reduce red tape for local organizations seeking USAID funds. It would be great to see further cooperation on ensuring more development dollars are actually spent in developing countries.
Country focus: All else even somewhat equal, a dollar of foreign assistance simply has a larger impact in poorer countries. The logic that richer countries should be able to look after themselves was a justification for the Trump administration’s “Journey to Self-Reliance”—a philosophy dedicated toward “ending the need for aid.” The Biden administration has continued to produce the “country roadmaps” designed to chart the journey. It would be great to see bipartisan efforts to focus grant resources in particular where they’ll have the greatest impact—in the poorest countries.
Sovereign lending and guarantees: While grants should be focused on poorer countries, loans could be an effective and comparatively low-cost tool to support wealthier countries. The recently passed Ukraineaid package provided resources in the form of partially forgivable loans, and senior Republicans have been pushing the model more widely. More lending and guarantees could be a powerful tool to support infrastructure rollout in middle-income countries. And strengthening the US sovereign loan guarantee program could back development and national security goals at a considerably lower cost than grant-based programs.
MCC reform: The Millennium Challenge Corporation, created during the George W. Bush administration, is running into pipeline challenges—and appropriators have clawed back funding in response. That’s a shame. It is a small but effective aid agency providing resources for development priorities including infrastructure and working with client countries to help them deliver—in fact, it’s a model of successful localization. MCC faces spending challenges in part because it hasn’t increased the size of individual country operations, limits repeat operations, and can only work in countries that pass its “scorecard” of development indicators. The agency wants to address its partner problem by working in richer countries. That’s a sad way to achieve impact and goes against the bipartisan principle that richer developing countries should be weaned off aid flows, not given more. Altering the size of compacts, allowing more repeat compacts, and moving away from a scorecard model towards a model of reward for reform—a specific set of policy changes that need to be completed before funds start flowing—would be a far more effective approach.
Fighting malaria: In the 1958 State of the Union, PresidentEisenhower said that the US would lead a global effort to eradicate malaria. The time and the tools were not right then, but today there is far greater hope for rapid progress against the disease. George Bush created the President’s Malaria Initiative in 2005, and the US has been a vital contributor to the global fight against the parasite since then. With the arrival of new vaccines in the past couple of years, we could accelerate progress and save hundreds of thousands of children’s lives each year. And with better vaccines, we could move even faster. PEPFAR, the US initiative to provide HIV drugs, has transformed the battle against AIDS worldwide. A similar bipartisan initiative could achieve as much with malaria.
Transparency: Both parties have shown commitment to increasing the transparency of aid finance including around subawards and indirect cost rate data. It would be great if there was a bipartisan consensus on simply publishing all aid contracts.
Beyond aid, the African Growth and Opportunity Act was first passed during the Clinton administration, renewed during the Bush administration and then again under the Obama administration. A bipartisan proposal to renew the trade package once more was launched in the Senate in April this year. Perhaps AGOA could be made even bigger and better. Even amidst partisan rancor, there is plenty a Congress and administration could do to improve US relations with and support to low- and middle-income countries next year.
Undoing Gender Inequality Traps in the Financial Sector: The Case of Colombia
by Mayra Buvinic and Alba Loureiro, July 9, 2024 (CGD Blog Post)
Gender data is needed to gauge the extent to which financial services include and benefit women. However, sex-disaggregated data that tracks access to and use of financial services is still hard to come by, and it is especially rare to have country-level data that captures the universe of financial sector providers (FSPs) and is published on a regular basis.
A notable exception is Colombia, where Banca de Oportunidades (BdO), a public sector technical assistance and advocacy platform, compiles in a centralized data platform anonymized data from all FSPs in partnership with Colombia’s Superintendency of Banks. The 2023 edition, the 13th annual publication, reports on 15 million transactions, 60 percent of them monetary, from the universe of banks, credit and savings cooperatives, microfinance institutions, and fintechs. The report tells a sobering story worth highlighting of the trajectory of women’s financial inclusion because it mirrors much of what we know [archived PDF] about the constraints women face having access to financial services in low- and middle-income countries. The report’s numbers [archived PDF] suggest that:
Expanding access is not enough
Despite almost universal access to financial products, gender gaps persist. In 2023, 19 out of every 20 adult Colombians (or 94.6 percent) reported access to at least one financial product or service. However, women faced less favorable conditions (see below), underscoring that mere access is insufficient.
Gender gaps are evident in both savings and credit
In 2023, women had 6.5 and 3.7 percentage points (pp) lower access to savings and credit, respectively, than men. While women’s access to savings increased over time–from 75 percent in 2018 to 90.4 percent in 2023–the gender gap widened (from 4.3 pp to 6.5 pp). In the same period, the gender gap in credit narrowed slightly (from 4.8 pp to 3.7 pp) but both men’s and women’s access to credit decreased–for women from 37.7 percent in 2018 to 33.4 percent in 2023.
Women face access to credit in less favorable conditions than men
Interest rates are higher for women clients across all loan types, and highest for microcredit–with a 5.4 percent gender gap–which women access more than men. In 2023, women accessed 1,029 million and men accessed 857,000 microcredit loans. More men than women accessed commercial loans (20,000 versus 14,000 loans) while housing loans went equally to women and men.
Paradoxically, these less favorable conditions coexist with women exhibiting lower credit risks than men
Women have better repayment rates than men across loan types (Figure 1). Women also perform better across insurance products, except for microinsurance, showing lower accident rates. However, female clients have 13.8 pp lower access to insurance products than men.
Figure 1: Total Repayment Rates, Overdue More Than 30 Days.
The data implies that women’s good financial behavior is penalized rather than prized, with higher interest rates and lower access to financial products
Rationing credit and other financial services to women perpetuates ‘gender inequality traps’ leading to further rationing
It all starts with women having fewer assets to use as collateral and lower earnings than men (a commonplace fact across financial markets everywhere) which leads them to qualify for smaller loans. In turn, this results in women having less access to credit to increase earnings because of the high costs to lenders of serving customers with small loans, resulting in even lower earnings.
Gender biases that affect the supply and demand for credit reinforce this vicious cycle
On the supply side, there are cognitive and perceptual biases (the latter detected by eye-tracking) from financial sector providers–male potential borrowers are ‘ex-ante’ perceived as having higher earnings than similar women. And female bank agents are stricter at evaluating female clients than male clients.
On the demand side, the incorrect assumption that women are higher credit risks than men is reinforced by female clients’ own lower self-confidence and greater self-exclusion from financial services: women do not apply for credit because they anticipate they will be rejected because they have lower earnings.
Not surprisingly perhaps, women in Colombia score lower than men in a financial health indicator–with an average score of 4.9 for women and 5.6 for men measured in a 0 to10 scale (scored by BdO using data from the 2022 edition of the survey).
To overcome these gender inequality traps, only a combination of strategies will work
Solutions must address both demand– and supply-side constraints and include:
Increase women’s self-confidence and combat their self-exclusion from financial services with credit ‘plus’ interventions that include ‘soft skills’ training.
Provide customized products that fit women’s needs, including importantly insurance and microinsurance that respond to women’s greater need for mitigating (family) risks.
Combat supply-side biases that lead to inefficiencies and exclusions, including incentives to financial sector providers to reach women with financial services.
For the above, collect and publish gender data, but data that does not end up sitting on a shelf gathering dust; data that instead is used to make management decisions, which underscores the role of public sector institutions such as BdO in collaborating with and incentivizing financial sector providers, and in measuring, tracking, and reporting progress in financial inclusion.
Fortunately, there is a growing wealth of research that backs up the solutions suggested above. But there is still an important practical research agenda ahead:
First is reaching the poorest and excluded with financial services that they may need. In the case of Colombia, this includes indigenous and Afro-descendent populations in geographically distant regions of the country. This requires building further granularity in the financial inclusion data, following guidelines of intersectionality data in development.
There is substantial research on demand-side constraints in women’s access to financial services. There is comparatively little research on supply-side gender biases and solutions to these biases that can be scaled.
Lastly, there is the task of developing financial health indicators that can be easily and widely used disaggregated by gender and other demographic features to monitor an important development outcome from increasing financial access to all.
Disclaimer
CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.
It’s almost “un-American” to be honest about the nightmare side of life when you cannot “walk on the sunny side of the street” and operate under all those facile Americanisms about “I’ve got the world on a string…” in all the songs and movie lines.
Film noir is supposed to be an antidote to this “false sunniness” and there’s one classic example that exemplifies this undiscussable nightmare side of life, namely, Detour (1945), directed by Edgar Ulmer.
As a refugee/expat, he understood that life isn’t always “a bowl of cherries” and set out to show this in his films.
In this underrated Ulmer masterpiece, Tom Neal plays a musician, Al Roberts, who gets into a labyrinthian mess via bad luck and some mindless impulsiveness combined. Detour is a kind of “road movie” in hell. With life and the world a kind of hellish school, the protagonist Al Roberts captures the enforced money-madness in everything:
“Money. You know what that is, the stuff you never have enough of. Little green things with George Washington’s picture that men slave for, commit crimes for, die for. It’s the stuff that has caused more trouble in the world than anything else we ever invented, simply because there’s too little of it.”
To this nightmarishness, there’s to be added the irrationality of fate or destiny or karma or luck:
“That’s life. Whichever way you turn, Fate sticks out a foot to trip you.”
“But one thing I don’t have to wonder about, I know. Someday a car will stop to pick me up that I never thumbed. Yes. Fate, or some mysterious force, can put the finger on you or me for no good reason at all.”
[as narrator] “Until then I had done things my way, but from then on something stepped in and shunted me off to a different destination than the one I’d picked for myself.”
Vera comments:
“Life’s like a ball game. You gotta take a swing at whatever comes along before you find it’s the ninth inning.”
Hitchhiking, say, is often hellish and not romantic and usually not a Jack KerouacOn the Road poetic or rhapsodic adventure at all, as Al Roberts explains:
“Ever done any hitchhiking? It’s not much fun, believe me. Oh yeah, I know all about how it’s an education, and how you get to meet a lot of people, and all that. But me, from now on I’ll take my education in college, or in PS-62, or I’ll send $1.98 in stamps for ten easy lessons.”
[voiceover] “It wasn’t much of a club, really. You know the kind. A joint where you could have a sandwich and a few drinks and run interference for your girl on the dance floor.”
Ulmer’s Detour is not exactly a “lowlife movie” but rather an undiscussed dark side to life movie, nor is it “stylishly pessimistic” (like the French “poetical pessimism” movies) but rather a truth-telling exercise that shows stability and permanence and happiness as “living” on thin ice. American “cock-eyed optimism” isn’t always appropriate.
In that sense, Detour is a part of remedial education.
“One of our most brilliant evolutionary biologists, Richard Lewontin has also been a leading critic of those—scientists and non-scientists alike—who would misuse the science to which he has contributed so much. In The Triple Helix, Lewontin the scientist and Lewontin the critic come together to provide a concise, accessible account of what his work has taught him about biology and about its relevance to human affairs. In the process, he exposes some of the common and troubling misconceptions that misdirect and stall our understanding of biology and evolution.
The central message of this book is that we will never fully understand living things if we continue to think of genes, organisms, and environments as separate entities, each with its distinct role to play in the history and operation of organic processes. Here Lewontin shows that an organism is a unique consequence of both genes and environment, of both internal and external features. Rejecting the notion that genes determine the organism, which then adapts to the environment, he explains that organisms, influenced in their development by their circumstances, in turn create, modify, and choose the environment in which they live.
The Triple Helix is vintage Lewontin: brilliant, eloquent, passionate and deeply critical. But it is neither a manifesto for a radical new methodology nor a brief for a new theory. It is instead a primer on the complexity of biological processes, a reminder to all of us that living things are never as simple as they may seem.”
Borrow from Lewontin the idea of a “triple helix” and apply it to the ultimate wide-angle view of this process of understanding. The educational triple helix includes and always tries to coordinate:
The student and their life (i.e., every student is first of all a person who is playing the role of a student). Every person is born, lives, and dies.
The student and their field are related to the rest of the campus. (William James: all knowledge is relational.)
The student keeps the triple helix “running” in the back of the mind and tries to create a “notebook of composite sketches” of the world and its workings and oneself and this develops through a life as a kind of portable “homemade” university which stays alive and current and vibrant long after one has forgotten the mean value theorem and the names and sequence for the six wives of Henry VIII).
“Globalization” is here. Signified by an increasingly close economic interconnection that has led to profound political and social change worldwide, the process seems irreversible. In this book, however, Harold James provides a sobering historical perspective, exploring the circumstances in which the globally integrated world of an earlier era broke down under the pressure of unexpected events.
James examines one of the great historical nightmares of the twentieth century: the collapse of globalism in the Great Depression. Analyzing this collapse in terms of three main components of global economics—capital flows, trade and international migration—James argues that it was not simply a consequence of the strains of World War I, but resulted from the interplay of resentments against all these elements of mobility, as well as from the policies and institutions designed to assuage the threats of globalism.
Could it happen again? There are significant parallels today: highly integrated systems are inherently vulnerable to collapse, and world financial markets are vulnerable and unstable.
While James does not foresee another Great Depression, his book provides a cautionary tale in which institutions meant to save the world from the consequences of globalization—think WTO and IMF, in our own time—ended by destroying both prosperity and peace.
PresidentTrump’s speech here at the World Economic Forum went over relatively well. That’s partly because Davos is a conclave of business executives, and they like Trump’s pro-business message. But mostly, the president’s reception was a testament to the fact that he and what he represents are no longer unusual or exceptional. Look around the world and you will see: Trump and Trumpism have become normalized.
Davos was once the place where countries clamored to demonstrate their commitment to opening up their economies and societies. After all, these forces were producing global growth and lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. Every year, a different nation would become the star of the forum, usually with a celebrated finance minister who was seen as the architect of a boom. The United States was the most energetic promoter of these twin ideas of economic openness and political freedom.
Today, Davos feels very different. Despite the fact that, throughout the world, growth remains solid and countries are moving ahead, the tenor of the times has changed. Where globalization was once the main topic, today it is the populist backlash to it. Where once there was a firm conviction about the way of the future, today there is uncertainty and unease.
This is not simply atmospherics and rhetoric. Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley Investment Management points out that since 2008, we have entered a phase of “deglobalization.” Global trade, which rose almost uninterruptedly since the 1970s, has stagnated, while capital flows have fallen. Net migration flows from poor countries to rich ones have also dropped. In 2018, net migration to the United States hit its lowest point in a decade.
It’s important not to exaggerate the backlash to globalization.
As a 2019 report by DHL demonstrates, globalization is still strong and, by some measures, continues to expand. People still want to trade, travel and transact across the world. But in government policy, where economic logic once trumped politics, today it is often the reverse. EconomistNouriel Roubini argues that the cumulative result of all these measures — protecting local industries, subsidizing national champions, restricting immigration — is to sap growth. “It means slower growth, fewer jobs, less efficient economies,” he told me recently. We’ve seen it happen many times in the past, not least in India, which suffered decades of stagnation as a result of protectionist policies, and we will see the impact in years to come.
This phase of deglobalization is being steered from the top. The world’s leading nations are, as always, the agenda-setters. The example of China, which has shielded some of its markets and still grown rapidly, has made a deep impression on much of the world. Probably deeper still is the example of the planet’s greatest champion of liberty and openness, the United States, which now has a president who calls for managed trade, more limited immigration and protectionist measures. At Davos, Trump invited every nation to follow his example. More and more are complying.
Students should sense that while history does not repeat itself, it sometimes rhymes and this is a major danger. It also might imply that coping with climate change will be all the harder because American-led unilateralism everywhere would mean world policy paralysis.
We then notice that one recurrent topic in various movie versions of the E. M. ForsternovelHowards End (1910, set in those years) is the “horrifying” trend where great mansions and stately estates (Howards End and Wickham Place, say, in the novel) are all being demolished and replaced by ugly “flats.”
There must be, one thinks, a direct link between all the massive migrations into London at the time and all the proliferating flats at the “expense” of beautiful and historical villas. (This “demolish” trend is also part of the story of the classic novelA Handful of Dust by Evelyn Waugh, 1934)
We see from this simple example how students should learn to “jump” between books and movies and TVminiseries to get a stronger focus on what’s being depicted on screens and pages and not just “swim along” at the surface level without any “drilling down.”
Education is largely the struggle or habit where students learn to bring pattern and structure out of “chaos,” thus giving narratives some overall shape.
“How is it possible to bring order out of memory? I should like to begin at the beginning, patiently, like a weaver at his loom. I should like to say, ‘This is the place to start; there can be no other.’ ”