money, Meta Intelligence

Japan Inc. Now Sells No Yen to Invest Abroad

Earnings on Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) reached 103% of new FDI in 2022–25. With dividends and retained earnings counted together, Japan Inc. now needs to sell little yen to invest abroad.

[by OKUBO Takuji]

Key takeaways

Foreign affiliates now earn about as much as Japan invests abroad each year. Reinvested earnings, dividends and interest together reached 103% of new outward FDI in 2022–25, against 48% in 1996–2000.
Dividends from foreign affiliates account for a growing share of Japanese corporate profit. We estimate that foreign affiliates contributed 13.4% of Japan Inc.’s earnings in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.
Corporate investment abroad now involves little net yen selling. After dividends and interest paid home, the estimated outflow has been close to zero since 2022, down from about ¥5 trillion a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s.

Japan’s FDI stock now earns 103% of new investment

It is often said that Japan’s ageing population and slow growth give its companies too few investment opportunities at home. A Japanese government report in 2024 included the following passages.

“Japan’s ageing and shrinking population depresses expected demand at home. Expected returns remain higher abroad, so Japanese companies have accelerated outward direct investment” (my translation). — MATSUBAYASHI Yōichi [松林洋一], MOF PRI, chapter 8, p.136.

“Companies invested abroad because they saw no promising investments in Japan; they are unlikely to bring back every return. On a cash-flow basis, the external balance is in deficit and is one factor behind the weak yen” (my translation). — KARAKAMA Daisuke [唐鎌大輔], MOF PRI, chapter 10, pp.178 and 175.

However, my review of recent data shows that while their premise of low growth prospects in Japan is probably still right, the direct investment Japan has accumulated abroad has reached a level where it earns enough to cover Japan’s new investment abroad. This changes the exchange-rate implication even if Japan keeps investing abroad.

As chart 1 shows, earnings on the accumulated investment stock rose from 48% of new outward FDI in 1996–2000 to 103% in 2022–25.

Chart 1

Overseas affiliates pay interest and dividends to their parent companies in Japan. Those dividends have become a sizable part of corporate Japan’s income: we estimate that they made up 13.4% of Japanese corporate profit in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.

When foreign affiliates retain their earnings on their balance sheets, Japan’s balance of payments statistics record them as FDI from Japan, even though no money crosses the border. While the companies receiving FDI dividends and the companies paying for new FDI are not necessarily the same, Japan Inc. as a whole is now financing its FDI almost entirely from the earnings of its overseas affiliates. At the current level of FDI, little new yen needs to be converted into foreign currencies as Japan goes about investing abroad.

In the rest of this report, I explain how foreign direct investment by Japanese companies evolved, and its near-term outlook. This report is the third in a series on the yen repatriation theme that I have published over the past few weeks, following “Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale”, on capital flows through Japan’s national pension funds, and “Mrs Watanabe No More”, on Japanese households’ assets invested abroad.

A strong yen helped drive Japan’s first outward FDI boom

Japan’s outward investment was heavily restricted after WWII, requiring case-by-case permission from the government. Approvals became more and more automatic over the years until outward investment became “free in principle” in 1980. Trade friction with the US-led Japanese carmakers to restrain their exports from 1981, pushing them to build factories abroad. The rapid appreciation of the yen was also a factor. The yen strengthened from ¥242 per dollar before the Plaza Accord in September 1985 to ¥121 by the end of 1987. Japanese producers had to move lower value-added work abroad. The strong yen also gave Japanese financial institutions sizable purchasing power for a while, until the stock and property bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991.

All of these factors contributed to a rapid increase in outward FDI through the 1980s and 1990s (chart 2).

Chart 2

Even after the bubble burst, the strong yen kept pushing manufacturers to move abroad. In 2005, manufacturers accounted for 60% of the FDI stock. As Japanese manufacturers expanded their supply chains abroad, Asia’s share of outward FDI rose from about 12% in FY1986–90 to 19% in FY1995–99, and Asia held 23% of the FDI stock by 2005 (chart 3).

Chart 3

Japan’s outward FDI stock rose to 56% of GDP

The next phase was sustained by a different pressure. With weak growth and low interest rates at home, Japan Inc. kept investing abroad, across a broader range of industries. Between 1995 and 2025, the stock of FDI rose from 9% of Japan’s GDP to 58% (chart 4). In 2025, it is as large as about 38% of the private sector’s domestic fixed capital, on our estimate.

Chart 4

By industry composition and by destination compositions changed over time. Manufacturing’s share of the FDI stock had fallen to 37% by 2025, giving Japan’s FDI more breadth. By destination, we are seeing a revival of FDI toward the United States. It accounted for 34% of the stock in 2025, Europe 29% and Asia 25% (see earlier chart 3).

Thus, after decades of overseas investment, Japan’s FDI stock is now large enough that its earnings are sufficient to finance new investment abroad, at least for now. In the next section, I consider whether this will continue, and in particular whether Japanese companies may bring an even larger share of their overseas earnings back to Japan, given the weak yen, higher borrowing costs in yen and possibly better investment opportunities at home.

The weak yen has slowed offshoring, not reversed it

The real depreciation of the yen over the past 15 years made production in Japan more competitive. There is some evidence that manufacturers are considering bringing production back to Japan. The 2023 manufacturing white paper found more firms shifting production back from China than moving there, and they named the weak yen as one reason. We see some signs of reshoring. Japanese manufacturers’ overseas production ratio rose from 18.0% in FY2011 to 27.2% in FY2023, but it may have started to decline or at least stabilize. The ratio fell to 26.7% in FY2024. A Cabinet Office survey of listed manufacturers puts the ratio at 24.5% in FY2025, and their plan for FY2030 is broadly unchanged at 24.7%. The weak yen seems to have stabilized the wave of offshoring, but I see no firm evidence of a move back onshore yet.

Domestic investment has grown slowly despite the weak yen

There are tentative signs that domestic capital spending is starting to grow again. For three decades it grew at a very low speed. In real terms, private business investment rose only 26% between FY1997 and FY2025, less than 1% a year. In comparison, capital spending grew by about 4% a year on average in the United States. In my view, a weak currency is only one of the factors manufacturers weigh in designing their global production chains. The weak yen makes production in Japan competitive today, but they have also seen the exchange rate swing violently within short periods. Japan also has a shrinking population problem. It started to address it by opening a door to immigration, but the door is only tentatively open. Overall, my view is that the weak yen alone is unlikely to give Japan Inc. sufficient incentive to bring its capital back to Japan and to the yen.

Economic security is bringing some production home

The government is pushing harder than the currency, mostly in the name of economic security, even before the Takaichi government came along. The government currently has a ¥250 trillion domestic investment target for FY2040 and named AI and semiconductors among its 17 strategic fields. Semiconductors are where the money has gone furthest. In November 2024, under the Ishiba government, Japan committed more than ¥10 trillion of public support to AI and semiconductors by FY2030, aiming to draw more than ¥50 trillion of public and private investment over ten years. Japan managed to lure a TSMC plant to Japan, backed by a sizable subsidy. Rapidus, a government-supported Japanese semiconductor maker, has received a sizable subsidy and is building a factory in Hokkaido. Japan’s production of integrated circuits and discrete semiconductors rose from ¥2.7 trillion in 2019 to ¥4.1 trillion in 2025.

Under the name of economic security, the Japanese government is promoting other industries such as batteries, shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals. Defence spending adds to the push. Japan’s defence budget rose from about ¥5 trillion in FY2022 to ¥9.0 trillion in FY2026. Some defence contractors, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, have doubled their defence revenue.

Japan’s industrial-policy record gives reason for caution

The Japanese government and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the key agency behind Japan’s industry policy, may claim some expertise in their industrial policies. Empirical studies in the past paint a poor track record, though. Rapidus, the most ambitious semiconductor project, has had no independent cost-benefit assessment (Negrine et al., 2025). While defence and economic security-driven policies have a different logic, I doubt that these industrial policies will succeed in bringing large-scale manufacturing investment back to Japan so long as macro factors such as Japan’s demography remain unfavourable.

FDI no longer appears to drive yen weakness

The weak yen and non-economic geopolitical factors do point to a halt in Japan’s four-decade offshoring trend, although it is a stabilization, rather than an economy-wide reversal of past offshoring. Japan Inc. will continue to invest more abroad, rather than within its borders. Given the sizable growth in the stock of cumulative FDI, Japan Inc. no longer needs to convert yen into overseas currency to keep investing abroad though. Net of dividends and interest paid home, Japan’s FDI sold about ¥5 trillion of yen a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s; since 2022 the net flow has been close to zero. There is also an interesting development in an effort to allow more share-exchange based M&A for cross-border deals that will further reduce the need for Japanese companies to spend their yen to purchase overseas assets. In my view, Japan Inc.’s FDI is no longer a factor to drive the yen weaker.

References

Negrine, Joseph, Christopher Findlay and Shiro Armstrong (2025), “Chips in Japan: Industrial policy, decline and renewal”, RIETI Discussion Paper 25-E-116.
Porter, Michael E. and Mariko Sakakibara (2004), “Competition in Japan”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1): 27–50.
Ministry of Finance Policy Research Institute, “Structural changes in the Japanese Economy and its capital flow” (2024), chapters 8 and 10.

Stablecoins and Financial Stability

The United States has introduced a new stablecoin regulatory framework, but concerns over the cryptocurrency’s place in the global economy remain.

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s Econ Focus, Fourth Quarter 2025, by Matthew Wells]

Signed into law in July 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act was a huge step forward for the cryptocurrency industry. The bipartisan legislation marked the federal government’s first effort at creating a regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies and signaled that crypto had finally achieved a status and size worthy of the government’s attention.

Stablecoins are digital assets used primarily as currency to buy and sell other cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, on blockchains, which are decentralized electronic ledgers. Traditionally, they are viewed as “private money” that has been pegged one-to-one to a state-issued currency, typically the U.S. dollar, although others have been pegged to the euro, the Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc.

While few people use stablecoins to pay for conventional goods and services, the technology is expanding rapidly. The SWIFT payment system is transitioning to the blockchain, allowing banks to settle transactions with stablecoins, and large companies such as PayPal have developed their own stablecoins. Walmart, Amazon, and several large financial institutions are also exploring their potential.

The GENIUS Act gives banking regulators, including the Federal Reserve, oversight authority over the entities that issue stablecoins. However, the law leaves it to those regulators to decide what rules to create and how to implement them. Further, increases in stablecoin demand may impact other sectors of the economy, such as the Treasury market and the global demand for dollars. All these carry potential implications for the stability of stablecoins, as well as the Fed’s efforts to maintain a safe and secure financial system.

Stablecoin Fundamentals

Customers wanting stablecoins pay money through their bank accounts, credit or debit cards, or other payment systems to an entity issuing them. With those stablecoins in hand, users can make purchases or investments wherever they are accepted. When users want to “cash in,” they take whatever stablecoins they have, which could have increased or decreased in number, back to an issuer, where they collect dollars back at a one-to-one rate.

Two of the most popular stablecoins in the crypto space are Tether and USD Coin. Unlike dollars, which are fiat currency (that is, their value is derived from the government’s declaration of their value), they and other stablecoins are backed or collateralized by a range of assets (or reserves), especially cash or U.S. Treasurys. In theory, these reserves can be easily liquidated to pay any customer seeking to redeem stablecoins for dollars.

The GENIUS Act addresses these dollar-pegged and reserve–collateralized stablecoins specifically, but there are other types of stablecoins that fall outside of the act’s definition. Crypto–collateralized stablecoins, for example, are still pegged to a currency but are backed by other digital assets such as Ethereum, making them less stable because of the greater volatility of their reserves. Another example includes algorithmic stablecoins, which attempt to maintain a consistent dollar-pegged value through automated adjustments in value relative to other digital currencies.

Stablecoins are used primarily as an immediate and secure medium of exchange for blockchain-based transactions, particularly the buying and selling of other cryptocurrencies. Unlike traditional payment systems, which can take days to fully settle transactions, stablecoin transactions are settled at any time of day on the blockchain almost instantaneously through “smart contracts,” where the terms of the transaction are written into the code.

Beyond their speed on the blockchain, another benefit of stablecoins is their global reach. They can be used anywhere in the world, including areas where dollars are difficult to acquire. Coupled with the ease with which a user can move stablecoins in and out of crypto markets, their use can reduce the costs and frictions associated with remittances or other international transactions. For individuals in developing countries with persistently high inflation, stablecoins may also be a way to save money that is insulated from swings in the domestic currency.

In a February 2025 speech [archived PDF], Fed Gov. Christopher Waller similarly noted that for some users, stablecoins might also serve as a store of value. Relative to the other, more volatile crypto assets, stablecoins are low risk, “which allows traders to move out of risky positions into safe ones where the safe asset price is known and stable,” he argued. Most stablecoin transactions — more than 80 percent — occur outside of the United States.

To date, these benefits of speed and availability have mostly been enjoyed by individuals active in the cryptocurrency marketplace rather than the average consumer. According to the Fed’s most recent Diary of Consumer Payment Choice [archived PDF], only 3 percent of respondents said they used cryptocurrency as a form of payment in the last month. However, the annual transaction value of stablecoins exceeded $27 trillion in 2024, surpassing that of Visa and Mastercard combined. Further, stablecoins’ current market capitalization is about $267 billion, and Citigroup projects it will grow to between $1.9 trillion and $4 trillion by 2030. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent made a similar claim in November, suggesting it could reach $3 trillion in the coming years. Motivated by that growth, and its potential implications for the economy, Congress passed the GENIUS Act.

A New Regulatory Framework

The GENIUS Act grants banks, nonbanks, and even nonfinancial institutions with approval from state or federal regulators the ability to issue stablecoins to the public. Under the act, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulates federally qualified issuers with over $10 billion in stablecoins in circulation. If the issuer is a subsidiary of an insured depository institution, such as a bank, it is regulated by the appropriate federal banking agency. All issuers with less than $10 billion in circulation would be regulated at the state level. Regulators would be responsible for conducting annual audit and ensuring compliance with existing anti-money laundering and sanctions requirements.

Crucially, issuers would be required to hold at least one dollar’s worth of reserves for every stablecoin issued. Those reserves mostly come in the form of cash, insured and uninsured deposits, short-term Treasurys, repo agreements, and central bank reserve deposits. However, these issuers would be exempt from the regulatory capital requirements that currently apply to banks, and this holds true even if the issuers are banks engaged in regular banking activities.

Stablecoins are not defined as securities or commodities under the legislation, meaning they are not federally insured and do not have the same protections as traditional bank deposits. In other words, there is no government-backed guarantee a user would be able to get cash back when they want to trade back in their stablecoins. Issuers, as of now, also do not have access to the Fed’s lending facilities.

Proponents of stablecoins argue that government insurance and access to the Fed are not necessary because the assets designated as collateral by the GENIUS Act are highly liquid, and issuers are required to hold as many dollars in reserve as they have stablecoins in circulation. While this would seemingly guarantee stablecoin holders could redeem their coins for cash whenever they choose without any difficulty, not all policymakers or observers agree it would be that easy.

In an October 2025 speech [archived PDF], Fed Gov. Michael Barr argued that “Because stablecoins are not backed by deposit insurance and stablecoin issuers do not have access to central bank liquidity, the quality and liquidity of their reserve assets is critical to their long-run viability.”

He identified several points of vulnerability in those assets. In addition to the potential for some consumers to mistakenly assume all stablecoins — not just those covered by the GENIUS Act — carry the same level of stability, he pointed out that other dollar-pegged assets have not always been able to maintain that one-to-one value. Money market mutual funds, which are listed as one class of asset that can be used as collateral, “broke the buck” in 2008 following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and experienced strains again in March 2020 at the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Uninsured deposits, another acceptable reserve asset, were also a risk factor that precipitated the March 2023 banking stress associated with the failure of Silicon Valley Bank and others. The legislation also allows for any medium of exchange authorized by a foreign government to be used as collateral via repo agreements, which until recently in the case of El Salvador included the highly volatile bitcoin.

In an October 2025 speech, Fed Gov. Michael Barr argued that “Because stablecoins are not backed by deposit insurance and stablecoin issuers do not have access to central bank liquidity, the quality and liquidity of their reserve assets is critical to their long-run viability.”

The GENIUS Act prohibits issuers from paying out interest to individuals holding their stablecoins. If stablecoins paid interest, they would have to be treated — and regulated — like securities rather than simply forms of payment. The legislation does, however, allow stablecoin exchanges, known as Virtual Asset Service Providers, to offer “rewards” to users who choose to buy and sell cryptocurrencies or conduct other transactions on their platforms. This creates a potential loophole, as these exchanges, if authorized by regulators, can also be part of the same entity issuing a stablecoin. The platform/issuer can then use the dollars traded for the stablecoins to purchase other assets, likely Treasurys to back the stablecoins, and then pay out rewards to customers with the proceeds from those investments.

Barr noted this area of concern, suggesting issuers “have a high incentive to maximize the return on their reserve assets by extending the risk spectrum as far out as possible. Stretching the boundaries of permissible reserve assets can increase profits in good times but risks a crack in confidence during inevitable bouts of market stress.” To hedge against this possibility, stablecoin issuers are required to publish monthly reports on the composition of their reserve assets, a move intended to give stablecoin holders increased confidence in the issuer’s liquidity.

Parallels to the Free Banking Era

Barr’s argument implies that stablecoins are only as stable as the assets backing them. The United States first established a banking system with a national currency backed by Treasury bonds during the Civil War. Prior to that, in the free banking era from 1836 to 1863, states conducted banking supervision and regulation, and banks issued their own currencies. (See “When Banking Was ‘Free,’” [archived PDF] Econ Focus, First Quarter 2018.) Those paper notes had to be collateralized through state and federal government bonds, and capital and reserve requirements were inconsistent across states.

This meant the country’s economy operated with competing, private currencies. It was difficult for currencies in one part of the country to be redeemed in other parts, and it was often done at a discount; for example, the farther away from the bank issuing the note, the steeper the redemption discount. It wasn’t unusual for citizens to question the collateral backing the various banks’ notes, leading to regular bank runs and failures.

One can draw parallels between the free banking period and today’s stablecoin landscape. First, as of early June, there were 233 stablecoins available on the crypto market. Numerous digital service platforms market themselves as spaces where private companies can create, manage, and distribute their own stablecoins. Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo are considering the idea of a jointly issued stablecoin, as well as their own individual ones.

As was the problem with free banking, some economists question whether consumers will always maintain confidence that they can redeem stablecoins for cash on demand at the promised one-to-one rate. The large banks may be able to issue coins that no one will doubt, but the stablecoin marketplace includes platforms and issuers that are not banks at all, as well as international operators outside the jurisdiction of U.S. financial regulators.

“Smaller companies planning to issue stablecoins under the GENIUS Act to be regulated by one of the states may face market resistance,” says Michael Bordo, an economist at Rutgers University. “Unless there is perfect information about the backing and complete confidence in it, holders may want to discount the stablecoins or avoid them completely, as was the case under free banking in the United States.”

Yale University economist Gary Gorton expresses similar concerns, particularly due to the difficulty in regulating a transnational market. “Let’s suppose that one of the exchanges out there collapses because of fraud. Now everybody’s a little suspicious of these exchanges, and many aren’t even based in the United States,” he says. “That’s the kind of thing that would cause everybody to run.”

Should one stablecoin issuer experience a run where customers doubt its ability to pay back dollars on demand, it is possible others would too, especially if they are all backed by similar assets. This could lead to a crisis that extends beyond the stablecoin space and impacts the wider financial system. In a recent paper co-authored with Jeffery Zhang of the University of Michigan Law School, Gorton argued this outcome is consistent with the nature of short-term debt. Stablecoins are a form of that debt, and because of the laws of supply and demand, their values should fluctuate as the values of the assets backing them fluctuate.

“If one issuer gets in trouble and its stablecoin holders all run on it and ask for cash, it can sell Treasurys and give them the cash,” says Gorton. “But in a systemic event, 500 issuers are under siege and they all sell their Treasurys, and the price of Treasurys goes way down.”

Gorton and Zhang argued such a failure is in keeping with the pattern of systemic crises over the past 200 years, and the solution is not to outlaw stablecoins but to provide a safer alternative where “no one should have an incentive to produce information about the backing for the money (i.e., the banks’ assets); and everyone should know that no one has an incentive to produce that information.” In other words, a stablecoin that is truly stable is one that is accepted at par, anywhere and at any time, no questions asked. Gorton says that a digital currency issued by a central bank would meet these criteria.

Should one stablecoin issuer experience a run where customers doubt its ability to pay back dollars on demand, it is possible others would too, especially if they are all backed by similar assets. This could lead to a crisis that extends beyond the stablecoin space and impacts the wider financial system.

The Road Ahead

Skeptics and supporters alike agree that stablecoin adoption is likely to increase in the coming years. An important question, however, is whether it will attract new users looking for a new form of payment. Certainly, stablecoins offer the advantage of instant transactions, and merchants might have incentive to adopt them to replace credit cards, which currently assess transaction fees between 1.5 percent and 3.5 percent for each purchase. (See “Should Credit Card Fees Be Regulated?” [archived PDF]) However, it may be possible to achieve the benefits of quicker settlements and lower fees with existing payment rails, such as FedNow, raising the possibility that internal U.S. demand may be limited.

In a recent speech [archived PDF], Fed Gov. Stephen Miran acknowledged that stablecoins’ future growth may lie outside the United States. “Because GENIUS Act payment stablecoins do not offer yield and are not backed by federal deposit insurance, I see little prospect of funds broadly fleeing the domestic banking system,” he said. “The real opportunity in stablecoins is to satiate untapped foreign appetite for dollar assets from savers in jurisdictions where dollar access is limited.”

This increased global demand for stablecoins could precipitate increased demand for U.S. Treasurys. Stefan Jacewitz, an economist at the Kansas City Fed, suggested in a recent report that there is still a way to go for any increased adoption of stablecoins to make a meaningful difference in the economy. Circle, the largest U.S.-based stablecoin issuer, currently holds 43 percent of its assets in Treasurys. If all other issuers held that same percentage in Treasurys, it would amount to about $125 billion, which is less than 2 percent of the $6 trillion in outstanding Treasurys.

However, if the projections of increased adoption materialize, Jacewitz acknowledged the possibility that “it could lead to a substantial redistribution of funds” and potentially increase demand for Treasurys such that the increase in stablecoin issuers’ Treasury holdings could outpace the decrease in bank holdings. A 1 percent decrease in bank Treasury holdings — and an accompanying 1 percent decrease in bank lending — translates to a $325 billion reduction in loans into the economy, Jacewitz estimated.

The American Bankers Association and other banking organizations point to this potential for deposits to leave the banking system in calling for regulators to limit the ability of stablecoin issuers and platforms to pay out rewards. The crypto industry disagrees, arguing that banks fear competition, and banks could incentivize their depositors to stay by raising their deposit rate, something they did when they first competed with money market mutual funds.

While there is widespread agreement on the potential for stablecoins to serve an important function for cross-border transactions, concerns about their soundness and stability remain, and they are not just theoretical. Circle held $3.3 billion of its approximately $40 billion in reserves at Silicon Valley Bank when it collapsed in 2023, and its inability to access those reserves triggered a fall in the value of its USD Coin from the one-to-one ratio to below 87 cents on the dollar. In that case, the federal government stepped in and made whole all of Silicon Valley Bank’s depositors, including Circle, which restored its dollar peg.

Bordo argues that in the wake of the free banking era, it still took years of costly bank failures to get to the point where policymakers acted upon the realization that stability in the banking system required much more government intervention, supervision, and regulation than had existed. He notes, “There are always new entities that are going to figure out a way to be outside the regulatory net,” and stablecoins will not be any different.

As with any new financial innovation, the Fed will continue to study stablecoins to ensure that their benefits can be enjoyed by those who want to use them while maintaining overall financial and banking stability.

Readings

Gorton, Gary, and Jeffery Zhang. “Why Financial Crises Recur.” [archived PDF] University of Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 24-069, June 25, 2025.

Jacewitz, Stefan. “Stablecoins Could Increase Treasury Demand, but Only by Reducing Demand for Other Assets.” [archived PDF] Economic Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Aug. 8, 2025.

Spira, Jack, and David Wessel. “What Are Stablecoins, and How Are They Regulated?” [archived PDF] Brookings Commentary, Oct. 24, 2025.

“Stablecoins 2030: Web3 to Wall Street.” [archived PDF] Citi Institute, September 2025.

Download this article [archived PDF].

Related Webinar

PaymentsJournal is offering a webinar entitled “Stablecoins and the Reinvention of Remittance” on Tuesday, May 12, 2026 1:00-2:00 PM EDT.

RSVP for their webinar.

Poly-Awareness, Checks & Commercial History

In an era moving towards electronic payment systems and replacing physical currency, it can be educational to look back at checks and how we arrived here. As Winston Churchill observed, “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.”

In looking at history, it is just as important to study commercial practices as well as government leaders and military conquests.

…In the ten years following 1850, the world production of gold was ten times greater than in the ten preceding years. As is well known, the French had always preferred metal currency, and welcomed the gold with a special enthusiasm; the state struck an impressive quantity of coins, striking five hundred million in 1845, for the world’s gold found its way more readily to France where it fetched the highest price. The circulation of gold increased in other European countries also, and the banks of issue, in particular, filed their vaults. In this gold rush the English were more cautious after their long acquaintance with problems of values, and the upheaval in the gold market brought hardly any changes in the prices of the metal there. It is true England also minted new coins, but took advantage of it chiefly to establish her banking system more firmly. The influx of gold, which was exclusively Australian, had at first little effect on the prices of goods, but it developed credit with a paper currency. The minting of this money increased England’s metallic circulation by almost fifty percent, but the use of the banknote and especially of the cheque increased by a far higher proportion. The use of the cheque became so widespread in England that shopkeepers and farmers adopted it as the only possible way of doing business although it was almost unknown on the continent. Cheques were often used for amounts of less than two pounds. Even if he had an income of only fifty pounds a year, the Englishman immediately opened a bank account. In 1885, payments in metal currency represented only one per cent of the London Bank payments and six per cent of those in Manchester.

The Act of 1826 granted complete freedom of issue, except in an area of twenty-six miles around London, where the privilege of the Bank was absolute. There was a good deal of argument about the exact meaning of this privilege; for example the question arose as to whether provincial banks could open an office in London, the main centre of business, without losing their rights of issue.

When it was ruled that they could not, many banks nevertheless settled in London and forfeited their privilege of printing. Only the Scottish banks put up a firmer resistance to this extension of the privileges of the Bank of England. On the other hand, the right of issue was losing much of its significance, since the remarkable development of payment by cheque meant that there was less resort to the note. Settlements between the great deposit banks were made neither in metal nor in notes, but were transacted in the accounts of a clearing house, which dealt with transactions amounting to several hundreds of thousands of pounds every year.

The London and Westminster Bank, one of the most important of the English private deposit banks, soon became a model for every bank in Europe, for it had a reserve capital of less than three million pounds, and held approximately twenty-two million in deposits. Such influential private banks, established as joint stock companies, had to resort to the Bank of England only rarely, so the latter did not need to be unduly anxious about its insignificant gold reserves which were barely one-third of those held by the Banque de France. The privilege of issuing paper money, a relic of the royal right of minting money, was therefore bypassed to all intents and purposes by the gradual improvement of English banking procedure. At the same time the Bank of England enjoyed a monopoly of issue which it was in process of acquiring without the intervention of the state, since the development of banking led all the provincial banks to settle in London, near the clearing house. It was a masterpiece of liberalism to coordinate the free activity of the English economy in the capital without any pressure from the political power. In this way financial centralization was achieved purely by private initiative once the need for it had become apparent.

French banking evolved on very different lines. In order to meet the credit crisis, the provisional government had recommended the establishment of departmental banks and of trade credit societies when it was reforming the Banque de France. Most of these establishments, whose capital was to be provided partly by the state and the departments, were stillborn, while others lingered on for a month or two before wasting away. On the other hand, the Comptoir d’Escompte de la Seine became a private concern, and flourished under the name of the Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris. The Banque du Département du Nord, which became the Crédit du Nord, was equally fortunate, as were several trade banks, particularly that of the Entrepreneurs de Travaux Publics. The unusual feature about the composition of the Comptoir National d’Escompte was that the Council of State had allowed it to set up as a joint stock company. Within a few years the Crédit Mobilier, the Crédit Industriel et Commercial, the Société Générale, the Société des Dépôtes et Comptes Courants, and other companies were established to benefit from this new way of accumulating capital.

Not all these new banks were as prudent as their English counterparts by any means and this point is worth dwelling on. After 1848 the Banque de France had the monopoly of issuing notes for the whole of France, because the local issuing banks created by Napoleon I and Louis-Philippe had been absorbed by the Banque de France, whose notes were the only ones in circulation. It was the state which had made this decision and had settled the problem of monetary unity by authoritarian measures. A few bankers, under the Second Empire, protested against the right of monopoly exercised by the Banque de France, which had been imposed on the whole of the country by the state. Very little use was made of payment by cheque, and compensation was meagre. The wide circulation of metal currency was a sign of a restricted paper currency, but this meant that credit was scarce and was based entirely on the Banque de France. The latter, taking no risks, consequently piled up in its coffers considerable reserves of precious metals, proud of the fact that it could now maintain a steady discount rate more easily than England. It also gained great satisfaction from being the gold-controller of Europe. Whenever a sudden drastic rise in the English bank rate sent businessmen, and even the Bank of England itself, as we have seen, hastening to Paris in search of precious metals, it was to the Banque de France that they turned. Although it was attacked by those who accused it of stifling credit, on the other hand it was defended by those who found its caution reassuring. It was a difference of opinion which further enlivened the quarrel between the Pereires and the Rothschilds.

As we know, Jewish bankers played a vital part in the building of the railways. Pereire, a railway enthusiast, and Rothschild, the largest holder of free capital in France, had at first been prepared to undertake the great task in complete agreement. Rothschild, content with holding the Nord and the English connections, was one of the directors whose word carried most weight in the Banque de France, while the Pereire brothers, their heads still full of Saint-Simonist projects, were interested in vast plans covering Austria, Spain and the Mediterranean. They financed the great development of the economy of the south although even so they were obliged to open a credit institution, the well-known Crédit Mobilier. But because they could not use it for the issue of paper notes, and had tied up the funds entrusted to them too quickly, the Pereires embarked on a struggle to deprive the Bank of its privilege of issue. They believed that the mere right of minting money would enable them to possess the wide credit necessary for the bold financial policy on which they were launching out. It so happened that when Savoy was annexed to France, the Banque de Chambéry brought its banknotes and its privileges within French frontiers. The Pereires and their friends seized the shares of this bank and tried to turn its notes into rivals of those of the central bank. The Banque de France then asserted its rights, Chambéry lost its rights of issue, and soon afterwards the Crédit Mobilier went into liquidation.

This incident occasioned a great quarrel between theorists for or against privilege; it was above all a demonstration of the solidity of the rights the Bank had acquired, while no-one doubted the right of the state to confirm its privileges any longer. This situation was all the more paradoxical since the state was in the hands of Napoleon III who was a firm supporter of the Pereires and the Crédit Mobilier. The underlying cause of this paradox lay in French scepticism about cheques, for the development of bank money lagged more than half a century behind England. It was to be chiefly the work of Henri Germain, founder of the Crédit Lyonnais. His patron of 1863 was mainly anxious to attract large deposits by guaranteeing them against theft and fire so that he insisted on the effective help the Bank could give industrialists and merchants by insuring their cash service itself. By making wise use of these deposits and by a cautious policy, the Crédit Lyonnais was able to open branches in Paris and Marseilles, so that it was soon as powerful as the Crédit Industriel et Commercial and then outstripped it. It even surpassed the Comptoir d’Escompte, and soon the Crédit Lyonnais became the leading French deposit bank. From 1860 it was the major bank to introduce cheques.

But there is little reason for surprise in the difficulties encountered by the cheque between 1860 and 1870.

The Banque de France was regarded as the most reliable of all issuing authorities, and French specie reserves as the most powerful stock of gold in the world; between notes and gold as the two methods of payment, there was very little room for the cheque. It is difficult to believe that France’s reserves could not have kept the deposit banks generously supplied, perhaps as much as, and even more than, the English reserves. But it kept a good part of its cash-balance in gold, which held up the full development of French credit institutions until the closing years of the nineteenth century.

In England there was security and in France hesitation, but in Germany there was an irresistible wave of enthusiasm which led to the rapid growth of credit institutions from 1840. There were a great many note-issuing banks in the Germany of the confederation, because each prince had his own currency. Hamburg had one of the soundest banks of issue, whose marc banco was esteemed throughout Europe and served as a standard for the whole of Germany. Nuremberg still had its old seventeenth-century bank and its florin, while a large number of private establishments were also manufacturing notes with a restricted circulation. In this scheme of things the Bank of Prussia held a pre-eminent position which was strengthened by the place Prussia had assumed in the Zollverein, but it still could not contest the superiority of Hamburg. In short, the legal position of the German banks was similar to that of the English, in that there was plurality of issue.

Bank money, and banknotes, increased in competition with each other, and the future of the four great and famous banks which were to dominate the destiny of capitalist Germany after 1880 had already begun to take shape.

The Dresner Bank was connected with the progress of the iron industry in the Rhineland, and particularly of Essen and Krupps. The Deutsche Bank operated in the countries of central Europe. The Darmstädter Bank and the Disconto Gesellschaft carved out a place for themselves; indeed bills on the latter increased from six to forty million marks between 1855 and 1862.
Charles Morazé, The Triumph of the Middle Classes: A Political and Social History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Anchor Books, 1968, pages 291-297.

Notice that in the discussion above, events are never monocausal. They are always part of a swirling tornado of change. If you become accustomed to this, the way the world works and the way the world changes will become more accessible to you.

For example, “The use of the cheque became so widespread in England that shopkeepers and farmers adopted it as the only possible way of doing business although it was almost unknown on the continent. Cheques were often used for amounts of less than two pounds.”

Also notice, “…soon the Crédit Lyonnais became the leading French deposit bank. From 1860 it was the major bank to introduce cheques.”

This is an example of poly-awareness, the core of meta-intelligence.

[Max Weber, in his book General Economic History, points out that the words “cheque” and “exchequer” derive from the same root.]

World-Watching: Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee — Copom

272nd Meeting – July 29-30, 2025

[from the Central Bank of Brazil, 5 August, 2025]

Update of the economic outlook and the Copom’s scenario¹
1. The global environment is more adverse and uncertain due to the economic policy and economic outlook in the United States, mainly regarding its trade and fiscal policies and their effects.
2. Therefore, the behavior and the volatility of different asset classes have been impacted, altering global financial conditions. This scenario requires particular caution from emerging market economies amid heightened geopolitical tensions.
3. Regarding the domestic scenario, the set of indicators on economic activity has shown some moderation in growth, as expected, but the labor market is still showing strength.
4. In recent releases, headline inflation and measures of underlying inflation remained above the inflation target. Inflation expectations for 2025 and 2026 collected by the Focus survey remained above the inflation target and stand at 5.1% and 4.4%, respectively.
Scenarios and risk analysis
1. The inflation outlook remains challenging in several dimensions. Copom assessed the international scenario, economic activity, aggregate demand, inflation expectations, and current inflation. Copom then discussed inflation projections and expectations before deliberating on the current decision and future communication.
2. The global environment is more adverse and uncertain. If, on the one hand, the approval of certain trade agreements, along with recent inflation and economic activity data from the U.S., could suggest a reduction in global uncertainty, on the other hand, the U.S. fiscal policy—and, particularly for Brazil, the U.S. trade policy—make the outlook more uncertain and adverse. The increase of trade tariffs by the U.S. to Brazil has significant sectoral impacts and still uncertain aggregate effects that depend on the unfolding of the next steps in the negotiations and the perception of risk inherent to this process. The Committee is closely monitoring the potential impacts on the real economy and financial assets. The prevailing assessment within the Committee is the increased global outlook uncertainty, and, therefore, Copom should maintain a cautious stance. As usual, the Committee will focus on the transmission mechanisms from the external environment to the domestic inflation dynamics and their impact on the outlook.
3. The domestic economic activity outlook has indicated a certain moderation in growth, while also presenting mixed data across sectors and indicators.
4. Overall, some moderation in growth is observed, supporting the scenario outlined by the Committee. This moderation, necessary for the widening of the output gap and the convergence of inflation to the target, is aligned with a contractionary monetary policy. Monthly sectoral surveys and more timely consumption data support a gradual slowdown in growth.
5. At turning points in the economic cycle, it is natural to observe mixed signals from economic indicators—some leading, others lagging—as well as from comparisons between markets, such as the credit and labor markets.
6. The credit market, which is more sensitive to financial conditions, has shown clearer moderation. A decline in non-earmarked credit granting and an increase in interest and delinquency rates have been observed. Moreover, regarding household credit, there has been an increase in the household debt–service ratio and a deepening of the negative credit flow—that is, households repaying more debt than taking on. It was emphasized during the discussion that some recent measures, such as private payroll-deducted loans, have had less impact than many market participants expected. Given the implementation agenda in this credit line, as well as the effects of introducing and removing taxes on other credit modalities, the Committee believes it should closely monitor upcoming credit data releases.
7. In contrast to the credit market, the labor market remains dynamic. Both from the perspective of income—with real gains consistently above productivity—and employment—with a significant decrease in the unemployment rate to historically low levels—the labor market has greatly supported consumption and income.
8. Thus, the Committee assesses that the signals from demand and economic activity so far suggest that the scenario is unfolding as expected and is consistent with the current monetary policy. The Committee reiterates that the aggregate demand slowdown is an essential element of supply–demand rebalancing in the economy and convergence of inflation to the target.
9. Fiscal policy has a short-term impact, mainly through stimulating aggregate demand, and a more structural dimension, which has the potential to affect perceptions of debt sustainability and influence the term premium in the yield curve. A fiscal policy that acts counter-cyclically and contributes to reducing the risk premium favors the convergence of inflation to the target. Copom reinforced its view that the slowdown in structural reform efforts and fiscal discipline, the increase in earmarked credit, and uncertainties over the public debt stabilization have the potential to raise the economy’s neutral interest rate, with deleterious impacts on the power of monetary policy and, consequently, on the cost of disinflation in terms of activity. The Committee remained firmly convinced that policies must be predictable, credible, and countercyclical. In particular, the Committee’s discussion once again highlighted the need for harmonious fiscal and monetary policy.
10. Inflation expectations, as measured by different instruments and obtained from various groups of agents, remained above the inflation target at all horizons, maintaining the adverse inflation outlook. For shorter-term horizons, following the release of the most recent data, there has been a decline in inflation expectations. For longer-term horizons, conversely, there has been no significant change in inflation expectations between Copom meetings, even though measures of breakeven inflation extracted from financial assets have declined. The Committee reaffirmed and renewed its commitment to re-anchoring expectations and to conducting a monetary policy that supports such a movement.
11. De-anchored inflation expectations is a factor of discomfort shared by all Committee members and must be tamed. Copom highlighted that environments with de-anchored expectations increase the disinflation cost in terms of activity. The scenario of inflation convergence to the target becomes more challenging with de-anchored expectations for longer horizons. When discussing this topic, the main conclusion obtained and shared by all members of Copom was that, in an environment of de-anchored expectations—as currently is the case—greater monetary restriction is required for a longer period than would be otherwise appropriate.
12. The inflation scenario has continued to show downside surprises in recent periods compared with analysts’ forecasts, but inflation has remained above the target Industrial goods inflation, which has already been showing weaker wholesale price pressures, continued to ease in the more recent period. Food prices also displayed slightly weaker-than-expected dynamics. Finally, services inflation, which has greater inertia, remains above the level required to meet the inflation target, in a context of a positive output gap. Beyond the changes in items, or even short-term oscillations, the core inflation measures have remained above the value consistent with the target achievement for months, corroborating the interpretation that inflation is pressured by demand and requires a contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.
13. Copom then addressed the projections. In the reference scenario, the interest rate path is extracted from the Focus survey, and the exchange rate starts at USD/BRL 5.55² and evolves according to the purchasing power parity (PPP). The Committee assumes that oil prices follow approximately the futures market curve for the following six months and then start increasing 2% per year onwards. Moreover, the energy tariff flag is assumed to be “green” in December of the years 2025 and 2026.
14. In the reference scenario, four-quarter inflation projections for 2025 and for 2026 are 4.9% and 3.6%, respectively (Table 1). For the relevant horizon for monetary policy—2027 Q1—the inflation projection based on the reference scenario extracted from the Focus survey remained at 3.4%, above the inflation target.
15. Regarding the balance of risks, it was assessed that the scenario of greater uncertainty continues to present higher-than-usual upside and downside inflation risks to the inflation outlook. Copom assessed that, among the upside risks for the inflation outlook and inflation expectations, it should be emphasized (i) a more prolonged period of de-anchoring of inflation expectations; (ii) a stronger-than-expected resilience of services inflation due to a more positive output gap; and (iii) a conjunction of internal and external economic policies with a stronger-than-expected inflationary impact, for example, through a persistently more depreciated currency. Among the downside risks, it should be noted (i) a greater-than-projected deceleration of domestic economic activity, impacting the inflation scenario; (ii) a steeper global slowdown stemming from the trade shock and the scenario of heightened uncertainty; and (iii) a reduction in commodity prices with disinflationary effects.
16. Prospectively, the Committee will continue monitoring the pace of economic activity, which is a fundamental driver of inflation, particularly services inflation; the exchange rate pass-through to inflation, after a process of increased exchange rate volatility; and inflation expectations, which remain de-anchored and are drivers of future inflation behavior. It was emphasized that inflationary vectors remain adverse, such as the economic activity resilience and labor market pressures, de-anchored inflation expectations, and high inflation projections. This scenario prescribes a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target.
Discussion of the conduct of monetary policy
1. Copom then discussed the conduct of monetary policy, considering the set of projections evaluated, as well as the balance of risks for prospective inflation.
2. Following a swift and firm interest rate hike cycle, the Committee anticipates, as its monetary policy strategy, continuity of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to observe the effects of the cycle already implemented. It was emphasized that, once the appropriate interest rate is determined, it should remain at a significantly contractionary level for a very prolonged period due to de-anchored expectations. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to proceed with the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.
Monetary policy decision
1. The Committee has been closely monitoring with particular attention the announcements regarding the imposition by the U.S. of trade tariffs on Brazil, reinforcing its cautious stance in a scenario of heightened uncertainty. Moreover, it continues to monitor how the developments on the fiscal side impact monetary policy and financial assets. The current scenario continues to be marked by de-anchored inflation expectations, high inflation projections, resilience on economic activity, and labor market pressures. Ensuring the convergence of inflation to the target in an environment with de-anchored expectations requires a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.
2. Copom decided to maintain the Selic rate at 15.00% p.a., and judges that this decision is consistent with the strategy for inflation convergence to a level around its target throughout the relevant horizon for monetary policy. Without compromising its fundamental objective of ensuring price stability, this decision also implies smoothing economic fluctuations and fostering full employment.
3. The current scenario, marked by heightened uncertainty, requires a cautious stance in monetary policy. If the expected scenario materializes, the Committee foresees a continuation of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to examine its yet-to-be-seen cumulative impacts, and then evaluate whether the current interest rate level, assuming it stable for a very prolonged period, will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to resume the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.
4. The following members of the Committee voted for this decision: Gabriel Muricca Galípolo (Governor), Ailton de Aquino Santos, Diogo Abry Guillen, Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan, Izabela Moreira Correa, Nilton José Schneider David, Paulo Picchetti, Renato Dias de Brito Gomes, and Rodrigo Alves Teixeira.

Table 1

Inflation projections in the reference scenario
Year-over-year IPCA change (%)

Price Index	2025	2026	2027 Q1
IPCA	4.9	3.6	3.4
IPCA market prices	5.1	3.5	3.3
IPCA administered prices	4.4	4.0	3.9

Footnotes

1 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this update considers changes since the June Copom meeting (271^st meeting).

² It corresponds to the rounded value of the average exchange rate observed over the ten working days ending on the last day of the week prior to the Copom meeting, according to the procedure adopted since the 258^th meeting.

Meeting information

Date: July 29-30 2025
Place: BCB Headquarters’ meeting rooms on the 8^th floor (7/29 and 7/30 on the morning) and 20^th floor (7/30 on the afternoon) – Brasilia – DF – Brazil
Starting and ending times:
July 29: 10:07 AM – 11:37 AM; 2:17 PM – 5:51 PM
July 30: 10:10 AM – 11:13 AM; 2:37PM – 6:34 PM

In attendance:

Members of the Copom
Gabriel Muricca Galípolo – Governor
Ailton de Aquino Santos
Diogo Abry Guillen
Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan
Izabela Moreira Correa
Nilton José Schneider David
Paulo Picchetti
Renato Dias de Brito Gomes
Rodrigo Alves Teixeira

Department Heads in charge of technical presentations (attending on July 29 and on the morning of July 30)
André de Oliveira Amante	Open Market Operations Department
Euler Pereira Gonçalves de Mello	Research Department (also attending on the afternoon of 7/30)
Fábio Martins Trajano de Arruda	Department of Banking Operations and Payments System
Luís Guilherme Siciliano Pontes	International Reserves Department
Marcelo Antonio Thomaz de Aragão	Department of International Affairs
Ricardo Sabbadini	Department of Economics

Other participants (attending on July 29 and on the morning of July 30)
Alexandre de Carvalho	Office of Economic Advisor
André Maurício Trindade da Rocha	Head of the Financial System Monitoring Department
Angelo Jose Mont Alverne Duarte	Head of Office of the Deputy Governor for Licensing and Resolution (attending on the mornings of 7/29 and 7/30)
Arnaldo José Giongo Galvão	Press Office Advisor
Cristiano de Oliveira Lopes Cozer	General Counsel
Edson Broxado de França Teixeira	Head of Office of the Deputy Governor for Supervision
Eduardo José Araújo Lima	Head of Office of the Deputy Governor for Economic Policy
Fernando Alberto G. Sampaio C. Rocha	Head of the Department of Statistics
Isabela Ribeiro Damaso Maia	Head of the Sustainability and International Portfolio Investors Unit (attending on the mornings of 7/29 and 7/30)
Julio Cesar Costa Pinto	Head of Office of the Governor
Laura Soledad Cutruffo Comparini	Deputy Head of the Department of Economics
Leonardo Martins Nogueira	Head of Office of the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy
Marcos Ribeiro de Castro	Deputy Head of the Research Department
Mardilson Fernandes Queiroz	Head of the Financial System Regulation Department
Olavo Lins Romano Pereira	Deputy Head of the Department of International Affairs
Renata Modesto Barreto	Deputy Head of the Department of Banking Operations and Payments System
Ricardo da Costa Martinelli	Deputy Head of the International Reserves Department
Ricardo Eyer Harris	Head of Office of the Deputy Governor for Regulation
Ricardo Franco Moura	Head of the Prudential and Foreign Exchange Regulation Department
Rogerio Antonio Lucca	Executive Secretary
Simone Miranda Burello	Advisor in the Office of the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy

The members of Copom analyzed the recent performance and prospects for the Brazilian and international economies, under the monetary policy framework, whose objective is to comply with the inflation targets established by the National Monetary Council. This document represents Copom’s best effort to provide an English version of its policy meeting minutes. In case of inconsistency, the Portuguese version prevails.

Economics-Watching: Earmarking in Programmable Payments

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta]

by Chris Colson, payments expert, Atlanta Fed Payments Forum

As programmable payments become more common, an old-school budgeting idea is making a comeback: earmarking. At its core, earmarking just means setting money aside for a specific purpose—like rent, payroll, or taxes—so it’s only used for that. It’s a simple concept, but when combined with automation, it could be the budgeting upgrade many people and businesses have been waiting for.

The word “earmark” dates to the 15th century, when farmers would notch their animals’ ears to show ownership. Over time, it came to mean setting something aside for a specific use. In personal finance, this idea lives on in the envelope system, where people divide up cash into labeled envelopes—groceries, bills, savings—and stick to those limits. It works, but let’s face it: handling cash envelopes isn’t exactly practical in a digital-first world.

That’s where programmable payments come in. These are payments that happen automatically based on rules you set. Instead of stuffing envelopes, you set up digital “buckets” for your money. Maybe 20 percent of every gig work payment goes straight to a tax account or your weekly paycheck splits into rent, groceries, and savings buckets automatically.

Through banking apps, digital wallets, or budgeting platforms, consumers choose or create spending categories and assign rules—like percentages, spending limits, or triggers. For example, you can link your checking account to a programmable wallet that auto-transfers money into savings or investments accounts on payday, or prevents spending on dining once you hit your monthly cap.

It’s like having a personal money assistant organizing your finances, paying your bills, and keeping you on budget without you having to think about it. For businesses, this brings new efficiency to managing payroll, vendor payments, and escrow accounts.

The timing couldn’t be better. Many Americans struggle financially. According to the Federal Reserve’s 2024 Survey of Household Economics and Decision-making (SHED), nearly 37 percent of adults wouldn’t be able to cover a $400 emergency without borrowing or selling something. Earmarking can help build emergency savings before the money gets spent elsewhere.

There’s also a big gap when it comes to retirement readiness. The Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) found that just over half of families have any kind of retirement account, and many people say they’re not on track with long-term savings. Automated payments into earmarked savings buckets can help make regular saving less of a hassle and more of a habit.

Even our spending habits show why this works. The Fed’s 2025 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice shows people still prefer cash for small purchases. Programmable payments bring that discipline into the digital world without the need for physical cash.

The upside of earmarking with programmable payments is clear: automation takes the work out of budgeting, real-time visibility helps track your money, and flexible rules let you customize how it all works. It’s also useful in more regulated settings like distributing aid or managing shared accounts because it adds accountability.

But if the rules are too rigid or confusing, that can frustrate users. Businesses may need to integrate programmable features with legacy systems, which takes time and money. And over reliance on automation poses risks—glitches, errors, or outdated settings can cause missed payments or unintended consequences.

Still, earmarking with programmable payments is a smart, modern take on a tried-and-true budgeting technique. It may not be right for every situation—and some apps already do this behind the scenes—but used intentionally, it can bring clarity, control, and purpose to the way money flows. In a complex financial world, that’s something both individuals and experts can benefit from.

Economics-Watching: BRICS Currency Creates Dilemma for the Dollar

by Christopher Whalen, from China Daily

The term “BRICS currency” typically refers to a hypothetical or proposed unified currency for the BRICS grouping. It’s not a single, physical currency currently in use, but rather a concept for a potential future monetary system that some suggest will reduce the dominance of the U.S. dollar in international trade and finance.

Is BRICS currency cooperation about immediate de-dollarization or long-term financial sovereignty? The answer is that BRICS cooperation may include reducing long-term dependence on the dollar as a means of exchange. The dollar is involved in more than half of all trade and 80 percent of all foreign exchange transactions. BRICS currency cooperation aims to gradually reduce the group’s dollar dependency, but challenges remain.

The BRICS concept came about not because the dollar is unsuitable as a means of exchange or unit of account, but rather because of the use of the dollar by Washington as a weapon. As I note in my book, Inflated: Money, Debt and the American Dream, the special role of the dollar in U.S. finance allows the U.S. government to impose harsh compliance and reporting requirements on foreign nationals and institutions. The U.S. is an arbitrary hegemon and does not follow reciprocity with other countries.

The global role of the dollar is an anomaly, the byproduct of two world wars had left the other antagonists broke by the time the Bretton Woods Agreement was signed in July 1944.

Choosing the fiat paper dollar as the default global reserve currency more than seven decades ago reflected the fact that the United States was one of the victors and possessed the wealth that gave Washington unchallenged economic leadership. Prior to World War I, the United Kingdom’s pound sterling was the global standard, but importantly, this paper currency was backed by gold — the only money that is not debt. The dollar, too, was backed by gold — until 1933, when the Franklin Roosevelt administration confiscated gold in private hands to prevent his government from collapsing.

Pound notes started to circulate in England in 1694, shortly after the establishment of the Bank of England. The paper pound helped to fuel the expansion of the British Empire, in large part because the only competing form of money was physical gold. When Britain and other nations left the gold standard in the 1930s, it was due to the deflation caused by the Great Depression rather than a deliberate choice.

The 19th-century rule attributed to English journalist and businessman Walter Bagehot says that in times of crisis, lend freely at a high rate against good collateral. Yet since the currency devaluation and gold seizures of 1933, fiat currencies and below-market interest rates have been the rule. In a global scheme in which the government occupies the prime position, the operative term remains “financial repression”, whereby governments control markets and artificially suppress rates of return on debt. For this reason, the dollar is losing its role as a store of value to gold.

The fact that the dollar continues to trade strongly versus other currencies reflects the reality that as the main means of exchange globally, the dollar cannot be easily replaced. One reason for this continued support for the dollar is that the trade in petroleum and other commodities is so large that it requires an equally large currency to accommodate it. Also, neither the Europeans nor the Japanese, the only two possible alternatives, are willing to risk the external deficits or inflation that the U.S. suffers as the host for the global currency.

What global currency will replace the fiat paper dollar? None. As this article is being written, gold is the second-largest reserve asset for central banks after the dollar. “The initiation in 2002 of the Shanghai Gold Exchange was of great strategic significance, both for gold and the global monetary system,” notes veteran gold fund manager Henry Smyth in an interview in The Institutional Risk Analyst. “Now it is completely clear what happened.”

Smyth and many other observers see the creation of the SGE in 2002 as the return of gold to the international monetary system. But while gold is growing in importance as a reserve asset for many countries, it does not mean that the role of the dollar as a global means of exchange or unit of account is about to change.

The dollar will remain the dominant asset. And even then, displacing the dollar will require a major change in the international monetary system, a change that is already underway.

The author is the chairman of Whalen Global Advisors LLC in New York and the author of Inflated: Money, Debt and the American Dream published by Wiley Global (2025).

Movies as a Part of Remedial Education

It’s almost “un-American” to be honest about the nightmare side of life when you cannot “walk on the sunny side of the street” and operate under all those facile Americanisms about “I’ve got the world on a string…” in all the songs and movie lines.

Film noir is supposed to be an antidote to this “false sunniness” and there’s one classic example that exemplifies this undiscussable nightmare side of life, namely, Detour (1945), directed by Edgar Ulmer.

Edgar Georg Ulmer was a Jewish–Moravian, Austrian–American film director who mainly worked on Hollywood B movies and other low-budget productions, eventually earning the epithet “The King of PRC,” due to his extremely prolific output on the said Poverty Row studio.
Wikipedia

As a refugee/expat, he understood that life isn’t always “a bowl of cherries” and set out to show this in his films.

In this underrated Ulmer masterpiece, Tom Neal plays a musician, Al Roberts, who gets into a labyrinthian mess via bad luck and some mindless impulsiveness combined. Detour is a kind of “road movie” in hell. With life and the world a kind of hellish school, the protagonist Al Roberts captures the enforced money-madness in everything:

“Money. You know what that is, the stuff you never have enough of. Little green things with George Washington’s picture that men slave for, commit crimes for, die for. It’s the stuff that has caused more trouble in the world than anything else we ever invented, simply because there’s too little of it.”

To this nightmarishness, there’s to be added the irrationality of fate or destiny or karma or luck:

“That’s life. Whichever way you turn, Fate sticks out a foot to trip you.”
— Al Roberts, Detour

He adds:

“But one thing I don’t have to wonder about, I know. Someday a car will stop to pick me up that I never thumbed. Yes. Fate, or some mysterious force, can put the finger on you or me for no good reason at all.”

[as narrator] “Until then I had done things my way, but from then on something stepped in and shunted me off to a different destination than the one I’d picked for myself.”

Vera comments:

“Life’s like a ball game. You gotta take a swing at whatever comes along before you find it’s the ninth inning.”

Hitchhiking, say, is often hellish and not romantic and usually not a Jack Kerouac On the Road poetic or rhapsodic adventure at all, as Al Roberts explains:

“Ever done any hitchhiking? It’s not much fun, believe me. Oh yeah, I know all about how it’s an education, and how you get to meet a lot of people, and all that. But me, from now on I’ll take my education in college, or in PS-62, or I’ll send $1.98 in stamps for ten easy lessons.”

Nightclubs too are not always heavenly escapes:

[voiceover] “It wasn’t much of a club, really. You know the kind. A joint where you could have a sandwich and a few drinks and run interference for your girl on the dance floor.”
— Al Roberts, Detour

Women might not be the salvation you were told to expect in songs like “Some Enchanted Evening” from South Pacific.

“Vera was just as rotten in the morning as she’d been the night before.”
— Al Roberts, Detour

There’s a genre of American films called “lowlife stories” such as The Hustler with Paul Newman.

Ulmer’s Detour is not exactly a “lowlife movie” but rather an undiscussed dark side to life movie, nor is it “stylishly pessimistic” (like the French “poetical pessimism” movies) but rather a truth-telling exercise that shows stability and permanence and happiness as “living” on thin ice. American “cock-eyed optimism” isn’t always appropriate.

In that sense, Detour is a part of remedial education.

Countries and Deep Patternings: China

China’s High-Level Equilibrium Trap as a Concept

The Pattern of the Chinese Past
Mark Elvin
Paperback: 348 pages
Publisher: Stanford University Press; 1st edition (June 1, 1973)

The 1973 classic work in Sinology, Mark Elvin’s The Pattern of the Chinese Past gives the student an “exemplum” in the kind of scholarship that might be called “pattern-seeking.” Without such attempts, all of history becomes formless and shapeless and an endless parade of “routs and rallies,” and “crimes and follies and misfortunes” (in Edward Gibbon’s catchphrase).

Professor Elvin renders Chinese history through an economic perspective instead of using the common dynastic classification by attempting to answer three questions:

What contributed to the continuity of the Chinese empire?
Why was the Chinese economy the most advanced in the world from the Song dynasty (960-1279) up until the latter half of the Qing dynasty (mid-1800s)?
Why did China fail to maintain her technological advantage after the mid-fourteenth century while advancing economically?

In the first section of the book, the author elucidates the staying power of the Chinese empire was due to the following factors. The economics of defense in relation to the size of empire and the power of its neighbors never became an extreme burden that it rendered the state impotent for any consecutively long period of time. It was always able to reformulate itself after a short disunity or rule by a foreign power of the whole, which only happened twice within a two thousand year period (Mongol and Manchu rule). Two other factors that contributed to the continuity of the Chinese state include a relatively isolated existence from the rest of the Eurasian landmass and the important placed on cultural unity, beginning with the first emperor’s destruction of local records in order to quell local loyalties (pp. 21-22). Both of these factors had been built up over time through a revolution in communication and transportation.

The second section of the book analyses the causes of the economic revolution that occurred between the 8^th and 12^th centuries and the technological growth that accompanied it. The transformation of agriculture, especially in the south, was the major impetus that fueled the economic growth of this period. This revolution in agriculture had four aspects.

The preparation of soil became more effective as a result of improved or new tools and the extensive use of manure and lime as fertilizer.
Seed improvements allowed for double cropping.
Improvements in hydraulic techniques and irrigation networks.
Specialization in crops other than basic food grains (p.118).

Improvements in transportation and communications were almost as important as agriculture in growing the economy. Water transport saw big gains and led to the golden age of geographic studies and cartography, with envoys traveling as far away as Africa. Money and credit matured during this time helping to expand the economy. Paper money made its first appearance in 1024. Improvements in science, medicine, and technology also occurred during this period. However, despite all these advancements, “this period was the climax and also the end of many preceding centuries of scientific and technical progress” (p. 179). Although the Chinese economy continued to advance from the 14^th century on, albeit on a smaller scale, it was not accompanied by improvements in technology.

The last section deals with this phenomenon, describing the distinctive characteristics of this late traditional period (1300-1800), and then proceeding to point out why technological advancements did not keep pace with the growth in the economy. This period sees a rise of small market towns in the sixteenth century and a decline in contact with the non-Chinese world around the middle of the fifteenth century. Also, by the eighteenth century serfdom disappeared, aiding population growth, which had reached 400 million by the mid-1800s. Elvin interestingly points out that the highly sophisticated metaphysics that evaded Chinese intellectual thought during the Ming and Qing dynasties negated any deep scientific inquiry (p. 233). In the attempt to explain the lack of technological advancement, Elvin disputes a number of conventional explanations. Contrary to popular belief, there was enough capital during this period to finance simple technological advances, also there was minimal political obstacles to economic growth.

In short, Elvin believes “that in late traditional China economic forces developed in such a way as to make profitable invention more and more difficult. With falling surplus in agriculture, and so falling per capita income and per capita demand, with cheapening labor but increasingly expensive resources and capital, with farming and transport technologies so good that no simple improvements could be made, rational strategy for peasants and merchants alike tended in the direction not so much of labor-saving machinery as of economizing on resources and fixed capital. Huge but nearly static markets created no bottlenecks in the production system that might have prompted creativity” (p. 314). This condition is what he terms as a “high-level equilibrium trap.” The term “trap” to describe the condition of late imperial China’s technological advancement in relation to the economy is similar to Escape from Predicament, Thomas Metzger’s analysis of the “predicament” that confronted Chinese intellectual thought from the Song through to the end of the Qing dynasty. Both explanations have at their core the idea of late imperial China not being able to generate real sustainable progress internally, stating that it was the Chinese response to the Western threat in the mid to late 1800s that finally brought the needed change.

Education via Strands of Great Books

Booth Tarkington’s novel The Magnificent Ambersons is very informative and educational precisely because it weaves together, in a “braid of insightfulness,” the various truths and phenomena of a life which have to be “taken together” to form a “cluster of understanding,” which is a pillar of what we are attempting to teach.

Life as a Social Status Olympics. The Death Scene of Major Amberson

“And now Major Amberson was engaged in the profoundest thinking of his life.
And he realized that everything which had worried him or delighted him during this lifetime, all his buying and building and trading and banking, that it was all trifling and waste beside what concerned him now.
For the Major knew now that he had to plan how to enter an unknown country where he was not even sure of being recognized as an Amberson.”
(The Magnificent Ambersons, Booth Tarkington, Orson Welles’s 1942 film narration)

Time and Place. The World of 1873, the Financial Crisis and the Vicissitudes and the Tempo of Life

“The magnificence of the Ambersons began in 1873. Their splendor lasted throughout all the years that saw their Midland town spread and darken into a city. In that town in those days, all the women who wore silk or velvet knew all the other women who wore silk or velvet and everybody knew everybody else’s family horse and carriage. The only public conveyance was the streetcar. A lady could whistle to it from an upstairs window, and the car would halt at once, and wait for her, while she shut the window, put on her hat and coat, went downstairs, found an umbrella, told the ‘girl’ what to have for dinner and came forth from the house. Too slow for us nowadays, because the faster we’re carried, the less time we have to spare.”
(The Magnificent Ambersons, Booth Tarkington, Orson Welles’s 1942 film narration)

Fickleness of Life and Its Ephemeral Nature

[Uncle Jack to George:] “Life and money both behave like loose quicksilver in a nest of cracks. When they’re gone, you can’t tell where—or what the devil we did with ’em.”
(The Magnificent Ambersons, Booth Tarkington, Doubleday, Page, 1918, page 435)

Entrepreneurial Psychology

[Uncle Jack:] “Twenty years have passed–but have they? … My Lord! Old times starting all over again! My Lord!”
[Eugene:] “Old times? Not a bit! There aren’t any old times. When times are gone, they’re not old, they’re dead! There aren’t any times but new times!”
(The Magnificent Ambersons, Booth Tarkington, Doubleday, Page, 1918, page 97-98)

The task is to “amalgamate” the points in great books into a sort of unified “braid.” That’s deep education. Booth Tarkington’s 1918 novel, The Magnificent Ambersons, is very informative and educational precisely because it weaves together, in a “braid of insightfulness,” the various truths and phenomena of a life which have to be “taken together” to form a “cluster of understanding,” a pillar of what we are attempting to teach.

Lombard Street as an Educational Gateway to Finance

Lombard Street [Project Gutenberg ebook] from 1873, by Walter Bagehot (editor of the Economist of London) is the best overview of the modern emergent financial system. If the student then reads Charles Kindleberger’s contemporary Manias, Panics and Crashes he or she will have a background or “pedagogic overview” for finance.

About the Author

Walter Bagehot is one of the most celebrated finance writers ever. One of the most lucid and discerning critics of his time, Bagehot was the editor of the highly regarded Economist. Widely acknowledged as an expert on banking and finance, he was frequently consulted by Parliament.

A General View of Lombard Street.
How Lombard Street Came to Exist, and Why it Assumed Its Present Form.
The Position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Money Market.
The Mode in Which the Value of Money is Settled in Lombard Street.
Why Lombard Street is Often Very Dull, and Sometimes Extremely Excited.
A More Exact Account of the Mode in Which the Bank of England has Discharged Its Duty of Retaining a Good Bank Reserve, and of Administering it Effectually.
The Government of the Bank of England.
The Joint Stock Banks.
The Private Banks.
The Bill-Brokers.
The Principles Which Should Regulate the Amount of the Banking Reserve to be Kept by the Bank of England.
Conclusion.
Appendices.