financial system, Meta Intelligence

Facing the Global South: Building a New International System by Yang Ping

“If you raise [the development of the BRI] to the strategic level, there are countries where … you will have to lose money and there are countries where you will be free to make money.”

by Thomas des Garets Geddes, Sinification

Dear Everyone,

How to respond to the growing political divide between China and the West marked by partial decoupling, security alliances, and the risk of sanctions, amongst other things, continues to be a major topic of discussion among China’s intellectual elite. As already evidenced in previous editions of this newsletter, opinions vary considerably. Those presented here so far have ranged from Da Wei (达巍) stressing the importance of preserving if not strengthening ties with the West and Shen Wei (沈伟) arguing in favor of reforming the WTO and building up a network of free trade agreements to Ye Hailin (叶海林) emphasizing the need for China to demonstrate its military might to demobilize U.S. allies and Lu Feng (路风) calling for self-reliance and greater assertiveness in the field of tech. A certain amount of overlap certainly exists among these perspectives but the differences are nonetheless striking.

Today’s edition of Sinification looks at a speech made last month by Yang Ping (杨平), head and editor-in-chief of the highly regarded Beijing Cultural Review (文化纵横, hereafter BCR). Yang is also director of the Longway Foundation (修远基金会) which publishes BCR. The foundation describes its publication as “the most influential magazine of intellectual thought and commentary in China” and sees itself as having a key role in helping shape the direction of intellectual debates in China (“议题的设置就是意识形态斗争成功的一半”). Indeed, BCR often republishes old articles at key junctures as so often highlighted by David Ownby’s wonderful Reading the China Dream.

The following are excerpts from an edited transcript of a speech by Yang made at an event hosted by Renmin University’s Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, which was attended by China’s Vice-minister of foreign affairs Xie Feng (谢锋). In his speech, Yang advocates building a new international system led by countries in the Global South (which, of course, includes China) rather than the West. His ideas are not particularly novel but are nevertheless noteworthy in that they represent yet another viewpoint in the ongoing debate over how China should respond to the increasing tensions that characterize its relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Next week, I will be sharing a somewhat longer piece that proposes a way of protecting China from the growing threat of Western sanctions.

Yang’s speech in a nutshell:

“Capitalist politics” are no longer in line with “capitalist economics.” The former now undermines globalization, while the latter supports it.
Sanctions, export controls, friend-shoring and alliance-building are damaging the world economy and further alienating China from the current U.S.-led international order.
China must respond to this growing trend by building a “new type of international system” with other countries in the Global South.
BRI projects should be increasingly focused on achieving this goal and thus allow more room for loss-making endeavors.

Capitalist politics ≠ Capitalist economics

“Since 2022 and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, our main focus and topic of discussion has been China’s construction of a new type of international system.

“The most important feature of today’s world is the beginning of a separation between capitalist politics and capitalist economics. The capitalist political order and the capitalist economic order do not support each other [any longer].

“We have witnessed two typical manifestations of the separation of politics and the economy and the impact of politics on the economy:

The first is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the West have reached unthinkable, abominable [令人发指] and unimaginable proportions. Under established international rules, it was understood that such sanctions could not possibly occur, but now they have. These include the fracturing of the financial system, the expropriation and seizure of Russian private assets and the freezing of Russian foreign exchange reserves. These are all abominable and unimaginable forms of confrontation. At the same time, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has led to serious disruptions in global food and energy systems and supply chains, with massive food ‘shortages’ and soaring food prices, particularly in developing countries. Sanctions and political repression [政治打压] have severely disrupted the [world’s] economic order.

The second is the conflict between the U.S. and China. Since the Trump era, the U.S. has been engaged in a trade war against China, mainly by raising tariffs. Basically, this was simply about balancing trade [with China] and used mainly economic means. But under Biden, it [has become] a war that mixes politics with economics. Biden’s strategy towards China can basically be summed up in just a few words: one, friend-shoring, [i.e.] only allowing friendly countries into [parts of] its supply chains; two, alliance politics, [i.e.] continuously forging an alliance system involving NATO, the European Union, Japan, AUKUS and the four Asia-Pacific countries [I assume he is referring to South Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia taking part for the first time in a NATO summit last year] and constantly opposing China [不断应对中国]; three, its so-called ‘precision strikes’, [i.e.] its radical crackdown on China’s high tech [industry], especially our chip industry.”

China is being pushed out of the U.S.-led international system

“The information I have seen so far is that the number of Chinese companies included in the U.S.’s ‘entity list’ has risen from 132 under Trump to over 530 now. The scope of such point-to-point [点对点] precision strikes is constantly expanding. With such a political impact on the economy, we can feel the [world’s] economic order being disrupted across the board. The world is moving inexorably in the direction of decoupling. The phenomenon of politics affecting the economy and the capitalist political order no longer upholding the capitalist economic order are extremely striking.

“In such a context, the challenges now facing China are extremely serious and varied. We have the pressures of dealing both with containment in the Indo-Pacific and with the U.S.-led politics of alliances across the world. More importantly and fundamentally China faces the strategic task of building a new type of international system [新型国际体系] … The existing Western-dominated international system used to be one in which we tried hard to blend [so as] to become one with it. During this process, we [sought to] absorb the West’s advanced technologies and management [practices] and thus complete our mission of industriali s ation and modernization.

“But once you enter the existing international system, he [who is already inside] does not want to play with you, and even wants to drive you back out. He wants to divide both supply chains and the economic system into two parts [搞成两套] and desperately wants to contain and suppress you. This is not something that can be determined by your own subjective preferences. He has made up his mind: you have already become his ‘fated opponent’ [命定的对手]. He has to suppress you and drive you out of the existing system.”

Building a new international system with the Global South

“It is at this point that China is faced with the task of constructing a new type of international system that is not dominated by the West. In today’s so-called strategic quadrangle consisting of the U.S., Europe, Russia and China, how to construct such an international system appears particularly difficult [逼庂 literally means ‘narrow’ or ‘cramped’ rather than ‘difficult’].

“But if we look a little further south, we will find a vast number of developing countries, the Third World and the countries of the global South. They should be our strategy’s depth [我们的战略纵深]. That is to say, [we should] build a new type of international relations and a new type of international system that has strategic depth and in which China and the countries of the global South are jointly integrated. [This] is, in my view, an important strategic task for China’s international relations in the coming decades.”

BRI projects: Strategy trumps profitability

“For China today, especially for businesses and governments at all levels [within China] that are currently working hard to develop BRI trade, there is a very important point to which they should be alerted or reminded about: the development of the BRI has to go beyond mere business, beyond the general export of [China’s excess] production capacity, beyond the partial thinking of industry and the partial thinking at the regional level, or the simple economic way of thinking of business. The development of the BRI should be considered at the strategic level. That is, it should be included into China’s strategy when thinking about Africa, South America, Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

“If you raise [the development of the BRI] to the strategic level, there are countries where you won’t be able to make money and will have to lose money, and there are countries where you will be free to make money. You have to unite the two within your organic strategy.

“The strategic task of building a new type of international system is, in my view, a strategic proposition that Chinese think tanks and research institutes should pay very close attention to with regards to international relations.

“Time is limited today. I just wanted to make a start here. I hope to receive your corrections and criticisms. Thank you!”

[Subscribe to Sinification]

The recessive importance of the Global South was previously explored by Richard and his partner Larry, with input from Supratik Bose, many decades ago as shown here.

World-Watching: The Problem with the Current Russia Sanctions Regime

[from Project Syndicate, by Mohamed A. El-Erian]

There is much debate about the effectiveness of Western sanctions, the Ukraine war’s implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be. While there are few good options, some are clearly worse than others.

Cambridge — It has been five months since Europe and the United States imposed tough economic and financial sanctions on Russia, a G20 country that was the world’s eleventh-largest economy on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine. While the sanctions have been gradually strengthened in the intervening months, debate rages about their effectiveness, the war’s broader implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be.

On the first question, although the sanctions have been less effective than Europe and the U.S. had hoped, they also are proving more onerous than the Kremlin claims. Russia’s central bank expects GDP to contract by 8-10% this year, while other forecasters expect a larger fall, together with longer-lasting damage to growth potential. Imports and exports have been severely disrupted, and inflows of foreign investment have essentially stopped. Shortages are multiplying, pushing inflation higher. At this point, the country no longer has a properly functioning foreign-exchange market.

The sanctions would have bitten much harder had the West not opted for a carve-out of Russia’s energy sector, and had many more countries joined the U.S. and Europe in the effort. Because that didn’t happen, Russia has not felt nearly as much pressure as it would have. Moreover, it has been able to continue trading through various side and back doors that will likely become increasingly important as long as the sanctions regime, as currently designed, continues.

Nonetheless, it is only a matter of time before the Russian economy experiences a harder hit. Inventories of imported goods – including many critical technological and industrial inputs – are dwindling fast, and many sectors are becoming less resilient. The cumulative damage to Russia’s economy over time will be significant and long-lasting – a fact that has not yet been fully captured by consensus medium-term forecasts.

The second question concerns global spillovers from the war and the sanctions regime. Most observers agree that Russia’s invasion has increased not just energy insecurity but also food insecurity, highlighting the fallout from the war’s disruption to Ukrainian agricultural exports. But there is still much debate about the West’s use of the economic nuclear sanctions option: the curbs placed on Russia’s central bank and on Russia’s use of the international payments system.

These curbs are far more intrusive than the usual mix of restrictions on sanctioned government and private sector trade and on individuals’ financial dealings. Yet, because they are not subject to any internationally agreed standards, guidelines, or checks and balances, they fall outside the purview of relevant global-governance bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

In a time of war, such oversight might seem like a nicety. But some worry that the sanctions could significantly reduce the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and the U.S. financial system’s role as the primary global intermediary for other countries’ savings and investments. After all, a growing number of countries undoubtedly now feel more vulnerable to the reach of U.S. sanctions.

But it is impossible to replace something with nothing, which means that no significant loss of dollar or U.S. financial primacy will occur in the immediate future. Rather, the sanctions will lend further momentum to the gradual process of global economic fragmentation, which was also fueled a few years ago by the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. More countries now have even more of a reason to pursue greater financial resilience and inherently inefficient forms of self-insurance.

That brings us to the third debate. With no end in sight for the war, what should the West do next? Fearing the implications for energy prices and the supply of gas to Europe, many in the West are tempted to call for a moratorium on any new sanctions – or even for additional carve-outs. Others, however, favor additional measures to hold Russia accountable for its indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian civilians.

In any case, maintaining the current sanctions regime is not problem-free, owing to the twin objectives of pressuring Russia and limiting the economic disruption to Europe. Moreover, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently said, it feels as if Russia is “blackmailing” Europe by threatening to disrupt gas supplies at any moment. No wonder the Commission is urging member countries to cut consumption by 15%.

Under the current sanctions regime, the West risks falling between two horses. While easing sanctions could help alleviate concerns about Europe’s economic outlook, this option is a non-starter, given the atrocities that Russian forces are committing in Ukraine. But if the West is serious about pressuring Russia through truly crippling economic and financial sanctions, it needs to bite the bullet and eliminate the carve-outs for energy.

Doing so would undoubtedly have a severe short-term economic impact on European economies and the rest of the world, amplifying the “little fires everywhere” syndrome that I warned about in May. It is therefore critical that governments use their available fiscal space to provide targeted support to vulnerable segments of the population, as well as to fragile countries; and multilateral agencies must support developing countries through aid and a more operational debt relief framework. If done properly, this option would yield better outcomes in the medium and long term than the current strategy.

Muddling through risks bringing about the worst of all possible worlds. It is insufficient to dissuade Russia from continuing its illegal war; it is fueling deeper fragmentation of the international monetary system; and it is not even protecting Europe from a winter gas disruption.

Mohamed A. El-Erian, President of Queens’ College at the University of Cambridge, is a professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse (Random House, 2016).

Russia-Watching: Economic Dysfunctionalities

[from the Russian Analytical Digest]

This issue deals with dysfunctionalities in the Russian economy. The first three contributions look at the direct impact of sanctions. Ilya Matveev provides an overview, while Andrei Yakovlev compares the government’s anti-sanctions measures to its reaction to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Janis Kluge offers a more detailed picture of the short- and long-term effects of the unfolding sanction regime. Michael Rochlitz then goes on to explain the lack of strategic planning in the country’s economic policy. Finally, Olga Masyutina and Ekaterina Paustyan provide a case study of inefficient governance mechanisms looking at waste management.

Read the full issue [archived PDF].

Analyses

Sanctions against Russia: No Blitzkrieg, but a Devastating Effect Nonetheless

by Ilya Matveev

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 40 countries have introduced sanctions against Russia. The new restrictions concern finance, trade, logistics, and personal sanctions against businessmen and officials. In addition, more than 1,000 companies have ceased or limited their activities in Russia. In this article, Ilya Matveev argues that the sanctions, despite their unprecedented scale, have not led to the collapse of the Russian economy, yet their effect is dramatic, multi-faceted, and will increase over time.

Read the full issue [archived PDF].

Fighting the Pandemic and Fighting Sanctions: Can the Russian Economy Now Benefit from Its Experience with Anti-Crisis Measures?

by Andrei Yakovlev

Faced with tough international sanctions in reaction to its war against Ukraine, the Russian government has resorted to measures developed during the COVID-19 pandemic in order to stabilize the economy. This short analysis discusses the rationale behind this approach and demonstrates its limits.

Read the full issue [archived PDF].

Russia’s Economy under Sanctions: Early Impact and Long-Term Outlook

by Janis Kluge

Four months after a coalition of Western states imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, the Russian economy seems to be holding up better than expected. The Central Bank has managed to stabilize the country’s financial system and Russian officials are trying to project optimism about the future. However, this optimism is likely to be short-lived. The sanctions’ effects are only just beginning to unfold: supply-chain problems are intensifying and demand is falling quickly. In the longer run, Russia’s economy will become more primitive as it partially decouples from international trade. To avoid social tensions, the government will intervene to support Russian businesses, leading to more protectionism and a larger state footprint in the economy.

Read the full issue [archived PDF].

Why Russia Is Lacking an Economic Strategy for the Future

by Michael Rochlitz

Even before the economic crisis caused by Russia’s full-scale attack against Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions, the Russian economy was plagued by a number of growing problems. As a result, Russia’s economy has hardly grown for almost a decade, with an average annual growth rate of just 0.5% between 2013 and 2021. However, the Russian government does not have a strategy for addressing the fundamental economic challenges that are looming just over the horizon. There also seem to be no public debates about these challenges, whether in the policy circles around the government or among the wider public.

Read the full issue [archived PDF].

The Political Economy of Waste Management in Russia

by Olga Masyutina and Ekaterina Paustyan

The problem of household waste is one of the numerous environmental challenges facing Russia today. The 2019 nation-wide waste management reform was designed to tackle this problem by promoting recycling. However, the reform is stalling, due in large part to the nature of state-business relations in Russia. The lack of transparency in the public procurement process and the importance of personal connections between businesses and the federal and regional authorities undermine the implementation of the reform and produce suboptimal outcomes in the fight against waste.

Read the full issue [archived PDF].

OFR Working Paper Finds Cash Biases Measurement of the Stock Return Correlations

[from the U.S. Office of Financial Research]

Today, the U.S. Office of Financial Research published a working paper, “Cash-Hedged Stock Returns” [archived PDF], and an accompanying blog (below), regarding firms’ cash holdings and the implications for asset prices and financial stability.

Cash holdings are important for financial stability because of their value in crises. Corporate cash piles vary across companies and over time. Firms’ cash holdings typically earn low returns, and their cash returns are correlated across firms. Thus, the asset pricing results are important for investors managing a portfolio’s risk and policymakers concerned about sources of vulnerability.

The working paper [archived PDF] shows how investors can hedge cash on firms’ balance sheets when making portfolio choices. Cash generates variation in beta estimates, and the working paper decomposes stock betas into components that depend on the firm’s cash holding, return on cash, and cash-hedged return. Common asset pricing premia have large implicit cash positions, and portfolios of cash-hedged premia often have higher Sharpe ratios, used by investors to understand a return on investment, because of the correlation between firms’ cash returns. The paper shows the value of a dollar increased in 2020, and firms hold cash because they are riskier.

Read the working paper [archived PDF].

OFR Finds Large Cash Holdings Can Lead to Mismeasuring Risk

[from the OFR blog, by Sharon Ross]

Cash is necessary for companies’ operations. Firms use cash to make payments, finance investments, and manage risk. But holding cash comes at a cost: its low pecuniary return. Published today by the OFR, the working paper, “Cash-Hedged Stock Returns” [archived PDF], shows that the cash returns of publicly traded, non-financial firms are correlated. Since cash returns are a part of equity returns, investors that are using equity return correlations to measure risk can mismeasure risk.

We show the importance of cash for systemic risk by documenting the value of cash in crises, showing that firms hold cash in part due to risk management and studying how cash biases the measurement of the interconnectedness of stock returns. The consequences of cash are important for policymakers monitoring aggregate risks, and sources of market vulnerability and for investors making portfolio choices.

Cash holdings are important for financial stability because of their value in crises. Several papers document a “dash for cash” during the initial panicked stages of the coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic when firms rushed to hold cash in their coffers. The dash for cash was driven by firms drawing down on lines of credit from banks, which in turn affected bank lending. The dash for cash highlighted the critical role of firms’ cash holdings and returns in understanding risk in the financial system.

We show the value of a dollar increased in 2020. Moreover, our results show that firms may hold cash because they are riskier, as opposed to firms with high cash shares being less risky due to their cash holdings. Our results are consistent with a precautionary savings motive for holding cash. In other words, firms hold cash for risk management, in part to weather bad times.

Cash is a growing share of public firms’ assets. The value-weighted U.S. stock market held 22% of its assets in cash in December 2020 compared to 8% in the 1980s. An investor buying the market in 2020 ends up with an implicit cash position three times larger than in 1980. Individual firms vary in how much cash they hold. As cash holdings increase, it is important to understand how cash holdings affect returns, which in turn impacts who chooses to invest in the firms.

Cash returns are correlated across firms, and cash biases measurement of the interconnectedness of stock returns, making it a risk for financial stability. As a result, the asset pricing results are important both for investors managing portfolio risk and for policymakers concerned about interconnected returns.

We argue that the value of corporate cash is distinct, and we can separate the value of cash and the value of the firm’s primary business. We show how investors can explicitly account for the effect of corporate cash holdings when forming a portfolio. When an investor owns stock in a company with substantial cash, the investor has an implicit cash position managed by the company—something the investor might not intend. We argue that investors should account for the effect of corporate cash holdings in the portfolio decision to measure a portfolio’s risk. Firms’ cash management is not consistent across firms, and investors may want to manage their cash positions themselves. Policymakers should be aware of investors’ choices in cash because of investors’ portfolio risk and the implications for aggregate risk.

We separate a company’s stock return into its cash and non-cash components, and we show that using the non-cash return gives a more informative correlation structure across stocks. In other words, if investors take out the correlated cash returns, the remaining return is less correlated, yielding portfolios that provide better diversification. We show how cash holdings and returns affect the returns of standard asset pricing strategies and asset pricing models like the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).

As cash holdings of public firms increase, it is important that policymakers understand how these increases impact stock returns for both individual firms and the aggregate market. Cash returns are correlated across firms, and cash biases the measurement of the interconnectedness of stock returns. This correlation is important both for investors who are managing a portfolio’s risk and policymakers concerned about sources of vulnerability stemming from interconnected returns.

European Central Bank’s Macroprudential Bulletin

The European Central Bank’s Macroprudential Bulletin provides insight into the work they are currently doing in the field of macroprudential policy. Their goal is to raise awareness of macroprudential policy issues in the euro area by making their ongoing work and thinking in this field more transparent, and to encourage broader discussion on these key issues.

January 2022, Issue 16

Reforming money market funds

Money market funds perform a key function for the financial system by linking the short-term funding and cash-management needs of various market participants. Proposals to reform the regulation of these funds and enhance the sector’s resilience are assessed in this issue of the Macroprudential Bulletin.

Assessing possible reform proposals

At the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, money market funds proved particularly vulnerable when faced with severe market disruption. This article looks at specific policies to address the liquidity risk of these funds and ensure they can deal with large and unexpected outflows under similar periods of stress.

[Archived PDF of full article]

The impact of a public debt quota on money market funds

Public debt assets tend to be easier to draw down and sell during market stress than private sector debt. Having a minimum public debt quota for private debt money market funds could increase their shock-absorbing capacity. What are the costs and benefits of such a proposal?

[Archived PDF of full article]

Essay 102: Economics—Atlanta Fed’s November Notes from the Vault

Financial System of the Future

Notes from the Vault
Larry D. Wall
November 2019

The financial services business is an information technology business that operates in an environment with substantial government involvement. The state of both technology and government intervention have evolved considerably since the financial crisis that began in 2007, with potentially large implications for the future financial system. With that in mind, the Atlanta Fed recently hosted the workshop Financial System of the Future, which was cosponsored by the Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR) at Georgia State University.

This post reviews many of the papers and presentations from the workshop dealing with both financial regulation and innovations in financial technology. It also reviews one of the keynote speeches on the important topic of corporate governance. A companion macroblog post summarizes the workshop’s discussion of digital currencies.

Post-crisis changes in regulation

Some banks had difficulty obtaining adequate funding from private financial markets during the crisis of 2007–08, despite being well capitalized by that period’s capital standards. In part, these funding difficulties were a result of bank depositors fearing that banks had not adequately provisioned for their credit losses.

A paper by University of Michigan professors Thomas Flanagan and Amiyatosh Purnanandam examines the question “Why Do Banks Hide Losses?” [PDF] with a particular focus on the role of shareholder monitoring and management incentives. One problem in conducting such a study is that of separating bad investment decisions from deceptive accounting. This paper exploits an unexpected change in regulation in India to help provide such separation. This regulatory change forced all of the banks in that country to detail the extent of their underreporting of loan losses in 2015. The paper finds that weaker shareholder monitoring and higher-power executive compensation contracts are associated with more underreporting of loan losses.¹ This paper helps us to understand how banks exploit accounting discretion over loan losses and reinforces the importance of supervisory oversight.

The funding problems encountered by U.S. banks led to runs and ultimately the collapse of a few banks, but these problems had a significant effect on the operations of some banks that survived. One measure of the vulnerability of a bank to a funding shock was its reliance on uninsured, wholesale deposits from large institutions. Professors Sudheer Chava of Georgia Institute of Technology, Rohan Ganduri of Emory University, Linghang Zeng of Babson College, and graduate student Nikhil Paradkar of Georgia Tech examine one effect of these shocks in their paper “Shocked by Bank Funding Shocks: Evidence from 500 Million Consumer Credit Cards” [PDF]. The paper finds that banks that were more exposed to wholesale funding shocks made larger cuts in consumer credit lines than other banks. The authors further find that these cutbacks were made to the most credit-constrained customers (those with lower credit scores and higher utilization of their credit line). The results also suggest that these credit-constrained consumers responded by cutting back their consumption. Overall, these results provide additional support for regulatory policies intended to strengthen banks so that they can continue lending through future crises.

The Federal Reserve was created in 1913 in large part to provide a source of liquidity during periods of stress in bank lending markets. Yet banks proved surprisingly resistant to borrowing from the Fed’s discount window at the start of the funding problems in the fall of 2007. In an attempt to overcome this reluctance to borrow, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. A paper by professors Yunzhi Hu of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Hanzhe Zhang from Michigan State University examines the TAF in a paper titled “Overcoming Borrowing Stigma: The Design of Lending-of-Last-Resort Policies” [PDF]. This paper develops a simple model in which TAF funding is preferred by stronger banks because the funds are only available with a delay (that is, the funds will not help a bank facing an immediate run) and because TAF gives stronger banks the potential to borrow at lower costs. The paper also provides evidence that when both the discount window and TAF were available, the weakest banks borrowed from the discount window and the relatively stronger banks bid for TAF funds. The results of this study may help to inform the Fed’s policies on the provision of emergency liquidity in the future.

In the post-crisis period, the bank supervisors agreed to adopt new liquidity rules and strengthen existing capital requirements at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A paper by Harvard University professor Daniel Roberts and Federal Reserve Bank of New York economists Asani Sarkar and Or Shachar examines the Basel liquidity requirements in the paper “Bank Liquidity Creation, Systemic Risk, and Basel Liquidity Regulations” [PDF]. The paper finds that the new regulation has the cost of reducing bank liquidity creation in normal times but also results in more resilient banks in a crisis. The authors estimate both the costs and benefits of the regulation and find that the benefits in terms of a more stable financial system exceed the costs of the reduction in liquidity.

Josef Schroth, an economist at the Bank of Canada, analyzes the question of how regulators could use capital regulation to smooth bank lending through a recession and financial crisis in his paper “Macroprudential Policy with Capital Buffers” [PDF]. Banks in his model hold sufficient capital in most periods but have insufficient capital to retain uninsured market funding during crises, which leads to severe credit crunches. Bank regulators can smooth lending by requiring banks to hold more capital during good times, also allowing banks to operate with reduced capital during a crisis and rebuild their capital gradually after a crisis. The paper’s findings are consistent with the Basel III’s creation of a capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital buffer.

Issues related to bank capital have been the subject of ongoing discussion among academics, bankers, and regulators since the crisis. Bank of Finland economists Gene Ambrocio and Esa Jokivuolle, along with professors Iftekhar Hasan from Fordham University and Kim Ristolainen from the University of Turku, surveyed the views of banking and finance academics and reported the results in the paper “Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views” [PDF] (slide deck [PDF]). The survey obtained results from 149 leading academic researchers. It found that most respondents believe that higher capital ratios would reduce the likelihood of a crisis and the social costs associated with a crisis. Most respondents thought an increase of 5 percentage points in capital would increase the average cost of capital and reduce bank lending. However, a majority said that this reduction in lending would result in “minimal to no change” in economic activity.

Fintech lending

Banks have historically been important suppliers of credit to consumers and small businesses. However, since the crisis, lending by some fintech firms to these borrowers has grown rapidly. The conference addressed a variety of questions such as the sources of competitive advantage to fintech lenders; competition between fintech lenders, small banks, and large banks; and the impact of fintech lending on consumers. Additionally, the conference looked at post-crisis changes in bank securitization rules, which may have some relevance to fintech lenders’ efforts to fund their loans.

Banks, especially large banks, have long used statistical analysis to help them predict the credit riskiness of consumers and small businesses. However, fintech firms have promoted their use of machine learning techniques as resulting in better credit analysis. Economist J. Christina Wang and former research associate Charles B. Perkins from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston explore the value added of some machine learning techniques in their paper “How Magic a Bullet Is Machine Learning for Credit Analysis? An Exploration with Fintech Lending Data” [PDF]. In particular, they examine the contribution of tree-based models using data from LendingClub, a fintech lender. Tree-based models provide easily understood decision rules that are valuable for demonstrating compliance with U.S. fair lending rules. The results indicate that tree-based machine learning improves prediction accuracy, in part by uncovering notable interactive effects. These models benefit from additional data (albeit only up to about 5,000 observations) and from the addition of more predictors. However, exactly which tree-based approach worked best varied across different subgroups of consumers.

Many large banks retreated from some types of retail and small business lending. In part, this pullback was likely to due to a combination of the increased riskiness of these loans and the tightening of bank capital requirements. However, fintech lenders have been expanding into some of the same spaces, raising the question of whether the reduced lending by big banks was due in part to competitive pressure from fintech firms. It also raises the question of whether smaller banks were also retreating due to increased competition or expanding to help fill the void left by the larger banks. Two papers examine the rise of fintechs in two different lending markets and analyze what developments in these markets tell us about big versus small banks.

Professors Taylor Begley from Washington University in St. Louis and Kandarp Srinivasan from Northeastern University focus on mortgage market lending in their paper “Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banking: A Sideshow?” [PDF]. Their paper observes that fintech lenders rely largely on government-supported loan securitization programs such as those of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration. However, not all mortgage loans qualify for these programs in large part due to limits on the maximum size of the loan. Thus, fintech mortgage lenders were able to take nationwide market share in government-supported loans from the large banks. Nevertheless, it was the small banks that stepped in to provide mortgage loans that did not qualify for government-supported securitization. As a result, small banks have proven more responsive to the withdrawal of bigger banks and have maintained nearly constant market share through the period from 2009 to 2013.

The paper “What Is Fueling the Fintech Lending Revolution? Local Banking Market Structure and Fintech Market Penetration” [PDF] by professor Tetyana Balyuk of Emory University and professors Allen N. Berger and John Hackney from the University of South Carolina studies the rise of fintech lenders in small business lending. The authors find that fintech lenders’ market penetration is associated with lower small bank market shares, consistent with the decline of small banks over time and helping to explain fintech lenders’ success. They also find evidence that small banks tend to make safer loans than fintech firms. Finally, looking at the contribution of different lenders to employment, the authors find that fintech matters most for the smallest businesses, small banks matter more for larger small businesses, and neither matters for large businesses.

As fintech lending has grown, the question of whether it is good for consumers has also arisen. This may be a trick question. We have long known that if people are given a choice, some will use it wisely and others will not. Last year’s CEAR–CenFIS conference provided some evidence of how consumers manage their finances after borrowing from fintech lenders (see “Winners and Losers of Marketplace Lending: Evidence From Borrower Credit Dynamics” [PDF] and “The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending and Personal Bankruptcy” [PDF]). This year, Federal Reserve Board economists Traci Mach and Timothy Dore provided additional evidence in the paper “Marketplace Lending and Consumer Credit Outcomes: Evidence from Prosper” [PDF]. The authors were able to match application data from one lender to credit bureau data. They find that relative to applicants without an origination, borrowers see an increase in their credit scores and total debt, but decreases in their delinquency rates. The increase in mortgage debt balances was especially notable.

An important issue for any type of lender is its access to funding. Banks fund their loans with a combination: (a) their own liabilities in the form of deposits and other market borrowings and (b) loan sales to investors. The risk with on-balance-sheet lending is that too many loans will turn bad, the bank will suffer large loan losses, and depositors will flee the bank. Although some fintech firms fund loans with their own liabilities, most of their loans are funded by sales to investors. The advantage to the loan originator of selling loans is that, if the loan goes bad, the buyers of the loan bear the credit losses. However, such sales can lead to concerns that the bank or fintech originating a loan will not be as careful in underwriting and monitoring as they would be with the loans they retain on their own books. The result can be similar to that discussed in the Chava et al. paper, where originators have to reduce their lending volume.

One alternative that may have the effect of improving banks’ incentives and thereby mitigating investor concerns is that of having the bank retain part of the credit risk on the loans it sells. Professor Martin Hibbeln and graduate student Werner Osterkamp from the University of Duisburg-Essen study the effect of bank loan retention in their paper “The Impact of Skin in the Game on Bank Behavior in the Securitization Market” [PDF]. The authors exploit changes in European Union regulations to study loans sold by European banks in the securitization market. They find evidence that retention of part of the risk of a loan does not improve the quality of the loans being securitized.

Corporate governance

The role of shareholders in corporate governance is important for both financial and non-financial firms. The last few decades have seen shareholder governance power increasingly concentrated in institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds. Although a few of these institutional funds are explicitly focused on corporate governance issues, most are not. However, even the funds that are not focused on governance nevertheless have an interest in participating in governance decisions. The problem for these investors is how to keep up with the many issues requiring a shareholder vote. The answer for a large fraction of institutional investors is to seek information and advice from proxy advisory firms. The role of these advisory firms was the topic of Carnegie Mellon University professor Chester Spatt’s dinner speech titled “Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Market Failure, and Regulation” [PDF] (See also his related paper [PDF].)

Spatt observed that the importance of proxy advisory firms is easy to understand. All shareholders in a firm face the same questions, and there is similarity in questions across firms. However, any one shareholder obtains only a small fraction of the gains from better governance while potentially paying all of the costs of analysis. In this setting, proxy advisory firms are a predictable market solution to a potential free-riding problem. The increasing returns to scale that arise in this setting also naturally lends itself to the development of a monopoly—or in this case, a duopoly. The result can be reduced incentives for the two proxy advisory firms to avoid factual mistakes and increased power for the advisers to impose their philosophy on firms. Spatt discussed a variety of steps the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken and further actions that could mitigate these concerns. However, the problem of what to do about the role of institutions and proxy advisers in corporate governance is one that may not be totally solvable, but rather requires careful management over time.

Conclusion

The post-crisis period has seen dramatic changes in both information technology and government regulation. The papers presented recently at a workshop at the Atlanta Fed analyzed a number of these changes and contribute to our understanding of how the financial system is likely to evolve in the future.

Larry D. Wall is executive director of the Center for Financial Innovation and Stability at the Atlanta Fed. The author thanks Brian Robertson for helpful comments. The view expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. If you wish to comment on this post, please email atl.nftv.mailbox@atl.frb.org.

¹ For further discussion on banks’ reporting of loan losses, see Larry’s recent post on changes to U.S. accounting rules.

Essay 49: Postdicting the 2008 Great Recession: Macro and Finance

Prof. George Akerlof (2001 Nobel) shows how macroeconomics overlooked the issue of financial stability as a pillar. He argues that Rajan’s 2005 paper and talk were uniquely prescient on this.

This is why we find thinking about, say, the Panic of 1873 so instructive especially when one adds an “omnidirectional” analysis: In 1873, we get Around the World in Eighty Days with the transport revolutions that make winning this bet about circling the world in eighty days, at all possible: railroads, steamships, etc. London is shown to have emerged as the world money center, as described in Walter Bagehot’s classic Lombard Street. The opening line of The Magnificent Ambersons is (in paraphrase): “The financial crisis of 1873 destroyed the fortunes of most people but made the Ambersons and this was the basis of their magnificence.”

The novel The Age of Innocence by Edith Wharton, set in the 1870s, shows the financial shocks of 1873 as a major player in the story.

Prof. Adam Tooze of Columbia published in 2018 a masterful account of finance and macro and politics relevant to our 2008 fiasco in his Crashed:

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World

Hence Akerlof’s depiction, in the current Journal of Economic Perspectives, of how macroeconomics became separated from financial instability analyses is key:

“The Keynesian–neoclassical synthesis that had emerged by the early 1960s put constraints on macroeconomics. Foremost, it divorced macroeconomists from working on financial stability. Luckily, after the crash of 2008, the prior work of finance economists has been belatedly acknowledged, and the subfield of macro stability has also emerged as quite possibly the most vibrant research frontier in economics. Nevertheless, macroprudential concerns remain as back matter in the textbooks. Correspondingly, macroprudential policy is undervalued in the councils of government. Yet its importance remains, given the likelihood of another crash.”

In this context, little damage could be done by macro models lacking the details of the financial system. But exclusion of such detail (with the attendant possibility of financial crash) from standard macroeconomics could be a problem in a different context: if the financial system changed in fundamental ways. That was exactly the topic of Rajan’s (2005) Jackson Hole talk, “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” [PDF] which did predict the crash of 2008 as it actually happened. In terms of the skeletal model, had that “financial development” beyond a well-supervised banking system with deposit insurance driven the financial system out of the safe region of always hold? In September 2008, the answer to Rajan’s question became clear: “yes, it had.”

Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 33, Number 4—Fall 2019—Pages 171–186

What They Were Thinking Then: The Consequences for Macroeconomics during the Past 60 Years [PDF] by Prof. George Akerlof.