However, non-mining business investment in Australia was fairly weak over much of the 2010s, despite declines in interest rates and moderate economic growth. While several explanations have been put forward, one potential explanation is that monetary policy is not very effective at stimulating business investment or has become less effective over time.
We provide new evidence on the effect of monetary policy on investment in Australia using firm-level data. We find that contractionary monetary policy makes firms less likely to invest and lowers the amount they invest if they do so. The effects are similar for young and old firms, indicating that the decline in the number of young firms in Australia over time is unlikely to have weakened the effect of monetary policy. The effects are also broadly similar for smaller and larger firms. This suggests that evidence that some, particularly large, firms have sticky hurdle rates does not mean that they do not respond to monetary policy. It also suggests that overseas findings that expansionary monetary policy lessens competition by supporting the largest firms likely do not apply to Australia. We find evidence that financially constrained firms, and sectors that are more dependent on external finance, are more responsive to monetary policy, highlighting the important role of cash flow and financing constraints in the transmission of monetary policy. Finally, we find evidence that monetary policy affects firms’ actual and expected investment contemporaneously, suggesting that expectations are reactive and will tend to lag over the cycle.
The Federal Trade Commission is sending more than $3 million in refunds to businesses that paid for memberships to HomeAdvisor, Inc., a company affiliated with Angi (formerly known as Angie’s List). The agency is also sending claim forms to businesses that are eligible for additional refunds.
The refunds stem from FTC allegations that HomeAdvisor used deceptive marketing tactics when selling home improvement project leads to service providers, including small businesses operating in the “gig” economy. The FTC’s March 2022 complaint alleged that since at least mid-2014, HomeAdvisor made false, misleading, or unsubstantiated claims about the quality and source of the leads it was selling to home service providers in search of potential customers. The agency also charged that HomeAdvisor told businesses that their annual membership would include one free month of mHelpDesk, an optional scheduling and payment processing service marketed by HomeAdvisor, but in reality, the company charged an additional $59.99 for the first month.
The FTC is sending 110,372 checks to eligible home service providers. These refunds are related to the FTC’s allegations that HomeAdvisor misled businesses about the quality of customer leads they would get with their membership. Recipients should cash their checks within 90 days, as indicated on the check.
The agency is also sending 91,273 claims forms to businesses that paid for mHelpDesk. The deadline to submit a claim is February 26, 2024. More information about the refund process is available at ftc.gov/HomeAdvisor or by calling the refund administrator, Rust Consulting, Inc., at 1-833-915-1144. The Commission never requires people to pay money or provide account information to get a refund.
This paper seeks to estimate the extent to which market-implied policy expectations could be improved with further information disclosure from the FOMC. Using text analysis methods based on large language models, we show that if FOMC meeting materials with five-year lagged release dates—like meeting transcripts and Tealbooks—were accessible to the public in real-time, marketpolicy expectations could substantially improve forecasting accuracy. Most of this improvement occurs during easing cycles. For instance, at the six-month forecasting horizon, the market could have predicted as much as 125 basis points of additional easing during the 2001 and 2008 recessions, equivalent to a 40-50 percent reduction in mean squared error. This potential forecasting improvement appears to be related to incomplete information about the Fed’s reaction function, particularly with respect to financial stability concerns in 2008. In contrast, having enhanced access to meeting materials would not have improved the market’s policy rate forecasting during tightening cycles.
Container shipping companies’ 3Q23 financial results showcased a sharp dip in profits or even losses. On a group level, eleven liners (which report quarterly results) among our portfolio of 13 companies reported an average slump of 54.6% YoY in their 3Q23 topline. Operating costs declined 18.1% YoY amid falling chartering costs and lowering bunker prices. However, the cost reduction was insufficient to offset the plunge in topline; thus, EBIT contracted 94.1% YoY on average.
The Drewry Container Equity Index tumbled 28.1% YTD 2023 (ending 22 November), driven by lowering freight rates (WCI: -30.7% in YTD 2023), which squeezed earnings over the quarters. On the contrary, the S&P 500 posted an 18.4% growth. The Drewry Container Equity Index declined 3.4% in the month ending 22 November 2023. Talking about equity prices individually, APMM’s stock price fell 9.0% amid EBIT loss for its Ocean segment in 3Q23, staff cuts and reduced capex guidance, highlighting APMM’s efforts toward reducing costs faced with the bleak industry outlook. Hapag-Lloyd’s stock price slumped 22.2% as its EBIT margin (3Q23: 5.1%) slid below its pre-pandemic level (3Q19: 7.8%). ZIM became the first carrier to report impairment of assets worth USD 2.0bn in 3Q23, and its stock price fell 18.1%. Meanwhile, China-exposed container companies benefitted from the positive sentiment arising from the proposed fiscal stimulus by the Chinese government, possibly boosting the out-of-China and intra-Asia trades. Asianstocks in the broader index rose 2.0% to 19.4% in the month ending 22 November 2023.
Mainly driven by weak earnings prospects, the Drewry Container Equity Index trades at a P/B of 0.5x, a 47.5% discount to its pre-pandemic average (2013-19). We expect freight rates to fall sharply in 2024 and increasingly incur losses. Thus, we expect the multiple to remain suppressed.
As the fleet of container shipping companies expands, the charter market softens. For instance, 1-year TC rates declined 14.2% and 52.5% YoY in October for vessels sized 1,110 teu and 8,500 teu. Rates declined more for larger vessels as these constitute the majority of the order book and new deliveries. The YoY decline has continued since October 2022, but rates improved slightly during April-May 2023. However, this was not due to the fundamentally strong market but MSC and CMA CGM’s aggressive chartering of vessels to expand their fleets. Now that the two companies have stopped chartering in vessels, the charter market continues to decline.
Driven by the softening charter market, second-hand asset prices are also weakening. In October, on a YoY basis, prices for five-year-old vessels (2,700 teu and 7,200 teu) contracted 30.6% and 31.5%, and for 10-year-old ships, prices tumbled between 36.7% and 53.2%. Contrary to the sale and purchase market, newbuild prices (1,500 teu and 14,000 teu) continue to increase and rose by an average of 2.2% YoY, led by a shortage of capacity in shipyards.
In October, I wrote about the potential for standards to make business-to-business payments more efficient. Today, let’s talk about standards again, this time for money transfer businesses and the state regulations covering them.
For new and established money transfer businesses and for state regulators, the hodgepodge of state regulations creates headaches. To do business everywhere in the United States, money transfer businesses must register separately in each state and US territory and meet license requirements that can vary from state to state. They can face multiple state examinations, also with different requirements, simultaneously (and annually). During examinations, regulators review operations, financial condition, management, and compliance with anti-money laundering laws.
Fortunately, many states have acted to address this confusing and inefficient situation by adopting the Model Money Transmission Modernization Act (MTMA) [archived PDF], sample legislation developed by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors to establish nationwide standards and requirements for licensed money transmitters. Fourteen states have adopted some version of the MTMA: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. In my home state of Massachusetts, the legislature’s Joint Committee on Financial Services heard testimony on a version of this bill just last month. For traditional money transmitters and new fintech entrants, the MTMA aims to reduce the substantive and technical differences among the various state laws and regulations. This kind of change has the potential to reduce compliance burdens, encourage innovation, and remove barriers to entry for new market participants.
The MTMA is important given the prodigious growth in person-to-person, or P2P, payments via apps. Among all USconsumers, half of P2P payments were sent using noncash methods in 2022, up from less than 30 percent in 2020 (see the chart). From Massachusetts alone, money transmitters sent $31 billion in 2022, according to the state’s Division of Banks.
Half of P2P payments were made electronically in 2022.
The MTMA also has the potential to create efficiencies for state supervisors. For example, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) has facilitated a collaborative exam program for nationwide payments and cryptocurrency firms to undergo one exam, each facilitated by one state overseeing a group of examiners sourced from across the country. According to the CSBS, transmitters in more than 40 states that have laws addressing core precepts can benefit from the streamlined exams.
The MTMA is another example showing that standards create efficiencies that are good for businesses, good for regulators and, by extension, good for consumers.
The slower momentum is concerning because, as we show in a new staff discussion note, green innovation is not only good for containing climate change, but for stimulating economic growth too. As the world confronts one of the weakest five-year growth outlooks in more than three decades, those dual benefits are particularly appealing. They ease concerns about the costs of pursuing more ambitious climate plans. And when countries act jointly on climate, we can speed up low-carbon innovation and its transfer to emerging markets and developing economies.
IMF research [archived PDF] shows that doubling green patent filings can boost gross domestic product by 1.7 percent after five years compared with a baseline scenario. And that’s under our most conservative estimate—other estimates show up to four times the effect.
A key question is how countries can better foster green innovation and its deployment. We highlight how domestic and global climate policies spur green innovation. For example, a big increase in the number of climate policies tends to boost green patent filings, our preferred proxy for green innovation, by 10 percent within five years.
One reason policy synchronization has a prominent impact on domestic green innovation is what is called the market size effect. There’s more incentive to develop low-carbon technologies if innovators can expect to sell into a much larger potential market, that is, in countries which adopted similar climate policies.
Another is that climate policies in other countries generate green innovations and knowledge that can be used in the domestic economy. This is known as technology diffusion. Finally, synchronized policy action and international climate commitments create more certainty around domestic climate policies, as they boost people’s confidence in governments’ commitment to addressing climate change.
The risks of protectionism are exacerbated when climate policies, such as subsidies, do not abide by international rules. For example, local content requirements, whereby only locally produced green goods benefit from subsidies, undermine trust in multilateral trade rules and could result in retaliatory measures.
Complaint alleges company violated FTC Act and ROSCA with false promises targeting consumers living paycheck-to-paycheck and by failing to deliver cash advances as advertised
The Federal Trade Commission is taking action against personal financeapp provider Brigit, alleging that its promises of “instant” cash advances of up to $250 for people living paycheck-to-paycheck were deceptive and that the company locked consumers into a $9.99 monthly membership they couldn’t cancel.
Brigit, also known as Bridge It, Inc., has agreed to settle the FTC’s charges, resulting in a proposed court order that would require the company to pay $18 million in consumer refunds, stop its deceptive marketing promises, and end tactics that prevented customers from cancelling.
“Brigit trapped those consumers least able to afford it into monthly membership plans they struggled to escape from,” said Sam Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “Companies that offer cash advances and other alternative financial products have to play by the same rules as other businesses or face potential action by the FTC.”
The FTC’s complaint, however, charges that consumers were rarely able to get an advance for the promised $250, and in many cases, consumers were not able to receive a cash advance at all. Despite Brigit’s promises that advances would be available with “free instant transfers,” the complaint notes that the company began charging consumers a 99-cent fee for an instant transfer. Consumers who did not pay the fee had to wait up to three business days for their advances.
In addition, the complaint charges that while Brigit claimed to offer “non-recourse” advances with no fees or interest, the company prevented consumers who had an open advance from cancelling their subscription and continued to withdraw $9.99 monthly from their bank account until the advance was paid off. Such monthly charges created significant additional hardship for consumers already struggling to pay off a cash advance.
Even when consumers without an open cash advance attempted to cancel the paid subscription, the complaint charges that the company employed dark patterns—manipulative design tricks—to create a confusing and misleading cancellation process that prevented consumers from cancelling their subscriptions, instead of offering a simple mechanism to cancel, as required by the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA) [archived PDF].
The proposed settlement order [archived PDF], which must be approved by a federal judge before it can go into effect, would require Brigit to pay $18 million to the FTC to be used to provide refunds to consumers. In addition, the order would prohibit Brigit from misleading consumers about how much money is available through their advances, how fast the money would be available, any fees associated with delivery, and consumers’ ability to cancel their service. The order would also require the company to make clear disclosures about its subscription products and provide a simple mechanism for consumers to cancel.
Production in major industrial sectors in Germany has developed very differently in recent years under the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and energy price shock. For example, manufacturing in electrical engineering rose by 18% compared with the start of 2015. In the chemical industry, there has been a 20% decline over the same period. The differences are not only cyclical, but also structural. In the future, it will be more important to distinguish between Germany as an industrial location and the German industry.
Whether inflation is short-lived or persistent, concentrated in a few sectors or broad-based, is of deep relevance to policymakers. We estimate a dynamic factor model on monthly data for the major sectors of the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index to assess the extent of inflation persistence and its broadness. The results give a measure of trend inflation and shed light on whether inflation dynamics are dominated by a trend common across sectors or are sector-specific.
Multivariate Core Trend (MCT) inflation was 2.9 percent in September, a 0.3 percentage point increase from August (which was revised up from 2.5 percent). The 68 percent probability band is (2.4, 3.3).
Services ex-housing accounted for 0.54 percentage point (ppt) of the increase in the MCT estimate relative to its pre-pandemic average, while housing accounted for 0.50 ppt. Core goods had the smallest contribution, 0.03 ppt.
A large part of the persistence in housing and services ex-housing is explained by the sector-specific component of the trend.
What is the goal of the Multivariate Core Trend (MCT) analysis?
The New York Fed aims to provide a measure of inflation’s trend, or “persistence,” and identify where the persistence is coming from.
What data are reported?
The New York Fed’s interactive charts report monthly MCT estimates from 1960 to the present. The New York Fed also provides estimates of how much three broad sectors (core goods, core services excluding housing, and housing) are contributing to overall trend inflation over the same time span. The New York Fed further distinguishes whether the persistence owes to common or sector-specific components. Data are available for download.
A dynamic factor model with time-varying parameters is estimated on monthly data for the seventeen major sectors of the PCE price index. The model decomposes each sector’s inflation as the sum of a common trend, a sector-specific trend, a common transitory shock, and a sector-specific transitory shock. The trend in PCEinflation is constructed as the sum of the common and the sector-specific trends weighted by the expenditure shares.
How does the MCT measure differ from the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation measure?
The core inflation measure simply removes the volatile food and energy components. The MCT model seeks to further remove the transitory variation from the core sectoralinflation rates. This has been key in understanding inflation developments in recent years because, during the pandemic, many core sectors (motor vehicles and furniture, for example) were hit by unusually large transitory shocks. An ideal measure of inflation persistence should filter those out.
PCE data are subject to revision by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). How does that affect MCT estimates?
Historical estimates in our MCT data series back to 1960 are based on the latest vintage of data available and incorporate all prior revisions.
How does the MCT Inflation measure relate to other inflation measures?
The MCT model adds to the set of tools that aim at measuring the persistent component of PCE price inflation. Some approaches, such as the Cleveland Fed’s Median PCE and the Dallas Fed’s Trimmed Mean, rely on the cross-sectional distribution of price changes in each period. Other approaches, such as the New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge (UIG), rely on frequency-domain time series smoothing methods. The MCT approach shares some features with them, namely: exploiting the cross-sectional distribution of price changes and using time series smoothing techniques. But the MCT model also has some unique features that are relevant to inflation data. For example, it allows for outliers and for the noisiness of the data and for the relation with the common component to change over time.
How useful can MCT data be for policymakers?
The MCT model provides a timely measure of inflationary pressure and provides insights on how much price changes comove across sectors.
“Labor marketindicators pointed to no growth in employment and a largely stable workweek,” said Jesus Cañas, Dallas Fed senior business economist. “Price pressures remained unchanged while wage growth eased slightly. Perceptions of broader business conditions continued to worsen in October, as pessimism notably increased.”
The revenueindex fell eight points to 0.7, with the near-zero reading suggesting little change in activity from September.
The employmentindex fell from 2.7 to 0.1, its lowest level in seven months.
The input pricesindex was flat at 37.3 and the selling pricesindex remained steady at 9.5.
The wages and benefitsindex fell two points to 17.0, approaching its average reading of 15.8.
The general business activity index dropped from -8.6 to -18.2, its lowest level since December of last year, while the company outlook index fell to -12.8, its lowest level in 16 months.
The sales index fell from -4.4 to -18.1, marking its sixth consecutive month in negative territory.
The employmentindex fell 13 points to -12.4 while the hours worked index fell from 0.6 to -12.1.
The general business activity index dropped from -10.2 to -23.0.
The Dallas Fed conducts the survey monthly to obtain a timely assessment of activity in the state’s service sector, which represents almost 70 percent of the state’s economy and employs about 9.5 million workers.
For this month’s survey, Texas business executives were asked supplemental questions on credit conditions. Results for these questions from the TexasManufacturing Outlook Survey, TexasService Sector Outlook Survey and TexasRetail Outlook Survey have been released together.