consumer, Meta Intelligence

Japan-Watching: Economics in the Age of AI

A Thought Experiment Envisioning A “Fully Automated Society”

from REITI, by IKEUCHI Kenta [池内健太], Senior Fellow (Policy Economist)

In a world where human labor has become unnecessary because of AI, what should be the focus of the study of economics? In the future, if AI and robots have become capable of producing all goods and services necessary for our society, what kind of economic problems could remain?

Of course, a fully automated society is not predicted for the near future. This article imagines such an extreme type of society as a thought experiment designed to consider economic systems in the age of AI. Here, a fully automated society refers not only to one in which corporate production is automated, but also to one in which the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of government are substantially supported—and in some cases automated—by AI.

I started thinking about this matter when I heard from a researcher acquaintance that a paper concerning AI’s impact on employment had caused quite a stir on X, and I decided to read it out of curiosity. The paper discussed the possibility that AI-driven job cuts could reduce workers’ incomes, weaken consumer demand, and ultimately backfire on firms themselves (Falk and Tsoukalas 2026). Companies may earn higher profits in the short term by taking advantage of AI to cut back on personnel costs. However, if most companies follow that same approach, overall market demand would weaken because workers are also consumers.

The purpose of this article is not to question the validity of that paper’s argument. Rather, the focus is on what economic problems would remain in a future society if AI not only partially replaces human labor but also produces most goods and services.

Scarcity Will Continue to Be a Problem

There has already been extensive research regarding the impact of AI on employment. For example, Acemoğlu and Restrepo (2019) argued that while automation may replace existing human jobs, it may also create new ones. Moreover, the possibility that technological advances could free humans from labor and greatly alleviate economic problems was discussed long ago by Keynes (1930).

If AI and robots become capable of producing goods and services on a sufficiently large scale, would economic problems disappear? That would not necessarily be the case. Even in a fully automated society, scarce resources such as land, location, natural environments, energy, and rare metals will remain limited. Moreover, social status, influence, and political decision-making power are deeply connected to human intentions and perception, and cannot simply be delegated to AI. More land will not become available simply because more people wish to live in convenient urban locations. Quiet natural environments, advanced healthcare resources, social attention, and political influence also cannot be maximized for everyone at the same time.

Therefore, even in a fully automated society, some economic problems will remain. However, the main focus will shift from the “problem of insufficient ordinary commodities” to “how to allocate fundamentally scarce resources.” As production capacity increases, the value of true scarcity only becomes clearer.

In that case, the roles of markets and prices will still exist. Prices are not merely figures that allow for corporate earnings; they convey information about which resources are scarce and to what extent, how much demand there is for those resources, and what supply constraints there are. That perspective connects to a classic argument made by Hayek (1945), who argued that prices function as a mechanism through which dispersed information can be aggregated.

However, if AI becomes deeply integrated into the market, the concept of price itself may change. At present, prices serve as one-dimensional signals representing the levels of various factors, such as scarcity, quality, demand, supply, environmental impact, and future risks, expressed in terms of a single metric, that is, monetary value. If AI agents become capable of processing large volumes of information on behalf of consumers and companies, it is possible that multi-dimensional market signals that convey information concerning all those various factors, including quality, environmental impact, congestion, delivery time, reliability and social impact may come into use. Narita (2025) also discussed the possibility that the roles of money and prices may change, with more diverse evaluation standards becoming involved in economic coordination.

For People to Enjoy Affluence

In a fully automated society, how people participate in the market and society will become more important than ever. If the premise that people earn income through labor becomes obsolete, it will be necessary to develop a mechanism whereby purchasing power is distributed to everyone. In this context, universal basic income (UBI) may be reframed not only as relief for the unemployed, but as a form of fundamental purchasing power used by people to express their preferences. Managi [馬奈木俊介] (2025) also pointed out that governance over the equitable distribution of the benefits of AI is essential.

Moreover, UBI may not be limited to simple monetary payments. In the future, UBI may take the form of a system combining other benefits as well, including energy use quotas, rights of access to basic healthcare services and education, and rights to refuse or control the use of personal data. In a fully automated society, UBI would therefore be a matter not only of how much to provide, but also of what kinds of access to guarantee and over what time horizon.

Another important issue is whether it is appropriate to treat people merely as consumers. In a fully automated society, the need for people to work for a living may diminish. However, even without such a necessity, humans will likely still possess the desire to create or to be creative. It is human nature to try new things and to try to surprise or impress other people. The spirit of fun and curiosity, a desire for self-expression, an inquisitive mind, and an appetite for challenges are deeply and fundamentally connected to human nature. Therefore, when designing a future UBI system, it will be important to treat people not merely as consumers but as agents who can participate in creation and exploration.

Additionally, the question of who owns and controls AI systems, robots, foundation models, and computing infrastructure is also a major issue. Even if a certain level of income is distributed to everyone, there may remain a power gap between those who control AI systems and robots and those who merely have access to them, in place of the income gap that currently exists in society.

All of the above-mentioned points for debate are relevant to the study of economics. How scarce resources should be allocated, how to guarantee people’s range of choices, and how to design ownership and controlling rights are problems central to economics. A fully automated society is not a near-future prediction. However, this extreme thought experiment serves as a useful guide for considering economic systems in the age of AI. Economics in the age of AI is not about discarding the intellectual legacy of economics, but about inheriting it and extending it toward a new society.

References

Acemoğlu, D. and Restrepo, P. (2019) “Automation and New Tasks” [archived PDF], Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2), 3–30.
Falk, B. H. and Tsoukalas, G. (2026) “The AI Layoff Trap” [archived PDF], arXiv preprint, arXiv:2603.20617.
Hayek, F. A. (1945) “The Use of Knowledge in Society” [archived PDF], American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530.
Keynes, J. M. (1930) “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” in Essays in Persuasion.
Narita, Y. [成田悠輔] (2025) Nijyu-ni Seiki no Shihon Shugi: Yagate Okane wa Zetsumetus Suru [22世紀の資本主義：やがてお金は絶滅する] (Capitalism of the 22nd Century), Bunshun Shinsho [文春新書].
Managi, S. [馬奈木俊介] (2025) “The Future of Social Science of AI,” RIETI Column.

June 12, 2026

Economic-Watching: Fourth District Beige Book

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 3 September 2025]

Summary of Economic Activity

Fourth District contacts reported a slight increase in overall business activity in recent weeks and expected activity to rise modestly in the months ahead. Consumer spending was flat, with retailers noting continued affordability concerns among consumers. Manufacturers also reported flat demand for goods, citing trade policy uncertainty as the main driver. Demand for professional and business services grew moderately, albeit at a slower pace than in the past three reporting periods. Contacts generally reported flat employment levels and modest wage pressures. Nonlabor cost pressures remained robust, and selling prices continued to grow modestly.

Read the full report [archived PDF].

Economics-Watching: Why Businesses Say Tariffs Have a Delayed Effect on Inflation

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 8 August, 2025]

by R. Andrew Bauer, Renee Haltom and Matthew Martin

Regional Matters

Ever since new tariffs were enacted in early 2025, a key policy question has been what is the extent to which businesses will pass tariff costs through to prices, and when? The effects of a tariff are rarely straightforward, given, among other things, competitive dynamics and the challenges of implementation, but the historically large and changing nature of these tariffs have created additional levels of uncertainty over the effects.

In uncertain times, anecdotal evidence from businesses can be especially insightful. We are learning how businesses are reacting to tariffs through the Richmond Fed’s business surveys as well as through hundreds of one-on-one conversations with Fifth District businesses since the start of 2025.

These conversations showcase that navigating tariffs is a complex and sometimes protracted process for firms, particularly when there is uncertainty. Firms describe several reasons they may not have experienced the full impact of proposed tariffs yet (even when goods and countries they deal with are subject to them), as well as reasons that even when they have incurred tariff-related cost increases, there can be a delayed impact on pricing decisions.

Reasons Firms May Not Have Incurred Tariffs Yet

Business contacts describe several strategies or circumstances that can delay or reduce the tariffs on inputs or other imported items. These include the following:

Delayed ordering. In response to announced tariffs, many firms ran down existing inventories or ran inventories lean in hopes that tariffs would become lower. For example, a national retailer said everyone was “delaying all we can delay in hopes we get more clarity on trade deals” and reported meeting with procurement teams multiple times per week to discuss ports and ship capacity, evolving tariffs, and inventories to keep goods flowing and prices as low as possible. One port said they have a crane waiting to be shipped but can’t do so now due to the tariff cost.
Delaying the tariff charge. Firms report using short-term tactics that allow a good to be shipped but delay the point at which the tariff is incurred. Bonded warehouses have become one well-known example. One national retailer noted a two-week “grace period” with importers, and a steel wholesaler/distributer reported having orders on hold in Canada waiting to be shipped from their supplier. Some firms also report stockpiling inventory in lower-tariff countries, which has to be weighed against the cost of adding a shipping stop.
Cost-sharing. Vendor relationships are often long term, and many firms report partnering with suppliers and customers to share costs. When tariffs first rolled out, multiple firms (a beverage distributer, supply chain logistics company) anticipated a “rule of thirds” where the cost was split evenly among the supplier, the importer, and the customer. A national retailer reported being large enough to force suppliers to bear much of the cost, though it varied by relationship and item. Interestingly, firms also reported that cost-sharing is not necessarily a permanent solution: A steel distributer said that with the second round of tariffs announced in June, “The ‘kumbaya’ of cost-sharing was likely to come to an end.” Similarly, a fabric manufacturer said that upon an announced trade deal with Vietnam that took tariffs from 10 percent to 20 percent, suppliers took a new stand on cost sharing: “Most vendors said you’re on your own” for the second 10 percent, and one even clawed back cost-sharing from the first round.
Transit time. It takes up to six weeks for container ships to arrive to the East Coast from China, so even if firms are ordering goods, there is a natural delay when the tariff is incurred. Shipping time in a world of rapidly changing tariff proposals add to uncertainty around tariff costs.
Tariff implementation delays. Richmond Fed economist Marina Azzimonti has found that a variety of tariff implementation delays help explain why actual tariffs as of May 2025 were much lower than expected. These factors include legacy exemptions and delays in customs system updates. Azzimonti also finds that a small percentage is explained by countries substituting away from high-tariff countries. For example, one national retailer we spoke with was in the process of dropping 10 percent of products sourced from China. Whether a company can change sourcing varies dramatically by type of firm and product.

As our monthly business surveys have found, many firms report deploying more than one strategy to delay tariffs. Notably, many of these delays are only temporary.

Reasons Tariffs May Have a Delayed Impact on Prices

Even when firms have incurred tariffs, they give several reasons why tariffs may not be immediately reflected in the prices they charge for their products. These include the following:

Waiting for tariff policy to clarify. Higher prices could reduce demand for goods and services and/or lead firms to lose market share, so many firms said they are hesitant to increase prices until they’re sure tariffs will remain in place. For example, a large national retailer said if tariffs are finalized at a sufficiently low level, they’ll absorb what they’ve incurred to date, but if high tariffs stick, they’ll have to raise prices. A steel fabricator for industrial equipment described being reluctant to raise prices on the 10 percent cost increases they’d seen thus far but would have to raise prices should the increases reach 12 to 13 percent. A grocery store chain was reluctant to raise prices and instead might reduce margins, which had recovered in recent years, to maintain their customer base. Some firms explicitly noted a strategy to both raise prices over time and pursue efficiency gains to cut costs and completely restore margins within a year or two.
Elasticity testing. Firms reported testing across goods whether consumers will accept price increases. A furniture manufacturer said he’s seen competitors pass along just 5 percentage points of the tariffs at a time so it isn’t such a huge shock to customers, though in that sector, “We all end in the same place which is the customer bearing most of it.” A national retailer said most firms are doing a version of stair-stepping tariffs through, e.g., raising prices a small amount once or twice to see if consumer demand holds, and if so, trying again two months later. This retailer said prices were going up very marginally in early summer, would increase more in July and August, and would be up by 3 to 5 percent by the end of Q4 and into 2026. Another national retailer said they would start testing the extent to which demand falls with price increases, e.g., when the first items that were subject to tariffs—in this case back to school items—hit shelves in late July.
Blind margin. Some firms reported attempting to pass through cost in less noticeable ways. While any price increase to consumers will be captured in measures of aggregate inflation, the fact that price increases may occur on non-tariffed goods might make it difficult to directly relate price increases to tariffs. An outdoor goods retailer said, “Unless it’s a branded item where everyone knows the price, if something goes for $18, it can also go for $19.” A national retailer plans to print new shelf labels with updated pricing, which will be less noticeable for consumers compared to multiple new price stickers layered on top. This takes time (akin to a textbook “menu cost” in economics), so it will not be reflected in prices until July and August. A grocery store said their goal was to increase average prices across the store but focus on less visible prices.
Selling out of preexisting inventory: Many firms noted they still have production inventory from before tariffs were announced, so they do not need to raise prices as long as they still sell these lower cost goods. A national retailer noted they have at least 25 weeks of inventory on hand for most imported products. A firm that produces grocery items said they will decide how much to raise prices as they get closer to selling tariff-affected products. Similarly, retailers order seasonal items quarters in advance. Many were receiving items for fall and winter when the new tariffs were going into effect in the spring. They paid the tariff then, but we won’t see the price increase until those items hit the shelves in the fall or winter. One retailer speculated that seasonal décor items will look the most like a one-time increase.
Pre-established prices. Many firms face infrequent pricing due to factors like annual contracts or pre-sales. For example, a dealer of farm equipment gets half its sales through incentivized pre-sales to lock in demand and smooth around crop cycles. They noted that while it would be difficult to retroactively ask those customers to pay for part of the tariff, they will pass tariffs directly through on spare parts. A steel fabricator for industrial equipment has a contract for steel through Q3, so they haven’t been impacted yet by price increases. However, they will face new costs once that contract expires.

In general, compared to small firms, large firms have more ability to negotiate with vendors, temporarily absorb costs, burn cash, wait for strategic opportunity, and test things out. This matters because large firms often lead pricing behavior among firms, so these strategic choices may influence the response of inflation to tariffs more generally. Even within firm size, one often hears that negotiations on price vary considerably by relationship and item.

Conclusion

A key question surrounding tariffs is whether any effects on inflation will resemble a short-lived price increase—as in the simplest textbook model of tariffs—or a more sustained increase to inflation that may warrant tighter Fed monetary policy. When asked in May what will determine the answer, Fed Chair Jerome Powell cited three factors [archived PDF]: 1) the size of the tariff effects; 2) how long it takes to work their way through to prices; and 3) whether inflation expectations remain anchored. The insights shared above suggest the process from proposed tariffs to the prices set by firms is far from instantaneous or clear-cut, particularly when tariff policy is changing.

Sensing from businesses suggests that the impact of tariffs on their price-setting [archived PDF] has been lagged, but it is starting to play out. Nonetheless, it remains highly uncertain how tariffs will impact consumer inflation. The discussion above makes clear that firms are nimble and innovative in the face of challenge, and they are concerned about losing customers in the current environment, particularly consumer-facing firms. We will continue to learn from our business contacts and share their insights.

Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.

Economics-Watching: Earmarking in Programmable Payments

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta]

by Chris Colson, payments expert, Atlanta Fed Payments Forum

As programmable payments become more common, an old-school budgeting idea is making a comeback: earmarking. At its core, earmarking just means setting money aside for a specific purpose—like rent, payroll, or taxes—so it’s only used for that. It’s a simple concept, but when combined with automation, it could be the budgeting upgrade many people and businesses have been waiting for.

The word “earmark” dates to the 15th century, when farmers would notch their animals’ ears to show ownership. Over time, it came to mean setting something aside for a specific use. In personal finance, this idea lives on in the envelope system, where people divide up cash into labeled envelopes—groceries, bills, savings—and stick to those limits. It works, but let’s face it: handling cash envelopes isn’t exactly practical in a digital-first world.

That’s where programmable payments come in. These are payments that happen automatically based on rules you set. Instead of stuffing envelopes, you set up digital “buckets” for your money. Maybe 20 percent of every gig work payment goes straight to a tax account or your weekly paycheck splits into rent, groceries, and savings buckets automatically.

Through banking apps, digital wallets, or budgeting platforms, consumers choose or create spending categories and assign rules—like percentages, spending limits, or triggers. For example, you can link your checking account to a programmable wallet that auto-transfers money into savings or investments accounts on payday, or prevents spending on dining once you hit your monthly cap.

It’s like having a personal money assistant organizing your finances, paying your bills, and keeping you on budget without you having to think about it. For businesses, this brings new efficiency to managing payroll, vendor payments, and escrow accounts.

The timing couldn’t be better. Many Americans struggle financially. According to the Federal Reserve’s 2024 Survey of Household Economics and Decision-making (SHED), nearly 37 percent of adults wouldn’t be able to cover a $400 emergency without borrowing or selling something. Earmarking can help build emergency savings before the money gets spent elsewhere.

There’s also a big gap when it comes to retirement readiness. The Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) found that just over half of families have any kind of retirement account, and many people say they’re not on track with long-term savings. Automated payments into earmarked savings buckets can help make regular saving less of a hassle and more of a habit.

Even our spending habits show why this works. The Fed’s 2025 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice shows people still prefer cash for small purchases. Programmable payments bring that discipline into the digital world without the need for physical cash.

The upside of earmarking with programmable payments is clear: automation takes the work out of budgeting, real-time visibility helps track your money, and flexible rules let you customize how it all works. It’s also useful in more regulated settings like distributing aid or managing shared accounts because it adds accountability.

But if the rules are too rigid or confusing, that can frustrate users. Businesses may need to integrate programmable features with legacy systems, which takes time and money. And over reliance on automation poses risks—glitches, errors, or outdated settings can cause missed payments or unintended consequences.

Still, earmarking with programmable payments is a smart, modern take on a tried-and-true budgeting technique. It may not be right for every situation—and some apps already do this behind the scenes—but used intentionally, it can bring clarity, control, and purpose to the way money flows. In a complex financial world, that’s something both individuals and experts can benefit from.

Economics-Watching: Money Transmitter Regulation: Key to Payments Modernization

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, by Claire Greene, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum]

In October, I wrote about the potential for standards to make business-to-business payments more efficient. Today, let’s talk about standards again, this time for money transfer businesses and the state regulations covering them.

We all know these businesses: Venmo, Western Union, MoneyGram, PayPal, CashApp. The roster seemingly grows by the day. Many crypto firms also are registered money transfer businesses. Money transfer businesses typically are nationwide and global in scope. Nevertheless, these multi-state and multi-national businesses are regulated under the separate licensing rules of individual states and US territories. Federal laws, including the Bank Secrecy Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, also apply to money transfer businesses.

For new and established money transfer businesses and for state regulators, the hodgepodge of state regulations creates headaches. To do business everywhere in the United States, money transfer businesses must register separately in each state and US territory and meet license requirements that can vary from state to state. They can face multiple state examinations, also with different requirements, simultaneously (and annually). During examinations, regulators review operations, financial condition, management, and compliance with anti-money laundering laws.

Fortunately, many states have acted to address this confusing and inefficient situation by adopting the Model Money Transmission Modernization Act (MTMA) [archived PDF], sample legislation developed by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors to establish nationwide standards and requirements for licensed money transmitters. Fourteen states have adopted some version of the MTMA: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. In my home state of Massachusetts, the legislature’s Joint Committee on Financial Services heard testimony on a version of this bill just last month. For traditional money transmitters and new fintech entrants, the MTMA aims to reduce the substantive and technical differences among the various state laws and regulations. This kind of change has the potential to reduce compliance burdens, encourage innovation, and remove barriers to entry for new market participants.

The MTMA is important given the prodigious growth in person-to-person, or P2P, payments via apps. Among all US consumers, half of P2P payments were sent using noncash methods in 2022, up from less than 30 percent in 2020 (see the chart). From Massachusetts alone, money transmitters sent $31 billion in 2022, according to the state’s Division of Banks.

Half of P2P payments were made electronically in 2022.

The MTMA also has the potential to create efficiencies for state supervisors. For example, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) has facilitated a collaborative exam program for nationwide payments and cryptocurrency firms to undergo one exam, each facilitated by one state overseeing a group of examiners sourced from across the country. According to the CSBS, transmitters in more than 40 states that have laws addressing core precepts can benefit from the streamlined exams.

The MTMA is another example showing that standards create efficiencies that are good for businesses, good for regulators and, by extension, good for consumers.

Economics-Watching: FTC Action Leads to $18 Million in Refunds for Brigit Consumers Harmed by Deceptive Promises About Cash Advances, Hidden Fees, and Blocked Cancellation

[from the Federal Trade Commission]

Complaint alleges company violated FTC Act and ROSCA with false promises targeting consumers living paycheck-to-paycheck and by failing to deliver cash advances as advertised

The Federal Trade Commission is taking action against personal finance app provider Brigit, alleging that its promises of “instant” cash advances of up to $250 for people living paycheck-to-paycheck were deceptive and that the company locked consumers into a $9.99 monthly membership they couldn’t cancel.

Brigit, also known as Bridge It, Inc., has agreed to settle the FTC’s charges, resulting in a proposed court order that would require the company to pay $18 million in consumer refunds, stop its deceptive marketing promises, and end tactics that prevented customers from cancelling.

“Brigit trapped those consumers least able to afford it into monthly membership plans they struggled to escape from,” said Sam Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “Companies that offer cash advances and other alternative financial products have to play by the same rules as other businesses or face potential action by the FTC.”

According to the FTC’s complaint [archived PDF], Brigit advertised its cash advance service online, through social media and through broadcast ads with claims that customers who subscribed to the company’s service would have access to “instant” cash advances of up to $250 “whenever you need it,” and could cancel anytime. Consumers could only access the cash advance features when they signed up for the $9.99 per month “Plus” subscription.

The FTC’s complaint, however, charges that consumers were rarely able to get an advance for the promised $250, and in many cases, consumers were not able to receive a cash advance at all. Despite Brigit’s promises that advances would be available with “free instant transfers,” the complaint notes that the company began charging consumers a 99-cent fee for an instant transfer. Consumers who did not pay the fee had to wait up to three business days for their advances.

In addition, the complaint charges that while Brigit claimed to offer “non-recourse” advances with no fees or interest, the company prevented consumers who had an open advance from cancelling their subscription and continued to withdraw $9.99 monthly from their bank account until the advance was paid off. Such monthly charges created significant additional hardship for consumers already struggling to pay off a cash advance.

Even when consumers without an open cash advance attempted to cancel the paid subscription, the complaint charges that the company employed dark patterns—manipulative design tricks—to create a confusing and misleading cancellation process that prevented consumers from cancelling their subscriptions, instead of offering a simple mechanism to cancel, as required by the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA) [archived PDF].

The proposed settlement order [archived PDF], which must be approved by a federal judge before it can go into effect, would require Brigit to pay $18 million to the FTC to be used to provide refunds to consumers. In addition, the order would prohibit Brigit from misleading consumers about how much money is available through their advances, how fast the money would be available, any fees associated with delivery, and consumers’ ability to cancel their service. The order would also require the company to make clear disclosures about its subscription products and provide a simple mechanism for consumers to cancel.

The Commission vote authorizing the staff to file the complaint and stipulated final order was 3-0. The FTC filed the complaint and final order in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

NOTE: The Commission files a complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the named defendants are violating or are about to violate the law and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. Stipulated final orders have the force of law when approved and signed by the District Court judge.

The staff attorneys on this matter were Patrick Roy, Mark Glassman and James Doty of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

Science-Watching: Why Do Batteries Sometimes Catch Fire and Explode?

[from Berkeley Lab News, by Theresa Duque]

Key Takeaways

Scientists have gained new insight into why thermal runaway, while rare, could cause a resting battery to overheat and catch fire.
In order to better understand how a resting battery might undergo thermal runaway after fast charging, scientists are using a technique called “operando X-ray microtomography” to measure changes in the state of charge at the particle level inside a lithium-ion battery after it’s been charged.
Their work shows for the first time that it is possible to directly measure current inside a resting battery even when the external current measurement is zero.
Much more work is needed before the findings can be used to develop improved safety protocols.

How likely would an electric vehicle battery self-combust and explode? The chances of that happening are actually pretty slim: Some analysts say that gasoline vehicles are nearly 30 times more likely to catch fire than electric vehicles. But recent news of EVs catching fire while parked have left many consumers – and researchers – scratching their heads over how these rare events could possibly happen.

Researchers have long known that high electric currents can lead to “thermal runaway” – a chain reaction that can cause a battery to overheat, catch fire, and explode. But without a reliable method to measure currents inside a resting battery, it has not been clear why some batteries go into thermal runaway, even when an EV is parked.

Now, by using an imaging technique called “operando X-ray microtomography,” scientists at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab) and UC Berkeley have shown that the presence of large local currents inside batteries at rest after fast charging could be one of the causes behind thermal runaway. Their findings were reported in the journal ACS Nano.

“We are the first to capture real-time 3D images that measure changes in the state of charge at the particle level inside a lithium-ion battery after it’s been charged,” said Nitash P. Balsara, the senior author on the study. Balsara is a faculty senior scientist in Berkeley Lab’s Materials Sciences Division and a UC Berkeley professor of chemical and biomolecular engineering.

“What’s exciting about this work is that Nitash Balsara’s group isn’t just looking at images – They’re using the images to determine how batteries work and change in a time-dependent way. This study is a culmination of many years of work,” said co-author Dilworth Y. Parkinson, staff scientist and deputy for photon science operations at Berkeley Lab’s Advanced Light Source (ALS).

The team is also the first to measure ionic currents at the particle level inside the battery electrode.

3D microtomography experiments at the Advanced Light Source enabled researchers to pinpoint which particles generated current densities as high as 25 milliamps per centimeter squared inside a resting battery after fast charging. In comparison, the current density required to charge the test battery in 10 minutes was 18 milliamps per centimeter squared. (Credit: Nitash Balsara and Alec S. Ho/Berkeley Lab. Courtesy of *ACS Nano*)

Measuring a battery’s internal currents

In a lithium-ion battery, the anode component of the electrode is mostly made of graphite. When a healthy battery is charged slowly, lithium ions weave themselves between the layers of graphite sheets in the electrode. In contrast, when the battery is charged rapidly, the lithium ions have a tendency to deposit on the surface of the graphite particles in the form of lithium metal.

“What happens after fast charging when the battery is at rest is a little mysterious,” Balsara said. But the method used for the new study revealed important clues.

Experiments led by first author Alec S. Ho at the ALS show that when graphite is “fully lithiated” or fully charged, it expands a tiny bit, about a 10% change in volume – and that current in the battery at the particle level could be determined by tracking the local lithiation in the electrode. (Ho recently completed his Ph.D. in the Balsara group at UC Berkeley.)

A conventional voltmeter would tell you that when a battery is turned off, and disconnected from both the charging station and the electric motor, the overall current in the battery is zero.

But in the new study, the research team found that after charging the battery in 10 minutes, the local currents in a battery at rest (or currents inside the battery at the particle level) were surprisingly large. Parkinson’s 3D microtomography instrument at the ALS enabled the researchers to pinpoint which particles inside the battery were the “outliers” generating alarming current densities as high as 25 milliamps per centimeter squared. In comparison, the current density required to charge the battery in 10 minutes was 18 milliamps per centimeter squared.

The researchers also learned that the measured internal currents decreased substantially in about 20 minutes. Much more work is needed before their approach can be used to develop improved safety protocols.

Researchers from Argonne National Laboratory also contributed to the work.

The Advanced Light Source is a DOE Office of Science user facility at Berkeley Lab.

The work was supported by the Department of Energy’s Office of Science and Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Additional funding was provided by the National Science Foundation.

Economics-Watching: Global Data Tracks Decade-Long Decline in Check Payments

[by Claire Greene, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta]

From around the world, we have more evidence that people are shifting from checks to other means of non-cash payments. Using data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), my Atlanta Fed colleagues Antar Diallo and Oz Shy found that from 2012 to 2021, in all 20 countries they examined, the number of checks declined as the number of cashless payments increased. Since checks are cashless payment instruments, it’s notable that the total of cashless payments increased even as a component of this calculation declined.

Among the 20 countries that reported the number and value of these payments to the BIS, the United States had by far the highest per capita use of checks per year in 2021: 30 checks. Only six countries reported more than two per capita (chart below), another 12 between zero and two. Belgium and South Africa reported zero.

Yikes, you say, 30 checks per person per year in 2021! How is that possible? Most checks in the United States—about two-thirds—are estimated to be written by businesses, according to the Atlanta Fed’s Check Sample Survey. That would put the average number of checks that U.S. consumers write at about 10 per year on average, which is in line with the findings of the 2021 Survey and Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.

Given the high per capita use in the United States, it makes sense that our year-over-year decline from 2012 has been slower than that for other countries. The per-year decline in the number of U.S. checks from 2012 to 2021 was slower than the decline for all the other high-use countries listed in the chart. The United States was down 6.7 percent per year from 2012 to 2021, compared to down 8.8 percent per year for Canada at the slow end and down 17.4 percent per year for Austria at the quick end.

No way around it: we love our checks, and our response to innovation has been tepid compared to that of other countries.

World-Watching: Small Business and Food Waste: Not a Small Problem

[from APEC News]

by Aaron Sydor

Faced with a possible food crisis, economies must work together and take action on food waste … starting at the front line with MSMEs.

Conflict, supply disruption, rising prices, and shortages are all impacting food supplies globally. Just as we are nearing some form of recovery from the pandemic, we are now facing another global challenge in the form of a food crisis – and it’s likely to get worse.

The United Nations World Food Programm e (WFP) tells us that 349 million people face acute food insecurity this year — an increase from 287 million people in 2021. It is a tragedy that when the world is “hungrier than ever,” as the WFP calls it, so much food goes to waste. One-third of food production, or 1.3 billion tons per year, goes to waste globally, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. It is inconceivable, then, that we don’t make the most of the food that we have.

This is a regional problem that cannot be solved by individual economies acting on their own. It must be looked at with a wider lens, such as through bodies, like APEC, that promote regional economic cooperation. APEC members acknowledge that all areas of the agri-food value chain are interdependent and that there is a need for a whole-system approach.

Among the forum’s efforts to reduce food waste is the Food Security Roadmap Towards 2030 which aims to establish an open, fair, transparent, productive, sustainable and resilient APEC food system. This corresponds to the UN and other multilateral goals by taking action through the following avenues: digital transformation; productivity and international trade; sustainability; public-private partnerships; and inclusivity, especially in the inclusion of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) along the agri-food value chain.

For more on this topic, download “Enhancing Green MSMEs’ Competitiveness for a Sustainable and Inclusive Asia-Pacific: Food Sector Waste Reduction in Food Supply Chain.” [Archived PDF]

In my capacity as the Chair of APEC’s Small and Medium Enterprises Working Group, I’d like to stress the importance of the latter: inclusivity and small business. MSMEs account for over 97 percent of all business in APEC economies and employ over half of the workforce. Any strategy for reducing food wastage will have to involve the wholesale participation of the region’s smaller businesses.

This is easier written than done. For one thing, fit-for-purpose data is scarce. No APEC economy has food waste data that is specific to MSMEs. And while all have policies and measures to address the problem of food waste, there are no large-scale direct MSME–food waste reduction targets, policies or plans. Few have tried to reduce MSME food waste in the retail food and food service industries. Supermarkets, food storage facilities or warehouses in many APEC economies aren’t required to donate excesses.

Most entrepreneurs aren’t even aware of the problem, or underestimate its true cost. Those who do understand have limited options or capital, and are unable to find cost-effective solutions to create value out of food waste, and face problems with logistics and transportation. On top of this, there are few to no regulatory frameworks to guide them. From a technology perspective, a majority of APEC economies utilize modern technologies, including mobile applications, to reduce or manage MSME food waste/surplus food, but these modern technologies are used only by large companies in big cities.

Amid these challenges are an abundance of opportunities to help MSMEs reduce food waste. Training, policies and guidelines can aid them in improving profits by reducing costs and increasing the value added of food. They can reduce their carbon footprint, which enhances consumer demand, and divert waste to new products or bioenergy.

A November study by the APEC Small and Medium Enterprises Working Group presents case studies, identifies the best available data on food waste for MSMEs, and identifies several best practices for economies in dealing with food waste through MSME policy.

In one section, the study’s authors analyze a case study of a successful MSME, and identify four key factors contributing to its successful reduction of food waste: 1) creating a network of people — e.g., a community surrounding a farm; 2) using innovation and technology to facilitate farming and save time; 3) producing knowledge and providing it through several channels — e.g., a learning and training center, friendly guide books; and 4) considering the environment at every step of the process.

The paper, called “Enhancing Green MSMEs’ Competitiveness for a Sustainable and Inclusive Asia-Pacific: Food Sector Waste Reduction in Food Supply Chain,” [Archived PDF] is extensive and easily doubles as a handbook for anyone interested in MSME food waste, or the problem of food waste in general. It is a great example of what can be achieved when economies combine knowledge and resources in the pursuit of keeping the region inclusive, prosperous, and fed.

Aaron Sydor is the Chair of the APEC Small and Medium Enterprises Working Group.

FRBSF Economic Letter: Can Monetary Policy Tame Rent Inflation?

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter]

by Zheng Liu and Mollie Pepper

Rent inflation has surged since early 2021. Because the cost of housing is an important component of total U.S. consumer spending, high rent inflation has contributed to elevated levels of overall inflation. Evidence suggests that, as monetary policy tightening cools housing markets, it can also reduce rent inflation, although this tends to adjust relatively slowly. A policy tightening equivalent to a 1 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate could reduce rent inflation as much as 3.2 percentage points over 2½ years.

“We’ve had a time of red-hot housing market all over the country… Shelter inflation is going to remain high for some time. We’re looking for it to come down, but it’s not exactly clear when that will happen. Hope for the best, plan for the worst.”
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (2022)

The rapid run-up of shelter costs—both house prices and rents—during the recovery from the pandemic has raised questions about how inflation pressures might affect housing affordability. Since March 2022, the Federal Reserve has rapidly lifted its federal funds rate target from near zero to over 4%, and policymakers have signaled that they are open to keeping the monetary policy stance sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to the longer-run goal of 2% on average. The tightened financial conditions following those policy changes, especially the surge in mortgage interest rates, have helped cool house price growth. However, rent inflation remains elevated.

This Economic Letter examines the effectiveness of monetary policy tightening for reducing rent inflation. We estimate that, during the period from 1988 to 2019, a policy tightening equivalent to a 1 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate can reduce rent inflation—measured by 12-month percentage changes in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) housing price index—by about 3.2 percentage points, but the full impact takes about 2½ years to materialize. Based on housing costs’ share in total PCE, this translates to a reduction in headline PCE inflation of about 0.5 percentage point over the same time horizon.

Rising housing costs

Following the COVID-19 recession, house prices and rents both surged in the United States. For example, the 12-month growth rate of Standard & Poor’s CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Index accelerated from about 10% in December 2020 to over 20% in March 2022. After the Federal Reserve started raising the target for the federal funds rate in March, house price growth has slowed significantly, to about 9% in October 2022.

Rent inflation also accelerated during the pandemic period. Figure 1 shows that rent inflation—measured using 12-month changes in the PCE housing price index and including rents for tenant-occupied housing and imputed rents for owner-occupied housing—rose from a low point of about 2% in early 2021 to 7.7% by December 2022, the highest level since 1986. During the same period, rent inflation measured by 12-month changes in the shelter component of the consumer price index (CPI) experienced a similar increase. Thus, following the tightening of monetary policy, house price growth has slowed but rent inflation continues to rise.

Figure 1: PCE and CPI measures of rent inflation

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Haver Analytics.
Note: Twelve-month percentage changes. Gray shading indicates NBER recession dates.

Economic theory suggests that some common forces such as changes in housing demand can drive both rents and house prices. For example, the expansion of remote work since the COVID-19 pandemic has increased demand for housing, raising both house prices and rents (Kmetz, Mondragon, and Wieland 2022). To the extent that the stream of current and future rents reflects the fundamental value of a house, house prices can be a leading indicator of future rent inflation (Lansing, Oliveira, and Shapiro 2022). Thus, monetary policy can affect both house prices and rents by cooling housing demand.

Housing demand responds to changes in financial conditions, such as increases in mortgage interest rates. However, theory suggests that house prices are more sensitive than rental prices to changes in financial conditions, because home purchases typically require longer-term mortgage financing. In addition, unlike rents, house prices can be partly driven by investor sentiments or beliefs, which explains the observed larger swings in house prices than in rents over business cycles (Dong et al. 2022). Long-term rental contracts can also contribute to slow adjustments in rent inflation.

Rent inflation is an important contributor to overall inflation because housing costs are an important component of total consumption expenditures. On average, housing expenditures represent about 15% of total PCE and 25% of the services component of PCE. In CPI, shelter costs represent an even larger share, accounting for about 30% of total consumption of all urban consumers and about 40% of core consumption expenditures excluding volatile food and energy components.

The contribution of rent inflation to overall PCE inflation has increased since early 2021. As Figure 2 shows, in the first quarter of 2021, rent inflation accounted for about 22% of the four-quarter change in the PCE services price index, excluding energy: 0.5 of the 2.3 percentage points increase in service prices was attributable to rent inflation. By the third quarter of 2022, the contribution of rent inflation had climbed to about one-third, or 1.5 of the 4.7 percentage point increase in service prices.

Figure 2: Rising contribution of rent inflation to services inflation

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Four-quarter changes in PCE services price index excluding energy.

Measuring policy effects

Given the rising contribution of rent inflation to overall inflation, it is important to assess the quantitative effects of monetary policy tightening on rent inflation.

For our analysis, we use a measure of monetary policy surprises constructed by Bauer and Swanson (2022). Their measure focuses on high-frequency changes in financial market indicators within a short period surrounding the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy announcements. If the public fully anticipates a policy change, then the financial market would not react to new policy announcements. However, if the market does react to an announcement, then the policy change must contain a surprise element. Thus, changes in financial market indicators, such as the price of Eurodollar futures, in a narrow window around an FOMC announcement can capture policy surprises. In practice, however, the data constructed this way are not complete surprises because they can be predicted by some macro and financial variables shortly before FOMC announcements. We follow the approach of Bauer and Swanson (2022) to purge the influences of those macro and financial variables from the measure of policy surprises. We use the resulting quarterly time series to measure monetary policy shocks, with a sample period from 1988 to 2019.

We then use a local projections model—a statistical tool proposed by Jordà (2005)—to project how rent inflation responds over time to a tightening of monetary policy equivalent to a 1 percentage point unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate in a given quarter. The model takes into account how monetary policy shocks interact with other macroeconomic variables, including lags of rent inflation, real GDP growth, and core PCE inflation.

In the final step, we compute the responses of rent inflation relative to its preshock level over a period up to 20 quarters after the initial increase in the federal funds rate.

Gradual impact of policy tightening on rent inflation

Figure 3 shows the response of rent inflation during the first 20 quarters after an unanticipated tightening of monetary policy (solid blue line). The shaded area shows the confidence band, indicating the statistical uncertainty in estimating the responses. Under the assumption that the model is correct, the shaded area contains the actual value of the rent inflation responses to the monetary policy shock roughly two-thirds of the time. The policy shock is normalized such that it is equivalent to a 1 percentage point unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate.

Figure 3: Response of rent inflation to monetary policy tightening

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bauer and Swanson (2022), and authors’ calculations.
Note: Response of rent inflation to a monetary policy shock equivalent to a 1 percentage point surprise increase in the federal funds rate. Shaded region shows 68% confidence band around the estimate.

The figure shows that monetary policy tightening has significant and gradual effects on rent inflation. On impact, a 1 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate reduces rent inflation about 0.6 percentage point relative to its preshock level. Over time, rent inflation declines gradually, falling about 3.2 percentage points in the 10 quarters following the impact. The slow adjustment in rent inflation partly reflects the stickiness in nominal rents due to long-term rental contracts. Since housing expenditures account for about 15% of total PCE, this estimate translates to a reduction in headline PCE inflation of about 0.5 percentage point, stemming from the decline in rent inflation over a period of 2½ years.

The rent component of PCE is measured based on average rents, including those locked in long-term rental contracts, which are slow to adjust to changes in economic and financial conditions. Rents on new leases, however, are more flexible. For example, the 12-month growth in Zillow’s observed rent index, which measures changes in asking rents on new leases, has slowed significantly since March 2022 (see Figure 4). Asking rents are typically a leading indicator of future average rents. Thus, the slowdown in asking rent growth could portend lower future rent inflation.

Figure 4: Year-over-year observed rent growth starting to slow

Source: Zillow and Haver Analytics.
Note: Twelve-month percentage changes in Zillow’s observed rent index. Gray shading indicates NBER recession dates.

Conclusion

Rents are an important component of consumer expenditures. Recent surges in rent inflation have led to concerns that overall inflation might stay persistently high despite tightening of monetary policy. We present evidence that monetary policy tightening is effective for reducing rent inflation, although the full impact takes time to materialize. A policy tightening equivalent to a 1 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate can reduce rent inflation up to 3.2 percentage points over the course of 2½ years. This translates to a maximum reduction in headline PCE inflation of about 0.5 percentage point over the same time horizon. Although average rents are slow to respond to policy changes, growth of asking rents on new leases has started to slow following recent monetary policy tightening. Our finding suggests that this tightening will gradually bring rent inflation down over time, thereby helping to reduce overall inflation.

Zheng Liu — Vice President and Director of the Center for Pacific Basin Studies, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Mollie Pepper — Research Associate, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

[Archived PDF]