credit, Meta Intelligence

Economics-Watching: Kuwait’s Banking Sector Posts Solid Credit Growth in October

[from NBK Group’s Economic Research Department, 21 November, 2024]

Kuwait: Solid credit growth in October driven by household credit. Domestic credit increased by a solid 0.4% in October, driving up YTD growth to 2.9% (3.2% y/y). The recovery in household credit continued, with growth in October at a solid 0.5%, resulting in a YTD increase of 2.4%. While y/y growth in household credit remains a limited 2.3%, annualized growth over the past four months is a stronger 4.7%. Business credit inched up by 0.2% in October, pushing YTD growth to 3.6% (2.9% y/y). Industry and trade drove business credit growth in October while construction and trade are the fastest growing YTD at 17% and 8%, respectively. In contrast, the oil/gas sector continued its downtrend, deepening the YTD decrease to 13%. Excluding the oil/gas sector, growth in business credit would increase to a relatively good 5% YTD. Looking ahead, the last couple of months of the year (especially December) are usually the weakest for business credit, likely due to increased repayments and write-offs, but it will not be surprising if the recovery in household credit is generally sustained, especially given the commencement of the interest rate-cutting cycle. Meanwhile, driven by a plunge in the volatile public-institution deposits, resident deposits decreased in October, resulting in YTD growth of 2.4% (4.2% y/y). Private-sector deposits inched up in October driving up YTD growth to 4.5% compared with 10% for government deposits while public-institution deposits are a big drag (-14%). Within private-sector KD deposits, CASA showed further signs of stabilization as there was no decrease for the third straight month while the YTD drawdown is a limited 1%.

Chart 1: Kuwait credit growth

(% y/y)

Chart 2: UK inflation

(%)

Egypt: IMF concludes mission for fourth review, sees external risks. The IMF concluded its visit to Egypt after spending close to 2 weeks, holding several in-person meetings with the Egyptian authorities, private sector, and other stakeholders. The IMF released a statement mentioning that the current ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region in addition to an increasing number of refugees have affected the external sector (Suez Canal receipts down by 70%) and put severe pressure on the fiscal front. The Fund acknowledged the Central Bank of Egypt’s commitment to unify the exchange rate, maintain the flexible exchange rate regime, and keep inflation on a firm downward trend over the medium term by substantially tightening monetary policy. It also highlighted that continued policy discipline was also a key to containing fiscal risks, especially those related to the energy sector. The Fund, as always, re-iterated the need for promoting the private sector mainly through an enhanced tax system and accelerating divestment plans of the state firms. Finally, it also said that the discussions would continue over the coming days to finalize the agreement on the remaining policies and reform plans. However, the release did not provide any clear hints about the conclusion on the government’s earlier request to push the timeline of some of the subsidy moves.

Oman: IMF completes article IV with a strong outlook for the economy in 2025. Oman’s economy continued to expand with growth reaching 1.9% in the first half of 2024 (versus 1.2% in 2023), despite being weighed down by OPEC+ mandated oil production cuts as non-oil GDP grew a stronger 3.8% y/y in H1 (versus 1.8% in 2023). The fiscal and current account balances remain in a comfortable situation evident by a decline in public sector debt and the recent rating upgrade to investment grade. The Fund expects Oman’s economic growth to see a strong rebound in 2025, supported by higher oil production. It also believes that fiscal and current account balances will remain in surplus but at lower levels. Key risks to the outlook stem from oil price volatility and intensifying geopolitical tensions. The IMF also mentioned that further efforts are needed to raise nonhydrocarbon revenues through more tax policy measures and the phasing out of untargeted subsidies which should help in freeing up resources to finance growth under the government’s diversification agenda.

UK: Inflation rises more than forecast, reinforcing BoE’s caution on rate cuts. UK CPI inflation increased to 2.3% y/y in October from 1.7% the previous month, slightly above the market and the Bank of England’s forecast of 2.2%. On a monthly basis too, inflation rose to 0.6%, a seven-month high, from September’s no change. The steep rise was mainly driven by an almost 10% rise in the household energy price cap effective from October. Core inflation also accelerated to 3.3% y/y (0.4% m/m) from 3.2% (0.1% m/m). While goods prices continued to fall (-0.3% y/y), service prices rose at a faster rate of 5% from 4.9%. Recently, the Bank of England had cautioned about inflation quickening next year (projecting a peak rate of 2.8% in Q3 2025), citing the impact of higher insurance contributions and rising minimum wages as outlined in the latest government budget. Therefore, with inflation rising above forecast, the bank will likely slow the pace of monetary easing after delivering two interest rate cuts of 25 bps earlier, with markets now seeing only two additional cuts by the end of 2025.

Eurozone: ECB warns of fiscal and growth risks in its latest Financial Stability Review [archived PDF]. In its most recent Financial Stability Review (November) [archived PDF], the European Central Bank warned that elevated debt and fiscal deficit levels and anemic long-term growth could expose sovereign debt vulnerabilities in the region, stoking concerns of a repeat of the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. Maturing debt being rolled over at much higher borrowing rates raising debt service costs poses risks to countries with little fiscal space and leaves certain governments exposed to market fluctuations. The bank also emphasized the risks of high equity valuations, low liquidity and a greater concentration of exposure among non-banks. Moreover, it sees current geopolitical uncertainties and the possibility of more trade tensions as heightening risks. The Eurozone’s current government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 88%, but the underlying data suggest a much more precarious situation with Greece, Italy, and France’s ratios at 164%, 137% and 112%. Recently, concerns about France’s high fiscal deficit (around 5.9% of GDP) and elevated debt levels saw yields on the country’s bonds rise steeply, widening the spread gap with German bonds to the highest level in over a decade.

Stock markets	Index	Daily Change (%)	YTD Change (%)
Regional
Abu Dhabi (ADI)	9,405	-0.23	-1.80
Bahrain (ASI)	2,043	-0.37	3.62
Dubai (DFMGI)	4,761	0.61	17.26
Egypt (EGX 30)	30,588	-0.33	23.18
GCC (S&P GCC 40)	709	0.09	-0.52
Kuwait (All Share)	7,353	-0.08	7.86
KSA (TASI)	11,868	-0.07	-0.83
Oman (MSM 30)	4,609	0.00	2.10
Qatar (QE Index)	10,438	0.12	-3.62
International
CSI 300	3,986	0.22	16.17
DAX	19,005	-0.29	13.45
DJIA	43,408	0.32	15.17
Eurostoxx 50	4,730	-0.45	4.60
FTSE 100	8,085	-0.17	4.55
Nikkei 225	38,352	-0.16	14.61
S&P 500	5,917	0.00	24.05

3m interbank rates	%	Daily Change (bps)	YTD Change (bps)
Bahrain	5.86	-1.29	-66.34
Kuwait	3.94	0.00	-37.50
Qatar	6.00	0.00	-25.00
UAE	4.43	3.81	-89.96
Saudi	5.50	-4.75	-73.14
SOFR	4.52	-0.09	-81.13

Bond yields	%	Daily Change (bps)	YTD Change (bps)
Regional
Abu Dhabi 2027	4.66	5.00	33.9
Oman 2027	5.49	6.00	33.0
Qatar 2026	4.68	6.00	16.1
Kuwait 2027	4.69	3.00	35.0
Saudi 2028	4.96	1.00	43.9
International 10-year
US Treasury	4.41	1.77	55.3
German Bund	2.34	0.35	31.2
UK Gilt	4.47	2.60	93.0
Japanese Gov’t Bond	1.07	1.0	45.4

Exchange rates	Rate	Daily Change (%)	YTD Change (%)
KWD per USD	0.31	0.04	-0.05
KWD per EUR	0.32	-0.46	-1.98
USD per EUR	1.05	-0.49	-4.47
JPY per USD	155.43	0.50	10.19
USD per GBP	1.27	-0.25	-0.62
EGP per USD	49.67	0.34	61.00

Commodities	$/unit	Daily Change (%)	YTD Change (%)
Brent crude	72.81	-0.68	-5.49
KEC	73.78	0.74	-7.26
WTI	68.87	-0.75	-3.88
Gold	2,648.2	0.80	28.40

Disclaimer: While every care has been taken in preparing this publication, National Bank of Kuwait accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential losses arising from its use. Daily Economic Update is distributed on a complimentary and discretionary basis to NBK clients and associates. This report and previous issues can be found in the “News & Insight / Economic Reports” section of the National Bank of Kuwait’s web site. Please visit their web site, nbk.com, for other bank publications.

Center for Global Development: Weekly Development Update

The EU as a Global Actor

Kicking off a new CGD series of policy proposals to inform the European Union’s upcoming development agenda, Mikaela Gavas and W. Gyude Moore suggest a reset of the EU’s international relations narrative. Explore their ideas for how the EU can position itself as a global development player while staying true to its values and focusing on the common good.

Read the full article [archived PDF].

Is There Any Hope for Bipartisan Cooperation on Aid in 2025?

by Charles Kenny, July 15, 2024 (CGD Blog Post)

The gap between parties on international economic policy is often smaller than the gap between consensus positions over time. While the Biden administration has introduced migrant-supporting measures including relief for the undocumented spouses of citizens and community sponsorship of refugees, both parties are far tougher on asylum seekers than Obama or Bush were. Back in the 1990s, President Bill Clinton signed NAFTA, which made it through Congress relying on considerable Republican support. Today, President Trump’s trade war with China has been expanded by President Biden and the tariffs first imposed by President Trump are openly backed by many Congressional Democrats. Again, there is now strong bipartisan agreement that a considerable focus of US overseas investment support ought to be countering China, with Democratic appointees leading the charge for greater flexibility in the US International Development Finance Corporation’s development mandate set during the last Republican administration.

The same applies to aid flows. The figure below shows data on total aid disbursements from the US depending on who is in power: the solid blue line is Democratic control of the presidency and both branches of Congress, the blue dashed line is Democratic control of the presidency and one or neither branch, the solid red line is Republican control of the presidency and both chambers, and the red dashed line is control of the presidency and one or neither chamber. There’s only one data point for each year, of course, but the lines connect between them. The broad picture strongly suggests the trend matters more than who is in power (indeed, remember the Surprise Party?).

Figure 1: US aid disbursements by party control (Current $m)

The potential good news from this is that despite substantive disagreements over topics including the Mexico City Policy, bipartisan cooperation on aid might still be more possible than it might appear from a close-up perspective in the midst of partisan rancor. To repeat the bad news: much of the recent bipartisan movement on foreign economic policy has been to the detriment of developing countries. And there is certainly some talk of sweeping changes, including cuts, that might mean the past is no guide. But perhaps there still space for elements of a positive agenda around aid for the legislative sessions of next year, one that could appeal to at least some people on both sides of the aisle. Examples might include:

Advancing localization: Spending more US aid finance in recipient countries rather than on US contractors has been a hallmark of Samantha Power’s tenure at USAID. But it has Republican antecedents. The Trump administration followed a localization strategy for PEPFAR that significantly increased the number of local partners and a New Partnerships Initiative at USAID designed in part to do the same. And in 2021, US Senators Marco Rubio (R–FL) and Tim Kaine (D–VA) introduced legislation to reduce red tape for local organizations seeking USAID funds. It would be great to see further cooperation on ensuring more development dollars are actually spent in developing countries.

Country focus: All else even somewhat equal, a dollar of foreign assistance simply has a larger impact in poorer countries. The logic that richer countries should be able to look after themselves was a justification for the Trump administration’s “Journey to Self-Reliance”—a philosophy dedicated toward “ending the need for aid.” The Biden administration has continued to produce the “country roadmaps” designed to chart the journey. It would be great to see bipartisan efforts to focus grant resources in particular where they’ll have the greatest impact—in the poorest countries.

Sovereign lending and guarantees: While grants should be focused on poorer countries, loans could be an effective and comparatively low-cost tool to support wealthier countries. The recently passed Ukraine aid package provided resources in the form of partially forgivable loans, and senior Republicans have been pushing the model more widely. More lending and guarantees could be a powerful tool to support infrastructure rollout in middle-income countries. And strengthening the US sovereign loan guarantee program could back development and national security goals at a considerably lower cost than grant-based programs.

MCC reform: The Millennium Challenge Corporation, created during the George W. Bush administration, is running into pipeline challenges—and appropriators have clawed back funding in response. That’s a shame. It is a small but effective aid agency providing resources for development priorities including infrastructure and working with client countries to help them deliver—in fact, it’s a model of successful localization. MCC faces spending challenges in part because it hasn’t increased the size of individual country operations, limits repeat operations, and can only work in countries that pass its “scorecard” of development indicators. The agency wants to address its partner problem by working in richer countries. That’s a sad way to achieve impact and goes against the bipartisan principle that richer developing countries should be weaned off aid flows, not given more. Altering the size of compacts, allowing more repeat compacts, and moving away from a scorecard model towards a model of reward for reform—a specific set of policy changes that need to be completed before funds start flowing—would be a far more effective approach.

Fighting malaria: In the 1958 State of the Union, President Eisenhower said that the US would lead a global effort to eradicate malaria. The time and the tools were not right then, but today there is far greater hope for rapid progress against the disease. George Bush created the President’s Malaria Initiative in 2005, and the US has been a vital contributor to the global fight against the parasite since then. With the arrival of new vaccines in the past couple of years, we could accelerate progress and save hundreds of thousands of children’s lives each year. And with better vaccines, we could move even faster. PEPFAR, the US initiative to provide HIV drugs, has transformed the battle against AIDS worldwide. A similar bipartisan initiative could achieve as much with malaria.

Transparency: Both parties have shown commitment to increasing the transparency of aid finance including around subawards and indirect cost rate data. It would be great if there was a bipartisan consensus on simply publishing all aid contracts.

Beyond aid, the African Growth and Opportunity Act was first passed during the Clinton administration, renewed during the Bush administration and then again under the Obama administration. A bipartisan proposal to renew the trade package once more was launched in the Senate in April this year. Perhaps AGOA could be made even bigger and better. Even amidst partisan rancor, there is plenty a Congress and administration could do to improve US relations with and support to low- and middle-income countries next year.

Undoing Gender Inequality Traps in the Financial Sector: The Case of Colombia

by Mayra Buvinic and Alba Loureiro, July 9, 2024 (CGD Blog Post)

Gender data is needed to gauge the extent to which financial services include and benefit women. However, sex-disaggregated data that tracks access to and use of financial services is still hard to come by, and it is especially rare to have country-level data that captures the universe of financial sector providers (FSPs) and is published on a regular basis.

A notable exception is Colombia, where Banca de Oportunidades (BdO), a public sector technical assistance and advocacy platform, compiles in a centralized data platform anonymized data from all FSPs in partnership with Colombia’s Superintendency of Banks. The 2023 edition, the 13th annual publication, reports on 15 million transactions, 60 percent of them monetary, from the universe of banks, credit and savings cooperatives, microfinance institutions, and fintechs. The report tells a sobering story worth highlighting of the trajectory of women’s financial inclusion because it mirrors much of what we know [archived PDF] about the constraints women face having access to financial services in low- and middle-income countries. The report’s numbers [archived PDF] suggest that:

Expanding access is not enough

Despite almost universal access to financial products, gender gaps persist. In 2023, 19 out of every 20 adult Colombians (or 94.6 percent) reported access to at least one financial product or service. However, women faced less favorable conditions (see below), underscoring that mere access is insufficient.

Gender gaps are evident in both savings and credit

In 2023, women had 6.5 and 3.7 percentage points (pp) lower access to savings and credit, respectively, than men. While women’s access to savings increased over time–from 75 percent in 2018 to 90.4 percent in 2023–the gender gap widened (from 4.3 pp to 6.5 pp). In the same period, the gender gap in credit narrowed slightly (from 4.8 pp to 3.7 pp) but both men’s and women’s access to credit decreased–for women from 37.7 percent in 2018 to 33.4 percent in 2023.

Women face access to credit in less favorable conditions than men

Interest rates are higher for women clients across all loan types, and highest for microcredit–with a 5.4 percent gender gap–which women access more than men. In 2023, women accessed 1,029 million and men accessed 857,000 microcredit loans. More men than women accessed commercial loans (20,000 versus 14,000 loans) while housing loans went equally to women and men.

Paradoxically, these less favorable conditions coexist with women exhibiting lower credit risks than men

Women have better repayment rates than men across loan types (Figure 1). Women also perform better across insurance products, except for microinsurance, showing lower accident rates. However, female clients have 13.8 pp lower access to insurance products than men.

Figure 1: Total Repayment Rates, Overdue More Than 30 Days.

Source: The graphic was extracted from the Financial Inclusion PowerPoint (Paola Arias and Jaime Rodriguez, 4 June, 2024) [archived PDF], and the labels were translated from Spanish.

The data implies that women’s good financial behavior is penalized rather than prized, with higher interest rates and lower access to financial products

This is partly the result of gender biases that affect both the demand and supply of credit and lead to rationing credit to women.

Rationing credit and other financial services to women perpetuates ‘gender inequality traps’ leading to further rationing

It all starts with women having fewer assets to use as collateral and lower earnings than men (a commonplace fact across financial markets everywhere) which leads them to qualify for smaller loans. In turn, this results in women having less access to credit to increase earnings because of the high costs to lenders of serving customers with small loans, resulting in even lower earnings.

Gender biases that affect the supply and demand for credit reinforce this vicious cycle

Results from five clever experiments in Colombia done by BdO in collaboration with the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) suggest how easily these gender biases reinforce each other:

On the supply side, there are cognitive and perceptual biases (the latter detected by eye-tracking) from financial sector providers–male potential borrowers are ‘ex-ante’ perceived as having higher earnings than similar women. And female bank agents are stricter at evaluating female clients than male clients.
On the demand side, the incorrect assumption that women are higher credit risks than men is reinforced by female clients’ own lower self-confidence and greater self-exclusion from financial services: women do not apply for credit because they anticipate they will be rejected because they have lower earnings.

Not surprisingly perhaps, women in Colombia score lower than men in a financial health indicator–with an average score of 4.9 for women and 5.6 for men measured in a 0 to10 scale (scored by BdO using data from the 2022 edition of the survey).

To overcome these gender inequality traps, only a combination of strategies will work

Solutions must address both demand– and supply-side constraints and include:

Expand access to financial services to all by lowering the costs of serving small and micro borrowers, including women–as a recently announced collaboration between the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the European Investment Bank, and KCB Bank Kenya seeks to pilot in Kenya by lowering the costs of loans to female micro borrowers through digital technology and data, and risk-sharing.
Increase women’s self-confidence and combat their self-exclusion from financial services with credit ‘plus’ interventions that include ‘soft skills’ training.
Provide customized products that fit women’s needs, including importantly insurance and microinsurance that respond to women’s greater need for mitigating (family) risks.
Combat supply-side biases that lead to inefficiencies and exclusions, including incentives to financial sector providers to reach women with financial services.
For the above, collect and publish gender data, but data that does not end up sitting on a shelf gathering dust; data that instead is used to make management decisions, which underscores the role of public sector institutions such as BdO in collaborating with and incentivizing financial sector providers, and in measuring, tracking, and reporting progress in financial inclusion.

Fortunately, there is a growing wealth of research that backs up the solutions suggested above. But there is still an important practical research agenda ahead:

First is reaching the poorest and excluded with financial services that they may need. In the case of Colombia, this includes indigenous and Afro-descendent populations in geographically distant regions of the country. This requires building further granularity in the financial inclusion data, following guidelines of intersectionality data in development.
There is substantial research on demand-side constraints in women’s access to financial services. There is comparatively little research on supply-side gender biases and solutions to these biases that can be scaled.
Lastly, there is the task of developing financial health indicators that can be easily and widely used disaggregated by gender and other demographic features to monitor an important development outcome from increasing financial access to all.

Disclaimer

CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.

Economics-Watching: Texas Service Sector Activity Flat, Outlook Continues to Worsen

[from The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas]

Growth in Texas service sector activity stalled in October, according to business executives responding to the Texas Service Sector Outlook Survey.

“Labor market indicators pointed to no growth in employment and a largely stable workweek,” said Jesus Cañas, Dallas Fed senior business economist. “Price pressures remained unchanged while wage growth eased slightly. Perceptions of broader business conditions continued to worsen in October, as pessimism notably increased.”

Key takeaways from the service sector survey:

The revenue index fell eight points to 0.7, with the near-zero reading suggesting little change in activity from September.
The employment index fell from 2.7 to 0.1, its lowest level in seven months.
The input prices index was flat at 37.3 and the selling prices index remained steady at 9.5.
The wages and benefits index fell two points to 17.0, approaching its average reading of 15.8.
The general business activity index dropped from -8.6 to -18.2, its lowest level since December of last year, while the company outlook index fell to -12.8, its lowest level in 16 months.

Texas Retail Sales Decline

“Retail sales declined again in October while retail labor market indicators reflected a contraction in employment and workweeks,” Cañas said. “Retail labor market indicators reflected flat employment and workweeks. Retailers’ perceptions of broader business conditions were mixed.”

Key takeaways from the retail survey:

The sales index fell from -4.4 to -18.1, marking its sixth consecutive month in negative territory.
The employment index fell 13 points to -12.4 while the hours worked index fell from 0.6 to -12.1.
The general business activity index dropped from -10.2 to -23.0.

The Dallas Fed conducts the survey monthly to obtain a timely assessment of activity in the state’s service sector, which represents almost 70 percent of the state’s economy and employs about 9.5 million workers.        

For this month’s survey, Texas business executives were asked supplemental questions on credit conditions. Results for these questions from the Texas Manufacturing Outlook Survey, Texas Service Sector Outlook Survey and Texas Retail Outlook Survey have been released together.

Read the special questions results.

Credit Conditions in the Pandemic Mortgage Market

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco]

by John Mondragon

The recent rapid rise in house prices has raised some questions about the potential risk to broader financial stability. However, credit quality in the mortgage market appears to be very high, and lending standards tightened in early 2020. While low interest rates increased the demand for refinancing, evidence from large nonconforming loans shows that credit supply contracted sharply in March 2020 and remained tight through the early pandemic period. The shift in credit supply suggests that lenders adjusted their standards to mitigate some risk in the housing market.

Read the full article [Archived PDF]

Countries and Deep Patternings: China

China’s High-Level Equilibrium Trap as a Concept

The Pattern of the Chinese Past
Mark Elvin
Paperback: 348 pages
Publisher: Stanford University Press; 1st edition (June 1, 1973)

The 1973 classic work in Sinology, Mark Elvin’s The Pattern of the Chinese Past gives the student an “exemplum” in the kind of scholarship that might be called “pattern-seeking.” Without such attempts, all of history becomes formless and shapeless and an endless parade of “routs and rallies,” and “crimes and follies and misfortunes” (in Edward Gibbon’s catchphrase).

Professor Elvin renders Chinese history through an economic perspective instead of using the common dynastic classification by attempting to answer three questions:

What contributed to the continuity of the Chinese empire?
Why was the Chinese economy the most advanced in the world from the Song dynasty (960-1279) up until the latter half of the Qing dynasty (mid-1800s)?
Why did China fail to maintain her technological advantage after the mid-fourteenth century while advancing economically?

In the first section of the book, the author elucidates the staying power of the Chinese empire was due to the following factors. The economics of defense in relation to the size of empire and the power of its neighbors never became an extreme burden that it rendered the state impotent for any consecutively long period of time. It was always able to reformulate itself after a short disunity or rule by a foreign power of the whole, which only happened twice within a two thousand year period (Mongol and Manchu rule). Two other factors that contributed to the continuity of the Chinese state include a relatively isolated existence from the rest of the Eurasian landmass and the important placed on cultural unity, beginning with the first emperor’s destruction of local records in order to quell local loyalties (pp. 21-22). Both of these factors had been built up over time through a revolution in communication and transportation.

The second section of the book analyses the causes of the economic revolution that occurred between the 8^th and 12^th centuries and the technological growth that accompanied it. The transformation of agriculture, especially in the south, was the major impetus that fueled the economic growth of this period. This revolution in agriculture had four aspects.

The preparation of soil became more effective as a result of improved or new tools and the extensive use of manure and lime as fertilizer.
Seed improvements allowed for double cropping.
Improvements in hydraulic techniques and irrigation networks.
Specialization in crops other than basic food grains (p.118).

Improvements in transportation and communications were almost as important as agriculture in growing the economy. Water transport saw big gains and led to the golden age of geographic studies and cartography, with envoys traveling as far away as Africa. Money and credit matured during this time helping to expand the economy. Paper money made its first appearance in 1024. Improvements in science, medicine, and technology also occurred during this period. However, despite all these advancements, “this period was the climax and also the end of many preceding centuries of scientific and technical progress” (p. 179). Although the Chinese economy continued to advance from the 14^th century on, albeit on a smaller scale, it was not accompanied by improvements in technology.

The last section deals with this phenomenon, describing the distinctive characteristics of this late traditional period (1300-1800), and then proceeding to point out why technological advancements did not keep pace with the growth in the economy. This period sees a rise of small market towns in the sixteenth century and a decline in contact with the non-Chinese world around the middle of the fifteenth century. Also, by the eighteenth century serfdom disappeared, aiding population growth, which had reached 400 million by the mid-1800s. Elvin interestingly points out that the highly sophisticated metaphysics that evaded Chinese intellectual thought during the Ming and Qing dynasties negated any deep scientific inquiry (p. 233). In the attempt to explain the lack of technological advancement, Elvin disputes a number of conventional explanations. Contrary to popular belief, there was enough capital during this period to finance simple technological advances, also there was minimal political obstacles to economic growth.

In short, Elvin believes “that in late traditional China economic forces developed in such a way as to make profitable invention more and more difficult. With falling surplus in agriculture, and so falling per capita income and per capita demand, with cheapening labor but increasingly expensive resources and capital, with farming and transport technologies so good that no simple improvements could be made, rational strategy for peasants and merchants alike tended in the direction not so much of labor-saving machinery as of economizing on resources and fixed capital. Huge but nearly static markets created no bottlenecks in the production system that might have prompted creativity” (p. 314). This condition is what he terms as a “high-level equilibrium trap.” The term “trap” to describe the condition of late imperial China’s technological advancement in relation to the economy is similar to Escape from Predicament, Thomas Metzger’s analysis of the “predicament” that confronted Chinese intellectual thought from the Song through to the end of the Qing dynasty. Both explanations have at their core the idea of late imperial China not being able to generate real sustainable progress internally, stating that it was the Chinese response to the Western threat in the mid to late 1800s that finally brought the needed change.

Bank of England Statistical Releases—February 2022

(from the Bank of England)

Money and Credit

Overview

These monthly statistics on the amount of, and interest rates on, borrowing and deposits by households and businesses are used by the Bank’s policy committees to understand economic trends and developments in the UK banking system.

Key Points

Net borrowing of mortgage debt by individuals amounted to £4.7 billion in February. Mortgage approvals for house purchases fell slightly to 71,000 in February, from 73,800 in January, but remains above the 12-month pre-pandemic average up to February 2020 of 66,700.
Consumers borrowed an additional £1.9 billion in consumer credit, on net, of which £1.5 billion was new lending on credit cards.
Sterling money (known as M4ex) increased by £7.2 billion in February. Households’ holdings of money weakened with net flows of £4.0 billion, compared with £7.2 billion in January.
The effective interest rate paid on individuals’ new time deposits with banks and building societies rose by 10 basis points to 0.77%.
Large businesses borrowing from banks rose to £4.0 billion in February, whilst small and medium sized businesses repaid £0.5 billion. Private non-financial companies (PNFCs) redeemed £4.1 billion in net finance from capital markets.

Read the full paper [Archived PDF].

Effective Interest Rates

Commentary on this data is now incorporated into the Money and Credit statistical release [Archived PDF, from above] to facilitate analysis.

Get the data tables [Archived Excel XLS].

Essay 109: Economics-Watching IMF RESMF Newsletter (November 2019)

from the IMF:

IMF Research Perspectives, volume 20, number 1

Featured Policy Work

Investigating the Impact of Global Stablecoins

The provision of financial services and products is undergoing rapid transformation, including through the development of stablecoins, which seek to stabilize the price of a digital currency by linking its value to that of a pool of assets. Stablecoins can potentially serve as a means of payment and store of value, and may contribute to the development of global payment arrangements that are faster, cheaper, and more inclusive. Yet these potential benefits can only be realized if significant risks are addressed. Stablecoin initiatives built on an existing big tech platform with a global customer base may have the potential to scale rapidly, and could pose regulatory and oversight challenges and risks related to consumer protection, fair competition, and the combating of money laundering and terrorism financing, among others, as well as have a significant impact on public policy goals such as financial stability and monetary policy transmission. This paper, written jointly by G7 members, the BIS, and the IMF, including RESMF staff, scopes the causes and implications of the adoption of global stablecoins, and the potential policy efforts to rein in the risks they can bring about.

Read the full report [Archived PDF].

Recent Research

IMF Research Perspectives, Volume 20, Number 1 [Archived PDF]

Blog

The Mobilisation Effects of Multilateral Development Banks

by Giulia Lotti & Andrea Presbitero

Filling the investment gap to achieve the sustainable development goals is one of the most important development challenges. Multilateral development banks can play an important role through a stronger engagement to attract additional resources from the private sector. This column uses data on syndicated lending to a large set of developing countries and shows that MDBs are able to crowd in bank credit to sectors to which they lend. The role of MDBs could be relevant, as they can mobilize up to seven dollars in bank credit for each dollar invested.

[Archived PDF]

Working Papers

Designing Central Bank Digital Currencies

by Itai Agur, Anil Ari & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank’s tradeoff.

[Archived PDF]

One Ring to Rule Them All? New Evidence on World Cycles

by Eric Monnet & Damien Puy

We estimate world cycles using a new quarterly dataset of output, credit and asset prices assembled using IMF archives and covering a large set of advanced and emerging economies since 1950. World cycles, both real and financial, exist and are generally driven by US shocks. But their impact is modest for most countries. The global financial cycle is also much weaker when looking at credit rather than asset prices. We also challenge the view that synchronization has increased over time. Although this is true for prices (goods and assets), this not true for quantities (output and credit). The world business and credit cycles were as strong during Bretton Woods (1950–1972) as during the Globalization period (1984-2006). For most countries, the way their output co-moves with the rest of the world has changed little over the last 70 years. We discuss the reasons behind these new findings and their policy implications for small open economies.

[Archived PDF]

Optimal Macroprudential Policy and Asset Price Bubbles

by Nina Biljanovska, Lucyna Gornicka & Alexandros Vardoulakis

An asset bubble relaxes collateral constraints and increases borrowing by credit-constrained agents. At the same time, as the bubble deflates when constraints start binding, it amplifies downturns. We show analytically and quantitatively that the macroprudential policy should optimally respond to building asset price bubbles non-monotonically depending on the underlying level of indebtedness. If the level of debt is moderate, policy should accommodate the bubble to reduce the incidence of a binding collateral constraint. If debt is elevated, policy should lean against the bubble more aggressively to mitigate the pecuniary externalities from a deflating bubble when constraints bind.

[Archived PDF]

Doing More for Less? New Evidence on Lobbying and Government Contracts

by Senay Agca, Deniz O Igan, Fuhong Li & Prachi Mishra

Why do firms lobby? This paper exploits the unanticipated sequestration of federal budget accounts in March 2013 that reduced the availability of government funds disbursed through procurement contracts to shed light on this question. Following this event, firms with little or no prior exposure to the federal accounts that experienced cuts reduced their lobbying spending. In contrast, firms with a high degree of exposure to the cuts maintained and even increased their lobbying spending. This suggests that, when the same number of contractors competed for a piece of a reduced pie, the more affected firms likely intensified their lobbying efforts to distinguish themselves from the others and improve their chances of procuring a larger share of the smaller overall. These findings are stronger in government-dependent sectors and when there is intense competition. The evidence is more consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for lobbying.

[Archived PDF]

The Long Shadow of the Global Financial Crisis: Public Interventions in the Financial Sector

by Deniz O Igan, Hala Moussawi, Alexander F. Tieman, Aleksandra Zdzienicka, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Paolo Mauro

We track direct public interventions and public holdings in 1,114 financial institutions over the period 2007–17 in 37 countries based on publicly available information. We use aggregate official data to validate this new dataset and estimate the fiscal impact of interventions, including the value of asset holdings remaining in state hands at end-2017. Direct public support to financial institutions amounted to $1.6 trillion ($3.5 trillion including guarantees), with larger amounts allocated to lower capitalized and less profitable banks. As of end-2017, only a few countries had fully divested the initial support they provided during the crisis. Public holdings were divested faster in better capitalized, more profitable, and more liquid banks, and in countries where the economy recovered faster. In countries where the government stake remained high relative to the initial intervention, private investment and credit growth were slower, financial access, depth, efficiency, and competition were worse, and financial stability improved less.

[Archived PDF]

Do Old Habits Die Hard? Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle

by Eric Monnet & Damien Puy

Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.

[Archived PDF]

The Price of Capital Goods: A Driver of Investment Under Threat

by Weicheng Lian, Natalija Novta, Evgenia Pugacheva, Yannick Timmer & Petia Topalova

Over the past three decades, the price of machinery and equipment fell dramatically relative to other prices in advanced and emerging market and developing economies. Using cross-country and sectoral data, we show that the decline in the relative price of tangible tradable capital goods provided a significant impetus to the capital deepening that took place during the same time period. The broad-based decline in the relative price of machinery and equipment, in turn, was driven by the faster productivity growth in the capital goods producing sectors relative to the rest of the economy, and deeper trade integration, which induced domestic producers to lower prices and increase their efficiency. Our findings suggest an additional channel through which rising trade tensions and sluggish productivity could threaten real investment growth going forward.

[Archived PDF]

Credit Supply and Productivity Growth

by Francesco Manaresi & Nicola Pierri

We study the impact of bank credit on firm productivity. We exploit a matched firm-bank database covering all the credit relationships of Italian corporations, together with a natural experiment, to measure idiosyncratic supply-side shocks to credit availability and to estimate a production model augmented with financial frictions. We find that a contraction in credit supply causes a reduction of firm TFP growth and also harms IT-adoption, innovation, exporting, and adoption of superior management practices, while a credit expansion has limited impact. Quantitatively, the credit contraction between 2007 and 2009 accounts for about a quarter of observed the decline in TFP.

[Archived PDF]

The Motives to Borrow

by Antonio Fatás, Atish R. Ghosh, Ugo Panizza & Andrea F Presbitero

Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low output growth, it is likely that some countries pay a price—in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility—for excessive debt accumulation.

[Archived PDF]

Discriminatory Pricing of Over-the-Counter Derivatives

by Harald Hau, Peter Hoffmann, Sam Langfield & Yannick Timmer

New regulatory data reveal extensive p r ice discrimination against non-financial clients in the FX derivatives market. The client at the 90th percentile pays an effective spread of 0.5%, while the bottom quarter incur transaction costs of less than 0.02%. Consistent with models of search frictions in over-the-counter markets, dealers charge higher spreads to less sophisticated clients. However, price discrimination is eliminated when clients trade through multi-dealer request-for-quote platforms. We also document that dealers extract rents from captive clients and market opacity, but only for contracts negotiated bilaterally with unsophisticated clients.

[Archived PDF]

Essay 107: Critiquing Geniuses Respectfully: “Stances” and “Circum-Stances”

A very deep intellectual exercise or “gymnastic skill” is the ability to critique a giant of intellect without flippancy or fear.

To acknowledge someone’s absolute greatness but sense human blindnesses and logical omissions is not childish or sophomoric but simply acknowledges the truth that one mind can’t “swallow” all of truth, as William James teaches us.

Take the case of Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the Danish genius thinker. His thinking is endlessly deep and rich. However, since life is a mix of “stances” (explored by people like Kierkegaard with profundity) and “circum-stances” (the hyphen is used here intentionally to emphasize that these practical details and situations surround us).

Consider this insight into Kierkegaard’s family finances:

About his birth S. K. (Kierkegaard) once remarked with somber wit that “it occurred in that year (i.e., 1813) when so many worthless (literally, ‘mad’) notes were put in circulation.”
He had in mind the great inflation which only two months before his birth brought financial ruin to most of the well-to-do families in Denmark.
To provide for its part in the Napoleonic Wars the government had issued a prodigious number of bank notes, which resulted of course, in a complete collapse of credit. The only security which did not sink to a a small fraction of its nominal value was the so-called “Royal Loan.”
Upon that, because the bonds were held briefly by foreign governments, Denmark was obliged to pay the stipulated interest in gold. The elder Kierkegaard had invested his whole fortune in this security, and therefore, from the general crumble of values he emerged not only as rich as he was before but relatively richer than ever.

(A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1974, page 23)

This Walter Lowrie standard biography of Kierkegaard shows you how these “circum-stances” were a kind of material background or financial basis which gave him, Kierkegaard, the basic economic and financial support system his life “stood” on. His genius was his own but his family background and financial realities cannot be completely ignored. Lowrie’s biographical book in various places tells you how Kierkegaard went on to manage his estate and how unlucky he sometimes was in financial matters.

A person “walks” on two practical “legs,” money and health.

When Kierkegaard (or Dostoyevsky, say) maps out the human soul, he tends to ignore these “preconditions” or economic supports so a completely reverential admirer of his could say that his depth psychology might have been even better had he included these two “practical legs” in his analyses.

Remember too the first sentence of the great American classic novel, The Magnificent Ambersons, where the author, Booth Tarkington, tells you that the magnificence of the Ambersons dated from 1873 when they uniquely got a “bounce” from the grave financial crisis which sank just about everybody else.

This reminds us of the Kierkegaard family, 1813, when the family, whether by dumb luck or shrewdness, benefited from the turbulence of Danish war finance.

“Stances” and “circum-stances” would be linked in an even deeper synthesis where these historical and financial dimensions are part of the story.

Such a critique of Kierkegaard (say) is not meant to be brickbats for their own sake or cranky grousing or facile negativity but a signpost as to what is needed to get even more out of these geniuses.

Essay 102: Economics—Atlanta Fed’s November Notes from the Vault

Financial System of the Future

Notes from the Vault
Larry D. Wall
November 2019

The financial services business is an information technology business that operates in an environment with substantial government involvement. The state of both technology and government intervention have evolved considerably since the financial crisis that began in 2007, with potentially large implications for the future financial system. With that in mind, the Atlanta Fed recently hosted the workshop Financial System of the Future, which was cosponsored by the Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR) at Georgia State University.

This post reviews many of the papers and presentations from the workshop dealing with both financial regulation and innovations in financial technology. It also reviews one of the keynote speeches on the important topic of corporate governance. A companion macroblog post summarizes the workshop’s discussion of digital currencies.

Post-crisis changes in regulation

Some banks had difficulty obtaining adequate funding from private financial markets during the crisis of 2007–08, despite being well capitalized by that period’s capital standards. In part, these funding difficulties were a result of bank depositors fearing that banks had not adequately provisioned for their credit losses.

A paper by University of Michigan professors Thomas Flanagan and Amiyatosh Purnanandam examines the question “Why Do Banks Hide Losses?” [PDF] with a particular focus on the role of shareholder monitoring and management incentives. One problem in conducting such a study is that of separating bad investment decisions from deceptive accounting. This paper exploits an unexpected change in regulation in India to help provide such separation. This regulatory change forced all of the banks in that country to detail the extent of their underreporting of loan losses in 2015. The paper finds that weaker shareholder monitoring and higher-power executive compensation contracts are associated with more underreporting of loan losses.¹ This paper helps us to understand how banks exploit accounting discretion over loan losses and reinforces the importance of supervisory oversight.

The funding problems encountered by U.S. banks led to runs and ultimately the collapse of a few banks, but these problems had a significant effect on the operations of some banks that survived. One measure of the vulnerability of a bank to a funding shock was its reliance on uninsured, wholesale deposits from large institutions. Professors Sudheer Chava of Georgia Institute of Technology, Rohan Ganduri of Emory University, Linghang Zeng of Babson College, and graduate student Nikhil Paradkar of Georgia Tech examine one effect of these shocks in their paper “Shocked by Bank Funding Shocks: Evidence from 500 Million Consumer Credit Cards” [PDF]. The paper finds that banks that were more exposed to wholesale funding shocks made larger cuts in consumer credit lines than other banks. The authors further find that these cutbacks were made to the most credit-constrained customers (those with lower credit scores and higher utilization of their credit line). The results also suggest that these credit-constrained consumers responded by cutting back their consumption. Overall, these results provide additional support for regulatory policies intended to strengthen banks so that they can continue lending through future crises.

The Federal Reserve was created in 1913 in large part to provide a source of liquidity during periods of stress in bank lending markets. Yet banks proved surprisingly resistant to borrowing from the Fed’s discount window at the start of the funding problems in the fall of 2007. In an attempt to overcome this reluctance to borrow, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. A paper by professors Yunzhi Hu of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Hanzhe Zhang from Michigan State University examines the TAF in a paper titled “Overcoming Borrowing Stigma: The Design of Lending-of-Last-Resort Policies” [PDF]. This paper develops a simple model in which TAF funding is preferred by stronger banks because the funds are only available with a delay (that is, the funds will not help a bank facing an immediate run) and because TAF gives stronger banks the potential to borrow at lower costs. The paper also provides evidence that when both the discount window and TAF were available, the weakest banks borrowed from the discount window and the relatively stronger banks bid for TAF funds. The results of this study may help to inform the Fed’s policies on the provision of emergency liquidity in the future.

In the post-crisis period, the bank supervisors agreed to adopt new liquidity rules and strengthen existing capital requirements at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A paper by Harvard University professor Daniel Roberts and Federal Reserve Bank of New York economists Asani Sarkar and Or Shachar examines the Basel liquidity requirements in the paper “Bank Liquidity Creation, Systemic Risk, and Basel Liquidity Regulations” [PDF]. The paper finds that the new regulation has the cost of reducing bank liquidity creation in normal times but also results in more resilient banks in a crisis. The authors estimate both the costs and benefits of the regulation and find that the benefits in terms of a more stable financial system exceed the costs of the reduction in liquidity.

Josef Schroth, an economist at the Bank of Canada, analyzes the question of how regulators could use capital regulation to smooth bank lending through a recession and financial crisis in his paper “Macroprudential Policy with Capital Buffers” [PDF]. Banks in his model hold sufficient capital in most periods but have insufficient capital to retain uninsured market funding during crises, which leads to severe credit crunches. Bank regulators can smooth lending by requiring banks to hold more capital during good times, also allowing banks to operate with reduced capital during a crisis and rebuild their capital gradually after a crisis. The paper’s findings are consistent with the Basel III’s creation of a capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital buffer.

Issues related to bank capital have been the subject of ongoing discussion among academics, bankers, and regulators since the crisis. Bank of Finland economists Gene Ambrocio and Esa Jokivuolle, along with professors Iftekhar Hasan from Fordham University and Kim Ristolainen from the University of Turku, surveyed the views of banking and finance academics and reported the results in the paper “Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views” [PDF] (slide deck [PDF]). The survey obtained results from 149 leading academic researchers. It found that most respondents believe that higher capital ratios would reduce the likelihood of a crisis and the social costs associated with a crisis. Most respondents thought an increase of 5 percentage points in capital would increase the average cost of capital and reduce bank lending. However, a majority said that this reduction in lending would result in “minimal to no change” in economic activity.

Fintech lending

Banks have historically been important suppliers of credit to consumers and small businesses. However, since the crisis, lending by some fintech firms to these borrowers has grown rapidly. The conference addressed a variety of questions such as the sources of competitive advantage to fintech lenders; competition between fintech lenders, small banks, and large banks; and the impact of fintech lending on consumers. Additionally, the conference looked at post-crisis changes in bank securitization rules, which may have some relevance to fintech lenders’ efforts to fund their loans.

Banks, especially large banks, have long used statistical analysis to help them predict the credit riskiness of consumers and small businesses. However, fintech firms have promoted their use of machine learning techniques as resulting in better credit analysis. Economist J. Christina Wang and former research associate Charles B. Perkins from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston explore the value added of some machine learning techniques in their paper “How Magic a Bullet Is Machine Learning for Credit Analysis? An Exploration with Fintech Lending Data” [PDF]. In particular, they examine the contribution of tree-based models using data from LendingClub, a fintech lender. Tree-based models provide easily understood decision rules that are valuable for demonstrating compliance with U.S. fair lending rules. The results indicate that tree-based machine learning improves prediction accuracy, in part by uncovering notable interactive effects. These models benefit from additional data (albeit only up to about 5,000 observations) and from the addition of more predictors. However, exactly which tree-based approach worked best varied across different subgroups of consumers.

Many large banks retreated from some types of retail and small business lending. In part, this pullback was likely to due to a combination of the increased riskiness of these loans and the tightening of bank capital requirements. However, fintech lenders have been expanding into some of the same spaces, raising the question of whether the reduced lending by big banks was due in part to competitive pressure from fintech firms. It also raises the question of whether smaller banks were also retreating due to increased competition or expanding to help fill the void left by the larger banks. Two papers examine the rise of fintechs in two different lending markets and analyze what developments in these markets tell us about big versus small banks.

Professors Taylor Begley from Washington University in St. Louis and Kandarp Srinivasan from Northeastern University focus on mortgage market lending in their paper “Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banking: A Sideshow?” [PDF]. Their paper observes that fintech lenders rely largely on government-supported loan securitization programs such as those of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration. However, not all mortgage loans qualify for these programs in large part due to limits on the maximum size of the loan. Thus, fintech mortgage lenders were able to take nationwide market share in government-supported loans from the large banks. Nevertheless, it was the small banks that stepped in to provide mortgage loans that did not qualify for government-supported securitization. As a result, small banks have proven more responsive to the withdrawal of bigger banks and have maintained nearly constant market share through the period from 2009 to 2013.

The paper “What Is Fueling the Fintech Lending Revolution? Local Banking Market Structure and Fintech Market Penetration” [PDF] by professor Tetyana Balyuk of Emory University and professors Allen N. Berger and John Hackney from the University of South Carolina studies the rise of fintech lenders in small business lending. The authors find that fintech lenders’ market penetration is associated with lower small bank market shares, consistent with the decline of small banks over time and helping to explain fintech lenders’ success. They also find evidence that small banks tend to make safer loans than fintech firms. Finally, looking at the contribution of different lenders to employment, the authors find that fintech matters most for the smallest businesses, small banks matter more for larger small businesses, and neither matters for large businesses.

As fintech lending has grown, the question of whether it is good for consumers has also arisen. This may be a trick question. We have long known that if people are given a choice, some will use it wisely and others will not. Last year’s CEAR–CenFIS conference provided some evidence of how consumers manage their finances after borrowing from fintech lenders (see “Winners and Losers of Marketplace Lending: Evidence From Borrower Credit Dynamics” [PDF] and “The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending and Personal Bankruptcy” [PDF]). This year, Federal Reserve Board economists Traci Mach and Timothy Dore provided additional evidence in the paper “Marketplace Lending and Consumer Credit Outcomes: Evidence from Prosper” [PDF]. The authors were able to match application data from one lender to credit bureau data. They find that relative to applicants without an origination, borrowers see an increase in their credit scores and total debt, but decreases in their delinquency rates. The increase in mortgage debt balances was especially notable.

An important issue for any type of lender is its access to funding. Banks fund their loans with a combination: (a) their own liabilities in the form of deposits and other market borrowings and (b) loan sales to investors. The risk with on-balance-sheet lending is that too many loans will turn bad, the bank will suffer large loan losses, and depositors will flee the bank. Although some fintech firms fund loans with their own liabilities, most of their loans are funded by sales to investors. The advantage to the loan originator of selling loans is that, if the loan goes bad, the buyers of the loan bear the credit losses. However, such sales can lead to concerns that the bank or fintech originating a loan will not be as careful in underwriting and monitoring as they would be with the loans they retain on their own books. The result can be similar to that discussed in the Chava et al. paper, where originators have to reduce their lending volume.

One alternative that may have the effect of improving banks’ incentives and thereby mitigating investor concerns is that of having the bank retain part of the credit risk on the loans it sells. Professor Martin Hibbeln and graduate student Werner Osterkamp from the University of Duisburg-Essen study the effect of bank loan retention in their paper “The Impact of Skin in the Game on Bank Behavior in the Securitization Market” [PDF]. The authors exploit changes in European Union regulations to study loans sold by European banks in the securitization market. They find evidence that retention of part of the risk of a loan does not improve the quality of the loans being securitized.

Corporate governance

The role of shareholders in corporate governance is important for both financial and non-financial firms. The last few decades have seen shareholder governance power increasingly concentrated in institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds. Although a few of these institutional funds are explicitly focused on corporate governance issues, most are not. However, even the funds that are not focused on governance nevertheless have an interest in participating in governance decisions. The problem for these investors is how to keep up with the many issues requiring a shareholder vote. The answer for a large fraction of institutional investors is to seek information and advice from proxy advisory firms. The role of these advisory firms was the topic of Carnegie Mellon University professor Chester Spatt’s dinner speech titled “Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Market Failure, and Regulation” [PDF] (See also his related paper [PDF].)

Spatt observed that the importance of proxy advisory firms is easy to understand. All shareholders in a firm face the same questions, and there is similarity in questions across firms. However, any one shareholder obtains only a small fraction of the gains from better governance while potentially paying all of the costs of analysis. In this setting, proxy advisory firms are a predictable market solution to a potential free-riding problem. The increasing returns to scale that arise in this setting also naturally lends itself to the development of a monopoly—or in this case, a duopoly. The result can be reduced incentives for the two proxy advisory firms to avoid factual mistakes and increased power for the advisers to impose their philosophy on firms. Spatt discussed a variety of steps the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken and further actions that could mitigate these concerns. However, the problem of what to do about the role of institutions and proxy advisers in corporate governance is one that may not be totally solvable, but rather requires careful management over time.

Conclusion

The post-crisis period has seen dramatic changes in both information technology and government regulation. The papers presented recently at a workshop at the Atlanta Fed analyzed a number of these changes and contribute to our understanding of how the financial system is likely to evolve in the future.

Larry D. Wall is executive director of the Center for Financial Innovation and Stability at the Atlanta Fed. The author thanks Brian Robertson for helpful comments. The view expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. If you wish to comment on this post, please email atl.nftv.mailbox@atl.frb.org.

¹ For further discussion on banks’ reporting of loan losses, see Larry’s recent post on changes to U.S. accounting rules.