Economy-Watching, USA: Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: April 2023 Update

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York]

A new reading of the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has been posted.

Estimates for March 2023

  • Global supply chain pressures decreased again in March, falling from 0.28 to 1.06 standard deviations below the index’s historical average.
  • There were significant downward contributions by many of the factors, with the largest negative contributions from European Area delivery times, European Area backlogs, and Taiwanese purchases.
  • The GSCPI’s recent movements suggest that global supply chain conditions have largely normalized after experiencing temporary setbacks around the turn of the year.

The GSCPI compiles more than two dozen metrics across seven economies—data on global transportation costs and regional manufacturing conditions—to track shifts in supply chain pressures from 1997 to the present.

The GSCPI is updated regularly at 10 AM ET on the fourth business day of each month.

The GSCPI is a product of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Applied Macroeconomics and Econometrics Center.

View the index.

Economics-Watching: FRBSF Economic Letter

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco]

Are Inflation Expectations Well Anchored in Mexico?

by Remy Beauregard, Jens H.E. Christensen, Eric Fischer and Simon Zhu

Price inflation has increased sharply since early 2021 in many countries, including Mexico. If sustained, high inflation in Mexico could raise questions about the ability of its central bank to bring inflation down to its 3% inflation target. However, analyzing the difference between market prices of nominal and inflation-indexed government bonds suggests investors’ long-term inflation expectations in Mexico are close to the central bank’s inflation target and are projected to remain so in coming years.

Inflation has risen substantially in many countries, including Mexico, since early 2021, driven in part by unique factors related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Sustained elevated inflation could be particularly challenging for inflation-targeting central banks in emerging economies given their higher macroeconomic uncertainty and greater sensitivity to external shocks compared with more developed economies. To examine this risk for a representative emerging economy affected by COVID-era disruptions in much the same way as the United States, we focus on Mexico, which has conducted monetary policy since 2002 according to an inflation targeting regime with a target rate for consumer price inflation of 3% per year.

In this Economic Letter, we assess whether recent higher inflation is leading businesses and households in Mexico to expect inflation to remain high over the long run. Specifically, we focus on what rising market-based measures of inflation compensation may imply about bond investors’ outlook for inflation. The rise in inflation compensation since spring 2021 could reflect three factors: an increase in investorsinflation expectations, an uptick in the premium investors demand for assuming inflation risk, or changes in other risk and liquidity premiums. We explore the relative importance of each of these factors using a novel dynamic term structure model of nominal and inflation-adjusted yields described in Beauregard et al. (2021, henceforth BCFZ). Overall, our results for five-year inflation expectations five years from now suggest Mexican bond investors’ long-term inflation expectations have been little affected by the recent rise in inflation. Instead, the rise in inflation compensation reflects a notable uptick in the inflation risk premium to the high end of its historical range. This suggests that, despite inflation expectations being little changed on average, some investors are particularly concerned about the risk that inflation will remain above expected levels.

The recent rise in Mexican inflation

Figure 1 shows the year-over-year change in the Mexican consumer price index (CPI) measured both by the headline CPI (green line) and the more stable core CPI (blue line) that strips out volatile food and energy prices. Also shown with a horizontal gray line is the 3% inflation target of the nation’s central bank, the Bank of Mexico.

Figure 1: Mexican consumer price index inflation
Mexican consumer price index inflation
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.

We note that Mexican CPI inflation has averaged somewhat above the Bank of Mexico’s target since its adoption in 2002. More importantly, CPI inflation in Mexico appears to have become more volatile and somewhat higher over the past five years. Although previous research by De Pooter et al. (2014) found inflation expectations in Mexico to be well anchored, the significant global economic dislocations caused by the coronavirus pandemic and related inflationary pressures could impact inflation expectations of businesses and households.

To assess the persistence of the recent rise in Mexican inflation, we turn to financial market data, which reflect forward-looking expectations among a large and diverse group of investors and financial market participants. Specifically, we consider prices of conventional fixed-coupon bonds that pay a nominal interest rate and inflation-indexed bonds that pay a real interest rate because their cash flows are adjusted with the change in the CPI and therefore maintain their purchasing power. Both types of securities are issued and guaranteed by the Mexican government.

The difference between nominal and real yields for bonds of the same maturity is known as breakeven inflation (BEI). This represents a market-based measure of inflation compensation used to assess financial market participants’ inflation expectations. Figure 2 shows BEI rates at different maturities, meaning annual average rates of inflation compensation between now and maturity, from 1 to 10 years at the end of March 2021 (green line) and at the end of November 2022 (blue line). The slightly upward-sloping BEI curve of close to 3% in 2021 contrasts with the higher downward-sloping BEI curve in 2022.

Figure 2: BEI curves for 1-year to 10-year Mexican bond maturities
BEI curves for 1-year to 10-year Mexican bond maturities
Source: Authors’ calculations using bond prices from Bloomberg.

The increase for shorter maturities, the left end of the 2022 BEI curve, is closely tied to the current high level of inflation and suggests inflation may remain elevated for some time. In contrast, the increase at longer maturities, the right end of the 2022 BEI curve, suggests that investors’ longer-term inflation expectations may be drifting above the Bank of Mexico’s inflation target. To better understand the shape and sources of variation of the BEI curve we use a yield curve model.

A yield curve model of nominal and real yields

Market-based measures of inflation compensation such as BEI rates contain three components. First, they include the average CPI inflation rate expected by bond investors, which is the focus here. Second is an inflation risk premium to compensate investors for the uncertainty of future inflation. This premium is embedded in nominal yields that provide no inflation protection. Third is the difference in relative market liquidity between standard fixed-coupon and inflation-indexed bonds. As discussed in BCFZ, both of these types of Mexican bonds are less liquid than U.S. Treasuries, and their prices therefore contain a discount to compensate investors for their liquidity risk. Neither the inflation risk premium nor the liquidity premiums are directly observable and must therefore be estimated.

To adjust for these challenges, we first use the nominal and real yields model developed in BCFZ to identify liquidity premiums in standard fixed-coupon and inflation-indexed bond prices as a function of the time since issuance and the remaining time to maturity. The time since issuance serves as a proxy for declining liquidity as, over time, a larger fraction of bonds gets locked into buy-and-hold strategies. We refer to the observed BEI net of estimated liquidity premiums as the adjusted BEI. In a second step, we then separate adjusted BEI into components representing investorsinflation expectations using a formula based on the absence of bond market arbitrage opportunities and the residual inflation risk premium.


To assess whether investorsinflation outlook has fundamentally changed, we follow De Pooter et al. (2014) and examine the five-year forward BEI rate that starts five years ahead, denoted 5yr5yr BEI. This is a horizon sufficiently long into the future that most transitory shocks to the economy can be expected to have vanished. Hence, the embedded inflation expectations are presumably less affected by current high inflation and pandemic-related transitory conditions and can therefore speak to the question about the anchoring of inflation expectations in Mexico.

Figure 3 shows the breakdown of 5yr5yr BEI into its various components according to our model. The dark blue line is the observed BEI, and the red line is the estimated adjusted BEI without liquidity risk premiums or other residual disturbances. The difference between these two measures of BEI—the yellow shaded area—represents the model’s estimate of the net liquidity premium or distortion of the observed BEI series due to risk premiums in both nominal and inflation-indexed bond prices. The adjusted BEI is entirely above the observed BEI, suggesting the liquidity risk distortions are systematically larger in the inflation-indexed bond prices, consistent with similar evidence from the U.S. Treasury market (Andreasen and Christensen 2016). Note that the net BEI liquidity premium widened around the financial turmoil in spring 2020 at the start of the pandemic and remains elevated.

Figure 3: Components of 5yr5yr breakeven inflation for Mexico
Components of 5yr5yr breakeven inflation for Mexico
Source: Survey forecasts from Consensus Economics and authors’ calculations using bond prices from Bloomberg.

The model also allows us to break down the adjusted BEI into an expected inflation component (light blue line) and the residual inflation risk premium (green line). Also shown is the Bank of Mexico’s 3% inflation target (gray horizontal line). For comparison, the figure also shows the 5yr5yr expected CPI inflation in Mexico reported semiannually in the Consensus Forecasts surveys (dark blue squares). We note that both observed and adjusted BEI have trended higher since the start of the pandemic in early 2020. Importantly, the breakdown indicates that long-term expected inflation in Mexico has remained stable, slightly above the 3% inflation target. As a result, the increase in BEI can be attributed to the inflation risk premium, which is at the high end of its historical range towards the end of our sample. Given the elevated levels of current inflation, this suggests some investors are concerned that inflation could remain elevated for longer than currently anticipated.

This raises the question of whether long-term inflation expectations in Mexico are likely to remain anchored near their current level going forward. To assess this risk, we simulate 10,000-factor paths over a three-year horizon using the estimated factors and factor dynamics as of November 2022—that is, the simulations are conditioned on the shapes of the nominal and real yield curves and investors’ embedded forward-looking expectations as of November 2022. These simulated factor paths are then converted into forecasts of 5yr5yr expected inflation. Figure 4 shows the median projection (solid green line) and the 5th and 95th percentile values (dashed green lines) for the simulated 5yr5yr expected inflation over a three-year horizon.

Figure 4: Three-year projections of 5yr5yr expected inflation, Mexico
Three-year projections of 5yr5yr expected inflation, Mexico
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Our model projections indicate that long-term inflation expectations are likely to deviate only modestly from their current level, consistent with the variation of the historical estimates back to 2009. Overall, our findings represent tangible evidence that long-term inflation expectations remain well-anchored in Mexico despite the recent rise in inflation.


Global inflation pressures in the aftermath of the pandemic have raised fears about a sustained increase in the level of inflation around the world, which could be particularly challenging for developing economies with monetary policy guided by an inflation target. In this Letter, to assess this risk for a major emerging economy with an established inflation target, we examine the variation in Mexico’s nominal and inflation-indexed bond prices, while accounting for their respective liquidity risk premiums. This allows us to estimate Mexican bond investors’ inflation expectations and associated risk premiums. The results reveal that the inflation risk premium has pushed up Mexican BEI rates in recent years, while investors’ long-term inflation expectations have remained stable near the Bank of Mexico’s inflation target despite the rise in inflation.

The policy path needed to keep inflation expectations anchored in a situation with highly elevated inflation may involve tradeoffs. The Bank of Mexico responded early and forcefully to inflation pressures starting in June 2021 and has indicated further tightening of the policy rate would likely be appropriate to bring inflation back down to target over the medium term. This could lower economic growth in Mexico in both 2022 and 2023. On the other hand, history shows that it may be difficult and costly to reverse extended departures from announced inflation targets. Thus, it will be important for central banks with inflation-targeting frameworks to monitor measures of long-term inflation expectations in the current situation.

Remy Beauregard
Economics Ph.D. student, University of California at Davis

Jens H.E. Christensen
Research Advisor, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Eric Fischer
Financial modeling and quantitative analytics principal, Markets Group, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Simon Zhu
Economics Ph.D. student, University of Texas at Austin


Andreasen, Martin M. and Jens H.E. Christensen. 2016. “TIPS Liquidity and the Outlook for Inflation.” [PDFFRBSF Economic Letter 2016-35 (November 21).

Beauregard, Remy, Jens H.E. Christensen, Eric Fischer, and Simon Zhu. 2021. “Inflation Expectations and Risk Premia in Emerging Bond Markets: Evidence from Mexico.” [PDF] FRB San Francisco Working Paper 2021-08.

De Pooter, Michiel, Patrice Robitaille, Ian Walker, and Michael Zdinak. 2014. “Are Long-Term Inflation Expectations Well Anchored in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico?” [PDFInternational Journal of Central Banking 10(2), pp. 337–400.

[Archived PDF]

Bond-Watching: Corporate Bond Market Distress Index, July 2022

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York]

The Corporate Bond Market Distress Index (CMDI) has updated with data through July 2022 on the New York Fed’s public website.

The CMDI uses weekly metrics to construct an aggregate index of corporate bond market conditions for both the primary and the secondary markets.

The CMDI will be updated regularly at 10:00 a.m. ET on the last Wednesday of each month. Data are available for download. Sign up to receive alerts when the New York Fed posts new content.

July 2022 Update

Access the Corporate Bond Market Distress Index.

Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: July 2022 Update

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Applied Macroeconomics and Econometrics Center]

A new reading of the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has been posted.

The GSCPI compiles more than two dozen metrics across seven economies—data on global transportation costs and regional manufacturing conditions—to track shifts in supply chain pressures from 1997 to the present.

The GSCPI is updated regularly at 10:00am ET on the fourth business day of each month.

Estimates for June 2022
  • Global supply chain pressures declined in June, continuing the decrease we observed for May.
  • The June decline was mostly due to a large decrease in Chinese supply delivery times.
  • The moves in the GSCPI over the past three months suggest that although global supply chain pressures have been decreasing, they remain at historically high levels.

The GSCPI is a product of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Applied Macroeconomics and Econometrics Center.

View the Index.

Economy-Watching: Supply Chain Pressures

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Applied Macroeconomics and Econometrics Center]

Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: June 2022 Update

A new reading of the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has been posted.

The GSCPI compiles more than two dozen metrics across seven economies—data on global transportation costs and regional manufacturing conditions—to track shifts in supply chain pressures from 1997 to the present.

The GSCPI will be updated regularly at 10 AM ET on the fourth business day of each month. The index was first introduced through a Liberty Street Economics post in early January 2022 [archived PDF], with subsequent blog posts in late January 2022 [archived PDF] and March 2022 [archived PDF].

The GSCPI is a product of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Applied Macroeconomics and Econometrics Center.

View the Index.

Research Update: Oil Price Dynamics Report, March 28

Our oil price decomposition, reported weekly, examines what’s behind recent fluctuations in oil prices: demand factors, supply factors, or some combination of the two?

(from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York)


Oil prices increased over the past week, mostly owing to lower supply.

Read the full report [Archived PDF].

View the data [Archived Excel XLS].

Economy Watching: Philadelphia Fed

from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:

Fed President Patrick Harker Says It Will “Soon” Be Time to Taper Asset Purchases

Philadelphia Fed President Patrick Harker told a virtual audience at the Prosperity Caucus in Washington, D.C., that the asset purchases once necessary during the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic are no longer effective as a tool for supporting the economy. He also said the U.S. economy created millions of jobs in recent months, but “we just can’t fill them.”

Economic Outlook: Growth Despite Constraints

Good evening! Thanks so much for having me. I understand that when this group meets in person there is usually pizza involved — so I intend to collect on that debt next time we do this in the flesh.

I plan to offer a few remarks about the state of the national economy and the path of Federal Reserve policy. Then we can move to our Q&A, which I’m really looking forward to.

But before I do that, I need to give you the standard Fed disclaimer: The views I express today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of anyone else on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or in the Federal Reserve System.

Fed Structure

I know this group encompasses a very diverse crowd — we have everyone from House staffers to Senate staffers here. So, just in case anyone doesn’t know, I want to begin by giving you a very brief explanation of what, exactly, a regional Federal Reserve Bank is. Our nation’s central bank, after all, is quite unusual — unique, even — in its design.

The configuration of the Federal Reserve System — a central bank with a decentralized structure — owes its existence to the 1913 Federal Reserve Act. It is something of a testament to old-fashioned American compromise and reflects the unique demands of the United States and our economy.

The System consists of a Board of Governors, which sits in Washington, and 12 regional Banks around the country.

The Board seats seven governors, including the Chair. Each regional Bank has its own president and board of directors, which is made up of business, banking, and community leaders from the area. Fundamentally, this provides the Fed with a perspective — within each District — of the sectors and issues that make the region tick. Mine is the Third District, which encompasses eastern Pennsylvania, South Jersey, and the state of Delaware. We’re the smallest District geographically, but I like to think we punch above our weight.

The FOMC, which is responsible for monetary policy, is composed of the Fed’s governors and regional Bank presidents. Regional Bank presidents don’t always get to vote. Most of us rotate into a voting position every three years, but the governors always vote, as does the president of the New York Fed. New York, owing to the presence of Wall Street, enjoys something of a “first among equals” status within the System.

While the rest of us don’t always vote, we do always represent our Districts and play a part in the discussion. If you were at a normal FOMC meeting, you probably wouldn’t be able to tell a voting member until the end of the meeting when it’s time to raise hands. Everybody contributes.

The Fed’s decentralized nature is, in my view, a unique strength. We’re making national policy, but we’re doing it for an enormous country, and the averages of economic data can obscure realities on the ground. Conditions look very different in Philadelphia, Dover, or Washington than they do in Dallas, Salt Lake City, or Honolulu. This System gives a voice to a range of localities and sectors. It also allows us to focus on regional issues within each Bank’s District.

The United States has a unique set of needs. It’s easy to forget that we’re an outlier because we’re such a massive country: Only Russia and Canada are bigger geographically, only China and India have larger populations, and no one country has a bigger economy, at least for now. And that economy is vast, spreading across sectors and natural resources in a way that is not typical of other nations.

So, it makes sense that we have a System that feeds back information from around the country.

The State of the Economy

And what that information is telling us is that, for the past 18 months, the economy has moved in tandem with the waxing and waning of the COVID-19 pandemic. During periods when case rates and hospitalizations have declined, the economy has surged as American consumers have voted with their wallets. When COVID-19 risks abate, more Americans dine out at restaurants, check in to hotels, and fill up airplanes. Those are important categories of spending in a country where consumption makes up about 70 percent of total economic activity. In the second quarter of this year, for instance, GDP grew at a very healthy annualized rate of around 6.7 percent as case rates plummeted.

And, of course, the opposite occurs during periods when the virus spikes. When the Delta variant of COVID-19 erupted, fomenting the country’s fourth major wave of the pandemic, things started moving sideways. Consumer confidence tanked, and large industries like hospitality and leisure stagnated at best. So for this quarter, we can expect growth to come in at an annualized rate of around 3 percent, a sharp slowdown from earlier this year. 

But there are reasons to be sanguine that the country’s recovery from this wave of COVID-19 may prove more durable than in the past and that we can avoid a fifth wave. And that is because more than half of the country is fully vaccinated. Getting more shots into arms will save lives and aid the recovery by reducing the size and severity of future spikes. The Delta variant has also concentrated minds: It seems to have not only persuaded more Americans to get shots on their own, but it also pushed more corporations and institutions to mandate their employees to get vaccinated. That is cause for optimism.

Filling me with less optimism is the persistent constraints the economy is operating under.

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed how fragile many of our supply chains are. We’re now experiencing shortages of crucial parts like computer chips, which has hobbled not only the production of cars and trucks, but also comparatively smaller durable goods like home appliances. My recent experience attempting to purchase a printer — there were essentially none at my local electronics store — testifies to that. And good luck trying to find a new washing machine or dishwasher.

These supply chain constraints are rippling through the entire economy. Manufacturers in our region have reported having to curtail production because of difficulties securing raw materials. We’re also seeing low inventory of everything from shoes to backpacks to even chicken wings, which is a particularly troubling development as the NFL season is picking up. Unfortunately, there are indications that these constraints could persist for a couple of more years.

There’s another input lacking in supply as well, further constraining the economy: labor. It isn’t true, as was widely reported, that the economy only created 194,000 jobs in September. In reality, the U.S. economy has created many millions of jobs in recent months — we just can’t fill them. Indeed, job openings are at record highs, hitting nearly 10.5 million at the end of August. Simultaneously, more people are quitting their jobs, and the rate at which open positions are being filled is continuing to slow.

It seems that a combination of factors — trouble accessing childcare or eldercare, lingering fears about the virus, the rise in equities and home values spurring people to retire, and perhaps a general revaluation of life choices — is persuading a lot of Americans to stay on the sidelines even as the economy has reopened. And notably, the elimination of extra federal unemployment benefits has not — at least not yet — appeared to nudge people back into the workforce. I do expect that will change eventually and especially as other forbearance programs run out.

So, where does all of this leave us? For 2021, I would expect GDP growth to come in around 5.5 percent, which is a downward revision from before Delta took hold. Growth will then moderate to about 3.5 percent in 2022, and 2.5 percent in 2023. Inflation, meanwhile, should come in around 4 percent for 2021, though I do see upside risk here. After that, our modal forecast — that is, the average of all of our forecasts — calls for inflation of a bit over 2 percent for 2022 and right at 2 percent in 2023.

Fed Policy

In terms of monetary policy, I am in the camp that believes it will soon be time to begin slowly and methodically — frankly, boringly — taper our $120 billion in monthly purchases of Treasury bills and mortgage-backed securities. This comes down to the efficacy of these purchases as a tool.

They were necessary to keep markets functioning during the acute phase of the crisis. But to the extent that we are still dealing with a labor force issue, the problem lies on the supply side, not with demand. You can’t go into a restaurant or drive down a commercial strip without noticing a sea of “Help Wanted” signs. Asset purchases aren’t doing much — or anything — to ameliorate that.

After we taper our asset purchases, we can begin to think about raising the federal funds rate. But I wouldn’t expect any hikes to interest rates until late next year or early 2023, unless the inflation picture changes dramatically.


Given the strong headwinds facing the economy, it is a testament to its underlying strength that growth continues at a relatively robust pace. That is a tribute, as always, to the ingenuity and tenacity of our people, especially in the face of huge challenges.

Thank you very much again for having me. And now let’s move on to questions.