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Tag: credit crunch

Poly-Awareness, Checks & Commercial History

In an era moving towards electronic payment systems and replacing physical currency, it can be educational to look back at checks and how we arrived here. As Winston Churchill observed, “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.”

In looking at history, it is just as important to study commercial practices as well as government leaders and military conquests.

…In the ten years following 1850, the world production of gold was ten times greater than in the ten preceding years. As is well known, the French had always preferred metal currency, and welcomed the gold with a special enthusiasm; the state struck an impressive quantity of coins, striking five hundred million in 1845, for the world’s gold found its way more readily to France where it fetched the highest price. The circulation of gold increased in other European countries also, and the banks of issue, in particular, filed their vaults. In this gold rush the English were more cautious after their long acquaintance with problems of values, and the upheaval in the gold market brought hardly any changes in the prices of the metal there. It is true England also minted new coins, but took advantage of it chiefly to establish her banking system more firmly. The influx of gold, which was exclusively Australian, had at first little effect on the prices of goods, but it developed credit with a paper currency. The minting of this money increased England’s metallic circulation by almost fifty percent, but the use of the banknote and especially of the cheque increased by a far higher proportion. The use of the cheque became so widespread in England that shopkeepers and farmers adopted it as the only possible way of doing business although it was almost unknown on the continent. Cheques were often used for amounts of less than two pounds. Even if he had an income of only fifty pounds a year, the Englishman immediately opened a bank account. In 1885, payments in metal currency represented only one per cent of the London Bank payments and six per cent of those in Manchester.

The Act of 1826 granted complete freedom of issue, except in an area of twenty-six miles around London, where the privilege of the Bank was absolute. There was a good deal of argument about the exact meaning of this privilege; for example the question arose as to whether provincial banks could open an office in London, the main centre of business, without losing their rights of issue.

When it was ruled that they could not, many banks nevertheless settled in London and forfeited their privilege of printing. Only the Scottish banks put up a firmer resistance to this extension of the privileges of the Bank of England. On the other hand, the right of issue was losing much of its significance, since the remarkable development of payment by cheque meant that there was less resort to the note. Settlements between the great deposit banks were made neither in metal nor in notes, but were transacted in the accounts of a clearing house, which dealt with transactions amounting to several hundreds of thousands of pounds every year.

The London and Westminster Bank, one of the most important of the English private deposit banks, soon became a model for every bank in Europe, for it had a reserve capital of less than three million pounds, and held approximately twenty-two million in deposits. Such influential private banks, established as joint stock companies, had to resort to the Bank of England only rarely, so the latter did not need to be unduly anxious about its insignificant gold reserves which were barely one-third of those held by the Banque de France. The privilege of issuing paper money, a relic of the royal right of minting money, was therefore bypassed to all intents and purposes by the gradual improvement of English banking procedure. At the same time the Bank of England enjoyed a monopoly of issue which it was in process of acquiring without the intervention of the state, since the development of banking led all the provincial banks to settle in London, near the clearing house. It was a masterpiece of liberalism to coordinate the free activity of the English economy in the capital without any pressure from the political power. In this way financial centralization was achieved purely by private initiative once the need for it had become apparent.

French banking evolved on very different lines. In order to meet the credit crisis, the provisional government had recommended the establishment of departmental banks and of trade credit societies when it was reforming the Banque de France. Most of these establishments, whose capital was to be provided partly by the state and the departments, were stillborn, while others lingered on for a month or two before wasting away. On the other hand, the Comptoir d’Escompte de la Seine became a private concern, and flourished under the name of the Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris. The Banque du Département du Nord, which became the Crédit du Nord, was equally fortunate, as were several trade banks, particularly that of the Entrepreneurs de Travaux Publics. The unusual feature about the composition of the Comptoir National d’Escompte was that the Council of State had allowed it to set up as a joint stock company. Within a few years the Crédit Mobilier, the Crédit Industriel et Commercial, the Société Générale, the Société des Dépôtes et Comptes Courants, and other companies were established to benefit from this new way of accumulating capital.

Not all these new banks were as prudent as their English counterparts by any means and this point is worth dwelling on. After 1848 the Banque de France had the monopoly of issuing notes for the whole of France, because the local issuing banks created by Napoleon I and Louis-Philippe had been absorbed by the Banque de France, whose notes were the only ones in circulation. It was the state which had made this decision and had settled the problem of monetary unity by authoritarian measures. A few bankers, under the Second Empire, protested against the right of monopoly exercised by the Banque de France, which had been imposed on the whole of the country by the state. Very little use was made of payment by cheque, and compensation was meagre. The wide circulation of metal currency was a sign of a restricted paper currency, but this meant that credit was scarce and was based entirely on the Banque de France. The latter, taking no risks, consequently piled up in its coffers considerable reserves of precious metals, proud of the fact that it could now maintain a steady discount rate more easily than England. It also gained great satisfaction from being the gold-controller of Europe. Whenever a sudden drastic rise in the English bank rate sent businessmen, and even the Bank of England itself, as we have seen, hastening to Paris in search of precious metals, it was to the Banque de France that they turned. Although it was attacked by those who accused it of stifling credit, on the other hand it was defended by those who found its caution reassuring. It was a difference of opinion which further enlivened the quarrel between the Pereires and the Rothschilds.

As we know, Jewish bankers played a vital part in the building of the railways. Pereire, a railway enthusiast, and Rothschild, the largest holder of free capital in France, had at first been prepared to undertake the great task in complete agreement. Rothschild, content with holding the Nord and the English connections, was one of the directors whose word carried most weight in the Banque de France, while the Pereire brothers, their heads still full of Saint-Simonist projects, were interested in vast plans covering Austria, Spain and the Mediterranean. They financed the great development of the economy of the south although even so they were obliged to open a credit institution, the well-known Crédit Mobilier. But because they could not use it for the issue of paper notes, and had tied up the funds entrusted to them too quickly, the Pereires embarked on a struggle to deprive the Bank of its privilege of issue. They believed that the mere right of minting money would enable them to possess the wide credit necessary for the bold financial policy on which they were launching out. It so happened that when Savoy was annexed to France, the Banque de Chambéry brought its banknotes and its privileges within French frontiers. The Pereires and their friends seized the shares of this bank and tried to turn its notes into rivals of those of the central bank. The Banque de France then asserted its rights, Chambéry lost its rights of issue, and soon afterwards the Crédit Mobilier went into liquidation.

This incident occasioned a great quarrel between theorists for or against privilege; it was above all a demonstration of the solidity of the rights the Bank had acquired, while no-one doubted the right of the state to confirm its privileges any longer. This situation was all the more paradoxical since the state was in the hands of Napoleon III who was a firm supporter of the Pereires and the Crédit Mobilier. The underlying cause of this paradox lay in French scepticism about cheques, for the development of bank money lagged more than half a century behind England. It was to be chiefly the work of Henri Germain, founder of the Crédit Lyonnais. His patron of 1863 was mainly anxious to attract large deposits by guaranteeing them against theft and fire so that he insisted on the effective help the Bank could give industrialists and merchants by insuring their cash service itself. By making wise use of these deposits and by a cautious policy, the Crédit Lyonnais was able to open branches in Paris and Marseilles, so that it was soon as powerful as the Crédit Industriel et Commercial and then outstripped it. It even surpassed the Comptoir d’Escompte, and soon the Crédit Lyonnais became the leading French deposit bank. From 1860 it was the major bank to introduce cheques.

But there is little reason for surprise in the difficulties encountered by the cheque between 1860 and 1870.

The Banque de France was regarded as the most reliable of all issuing authorities, and French specie reserves as the most powerful stock of gold in the world; between notes and gold as the two methods of payment, there was very little room for the cheque. It is difficult to believe that France’s reserves could not have kept the deposit banks generously supplied, perhaps as much as, and even more than, the English reserves. But it kept a good part of its cash-balance in gold, which held up the full development of French credit institutions until the closing years of the nineteenth century.

In England there was security and in France hesitation, but in Germany there was an irresistible wave of enthusiasm which led to the rapid growth of credit institutions from 1840. There were a great many note-issuing banks in the Germany of the confederation, because each prince had his own currency. Hamburg had one of the soundest banks of issue, whose marc banco was esteemed throughout Europe and served as a standard for the whole of Germany. Nuremberg still had its old seventeenth-century bank and its florin, while a large number of private establishments were also manufacturing notes with a restricted circulation. In this scheme of things the Bank of Prussia held a pre-eminent position which was strengthened by the place Prussia had assumed in the Zollverein, but it still could not contest the superiority of Hamburg. In short, the legal position of the German banks was similar to that of the English, in that there was plurality of issue.

Bank money, and banknotes, increased in competition with each other, and the future of the four great and famous banks which were to dominate the destiny of capitalist Germany after 1880 had already begun to take shape.

The Dresner Bank was connected with the progress of the iron industry in the Rhineland, and particularly of Essen and Krupps. The Deutsche Bank operated in the countries of central Europe. The Darmstädter Bank and the Disconto Gesellschaft carved out a place for themselves; indeed bills on the latter increased from six to forty million marks between 1855 and 1862.

Charles Morazé, The Triumph of the Middle Classes: A Political and Social History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Anchor Books, 1968, pages 291-297.

Notice that in the discussion above, events are never monocausal. They are always part of a swirling tornado of change. If you become accustomed to this, the way the world works and the way the world changes will become more accessible to you.

For example, “The use of the cheque became so widespread in England that shopkeepers and farmers adopted it as the only possible way of doing business although it was almost unknown on the continent. Cheques were often used for amounts of less than two pounds.”

Also notice, “…soon the Crédit Lyonnais became the leading French deposit bank. From 1860 it was the major bank to introduce cheques.”

This is an example of poly-awareness, the core of meta-intelligence.

[Max Weber, in his book General Economic History, points out that the words “cheque” and “exchequer” derive from the same root.]

Author Richard MelsonPosted on April 9, 2026April 23, 2026Categories EssaysTags 17th century, 1840, 1845, 1848, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1862, 1863, 1870, 1880, 1885, 19th century, Australia, Austria, authoritarianism, bank, bank account, Bank of France, Bank of Prussia, bank reserves, banking in the United Kingdom, banknote, bullion coin, business, business magnate, capitalism, central bank, Central Europe, centralisation, cheque, clearing house (finance), coin, commerce, company, Comptoir national d’escompte de Paris, conquest, Conseil d’État, credit, credit crunch, Crédit Industriel et Commercial, Crédit Lyonnais, Crédit Mobilier, currency, Darmstädter Bank, deposit (finance), Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Mark, Disconto-Gesellschaft, Doubleday (publisher), economy, economy of England, England, English people, Essen, Europe, exchequer, finance, financial capital, financial transaction, florin, France, French people, General Economic History, German Confederation, Germany, gold, gold as an investment, gold reserve, goods, government, Hamburg, Hamburg mark, Henri Germain, History, history of the steel industry (1850–1970), income, insurance, Isaac Pereire, James Mayer de Rothschild, Jews, joint-stock company, Krupp steelworks, liberalism, liquidation, London, Louis Philippe I, Manchester, Marseilles, Max Weber, Mediterranean Sea, merchant, metal, military, mint (facility), mobile payment, money, monopoly, Napoleon, Napoleon III, Nuremberg, paper money, Paris, payment, payment system, Pereire brothers, Pound sterling, power (social and political), precious metal, price, private bank, provisional government, Prussia, rail transport, Rhineland, Rothschild family, Saint-Simonianism, Savoy, Second French Empire, settlement (finance), skepticism, Société des Dépôtes et Comptes Courants, Spain, state (polity), The Triumph of the Middle Classes, trade credit, Westminster Bank, Zollverein

Economics—Atlanta Fed’s November Notes from the Vault

Financial System of the Future

Notes from the Vault
Larry D. Wall
November 2019

The financial services business is an information technology business that operates in an environment with substantial government involvement. The state of both technology and government intervention have evolved considerably since the financial crisis that began in 2007, with potentially large implications for the future financial system. With that in mind, the Atlanta Fed recently hosted the workshop Financial System of the Future, which was cosponsored by the Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR) at Georgia State University.

This post reviews many of the papers and presentations from the workshop dealing with both financial regulation and innovations in financial technology. It also reviews one of the keynote speeches on the important topic of corporate governance. A companion macroblog post summarizes the workshop’s discussion of digital currencies.

Post-crisis changes in regulation

Some banks had difficulty obtaining adequate funding from private financial markets during the crisis of 2007–08, despite being well capitalized by that period’s capital standards. In part, these funding difficulties were a result of bank depositors fearing that banks had not adequately provisioned for their credit losses.

A paper by University of Michigan professors Thomas Flanagan and Amiyatosh Purnanandam examines the question “Why Do Banks Hide Losses?” [PDF] with a particular focus on the role of shareholder monitoring and management incentives. One problem in conducting such a study is that of separating bad investment decisions from deceptive accounting. This paper exploits an unexpected change in regulation in India to help provide such separation. This regulatory change forced all of the banks in that country to detail the extent of their underreporting of loan losses in 2015. The paper finds that weaker shareholder monitoring and higher-power executive compensation contracts are associated with more underreporting of loan losses.1 This paper helps us to understand how banks exploit accounting discretion over loan losses and reinforces the importance of supervisory oversight.

The funding problems encountered by U.S. banks led to runs and ultimately the collapse of a few banks, but these problems had a significant effect on the operations of some banks that survived. One measure of the vulnerability of a bank to a funding shock was its reliance on uninsured, wholesale deposits from large institutions. Professors Sudheer Chava of Georgia Institute of Technology, Rohan Ganduri of Emory University, Linghang Zeng of Babson College, and graduate student Nikhil Paradkar of Georgia Tech examine one effect of these shocks in their paper “Shocked by Bank Funding Shocks: Evidence from 500 Million Consumer Credit Cards” [PDF]. The paper finds that banks that were more exposed to wholesale funding shocks made larger cuts in consumer credit lines than other banks. The authors further find that these cutbacks were made to the most credit-constrained customers (those with lower credit scores and higher utilization of their credit line). The results also suggest that these credit-constrained consumers responded by cutting back their consumption. Overall, these results provide additional support for regulatory policies intended to strengthen banks so that they can continue lending through future crises.

The Federal Reserve was created in 1913 in large part to provide a source of liquidity during periods of stress in bank lending markets. Yet banks proved surprisingly resistant to borrowing from the Fed’s discount window at the start of the funding problems in the fall of 2007. In an attempt to overcome this reluctance to borrow, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. A paper by professors Yunzhi Hu of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Hanzhe Zhang from Michigan State University examines the TAF in a paper titled “Overcoming Borrowing Stigma: The Design of Lending-of-Last-Resort Policies” [PDF]. This paper develops a simple model in which TAF funding is preferred by stronger banks because the funds are only available with a delay (that is, the funds will not help a bank facing an immediate run) and because TAF gives stronger banks the potential to borrow at lower costs. The paper also provides evidence that when both the discount window and TAF were available, the weakest banks borrowed from the discount window and the relatively stronger banks bid for TAF funds. The results of this study may help to inform the Fed’s policies on the provision of emergency liquidity in the future.

In the post-crisis period, the bank supervisors agreed to adopt new liquidity rules and strengthen existing capital requirements at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A paper by Harvard University professor Daniel Roberts and Federal Reserve Bank of New York economists Asani Sarkar and Or Shachar examines the Basel liquidity requirements in the paper “Bank Liquidity Creation, Systemic Risk, and Basel Liquidity Regulations” [PDF]. The paper finds that the new regulation has the cost of reducing bank liquidity creation in normal times but also results in more resilient banks in a crisis. The authors estimate both the costs and benefits of the regulation and find that the benefits in terms of a more stable financial system exceed the costs of the reduction in liquidity.

Josef Schroth, an economist at the Bank of Canada, analyzes the question of how regulators could use capital regulation to smooth bank lending through a recession and financial crisis in his paper “Macroprudential Policy with Capital Buffers” [PDF]. Banks in his model hold sufficient capital in most periods but have insufficient capital to retain uninsured market funding during crises, which leads to severe credit crunches. Bank regulators can smooth lending by requiring banks to hold more capital during good times, also allowing banks to operate with reduced capital during a crisis and rebuild their capital gradually after a crisis. The paper’s findings are consistent with the Basel III’s creation of a capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital buffer.

Issues related to bank capital have been the subject of ongoing discussion among academics, bankers, and regulators since the crisis. Bank of Finland economists Gene Ambrocio and Esa Jokivuolle, along with professors Iftekhar Hasan from Fordham University and Kim Ristolainen from the University of Turku, surveyed the views of banking and finance academics and reported the results in the paper “Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views” [PDF] (slide deck [PDF]). The survey obtained results from 149 leading academic researchers. It found that most respondents believe that higher capital ratios would reduce the likelihood of a crisis and the social costs associated with a crisis. Most respondents thought an increase of 5 percentage points in capital would increase the average cost of capital and reduce bank lending. However, a majority said that this reduction in lending would result in “minimal to no change” in economic activity.

Fintech lending

Banks have historically been important suppliers of credit to consumers and small businesses. However, since the crisis, lending by some fintech firms to these borrowers has grown rapidly. The conference addressed a variety of questions such as the sources of competitive advantage to fintech lenders; competition between fintech lenders, small banks, and large banks; and the impact of fintech lending on consumers. Additionally, the conference looked at post-crisis changes in bank securitization rules, which may have some relevance to fintech lenders’ efforts to fund their loans.

Banks, especially large banks, have long used statistical analysis to help them predict the credit riskiness of consumers and small businesses. However, fintech firms have promoted their use of machine learning techniques as resulting in better credit analysis. Economist J. Christina Wang and former research associate Charles B. Perkins from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston explore the value added of some machine learning techniques in their paper “How Magic a Bullet Is Machine Learning for Credit Analysis? An Exploration with Fintech Lending Data” [PDF]. In particular, they examine the contribution of tree-based models using data from LendingClub, a fintech lender. Tree-based models provide easily understood decision rules that are valuable for demonstrating compliance with U.S. fair lending rules. The results indicate that tree-based machine learning improves prediction accuracy, in part by uncovering notable interactive effects. These models benefit from additional data (albeit only up to about 5,000 observations) and from the addition of more predictors. However, exactly which tree-based approach worked best varied across different subgroups of consumers.

Many large banks retreated from some types of retail and small business lending. In part, this pullback was likely to due to a combination of the increased riskiness of these loans and the tightening of bank capital requirements. However, fintech lenders have been expanding into some of the same spaces, raising the question of whether the reduced lending by big banks was due in part to competitive pressure from fintech firms. It also raises the question of whether smaller banks were also retreating due to increased competition or expanding to help fill the void left by the larger banks. Two papers examine the rise of fintechs in two different lending markets and analyze what developments in these markets tell us about big versus small banks.

Professors Taylor Begley from Washington University in St. Louis and Kandarp Srinivasan from Northeastern University focus on mortgage market lending in their paper “Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banking: A Sideshow?” [PDF]. Their paper observes that fintech lenders rely largely on government-supported loan securitization programs such as those of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration. However, not all mortgage loans qualify for these programs in large part due to limits on the maximum size of the loan. Thus, fintech mortgage lenders were able to take nationwide market share in government-supported loans from the large banks. Nevertheless, it was the small banks that stepped in to provide mortgage loans that did not qualify for government-supported securitization. As a result, small banks have proven more responsive to the withdrawal of bigger banks and have maintained nearly constant market share through the period from 2009 to 2013.

The paper “What Is Fueling the Fintech Lending Revolution? Local Banking Market Structure and Fintech Market Penetration” [PDF] by professor Tetyana Balyuk of Emory University and professors Allen N. Berger and John Hackney from the University of South Carolina studies the rise of fintech lenders in small business lending. The authors find that fintech lenders’ market penetration is associated with lower small bank market shares, consistent with the decline of small banks over time and helping to explain fintech lenders’ success. They also find evidence that small banks tend to make safer loans than fintech firms. Finally, looking at the contribution of different lenders to employment, the authors find that fintech matters most for the smallest businesses, small banks matter more for larger small businesses, and neither matters for large businesses.

As fintech lending has grown, the question of whether it is good for consumers has also arisen. This may be a trick question. We have long known that if people are given a choice, some will use it wisely and others will not. Last year’s CEAR–CenFIS conference provided some evidence of how consumers manage their finances after borrowing from fintech lenders (see “Winners and Losers of Marketplace Lending: Evidence From Borrower Credit Dynamics” [PDF] and “The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending and Personal Bankruptcy” [PDF]). This year, Federal Reserve Board economists Traci Mach and Timothy Dore provided additional evidence in the paper “Marketplace Lending and Consumer Credit Outcomes: Evidence from Prosper” [PDF]. The authors were able to match application data from one lender to credit bureau data. They find that relative to applicants without an origination, borrowers see an increase in their credit scores and total debt, but decreases in their delinquency rates. The increase in mortgage debt balances was especially notable.

An important issue for any type of lender is its access to funding. Banks fund their loans with a combination: (a) their own liabilities in the form of deposits and other market borrowings and (b) loan sales to investors. The risk with on-balance-sheet lending is that too many loans will turn bad, the bank will suffer large loan losses, and depositors will flee the bank. Although some fintech firms fund loans with their own liabilities, most of their loans are funded by sales to investors. The advantage to the loan originator of selling loans is that, if the loan goes bad, the buyers of the loan bear the credit losses. However, such sales can lead to concerns that the bank or fintech originating a loan will not be as careful in underwriting and monitoring as they would be with the loans they retain on their own books. The result can be similar to that discussed in the Chava et al. paper, where originators have to reduce their lending volume.

One alternative that may have the effect of improving banks’ incentives and thereby mitigating investor concerns is that of having the bank retain part of the credit risk on the loans it sells. Professor Martin Hibbeln and graduate student Werner Osterkamp from the University of Duisburg-Essen study the effect of bank loan retention in their paper “The Impact of Skin in the Game on Bank Behavior in the Securitization Market” [PDF]. The authors exploit changes in European Union regulations to study loans sold by European banks in the securitization market. They find evidence that retention of part of the risk of a loan does not improve the quality of the loans being securitized.

Corporate governance

The role of shareholders in corporate governance is important for both financial and non-financial firms. The last few decades have seen shareholder governance power increasingly concentrated in institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds. Although a few of these institutional funds are explicitly focused on corporate governance issues, most are not. However, even the funds that are not focused on governance nevertheless have an interest in participating in governance decisions. The problem for these investors is how to keep up with the many issues requiring a shareholder vote. The answer for a large fraction of institutional investors is to seek information and advice from proxy advisory firms. The role of these advisory firms was the topic of Carnegie Mellon University professor Chester Spatt’s dinner speech titled “Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Market Failure, and Regulation” [PDF] (See also his related paper [PDF].)

Spatt observed that the importance of proxy advisory firms is easy to understand. All shareholders in a firm face the same questions, and there is similarity in questions across firms. However, any one shareholder obtains only a small fraction of the gains from better governance while potentially paying all of the costs of analysis. In this setting, proxy advisory firms are a predictable market solution to a potential free-riding problem. The increasing returns to scale that arise in this setting also naturally lends itself to the development of a monopoly—or in this case, a duopoly. The result can be reduced incentives for the two proxy advisory firms to avoid factual mistakes and increased power for the advisers to impose their philosophy on firms. Spatt discussed a variety of steps the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken and further actions that could mitigate these concerns. However, the problem of what to do about the role of institutions and proxy advisers in corporate governance is one that may not be totally solvable, but rather requires careful management over time.

Conclusion

The post-crisis period has seen dramatic changes in both information technology and government regulation. The papers presented recently at a workshop at the Atlanta Fed analyzed a number of these changes and contribute to our understanding of how the financial system is likely to evolve in the future.

Larry D. Wall is executive director of the Center for Financial Innovation and Stability at the Atlanta Fed. The author thanks Brian Robertson for helpful comments. The view expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. If you wish to comment on this post, please email atl.nftv.mailbox@atl.frb.org.

1 For further discussion on banks’ reporting of loan losses, see Larry’s recent post on changes to U.S. accounting rules.

Author David ClarkPosted on December 14, 2020August 5, 2025Categories Economics, Essays, Press Release, World WatchingTags accounting, Babson College, balance sheet, bank, Bank of Canada, Bank of Finland, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III, capital (economics), Carnegie Mellon University, Center for Financial Innovation and Stability (CenFIS), Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR), competition, consumer, corporate governance, credit, credit analysis, credit bureau, credit crunch, credit risk, credit score, creditor, customer, debt, debtor, deposit account, digital currency, duopoly, economic interventionism, economist, Emory University, employment, Europe, European Union, Fannie Mae, Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, financial crisis, Financial crisis of 2007–2008, financial market, financial regulation, financial services, financial system, Fordham University, Freddie Mac, Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia State University, Georgia Tech, Harvard University, India, information technology, institutional investor, investment, investor, LendingClub, liability (financial accounting), line of credit, loan, loan origination, loan sale, machine learning, market (economics), market penetration, market share, monopoly, mortgage loan, mutual fund, Northeastern University, pension fund, philosophy, proxy firm, recession, regulation, retail, securitization, shareholder, technology, Term Auction Facility, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, underwriting, University of Duisburg-Essen, University of Michigan, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of South Carolina, University of Turku, voting, Washington University in St. Louis
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