Her potential-growth example implies a neutral rate around 2.8%, above the Bank’s published 2.5% ceiling and well above today’s 1.25% policy rate.
[by OKUBO Takuji]
Key Takeaways
Koeda, probably the most influential swing vote on the board, seemed slightly more hawkish in her speech on October 15. She stopped just short of calling the 2% target achieved.
Her conceptual example of a neutral rate, potential growth plus 2%, points to a neutral rate well above 2%. While she is not in a hurry to push for hikes as the two hawks are, she seems open to a protracted hiking cycle.
I continue to think an October hike is out of the question. Koeda’s openness to a hike marginally raises the possibility of a December hike. I still consider it highly unlikely, though.
Why Koeda matters
On October 15, 2026, KOEDA Junko [小枝淳子] made her 3rd speech since she joined the BoJ policy board in 2025. She is an ex-IMF academic and yield curve specialist. She is probably the most important and influential swing vote in the current BoJ board. In her speech [archived PDF] and the following press conference (Japan Macro Advisors’ unofficial transcript), she sounded more open to continued rate increases than the three BoJ executives, although she was careful not to give any indication of the timing of the next move.
The board is balanced at both ends
As you can see in chart 1, the board is evenly balanced with two hawks at top-right and two doves at bottom-left (if you are unfamiliar with the BoJ-Policy Stance Indicator framework, please see the Japan Macro Advisors primer). That leaves KOEDA Junko [小枝 淳子] and MASU Kazuyuki [増 一行] between the two ends, sitting with the three BoJ executives: the Governor and two Deputy Governors. As BoJ executives tend to vote together, Koeda and Masu cast critical swing votes.
Chart 1
Koeda sounded more hawkish than before
In her speech [archived PDF] and the following press conference (see the Japan Macro Advisors unofficial transcript), she seemed slightly more hawkish than I anticipated. Koeda judges trend inflation to be already about 2% overall and increasingly well-anchored. She stopped just short of saying the 2% target has been achieved. She said:
“For about a year now I have described underlying inflation as roughly 2% on the whole, and I have kept checking how firmly it is taking hold. On the CPI, as I noted at Chart 11, broad-based price increases have continued for several years, and the distribution of year-on-year changes by item also suggests that this is becoming established. Wages, too, have shown stable increases overall. For these reasons, I think Japan’s inflation is becoming more persistently entrenched than before.” [Kumamoto speech, 15 October 2026, Japan Macro Advisors translation]
Koeda also offered a simplified concept of the neutral rate as the potential growth rate plus the 2% inflation target. As the Bank’s latest potential-growth estimate is about 0.8%, this could put the nominal neutral rate at 2.8%, exceeding the top of the Bank’s published nominal range of 1.1–2.5%. She did offer another version that put the neutral rate at a lower level, but it was clear that she wanted to give a higher version of a potential neutral rate.
To be clear, she did not endorse 2.8% as a policy-rate destination. At the press conference, she said the potential-growth rule does not always hold and declined to give a point estimate. But her intention was most likely to nudge the neutral rate range higher.
Koeda was clear in her message that she is open to a rate hike. She said: “I do not think we need to be overly cautious about raising rates.” [speech, Japan Macro Advisors translation]
But she was quite evasive regarding the timing of the next hike. In the press conference, reporters repeatedly asked for her view on a back-to-back rate hike, a veiled way of asking whether an October hike is possible. She was quite firm in repeating her stance that she does not have any particular pace in mind. This was an interesting contrast with Governor Ueda’s dismissive comment on the possibility of a successive or oversized rate hike (see the Japan Macro Advisors September 18 report). That does not mean she endorsed consecutive hikes. It means she left the option more open than Ueda did.
Conclusion: More open to multiple hikes
By choosing potential growth plus 2% as an example of the neutral rate, Koeda seems to be creating more space for the policy rate to eventually rise above 2%, in my view. In terms of the timing for the next hike, she was non-committal. I would still consider an October hike out of the question, but her non-committal attitude does marginally raise the possibility of a December hike, although I still consider it highly unlikely.
GPIF, one of the largest national pension funds in the world, is likely to rebalance its assets from non-yen bonds to yen bonds, signaling a big turn in Japan’s cross-border capital flows.
[from Japan Macro Advisors, 10 September, 2026]
Key takeaways
In 2013, GPIF’s investment committee, chaired by UEDA Kazuo [植田和男], now the BoJ governor, saw a fair chance of a JGB crash within five to ten years. Its CEO priced the crash as the 10-year rising from 0.5% to 3%. Subsequently, GPIF cut its target weight for domestic bonds from 60% to 25% as an emergency measure against abnormally low yields.
The 10-year is now at 3%. On my replication of GPIF’s own allocation rule, a real return on JGBs near zero points to a 50% weight in domestic bonds, against 25% today. I expect GPIF to raise the weight, if it has not already started in the September quarter.
How GPIF decides its asset allocation and communicates it publicly is a very delicate and political issue. But regardless of how it communicates it, a change in asset allocation is inevitable. In my view, it signifies a big turn in Japan’s cross-border capital flows.
Japan has one of the Largest Pension Funds in the World
Japan has the second largest public pension fund in the world. Norway’s is the biggest, although it is not strictly a pension fund. Canada’s pension funds, when all eight of its variants are added together, come a close third.
Japan set up its first national pension fund in 1961 and it has since gone through various reforms and reorganization over the last 65 years. Its current form is called the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF). As explained in a later section, GPIF has a few siblings, and when we add them together, Japan’s public pension funds can be said to be the largest in the world.
Chart 1
GPIF used to invest most of its asset into JGBs
GPIF used to invest the majority of its fund as loans to the national government and into Japanese government bonds (JGBs). At the end of FY2012, 62% of its assets consisted of domestic bonds. However, in 2014 it went through a radical asset reallocation and the target weight for domestic bonds was reduced from 60% to 35%, and then further down to 25% in 2020. Its current target allocation is a clean four-way 25% split into domestic bonds, domestic equity, foreign equity and foreign bonds.
As one of the largest pension funds in the world, its asset allocations attract market attention and there is speculation that it is about to raise its allocation into domestic bonds. In my view, there is indeed a very high chance that GPIF will be raising its allocation into domestic bonds, if it has not already started to do so in the current quarter ending in September 2026.
Chart 2
UEDA in 2013 Saw a Bond Crash Coming
To understand why GPIF is highly likely to raise its allocation into domestic bonds, we need to go back in history to 2013. Why 2013? Of course, it is the year the Bank of Japan (BoJ) started its massive quantitative easing. The 10-year JGB yield started 2013 at 0.8% and it fell to 0.3% by the end of 2015 before briefly hitting a negative rate of -0.3% in 2016. If you were the chairperson of the GPIFinvestment committee, you would have been concerned about the wisdom of continuing to invest in JGBs at such a policy-driven low rate. The actual chairperson was UEDA Kazuo [植田和男], the current BoJ governor. In the minutes for October 2013, UEDA said, “I think there is a fair chance that bonds will crash at some point in the next five to ten years [unofficial translation].”
The minutes were released only seven years later; otherwise the use of the word “crash” would have been controversial.
GPIF CEO Priced the Crash at 3% in 2014. We Are There Now
If you read through the GPIF minutes between 2013 and 2014, you would see that GPIF officials were increasingly conscious of the precariousness of investing in JGBs. Long story short, as this process was highly political and a sensitive subject, they decided to radically lower the target allocation weight for JGBs to 35% in 2014, presented it as the result of a philosophical change in the way GPIF is managed and how the concept of “risk” should be considered. Investment in JGBs was no longer considered low risk in real terms. The asset allocation for domestic bonds was further lowered to 25% in 2020. The following is what MITANI Takahiro [三谷隆博], the GPIF CEO at the time and an ex-BoJ senior official, said in the October 2014 GPIF minutes.
“Yields are just under 0.5% now, so a move to near 3% would mean a loss of about ¥25 trillion. (…). So I think the clearest way to explain it is that reducing the weight on JGBs to some degree is simply unavoidable [unofficial translation]”
The 2014 cut in the weight was partly an emergency escape
As I wrote earlier, the radical asset reallocation in 2014 was part a shift in the concept of risk from “nominal” to “real”, so that JGB is no longer risk free assets. But the change was also at least partly an emergency measure to escape the abnormally low-yield environment. Then the next natural question is, now that the JGB yields are no longer abnormally low, what should happen to its asset allocation? Pensions are paid in yen, so long-duration Japanese government bonds are a natural match, while GPIF should also be holding some non-yenassets and equities to diversify its assets and protect the overall balance sheet from inflation. In the next section, I will show you a simplified replication of how GPIF decides its asset allocation and what GPIF’s asset allocation could be now that JGB yields are normal.
How GPIF decides its weights
Put simply, GPIF’s target weights are the output of an optimizer with a few rules. Find the portfolio that, at the required real return, has the smallest average shortfall below wage growth in the years when it falls short, and round it to the nearest 5%.
When GPIF last decided to keep the current 25% weight for domestic bonds in 2025, JGBs were assumed to produce a nominal return of 0.5% against wage growth of 1.3%, so a real return of minus 0.8%. Exhibit 1 shows a simplified matrix of weights depending on expected nominal return on bonds and wage growth. The red box shows the assumption behind the 2025 weights decision mentioned above. If we use a higher wage growth assumption of 2.3%, an expected nominal return of 1.8% on bonds gives a weight of 35%. GPIF’s bondportfolio has an average maturity around 10 years, and the 10-year bond is yielding 3% now. A lot of thought and estimation is needed to form a view on the expected real return on domestic bonds, but in my view, it is clear that the minus 0.8% used in their last review is too low given where bond yields are.
Why GPIF kept the weight in 2025 and why circumstances changed
In late 2024 when the GPIF was reviewing the weight as part of its five-year plan, the BoJ was already in the process of exiting from QE and raising its policy rate. However, the JGBmarket was still in the process of adjustment and bond yields had a lot of room to rise. For example, the 10-year yield was 0.89% at the end of September 2024, rose to 2% by the end of 2025 and now, in September 2026, stands at 3%. You can understand why GPIF decided to keep its weight on domestic bonds unchanged as it would have incurred capital losses on bond purchases in 2025. But in my view, as I wrote in the report “The Long Climb in JGB Yields Is Nearly Over” [archived PDF], long bond yields are getting closer to a stability point. If the GPIF board shares my view, it is a good time to think about raising its target weight into domestic yenbonds.
The Whale Problem and the Washington Problem
How high should the new weight be for domestic bonds? The reality of determining appropriate weights and how to announce it is a lot harder than the simplified model I explained above. Other than forming a reasonable view on the expected real return on asset classes, there are a few factors that complicate the process.
Firstly, GPIF needs to think about how such an announcement would affect the market. GPIF is what financial market professionals call a whale, a massive investor whose investment decisions sway market prices. There is also a related argument that given the dominance of GPIF in the domestic market, GPIF should be increasing its asset weight abroad to reduce its impact on domestic assetmarkets.
Secondly, changing asset allocation weights carries political considerations. If GPIF decides to raise the target weight for domestic bonds, foreign bonds are the likely asset class whose weight will go down. More than 50% of its foreign bonds are in US dollars. With all the news circulating in the market now, Scott Bessent will not like a public announcement that one of the largest pension funds in the world is reducing its purchase of US treasuries. There are domestic political considerations as well, as the Takaichi government contemplates how best to fund its deficits.
These are the issues GPIF officials must be debating. How GPIF decides its asset allocation in the near future will be a revealing case study for those who want to study how policy-making works in Japan. Those who are interested in this topic should read the transcripts of an interesting government committee in 2014 that focused on how GPIF could shield itself from political meddling. Guess who chaired the committee? UEDA Kazuo [植田和男].
Whatever the near-term decision GPIF makes regarding its target weight, I think it is fairly clear that GPIF should be increasing its investment into domestic bonds. The following table shows how much GPIF could buy in net terms, depending on the eventual rise in the target weight.
Additional domestic-bond holdings from re-weighting the fund at 30 June 2026 (managed assets ·317.8tn). Foreign bonds sold first. Source: GPIF, JMA.
Three things in this table matter for the market. GPIF is allowed to deviate its asset allocation by six points either side of 25% without any announcement, so 39% target is already possible without any public announcement. In 2014 GPIF moved inside its band first and announced the new portfolio afterwards, and I would expect the same sequence this time. Second, these are static figures, which do not account for the growth of the fund over time.
The sister funds move with the whale
As mentioned earlier, GPIF has a few siblings. The Pension Fund Association for Local Government Officials (¥35.5tn), the Federation of National Public Service Personnel Mutual Aid Associations, known as KKR (¥11.5tn), and the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan (¥4.9tn) manage the pension reserves of local government employees, national government employees and private-school teachers. These sisters run their funds on the same 25/25/25/25 model, and with the legacy reserves they also run, they hold a further ¥87tn on top of GPIF’s.
Conclusion
GPIF cut its domestic bond weight from 60% to 35% in 2014, and later to 25%, to safeguard its assets from the manipulated low JGB yields at the time and the eventual crash they foresaw. That crash, as GPIF’s CEO MITANI defined it in 2014, has now happened with the 10-year yield rising to 3%. In my view, JGB yields have largely normalized and there is no emergency reason to avoid domestic bonds. It is only natural that GPIF would raise its allocation into domestic bonds, although how GPIF communicates this publicly is a touchy issue they need to figure out. When GPIF raises its domestic bond allocation, foreign bonds are the likely asset class to take the hit. GPIF publishes quarterly results and the next publication for the end-September 2026 quarter, expected in early November 2026, will be closely watched. Judging from market movements in the last few weeks, the market has started to sense that what I described in this article is already happening and Japanese money is starting to come back to the yen. While it should be characterized as rebalancing, rather than a repatriation, it seems we are observing a big turn in Japanese cross-border capital flows.
Fourth District contacts reported a slight increase in overall business activity in recent weeks and expected activity to rise modestly in the months ahead. Consumer spending was flat, with retailers noting continued affordability concerns among consumers. Manufacturers also reported flat demand for goods, citing trade policy uncertainty as the main driver. Demand for professional and business services grew moderately, albeit at a slower pace than in the past three reporting periods. Contacts generally reported flat employment levels and modest wage pressures. Nonlabor cost pressures remained robust, and selling prices continued to grow modestly.
The twentieth centuryphilosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, tells us that his purpose is “to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.” Where the fly is, of course, ourselves. He then tells us, that perhaps the main reason is that one is unable to free oneself from bewitchment of the mind by “language games.”
In the song “Hotel California” by the Eagles, there’s the line, “‘We are all just prisoners here / Of our own device.’” In this context, “device” could be interpreted as a bad decision.
My Body and Myself
The Americanphilosophy professor, Samuel Todes, in his book Body and World, analyzes the human body, not as a meat-machine, but more like the silent partner of a person navigating their life. You can get a sense of this from Gabriel Marcel, when he writes:
Is my body my body, for instance, in the same sense in which I would say that my dog belongs to me? The question, let us first of all notice, of how the dog originally came into my hands is quite irrelevant here. Perhaps I found it wandering wretchedly about the streets, perhaps I bought it in a shop; I can say it is mine if nobody else puts in a claim for it—though this is still quite a negative condition of ownership. For the dog to be really, not merely nominally, mine there must exist between us a more positive set of relations. He must live, either with me, or as I, and I alone, have decided he shall live—lodged, perhaps, with a servant or a farmer; whether or not I look after him personally, I must assume the responsibility for his being looked after. And this implies something reciprocal in our relations. It is only it the dog recognizes me, obeys me, expresses by his behaviour towards me some feeling which I can interpret as affection or, at the very least, as wholesome fear, that he is really mine; I would become a laughingstock if I persisted in calling an animal that completely ignored me, that took no notice of me at all, my dog. And the mockery to which I would be exposed in such an instance is very significant. It is linked to a very positive idea of how things must be between my dog and me, before I can really say, ‘This dog is mine’.
We should recall, at this point, what we said in an earlier lecture about the body; the latter is not merely an instrument, it presents us with a kind of reality which is quite different from the reality of any sort of apparatus, in so far as it, my body, is also my way of being in the world.
When I try to make clear to myself the nature of my bond with my body, it appears to me chiefly as something of which I have the use (as one has the use of a piano, a saw, or a razor); but all these uses are extensions of the initial use, which is simply the use of the body. I have real priority to my body when it is a question of active use, but none whatever when it is a question of knowledge. The use is only possible on the basis of a certain felt community. But the community is indivisible; I cannot validly say ‘I and my body.’ The difficulty arises from the fact that I think of my relation with my body on the analogy of my relation with my instruments—whereas in fact the latter presupposes the former.
The connections between the trio of “me, myself and I” and the body is very elusive (as you may sense from your own introspection). This is another “argument without end.”
But, of course, it needed more than economic hardship, social discontent, and the frustration of political and social ambitions to make a revolution. To give cohesion to the discontents and aspirations of widely varying social classes there had to be some unifying body of ideas, a common vocabulary, of hope and protest, something, in short, like a common “revolutionarypsychology”. In the revolutions of our day, this ideological preparation has been the concern of political parties; but there were no such parties in eighteenth-centuryFrance.
by Mohammad Al-Shehri, Assistant Economist & Omar Al-Nakib, Head of MENA Research
Preliminary official figures show GDP expanding 1% y/y in Q1 2025 following seven consecutive quarters of contraction, helped by a less severe downturn in oil output. With the negative effects of earlier voluntary oil production cuts beginning to fade, oilGDP recorded only a marginal decline, the softest since Q2 2023. Growth in non-oil activity remained positive though eased, weighed by a moderation in the manufacturing, real estate, and transportsectors. The near-term outlook for GDP is one of positive growth, lifted by rising oil production after Kuwait started to restore 135 kb/d of oil output cuts between April and September 2025, while the non-oilsector should also register further steady gains.
Non-oil GDP growth softens in Q1 2025 after strong performance in Q4 2024
Growth in the non-oilsector weakened in Q1 2025, slowing to 2% y/y compared to 4% recorded in the prior quarter. (Chart 1.) The softer expansion in non-oil activity reflected, among other things, a moderation in the manufacturingsector, where activity grew at a still-solid 4.3% despite a decline in refined petroleum products output but slowed notably from the 12.2% reading registered in Q4 2024. Growth in other sectors including real estate, wholesale & retailtrade, transport, and education also slowed. Offsetting the slowdown was stronger expansion in the non-oileconomy’s largest segments: public administration and defense as well as financial intermediation and insurance, which grew 1% and 3.2% y/y, respectively. (Chart 2.)
Oil sector logs marginal contraction, set to return to growth in Q2
The contraction in oilGDP eased significantly to -0.3% y/y from -5.7% y/y in Q4 2024, registering the softest rate of decline since Kuwait embarked on cutting oil production in Q2 2023 after participating in the voluntary cuts scheme with 7 other OPEC+ members. (Chart 4.) Kuwait’s oil production averaged 2.415 mb/d in Q1 2025, a 0.7% decline from the same quarter last year, according to OPEC secondary sources. However, oilsector fortunes are set to shift in Q2 2025 and thereafter, after the OPEC-8 member alliance started unwinding the 2.2 mb/d voluntary cut tranche in April 2025. Originally planned to be unwound over the course of 18 months, OPEC+ has accelerated the pace of supply hikes with output now on a path to be fully restored in September, a full year ahead of schedule. For Kuwait, crude production rose by 0.5% q/q in Q2 to 2.426 mb/d and is set to accelerate further to average 2.533 mb/d in H2 2025. With the oil market so far able to absorb the additional OPEC and global supply and oil prices currently holding near $70/bbl, an upside risk to our oilsector outlook involves the potential unwinding of the outstanding OPEC-8 voluntary cuts (1.66 mb/d), of which Kuwait’s share is 128 kb/d.
Growth heading back into positive territory in 2025
Growth in total GDP is set to remain on a positive trajectory in the near term, buoyed by further steady expansion in non-oileconomic activity and increased oil production. Non-oilGDP is set to benefit from the government’s reform drive which includes the recent passing of the debtlaw that could catalyze the implementation of key development projects and the potential approval of the ‘mortgage’ law later in 2025, which could spur higher household borrowing and consumer spending. Economic indicators for Q2 2025 pointed to a healthy pace of non-oileconomic activity. The key ‘output’ and ‘new orders’ balances in the non-oilprivate sectorPMI gauge both averaged a very robust 57+ in Q2 2025, real estate activity continued to expand at a robust pace with earlier price falls in the residentialsector abating, while credit growth stood at a healthy 5.5% y/y in May, and could benefit in coming months if interest rates are reduced further.
Nonetheless, there are also downside risks to the outlook. Local consumer spending growth (according to central bankcardtransactions data) turned negative in Q1 2025, extending the weakening trend now observed for more than a year. The government’s ongoing fiscal consolidation push will also weigh on wage and job growth. Overall, we see GDP growing 1.9% this year, boosted by expansions in both the oil and non-oilsectors of 1.2% and 2.5%, respectively.
[from NBK Group’s Economic Research Department, 21 November, 2024]
Kuwait: Solid credit growth in October driven by household credit. Domestic credit increased by a solid 0.4% in October, driving up YTD growth to 2.9% (3.2% y/y). The recovery in household credit continued, with growth in October at a solid 0.5%, resulting in a YTD increase of 2.4%. While y/y growth in household credit remains a limited 2.3%, annualized growth over the past four months is a stronger 4.7%. Businesscredit inched up by 0.2% in October, pushing YTD growth to 3.6% (2.9% y/y). Industry and trade drove businesscredit growth in October while construction and trade are the fastest growing YTD at 17% and 8%, respectively. In contrast, the oil/gas sector continued its downtrend, deepening the YTD decrease to 13%. Excluding the oil/gas sector, growth in business credit would increase to a relatively good 5% YTD. Looking ahead, the last couple of months of the year (especially December) are usually the weakest for businesscredit, likely due to increased repayments and write-offs, but it will not be surprising if the recovery in household credit is generally sustained, especially given the commencement of the interest rate-cutting cycle. Meanwhile, driven by a plunge in the volatile public-institution deposits, resident deposits decreased in October, resulting in YTD growth of 2.4% (4.2% y/y). Private-sectordeposits inched up in October driving up YTD growth to 4.5% compared with 10% for government deposits while public-institution deposits are a big drag (-14%). Within private-sector KD deposits, CASA showed further signs of stabilization as there was no decrease for the third straight month while the YTDdrawdown is a limited 1%.
Chart 1: Kuwait credit growth
(% y/y)
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK)
Chart 2: UK inflation
(%)
Source: Haver
Egypt: IMF concludes mission for fourth review, sees external risks. The IMF concluded its visit to Egypt after spending close to 2 weeks, holding several in-person meetings with the Egyptian authorities, private sector, and other stakeholders. The IMF released a statement mentioning that the current ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region in addition to an increasing number of refugees have affected the external sector (Suez Canal receipts down by 70%) and put severe pressure on the fiscal front. The Fund acknowledged the Central Bank of Egypt’s commitment to unify the exchange rate, maintain the flexible exchange rate regime, and keep inflation on a firm downward trend over the medium term by substantially tightening monetary policy. It also highlighted that continued policy discipline was also a key to containing fiscal risks, especially those related to the energy sector. The Fund, as always, re-iterated the need for promoting the private sector mainly through an enhanced tax system and accelerating divestment plans of the state firms. Finally, it also said that the discussions would continue over the coming days to finalize the agreement on the remaining policies and reform plans. However, the release did not provide any clear hints about the conclusion on the government’s earlier request to push the timeline of some of the subsidy moves.
Oman: IMF completes article IV with a strong outlook for the economy in 2025. Oman’s economy continued to expand with growth reaching 1.9% in the first half of 2024 (versus 1.2% in 2023), despite being weighed down by OPEC+ mandated oil production cuts as non-oil GDP grew a stronger 3.8% y/y in H1 (versus 1.8% in 2023). The fiscal and current account balances remain in a comfortable situation evident by a decline in public sectordebt and the recent rating upgrade to investment grade. The Fund expects Oman’s economic growth to see a strong rebound in 2025, supported by higher oil production. It also believes that fiscal and current account balances will remain in surplus but at lower levels. Key risks to the outlook stem from oil price volatility and intensifying geopolitical tensions. The IMF also mentioned that further efforts are needed to raise nonhydrocarbon revenues through more tax policy measures and the phasing out of untargeted subsidies which should help in freeing up resources to finance growth under the government’s diversification agenda.
UK: Inflation rises more than forecast, reinforcing BoE’s caution on rate cuts. UKCPIinflation increased to 2.3% y/y in October from 1.7% the previous month, slightly above the market and the Bank of England’s forecast of 2.2%. On a monthly basis too, inflation rose to 0.6%, a seven-month high, from September’s no change. The steep rise was mainly driven by an almost 10% rise in the household energy price cap effective from October. Core inflation also accelerated to 3.3% y/y (0.4% m/m) from 3.2% (0.1% m/m). While goods prices continued to fall (-0.3% y/y), service prices rose at a faster rate of 5% from 4.9%. Recently, the Bank of England had cautioned about inflation quickening next year (projecting a peak rate of 2.8% in Q3 2025), citing the impact of higher insurance contributions and rising minimum wages as outlined in the latest government budget. Therefore, with inflation rising above forecast, the bank will likely slow the pace of monetary easing after delivering two interest rate cuts of 25 bps earlier, with markets now seeing only two additional cuts by the end of 2025.
Eurozone: ECB warns of fiscal and growth risks in its latest Financial Stability Review [archived PDF]. In its most recent Financial Stability Review (November) [archived PDF], the European Central Bank warned that elevated debt and fiscal deficit levels and anemic long-term growth could expose sovereign debt vulnerabilities in the region, stoking concerns of a repeat of the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. Maturing debt being rolled over at much higher borrowing rates raising debt service costs poses risks to countries with little fiscal space and leaves certain governments exposed to market fluctuations. The bank also emphasized the risks of high equity valuations, low liquidity and a greater concentration of exposure among non-banks. Moreover, it sees current geopolitical uncertainties and the possibility of more trade tensions as heightening risks. The Eurozone’s current government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 88%, but the underlying data suggest a much more precarious situation with Greece, Italy, and France’s ratios at 164%, 137% and 112%. Recently, concerns about France’s high fiscal deficit (around 5.9% of GDP) and elevated debt levels saw yields on the country’s bonds rise steeply, widening the spread gap with Germanbonds to the highest level in over a decade.
Disclaimer: While every care has been taken in preparing this publication, National Bank of Kuwait accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential losses arising from its use. Daily Economic Update is distributed on a complimentary and discretionary basis to NBK clients and associates. This report and previous issues can be found in the “News & Insight / Economic Reports” section of the National Bank of Kuwait’s web site. Please visit their web site, nbk.com, for other bank publications.
Among the 369 largest counties, 348 had over-the-year increases in average weekly wages. In the second quarter of 2024, average weekly wages for the nation increased to $1,390, a 4.4-percent increase over the year. Hamilton, IN, had the largest second quarter over-the-year wage gain at 33.4 percent. (See table 1 [archived PDF].)
Large County Average Weekly Wage in Second Quarter 2024
Hamilton, IN, had the largest over-the-year percentage increase in average weekly wages (+33.4 percent). Within Hamilton, an average weekly wage gain of $2,161 (+139.6 percent) in professional and business services made the largest contribution to the county’s increase in average weekly wages.
Essex, MA, had the largest over-the-year percentage decrease in average weekly wages (-2.1 percent). Within Essex, an average weekly wage loss of $644 (-25.7 percent) in professional and business services made the largest contribution to the county’s decrease in average weekly wages.
All of the 10 largest counties had over-the-year percentage increases in average weekly wages. In the second quarter of 2024, King, WA, experienced the largest over-the-year percentage gain in average weekly wages (+10.4 percent). Within King, professional and business services had the largest impact, with an average weekly wage increase of $774 (+24.5 percent).
For More Information
The tables included in this release contain data for the nation and for the 369 U.S. counties with annual average employment levels of 75,000 or more in 2023. June 2024 employment and second quarter 2024 average weekly wages for all states are provided in table 3 [archived PDF] of this release.
Over-the-year changes of employment and wages presented in this news release are adjusted and may differ from unadjusted data used in BLS data tools and interactive charts. More information is available in the QCEWTechnical Note.
The County Employment and Wages full data update for second quarter 2024 is scheduled to be released on Thursday, December 5, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. (ET).
The County Employment and Wages news release for third quarter 2024 is scheduled to be released on Wednesday, February 19, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. (ET).
“Labor marketindicators pointed to no growth in employment and a largely stable workweek,” said Jesus Cañas, Dallas Fed senior business economist. “Price pressures remained unchanged while wage growth eased slightly. Perceptions of broader business conditions continued to worsen in October, as pessimism notably increased.”
The revenueindex fell eight points to 0.7, with the near-zero reading suggesting little change in activity from September.
The employmentindex fell from 2.7 to 0.1, its lowest level in seven months.
The input pricesindex was flat at 37.3 and the selling pricesindex remained steady at 9.5.
The wages and benefitsindex fell two points to 17.0, approaching its average reading of 15.8.
The general business activity index dropped from -8.6 to -18.2, its lowest level since December of last year, while the company outlook index fell to -12.8, its lowest level in 16 months.
The sales index fell from -4.4 to -18.1, marking its sixth consecutive month in negative territory.
The employmentindex fell 13 points to -12.4 while the hours worked index fell from 0.6 to -12.1.
The general business activity index dropped from -10.2 to -23.0.
The Dallas Fed conducts the survey monthly to obtain a timely assessment of activity in the state’s service sector, which represents almost 70 percent of the state’s economy and employs about 9.5 million workers.
For this month’s survey, Texas business executives were asked supplemental questions on credit conditions. Results for these questions from the TexasManufacturing Outlook Survey, TexasService Sector Outlook Survey and TexasRetail Outlook Survey have been released together.
The Atlanta Fed’s Wage Growth Tracker was 6.1 percent in January, the same as in December. For people who changed jobs, the Tracker in January was 7.3 percent, compared to 7.7 percent in December. For those not changing jobs, the Tracker was 5.4 percent, compared to the 5.3 percent reading in December.
While continuing to cool over the last several months, 12-month inflation remains at historically high levels. The headline personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index rose 5.5% in November 2022 from a year earlier. This marks a decline in inflation to a level last observed in October 2021, but still well above the Fed’s longer-run goal of 2%. A portion of the inflation moderation is attributable to recent declines in energy prices. Core PCE inflation, which removes food and energy prices, has shown less easing.
Owing to fiscal relief efforts and lower household spending over the course of the pandemic, consumers accumulated over $2 trillion dollars in excess savings, based on pre-pandemic trends. Since then, consumers have drawn down over half of this excess savings which has helped support recent growth in personal consumption expenditures. A considerable amount of accumulated savings remains for some consumers to support spending in 2023.
In the wake of the pandemic, consumer spending patterns shifted away from services towards goods. While there appears to be some normalization of spending behavior, this shift has generally persisted. Real goods spending remains significantly above its pre-pandemic trend, driven by strong demand for durables such as furniture, electronics, and recreational goods. Spending on services has shown a resurgence but remains below its pre-pandemic trend.
Supply chainbottlenecks for materials and labor remain a constraint on production, although there are some recent signs of easing. The fraction of manufacturers who reported operating below capacity due to insufficient materials peaked in late 2021 and has moderately declined over the past year. However, the fraction of manufacturers reporting insufficient labor has persisted at high levels.
The labor market remains tight, despite some signs of cooling. The number of available jobs remains well above the number of available workers, although vacancy postings have been trending down in recent months. The tight labor market has put continued upward pressure on wages and labor market turnover.
A decomposition of headline PCE inflation into supply– and demand-driven components shows that both supply and demand factors are responsible for the recent rise in inflation. The surge in inflation in early 2021 was mainly due to an increase in demand-driven factors. Subsequently, supply factors became more prevalent for the remainder of 2021. Supply-driven inflation has moderated significantly over recent months, while demand-driven inflation remains elevated.
Although the labor market is currently very strong, financial markets are pointing to some downside risks. Namely, the difference between longer- and shorter-term interest rates has turned negative, which historically tends to occur immediately preceding recessions. It remains unclear whether lower longer-term yields are indicative of anticipated slower growth or lower inflation.
Short-term inflation expectations remain elevated relative to their pre-pandemic levels in December 2019. Consumers are expecting prices to rise 5% this year, while professional forecasters are expecting prices to rise 3.5%. Longer-term inflation expectations remain more subdued, indicating that both consumers and professionals believe inflation pressures will eventually dissipate.
Rentinflation is expected to remain high over the next year. The prices for asking rents have grown quite substantially over the last two years. As new leases begin and existing leases are renewed, these higher asking rents will flow into the stock of rental units, putting upward pressure on rentinflation.
