China to Sustain Top-Down, Debt-Fueled Investment in Major Projects and Security Capacities, Ex-Official Says

Dong Yu, now at Tsinghua, says via state media that Beijing-decreed, central govt bond-backed construction will continue into the next five years.

[from the Center for China & Globalization’s Pekingology]

by Zichen Wang, 10 August, 2025

The key concept in today’s newsletter is 国家重大战略实施和重点领域安全能力建设, in abbreviation in Chinese as 两重 liǎng zhòng.

In English, it is translated officially as the implementation of major national strategies and building up security capacity in key areas, hereinafter referred to as “Two Major Undertakings.”

The concept first appeared in official policy documents in the Chinese Premier’s Report on the Work of the Government [archived PDF] in March 2024.

To systematically address funding shortages facing some major projects for building a great country and advancing national rejuvenation, it is proposed that, starting this year and over each of the next several years, ultra-long special treasury bonds be issued. These bonds will be used to implement major national strategies and build up security capacity in key areas. One trillion yuan of such bonds will be issued in 2024.

By the end of the year, the yuan tag, despite being approved by the national legislature, had changed by 300 billion. The People’s Daily newspaper reported in December 2024.

As of now, the 700 billion yuan in ultra-long-term special treasury bonds allocated for the “two major undertakings” has been distributed in three batches to specific projects.

In 2025, the following year, the Report on the Work of the Government [archived PDF] says,

A total of 1.3 trillion yuan of ultra-long special treasury bonds will be issued, 300 billion yuan more than last year.

735 billion yuan will be earmarked in the central government budget for investment. We will put ultra-long special treasury bonds to good use, increase ultra-long-term loans and other types of financing support, and strengthen top-down organization and coordination to ensure greater support for the implementation of major national strategies and security capacity building in key areas.

A simultaneous Finance Ministry budget plan [archived PDF] rounds up the overall central government spending for the Two Major Undertakings to 800 billion yuan in 2025.

In yuan terms, the much-touted new government subsidies to households pale in comparison with the two major undertakings.

Also from the 2025 Report on the Work of the Government [archived PDF]:

Ultra-long special treasury bonds totaling 300 billion yuan will be issued to support consumer goods trade-in programs. This represents an increase of 150 billion yuan over the previous year.

This week, China announced this week that the phased free preschool education policy will cover all children in their final year of kindergartens, saving families 20 billion yuan. Childcare subsidies unveiled in July amount to 90 billion yuan

As Joe Biden repeated over the years,

Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.

The National Development and Reform Commission said last month:

In 2025, a total of 800 billion yuan has been allocated for the “two major undertakings,” supporting 1,459 projects in key areas such as ecological restoration in the Yangtze River Basin, major transportation infrastructure along the Yangtze River, the New Western Land–Sea Corridor, high-standard farmland, major water conservancy projects, urban underground pipeline networks, the “Three-North” shelterbelt program, and the renovation of hospital wards.

Now that the 2025 money has been spent by July and China is drawing up its next Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, will there be more such projects in the future?

In a column for the state-run China News Service this week, Dong Yu, previously Deputy Director-General of the Second Economic Bureau of the Office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission and, before that, an official at China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), pointedly said,

In the next step, during the formulation and implementation of the 15th Five-Year Plan, the “two major undertakings” will continue to occupy an important place, be organically incorporated into the new five-year plan, and form close alignment and sustained momentum with major national strategies, major plans, major projects, and key initiatives…

…Such a major strategy will be pursued with persistence—it will not remain rhetorical, nor will it be reversed abruptly.

He did not cite a source of information in his article.

Continuing with his lecturing style, Dong, now Executive Vice Director of China Institute for Development Planning, Tsinghua University, rebuked some unspecified market analysis that had observed the investments just were a one-time boost shot.

Some market institutions once analyzed that when China’s economy was facing short-term difficulties and challenges, the launch of the “two major undertakings” was mainly aimed at expanding investment in the short term to stabilize growth. Such a view clearly lacks a professional understanding of the decision-making intentions and logic, fails to properly grasp the relationship between the short term and the medium-to-long term, as well as between objectives and means, and inverts the proper order of priorities—a misconception that needs to be pointed out and corrected.

Dong also highlighted what he said was the unusual nature of the “strategic move,” including that central government debts fueled the investments, and they were selected “top-down,” rather than primarily relying on local government proposal or input.

The two undertakings were formally submitted for deliberation at the 2024 National People’s Congress after the central leadership made its decision and arrangements…

The central authorities have shown firm determination in this work, adopting the ultra-long-term special treasury bond—a macro policy tool that has rarely been used. Compared with several past issuances of special treasury bonds, the funding arrangement for the “two major undertakings” spans a longer cycle, has a broader scope of application, and will continue to advance in the next stage. It can be said that the scale and intensity are unprecedented. In 2024, a total of 700 billion yuan in ultra-long-term special treasury bonds was allocated, and in 2025, the figure is 800 billion yuan, all of which have now been fully disbursed.

The organization of the “two major undertakings” construction is top-down, completely different from the past practice in the investment sector where projects were determined through bottom-up applications. The purpose is to facilitate the smoother downward transmission of the needs of major national strategies. Relevant [central] government departments, by identifying shortcomings and weaknesses, specifying key areas, and refining project requirements, have ensured that the project list is no longer a collection of fragmented local items. Instead, projects are planned in an integrated manner by category and sector, with strengthened guidance for key regions, more targeted measures, and clearer standards.

Although an exhaustive list of the 1,459 projects does not appear to be available to the public, the “security capacity” build-up in the two major undertakings should be understood in broad terms, and Dong claims the investments put China on a sounder footing globally now that Donald Trump rules America again.

In recent years, the central authorities have emphasized security awareness and bottom-line thinking in development planning, a shift closely related to changes in the international situation. The closer China’s economy becomes intertwined with the global economy, the more comprehensive its considerations must be regarding issues such as food security, energy security, industrial security, and ecological security. The second “undertaking” in the “two major undertakings”—the strengthening of security capabilities in key areas—is precisely a forward-looking arrangement. The dramatic changes in the international environment since the beginning of 2025 have further underscored and confirmed the necessity of enhancing security capabilities, fully demonstrating that the central authorities’ thinking and deployment have been prescient and ahead of the curve.

Dong’s article via China News Service is fully translated below.

中央这一先手棋很不寻常

This Strategic First Move by the Central Authorities Is Highly Unusual

by Dong Yu, Executive Vice President, Institute for China Development Planning, Tsinghua University

The issuance of ultra-long-term special treasury bonds to support the implementation of major national strategies and the building of security capacities in key areas (hereinafter referred to as the “two major undertakings”) has become one of the hottest topics in China’s economy in recent years. Any observation of China’s present and future economic trajectory must include research and analysis of these two undertakings. More than a year has passed since the initiative was launched, making it both necessary and timely to evaluate its effectiveness, understand its operating mechanisms, and look ahead to its prospects.

The “Two Major Undertakings” Are by No Means Ordinary Policy Measures

In terms of decision-making background and process, as well as policy intensity and scope, the launch and implementation of the two major undertakings stand out from other policies. They represent a top-level design initiative.

Understanding a policy starts with its background. From the sequence of events leading to the proposal, this was a proactive, historic choice. The two undertakings were formally submitted for deliberation at the 2024 National People’s Congress after the central leadership made its decision and arrangements. The timing was significant: the 20th Communist Party of China National Congress had laid out a series of major long- and medium-term strategic initiatives that needed concrete engineering projects to push forward. China was midway through two Five-Year Plans, yet strategic advancement could not wait. The central leadership thus introduced the two major undertakings as a groundbreaking initiative.

Strategically, the undertakings directly address the needs of advancing long-term objectives. From the outset, they have been aimed squarely at the goals of Chinese modernization. By breaking down these goals into specific tasks and identifying the most difficult bottlenecks, the undertakings found their points of focus. Some of these tasks might take decades for other countries to achieve, but China has chosen not to delay—tackling them head-on at the starting stage of the new journey toward modernization. This model is uniquely Chinese and has been proven by history to be a key factor in China’s remarkable development successes.

The undertakings are also highly forward-looking—a “first move” by the central leadership. In recent years, national development planning has placed greater emphasis on security and on guarding the bottom line, in response to changes in the international environment. The closer China’s economy is linked to the global economy, the more comprehensive its considerations must be on food security, energy security, industrial security, and ecological security, and other issues. The second “major” in the initiative—security capacity building in key areas—is an arrangement made in anticipation of future challenges. The sharp changes in the international environment since 2025 have only highlighted and validated the necessity of strengthening security capacities, demonstrating that the central leadership’s thinking and arrangements were ahead of the curve.

The undertakings also have a strong overall and systemic quality, constituting a key move in macroeconomic governance. They focus on areas of outstanding importance to economic and social development and have a high degree of relevance to the overall development landscape. The policy toolkit they employ integrates investment, fiscal, science and technology, education, social, and ecological policies. This comprehensive package embodies the use of systems thinking to drive development and will significantly impact all aspects of the economy and society.

A Manifestation of Central Will

Extraordinary measures are for extraordinary tasks. The strategic objectives of Chinese modernization are long-term undertakings, and the two major undertakings provide the foundational support through systematic design and substantial funding.

The central leadership has committed to this initiative by adopting the rarely used macroeconomic tool of ultra-long-term special treasury bonds. Compared with previous special bond issuances, the funding for the two undertakings spans a longer cycle and serves a wider range of purposes, with plans for continued implementation. In both scale and intensity, this is unprecedented: 700 billion yuan in 2024 and 800 billion yuan in 2025, all of which has already been allocated.

In terms of priorities, it vividly reflects the principle of “concentrating resources to accomplish major undertakings.” The focus areas include urban–rural integration, regional coordination, high-quality population development, food security, energy and resource security, ecological security, and self-reliance and strength in science and technology—all crucial to building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation. These require coordinated planning and advancement. In just over a year, the high-level requirements have been translated into batches of concrete projects, reflecting the efficiency of implementation.

Project selection is guided by the principle that only the central government can resolve these issues. Some involve urgent development bottlenecks with significant obstacles that cannot be overcome by conventional means, such as scientific and technological breakthroughs, high-standard farmland construction, and upgrading the quality of higher education. Others are long-desired but previously unachievable projects that lack local willingness or capacity to implement, such as major cross-regional infrastructure, cross-basin wastewater treatment, and urban underground utility upgrades.

The organization of the “two major undertakings” construction is top-down, completely different from the past practice in the investment sector where projects were determined through bottom-up applications. The purpose is to facilitate the smoother downward transmission of the needs of major national strategies. Relevant [central] government departments, by identifying shortcomings and weaknesses, specifying key areas, and refining project requirements, have ensured that the project list is no longer a collection of fragmented local items. Instead, projects are planned in an integrated manner by category and sector, with strengthened guidance for key regions, more targeted measures, and clearer standards.

A Combination of “Hard” and “Soft” Measures

From the start, the undertakings were designed not only to fund “hard” engineering projects but also to include comprehensive arrangements for “soft” institutional and policy measures—an important innovation.

The emphasis on soft measures is pragmatic. Given the high importance and public nature of the projects, long-term mechanisms must be designed to ensure smooth progress during construction and sustainable operation thereafter. This includes drafting specialized plans to provide strategic guidance, introducing targeted policies to improve funding efficiency, and innovating institutional arrangements to safeguard implementation.

The implementation process is thus also a process of improving the investment and financing system, updating project management approaches, and enhancing investment effectiveness. In some sectors, soft-measure experiments have had positive impacts, creating healthy interaction with hard investments.

For example, the healthy operation of urban underground pipelines depends on sound maintenance mechanisms. Some local governments have attracted long-term institutional funds into major pipeline projects through debt or equity investment plans, stabilizing private sector returns via operational rights, government subsidies, and tax incentives. Others have introduced province-wide upstream–downstream gas price linkage, set reasonable water supply return rates based on market profits, and advanced the marketization of gas and water prices—reducing losses for public utilities and encouraging private investment.

Similarly, in the quality undergraduate expansion program, mechanisms play a guiding role: schools effectively implementing expansion plans receive increased support, while those performing poorly see reduced support; universities without expanded undergraduate admission plans are generally excluded from special bond funding. Disciplines and programs are adjusted dynamically to align talent training with economic and societal needs.

Directly Relevant to Everyone

The nature of the undertakings is not determined by project size but by their strategic objectives and significance. As long as they align with major national strategies, they are included—whether as large standalone projects, such as high-speed rail along the Yangtze River, or as “project packages,” such as Yangtze River wastewater treatment composed of multiple treatment facilities. This flexible, problem-oriented approach allows better alignment with public needs.

As projects break ground and enter operation, their benefits to people’s livelihoods will become increasingly evident. Observers should not see the undertakings as distant from daily life; they will bring tangible improvements to everyone’s quality of life.

For example:

  • Urban underground pipelines: Upgrades to gas, water, and heating systems will greatly improve safety and resilience. Renovation of old gas pipelines is nearing completion, reducing accident rates by over 30%. Eliminating hidden risks in unseen places increases residents’ sense of security.
  • Food security: Gradually converting all permanent basic farmland into high-standard farmland will stabilize grain output and enhance food safety. Higher standards mean safer products, so people will eat with greater confidence.
  • Yangtze River protection: Building or upgrading over 60,000 kilometers of sewage pipelines in the Yangtze Economic Belt will greatly improve the river’s ecological environment and resolve long-standing public concerns.
  • Transportation: Creating the shortest ShanghaiChengdu high-speed rail corridor (approx. 1,900 km) will connect the Yangtze River Delta, the middle Yangtze region, and the ChengduChongqing area more quickly, cutting travel time nearly in half and boosting east–west connectivity.
  • Ecological security: Implementing the “Three-North” shelterbelt project over 130 million mu (93 million hectares), with good survival rates for trees, shrubs, and grasses, will safeguard northern ecological security and create new income opportunities.
  • Higher education: “Double First-Class” universities will see markedly improved conditions, with over 500,000 new standard dorm beds. Quality undergraduate enrollment will rise by 16,000 in 2024 and over 20,000 in 2025, giving more students access to quality education and ensuring basic living needs for those from low-income families.
A Bold Stroke in the History of Development

The two major undertakings are a major decision by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, aimed at the overall strategy of building a strong country and achieving national rejuvenation. They play an irreplaceable role in advancing Chinese modernization.

They are not short-term measures but focus on medium- to long-term development. Some market institutions once analyzed that when China’s economy was facing short-term difficulties and challenges, the launch of the “two major undertakings” was mainly aimed at expanding investment in the short term to stabilize growth. Such a view clearly lacks a professional understanding of the decision-making intentions and logic, fails to properly grasp the relationship between the short term and the medium-to-long term, as well as between objectives and means, and inverts the proper order of priorities — a misconception that needs to be pointed out and corrected.

Since implementation began, the undertakings have provided important support for economic stability. Although their starting point was not short-term growth, the resulting investment has boosted employment and consumption, helping to expand domestic demand and stabilize growth. In the next step, during the formulation and implementation of the 15th Five-Year Plan, the “two major undertakings” will continue to occupy an important place, be organically incorporated into the new five-year plan, and form close alignment and sustained momentum with major national strategies, major plans, major projects, and key initiatives.

They will also bolster the country’s core competitiveness. As foundational support for Chinese modernization, they will strengthen factor security and resolve long-term bottlenecks, with far-reaching significance for shaping China’s development prospects. In an era of intensifying major-power competition, they will provide stable expectations and significantly enhance China’s capacity to manage international uncertainty. Such a major strategy will be pursued with persistence—it will not remain rhetorical, nor will it be reversed abruptly.

Though implementation has only recently begun, the undertakings’ historic role will continue to grow over time. In the future, looking back, they will surely stand as an important part of the “China story” and leave a bold stroke in the history of the People’s Republic’s development.

World-Watching: Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee — Copom

272nd Meeting – July 29-30, 2025

[from the Central Bank of Brazil, 5 August, 2025]

  1. Update of the economic outlook and the Copom’s scenario1
    1. The global environment is more adverse and uncertain due to the economic policy and economic outlook in the United States, mainly regarding its trade and fiscal policies and their effects.
    2. Therefore, the behavior and the volatility of different asset classes have been impacted, altering global financial conditions. This scenario requires particular caution from emerging market economies amid heightened geopolitical tensions.
    3. Regarding the domestic scenario, the set of indicators on economic activity has shown some moderation in growth, as expected, but the labor market is still showing strength.
    4. In recent releases, headline inflation and measures of underlying inflation remained above the inflation target. Inflation expectations for 2025 and 2026 collected by the Focus survey remained above the inflation target and stand at 5.1% and 4.4%, respectively.
  2. Scenarios and risk analysis
    1. The inflation outlook remains challenging in several dimensions. Copom assessed the international scenario, economic activity, aggregate demand, inflation expectations, and current inflation. Copom then discussed inflation projections and expectations before deliberating on the current decision and future communication.
    2. The global environment is more adverse and uncertain. If, on the one hand, the approval of certain trade agreements, along with recent inflation and economic activity data from the U.S., could suggest a reduction in global uncertainty, on the other hand, the U.S. fiscal policy—and, particularly for Brazil, the U.S. trade policy—make the outlook more uncertain and adverse. The increase of trade tariffs by the U.S. to Brazil has significant sectoral impacts and still uncertain aggregate effects that depend on the unfolding of the next steps in the negotiations and the perception of risk inherent to this process. The Committee is closely monitoring the potential impacts on the real economy and financial assets. The prevailing assessment within the Committee is the increased global outlook uncertainty, and, therefore, Copom should maintain a cautious stance. As usual, the Committee will focus on the transmission mechanisms from the external environment to the domestic inflation dynamics and their impact on the outlook.
    3. The domestic economic activity outlook has indicated a certain moderation in growth, while also presenting mixed data across sectors and indicators.
    4. Overall, some moderation in growth is observed, supporting the scenario outlined by the Committee. This moderation, necessary for the widening of the output gap and the convergence of inflation to the target, is aligned with a contractionary monetary policy. Monthly sectoral surveys and more timely consumption data support a gradual slowdown in growth.
    5. At turning points in the economic cycle, it is natural to observe mixed signals from economic indicators—some leading, others lagging—as well as from comparisons between markets, such as the credit and labor markets.
    6. The credit market, which is more sensitive to financial conditions, has shown clearer moderation. A decline in non-earmarked credit granting and an increase in interest and delinquency rates have been observed. Moreover, regarding household credit, there has been an increase in the household debtservice ratio and a deepening of the negative credit flow—that is, households repaying more debt than taking on. It was emphasized during the discussion that some recent measures, such as private payroll-deducted loans, have had less impact than many market participants expected. Given the implementation agenda in this credit line, as well as the effects of introducing and removing taxes on other credit modalities, the Committee believes it should closely monitor upcoming credit data releases.
    7. In contrast to the credit market, the labor market remains dynamic. Both from the perspective of income—with real gains consistently above productivity—and employment—with a significant decrease in the unemployment rate to historically low levels—the labor market has greatly supported consumption and income.
    8. Thus, the Committee assesses that the signals from demand and economic activity so far suggest that the scenario is unfolding as expected and is consistent with the current monetary policy. The Committee reiterates that the aggregate demand slowdown is an essential element of supplydemand rebalancing in the economy and convergence of inflation to the target.
    9. Fiscal policy has a short-term impact, mainly through stimulating aggregate demand, and a more structural dimension, which has the potential to affect perceptions of debt sustainability and influence the term premium in the yield curve. A fiscal policy that acts counter-cyclically and contributes to reducing the risk premium favors the convergence of inflation to the target. Copom reinforced its view that the slowdown in structural reform efforts and fiscal discipline, the increase in earmarked credit, and uncertainties over the public debt stabilization have the potential to raise the economy’s neutral interest rate, with deleterious impacts on the power of monetary policy and, consequently, on the cost of disinflation in terms of activity. The Committee remained firmly convinced that policies must be predictable, credible, and countercyclical. In particular, the Committee’s discussion once again highlighted the need for harmonious fiscal and monetary policy.
    10. Inflation expectations, as measured by different instruments and obtained from various groups of agents, remained above the inflation target at all horizons, maintaining the adverse inflation outlook. For shorter-term horizons, following the release of the most recent data, there has been a decline in inflation expectations. For longer-term horizons, conversely, there has been no significant change in inflation expectations between Copom meetings, even though measures of breakeven inflation extracted from financial assets have declined. The Committee reaffirmed and renewed its commitment to re-anchoring expectations and to conducting a monetary policy that supports such a movement.
    11. De-anchored inflation expectations is a factor of discomfort shared by all Committee members and must be tamed. Copom highlighted that environments with de-anchored expectations increase the disinflation cost in terms of activity. The scenario of inflation convergence to the target becomes more challenging with de-anchored expectations for longer horizons. When discussing this topic, the main conclusion obtained and shared by all members of Copom was that, in an environment of de-anchored expectations—as currently is the case—greater monetary restriction is required for a longer period than would be otherwise appropriate.
    12. The inflation scenario has continued to show downside surprises in recent periods compared with analystsforecasts, but inflation has remained above the target Industrial goods inflation, which has already been showing weaker wholesale price pressures, continued to ease in the more recent period. Food prices also displayed slightly weaker-than-expected dynamics. Finally, services inflation, which has greater inertia, remains above the level required to meet the inflation target, in a context of a positive output gap. Beyond the changes in items, or even short-term oscillations, the core inflation measures have remained above the value consistent with the target achievement for months, corroborating the interpretation that inflation is pressured by demand and requires a contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.
    13. Copom then addressed the projections. In the reference scenario, the interest rate path is extracted from the Focus survey, and the exchange rate starts at USD/BRL 5.552 and evolves according to the purchasing power parity (PPP). The Committee assumes that oil prices follow approximately the futures market curve for the following six months and then start increasing 2% per year onwards. Moreover, the energy tariff flag is assumed to be “green” in December of the years 2025 and 2026.
    14. In the reference scenario, four-quarter inflation projections for 2025 and for 2026 are 4.9% and 3.6%, respectively (Table 1). For the relevant horizon for monetary policy—2027 Q1—the inflation projection based on the reference scenario extracted from the Focus survey remained at 3.4%, above the inflation target.
    15. Regarding the balance of risks, it was assessed that the scenario of greater uncertainty continues to present higher-than-usual upside and downside inflation risks to the inflation outlook. Copom assessed that, among the upside risks for the inflation outlook and inflation expectations, it should be emphasized (i) a more prolonged period of de-anchoring of inflation expectations; (ii) a stronger-than-expected resilience of services inflation due to a more positive output gap; and (iii) a conjunction of internal and external economic policies with a stronger-than-expected inflationary impact, for example, through a persistently more depreciated currency. Among the downside risks, it should be noted (i) a greater-than-projected deceleration of domestic economic activity, impacting the inflation scenario; (ii) a steeper global slowdown stemming from the trade shock and the scenario of heightened uncertainty; and (iii) a reduction in commodity prices with disinflationary effects.
    16. Prospectively, the Committee will continue monitoring the pace of economic activity, which is a fundamental driver of inflation, particularly services inflation; the exchange rate pass-through to inflation, after a process of increased exchange rate volatility; and inflation expectations, which remain de-anchored and are drivers of future inflation behavior. It was emphasized that inflationary vectors remain adverse, such as the economic activity resilience and labor market pressures, de-anchored inflation expectations, and high inflation projections. This scenario prescribes a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target.
  3. Discussion of the conduct of monetary policy
    1. Copom then discussed the conduct of monetary policy, considering the set of projections evaluated, as well as the balance of risks for prospective inflation.
    2. Following a swift and firm interest rate hike cycle, the Committee anticipates, as its monetary policy strategy, continuity of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to observe the effects of the cycle already implemented. It was emphasized that, once the appropriate interest rate is determined, it should remain at a significantly contractionary level for a very prolonged period due to de-anchored expectations. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to proceed with the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.
  4. Monetary policy decision
    1. The Committee has been closely monitoring with particular attention the announcements regarding the imposition by the U.S. of trade tariffs on Brazil, reinforcing its cautious stance in a scenario of heightened uncertainty. Moreover, it continues to monitor how the developments on the fiscal side impact monetary policy and financial assets. The current scenario continues to be marked by de-anchored inflation expectations, high inflation projections, resilience on economic activity, and labor market pressures. Ensuring the convergence of inflation to the target in an environment with de-anchored expectations requires a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.
    2. Copom decided to maintain the Selic rate at 15.00% p.a., and judges that this decision is consistent with the strategy for inflation convergence to a level around its target throughout the relevant horizon for monetary policy. Without compromising its fundamental objective of ensuring price stability, this decision also implies smoothing economic fluctuations and fostering full employment.
    3. The current scenario, marked by heightened uncertainty, requires a cautious stance in monetary policy. If the expected scenario materializes, the Committee foresees a continuation of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to examine its yet-to-be-seen cumulative impacts, and then evaluate whether the current interest rate level, assuming it stable for a very prolonged period, will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to resume the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.
    4. The following members of the Committee voted for this decision: Gabriel Muricca Galípolo (Governor), Ailton de Aquino Santos, Diogo Abry Guillen, Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan, Izabela Moreira Correa, Nilton José Schneider David, Paulo Picchetti, Renato Dias de Brito Gomes, and Rodrigo Alves Teixeira.
Table 1

Inflation projections in the reference scenario
Year-over-year IPCA change (%)

Price Index202520262027 Q1
IPCA4.93.63.4
IPCA market prices5.13.53.3
IPCA administered prices4.44.03.9
Footnotes

1 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this update considers changes since the June Copom meeting (271st meeting).

2 It corresponds to the rounded value of the average exchange rate observed over the ten working days ending on the last day of the week prior to the Copom meeting, according to the procedure adopted since the 258th meeting.

Meeting information
Date: July 29-30 2025
Place: BCB Headquarters’ meeting rooms on the 8th floor (7/29 and 7/30 on the morning) and 20th floor (7/30 on the afternoon) – Brasilia – DF – Brazil
Starting and ending times:
July 29: 10:07 AM – 11:37 AM; 2:17 PM – 5:51 PM
July 30: 10:10 AM – 11:13 AM; 2:37PM – 6:34 PM
In attendance:
Members of the Copom
Gabriel Muricca Galípolo – Governor
Ailton de Aquino Santos
Diogo Abry Guillen
Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan
Izabela Moreira Correa
Nilton José Schneider David
Paulo Picchetti
Renato Dias de Brito Gomes
Rodrigo Alves Teixeira
Department Heads in charge of technical presentations (attending on July 29 and on the morning of July 30)
André de Oliveira AmanteOpen Market Operations Department
Euler Pereira Gonçalves de MelloResearch Department (also attending on the afternoon of 7/30)
Fábio Martins Trajano de ArrudaDepartment of Banking Operations and Payments System
Luís Guilherme Siciliano PontesInternational Reserves Department
Marcelo Antonio Thomaz de AragãoDepartment of International Affairs
Ricardo SabbadiniDepartment of Economics
Other participants (attending on July 29 and on the morning of July 30)
Alexandre de CarvalhoOffice of Economic Advisor
André Maurício Trindade da RochaHead of the Financial System Monitoring Department
Angelo Jose Mont Alverne DuarteHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Licensing and Resolution (attending on the mornings of 7/29 and 7/30)
Arnaldo José Giongo GalvãoPress Office Advisor
Cristiano de Oliveira Lopes CozerGeneral Counsel
Edson Broxado de França TeixeiraHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Supervision
Eduardo José Araújo LimaHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Economic Policy
Fernando Alberto G. Sampaio C. RochaHead of the Department of Statistics
Isabela Ribeiro Damaso MaiaHead of the Sustainability and International Portfolio Investors Unit (attending on the mornings of 7/29 and 7/30)
Julio Cesar Costa PintoHead of Office of the Governor
Laura Soledad Cutruffo CompariniDeputy Head of the Department of Economics
Leonardo Martins NogueiraHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy
Marcos Ribeiro de CastroDeputy Head of the Research Department
Mardilson Fernandes QueirozHead of the Financial System Regulation Department
Olavo Lins Romano PereiraDeputy Head of the Department of International Affairs
Renata Modesto BarretoDeputy Head of the Department of Banking Operations and Payments System
Ricardo da Costa MartinelliDeputy Head of the International Reserves Department
Ricardo Eyer HarrisHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Regulation
Ricardo Franco MouraHead of the Prudential and Foreign Exchange Regulation Department
Rogerio Antonio LuccaExecutive Secretary
Simone Miranda BurelloAdvisor in the Office of the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy

The members of Copom analyzed the recent performance and prospects for the Brazilian and international economies, under the monetary policy framework, whose objective is to comply with the inflation targets established by the National Monetary Council. This document represents Copom’s best effort to provide an English version of its policy meeting minutes. In case of inconsistency, the Portuguese version prevails.

World-Watching: 272nd Meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (“Copom”) of the Central Bank of Brazil Press Release

Copom maintains the Selic rate at 15.00% p.a.

[from the Central Bank of Brazil, 30 July, 2025]

The global environment is more adverse and uncertain due to the economic policy and economic outlook in the United States, mainly regarding its trade and fiscal policies and their effects. Therefore, the behavior and the volatility of different asset classes have been impacted, altering global financial conditions. This scenario requires particular caution from emerging market economies amid heightened geopolitical tensions.

Regarding the domestic scenario, the set of indicators on economic activity has shown some moderation in growth, as expected, but the labor market is still showing strength. In recent releases, headline inflation and measures of underlying inflation remained above the inflation target.

Inflation expectations for 2025 and 2026 collected by the Focus survey remained above the inflation target and stand at 5.1% and 4.4%, respectively. Copom’s inflation projections for the first quarter of 2027, currently the relevant horizon for monetary policy, stand at 3.4% in the reference scenario (Table 1).

The risks to the inflation scenarios, both to the upside and to the downside, continue to be higher than usual. Among the upside risks for the inflation outlook and inflation expectations, it should be emphasized (i) a more prolonged period of de-anchoring of inflation expectations; (ii) a stronger-than-expected resilience of services inflation due to a more positive output gap; and (iii) a conjunction of internal and external economic policies with a stronger-than-expected inflationary impact, for example, through a persistently more depreciated currency. Among the downside risks, it should be noted (i) a greater-than-projected deceleration of domestic economic activity, impacting the inflation scenario; (ii) a steeper global slowdown stemming from the trade shock and the scenario of heightened uncertainty; and (iii) a reduction in commodity prices with disinflationary effects.

The Committee has been closely monitoring the announcements on tariffs by the USA to Brazil, which reinforces its cautious stance in a scenario of heightened uncertainty. Moreover, it continues to monitor how the developments on the fiscal side impact monetary policy and financial assets. The current scenario continues to be marked by de-anchored inflation expectations, high inflation projections, resilience on economic activity and labor market pressures. Ensuring the convergence of inflation to the target in an environment with de-anchored expectations requires a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.

Copom decided to maintain the Selic rate at 15.00% p.a., and judges that this decision is consistent with the strategy for inflation convergence to a level around its target throughout the relevant horizon for monetary policy. Without compromising its fundamental objective of ensuring price stability, this decision also implies smoothing economic fluctuations and fostering full employment.

The current scenario, marked by heightened uncertainty, requires a cautious stance in monetary policy. If the expected scenario materializes, the Committee foresees a continuation of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to examine its yet-to-be-seen cumulative impacts, and then evaluate whether the current interest rate level, assuming it stable for a very prolonged period, will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to resume the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.

The following members of the Committee voted for this decision: Gabriel Muricca Galípolo (Governor), Ailton de Aquino Santos, Diogo Abry Guillen, Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan, Izabela Moreira Correa, Nilton José Schneider David, Paulo Picchetti, Renato Dias de Brito Gomes, and Rodrigo Alves Teixeira.

Table 1

Inflation projections in the reference scenario
Year-over-year IPCA change (%)

Price Index202520261st quarter 2027
IPCA4.93.63.4
IPCA market prices5.13.53.3
IPCA administered prices4.44.03.9

In the reference scenario, the interest rate path is extracted from the Focus survey, and the exchange rate starts at USD/BRL 5.55 and evolves according to the purchasing power parity (PPP). The Committee assumes that oil prices follow approximately the futures market curve for the following six months and then start increasing 2% per year onwards. Moreover, the energy tariff flag is assumed to be “green” in December of the years 2025 and 2026. The value for the exchange rate was obtained according to the usual procedure.

Note: This press release represents the Copom’s best effort to provide an English version of its policy statement. In case of any inconsistency, the original version in Portuguese prevails.

Movies As Education: Books and Selves

La Notte (English: The Night) is a 1961 Italian drama directed by Michelangelo Antonioni. The film stars Marcello Mastroianni, Jeanne Moreau, and Monica Vitti (with Umberto Eco, the novelist, appearing in a cameo).

Filmed on location in Milan, the film depicts a day in the life of an unfaithful married couple and their deteriorating relationship.

In 1961, La Notte received the Golden Bear (at the Berlin International Film Festival, the first for an Italian film) and the David di Donatello Award for Best Director.

La Notte is the central film of a trilogy, beginning with L’Avventura (1960) and ending with L’Eclisse (1962).

The movie follows Giovanni Pontano (Marcello Mastroianni), a distinguished writer, and his beautiful wife Lidia (Jeanne Moreau) as they visit their dying friend Tommaso Garani (Bernhard Wicki) who is hospitalized in Milan. Giovanni’s new book, La stagione (The Season), has just been published, and Tommaso praises his friend’s work.

La Notte reflects the director’s intuition that “you are what you read,” and books create a kind of thread through the story.

The dying, hospitalized patient has recently published an article on the famous philosophical writer Theodor Adorno. At the party the couple drifts into, the works of the AustrianJewish writer, Hermann Broch, are mentioned. Essentially, in a depressing glitzy world of lost and semi-lost souls, reading and books constitute a kind of emotional life raft or direction-finding compass, at least potentially. Antonioni frequently uses this motif.

We find this kind of reading and books-centered view of people interpreting their (bewildering) worlds in the works of the French thinker Charles Péguy (who died in battle during World War I in 1914):

“The Jew,” he declares in a passage that has become famous, “is a man who has always read, the Protestant has read for three hundred years, the Catholic for only two generations.”

(quoted in Consciousness and Society, H. Stuart Hughes, Vintage Books, paperback, 1958, page 355)

Charles Péguy is also central to Louis Malle’s classic French film Au revoir les enfants (English: “Goodbye, Children”).

If we “zoom out” and look for a meta-intelligent lesson, we can say that reading, writing, and arithmetic, the three basics mentioned in the phrase we all know, are very deeply entwined with who we are. Stories explain us to ourselves, and stories involve books and reading in our “Gutenberg world.”

The replacement of these by various (post-Gutenberg) screens and games may or may not be thought of as a variant since they constitute a kind of “pseudo-participation” and not participation based on perusal.

3rd Harvard Korean Security Summit: “Korea—A Catalyst for Global Trends” [Zoom]

[from Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, part of Harvard University]

Tuesday, July 19Thursday, July 21

RSVP REQUIRED FOR EACH DAY

During July 19-21, 2022, the Korea Project will convene the 3rd Harvard Korean Security Summit. Our theme of “Korea—A Catalyst of Global Trends” explores how quickly various Korea-related functional issues play out with global implications. Korea cases provide unique insights into global trends ranging from ongoing efforts to change leader-level calculus (2017 Korean Missile Crisis) to the ROK’s designs for bolstering tech supply chain resilience to the DPRK’s expanding use of cryptocurrency theft for funding the regime.

Day 1: Tue., July 19, 2022 | 5:00 – 7:30 PM ET  (RSVP for Day 1)
Day 2: Wed., July 20, 2022 | 5:00 – 7:15 PM ET  (RSVP for Day 2)
Day 3: Thu., July 21, 2022 | 5:00 – 7:15 PM ET  (RSVP for Day 3)

Day 1 Agenda (Tuesday, July 19)

5:00 – 5:05 PM ET: Day 1 Overview

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:05 – 5:10 PM ET: Korea Foundation’s Opening Remarks

Dr. Geun Lee (President, Korea Foundation)

5:10 – 5:15 PM ET: Belfer Center’s Opening Remarks

Natalie Colbert (Executive Director, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:15 – 5:20 PM ET: Congratulatory Remarks

The Honorable Dr. Park Jin (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea)

5:20 – 7:25 PM ET: Panel 1: Enhancing Security on the Korean Peninsula

Panelists

General (Ret.) Vincent Brooks (Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School & Former Commander, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command)

Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service)

General (Ret.) Leem Ho-Young (President, Korea Association of Military Studies & Former Deputy Commander, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command)

Dr. Sue Mi Terry (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center)

The Honorable Dr. Yoon Young-kwan (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea)

Moderator

Nick Schifrin (Foreign Affairs and Defense Correspondent, PBS NewsHour) – TBC

7:25 – 7:30 PM ET: Day 1 Wrap-Up

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

Day 2 Agenda (Wednesday, July 20)

5:00 – 5:05 PM ET: Day 2 Overview

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:05 – 5:15 PM ET: Day 2 Keynote Remarks

Tami Overby (Senior Director, McLarty Associates & Former President, U.S.-Korea Business Council)

5:15 – 7:10 PM ET: Panel 2: Building Mutual Prosperity Through Resilient Technology Supply Chains

Panelists

The Honorable Dr. Taeho Bark (Former ROK Minister for Trade & President, Lee & Ko Global Commerce Institute)

Ambassador Mark Lippert (Executive Vice President, Head of U.S. Public Affairs, and Chief Risk Officer, Samsung Electronics & Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea)

Damien Ma (Managing Director, MacroPolo, Paulson Institute)

Naomi Wilson (Vice President of Policy, Asia, Information Technology Industry Council)

Moderator

Dr. Francesca Giovannini (Executive Director, Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

7:10 – 7:15 PM ET: Day 2 Wrap-Up

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

Day 3 Agenda (Thursday, July 21)

5:00 – 5:05 PM ET: Day 3 Overview

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

5:05 – 5:15 PM ET: Day 3 Keynote Remarks

Jean Lee (Host of BBC Podcast Series, The Lazarus Heist)

5:15 – 7:05 PM ET: Panel 3: Addressing North Korea’s Cybercriminal Statecraft Activities

Panelists

Jason Bartlett (Research Associate, Energy, Economics, and Security Program, Center for a New American Security)

Ashley Chafin-Lomonosov (DPRK Cybercrimes Expert, Chainalysis)

Saher Naumaan (Principal Threat Intelligence Analyst, BAE Systems Applied Intelligence)

David Park (Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Department of the Treasury)

Moderator

Alex O’Neill (Coordinator, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

7:05 – 7:10 PM ET: Day 3 Wrap-Up

Dr. John Park (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

7:10 – 7:15 PM ET: Closing Remarks

Consul General Kijun You (Korean Consulate General in Boston)

Speaker Biographies

Dr. Taeho Bark is the first president of the Lee & Ko Global Commerce Institute (GCI), newly established in September 2017. Together with the GCI team members working under his supervision, Dr. Bark monitors new developments and trends in global trade and investment, analyzes major international trade dispute cases and provides in-depth advice and strategic insights to Korean and foreign enterprises in connection with their trade and investment-related planning and concerns. Dr. Bark is an internationally renowned trade expert and, among other accomplishments, is a Seoul National University (SNU) Professor Emeritus, who has lectured extensively on international commerce and related subjects, and former Dean of the SNU Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). In addition to his academic career, Dr. Bark has extensive experience serving as a public official working on trade policy and negotiation matters, having served with distinction as Minister for Trade of the Korean government (December 2011 – March 2013), as well as serving as the Ambassador-at-Large for International Trade and as the Chairman of the International Trade Commission of Korea.

Jason Bartlett is a Research Associate for the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He analyzes developments and trends in sanctions policy and evasion tactics, proliferation finance, and cyber-enabled financial crime with a regional focus on North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. He also researches the U.S.ROK alliance and international security issues, such as North Korean military provocations and cybercrime. Lastly, Bartlett leads research and writing for the CNAS Sanctions by the Numbers series. Prior to joining CNAS, Bartlett worked at various nonprofit research organizations such as C4ADS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in South Korea. He also spent several years volunteering at human rights-focused NGOs resettling North Korean defectors in the United States and South Korea. Bartlett was a 2018-2019 Boren Fellow and Critical Language Scholarship (CLS) recipient in South Korea for Korean language immersion through the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, respectively. He holds a master’s degree in Asian studies and a graduate certificate in refugee and humanitarian emergencies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He received a B.S. in Spanish language and literature and a B.A. in international studies from SUNY Oneonta. He also graduated from the Korean Language Institute at Yonsei University in Seoul. Bartlett is fluent in Korean and Spanish. Outside of CNAS, Bartlett is a contributing author for The Diplomat, where he writes on the intersections of cyber, culture, and security in Asia. He is also a member of the North Korea Cyber Working Group at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. His commentary and analysis have appeared in The Wall Street Journal, Government MattersBusiness InsiderYahoo! FinanceThe Wire China, NK News, Inkstick Media, Radio Free Asia, Voice of America – Korean, The National Interest, and El País.

General (Ret.) Vincent K. Brooks is a career Army officer who retired from active duty in January 2019 as the four-star general in command of over 650,000 Koreans and Americans under arms. General Brooks is a 1980 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which was the first class to include women. He led the 4,000 cadets as the cadet brigade commander or “First Captain.” A history-maker, Brooks is the first African American to have been chosen for this paramount position, and he was the first cadet to lead the student body when women were in all four classes. He is also the eighth African American in history to attain the military’s top rank – four-star general in the U.S. Army. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; a Master of Military Art and Science from the prestigious U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; was a National Security Fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. General Brooks also holds an honorary Doctor of Laws from the New England School of Law as well as an honorary Doctor of Humanities from New England Law | Boston. He is a combat veteran and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In retirement, General Brooks is a Director of the Gary Sinise Foundation; a non-resident Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; a Distinguished Fellow at the University of Texas, with both the Clements Center for National Security and also the Strauss Center for International Security and Law; an Executive Fellow with the Institute for Defense and Business; and the President of VKB Solutions LLC.

Ashley Chafin-Lomonosov is a Cybercrimes Investigator with Chainalysis, the blockchain data company that serves the public and private sectors globally in order to enable investigations and compliance in the crypto space. Prior to joining Chainalysis, Ashley served in the U.S. government. She leverages the past 10 years of developing financial threat intelligence analysis skills to investigate nation state activity on the blockchain. She specifically focuses on East Asian issues, spending the majority of her time studying DPRK’s tactics, techniques, and procedures on the blockchain. Ashley holds a Master’s in Business Administration and a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism & Public Relations.

Emma Chanlett-Avery is a Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. She focuses on U.S. relations with Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Thailand, and Singapore. Ms. Chanlett-Avery joined CRS in 2003 through the Presidential Management Fellowship, with rotations in the State Department on the Korea Desk and at the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Bangkok, Thailand. She also worked in the Office of Policy Planning as a Harold Rosenthal Fellow. She is a member of the Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Japan Network for the Future, Vice-Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Japan America Society of Washington, and the 2016 recipient of the Kato Prize. Ms. Chanlett-Avery received an M.A. in international security policy from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and her B.A. in Russian studies from Amherst College.

Natalie Colbert is the Belfer Center’s Executive Director. Before coming to the Belfer Center, Colbert served in the Central Intelligence Agency for 13 years. Most recently, she was Director of Analytic Resources and Corporate Programs for the Near East Mission Center, where she led strategic management of analytic personnel resources and created a career development seminar for mid-level analysts. Prior to this role, Colbert led multiple analytic teams to produce intelligence assessments covering fast-paced issues in the Middle East for the President and other customers in the policymaking, intelligence, and military communities. Colbert previously served as an intelligence analyst covering conflict zones in Africa and Latin America. Across her CIA career, Colbert has earned awards for leadership excellence and in 2021 received the Near East Mission Center Award for Excellence in Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Colbert is a 2008 graduate of Harvard Kennedy School, where she earned a Master in Public Policy. She graduated in 2006 from New York University, majoring in International Relations and Francophone Studies.

Dr. Francesca Giovannini is the Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. In addition, she is a non-residential fellow at the Centre for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Dr. Giovannini served as Strategy and Policy Officer to the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), based in Vienna. In that capacity, she oversaw a series of policy initiatives to promote CTBT ratification as a confidence-building mechanism in regional and bilateral nuclear negotiations, elevate the profile of CTBT in academic circles and promote the recruitment of female scientists from the Global South. Prior to her international appointment, Dr. Giovannini served for five years at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston as Director of the Research Program on Global Security and International Affairs. Working to leverage academic knowledge to inform better policies, she led and promoted countless academic research on issues such as bilateral and multilateral arms control frameworks, regional nuclear proliferation dynamics, and nuclear security and insider threats. With a Doctorate from the University of Oxford and two Masters from the University of California, Berkeley, Dr. Giovannini began her career working for international organizations and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Geun Lee was appointed President of the Korea Foundation in September 2019. Prior to joining the Korea Foundation, he was a professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, and former Dean of Office of International Affairs, Seoul National University. From 2015 to 2016, he was visiting Super Global Professor at Keio University in Japan. He is also former Chair of the Global Agenda Council on the Future of Korea at the World Economic Forum (Davos Forum), and currently a member of the Global Future Council of the World Economic Forum. Before joining the faculty of Seoul National University, he served as a professor at the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (which is now part of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy). He also served as President of an independent think tank, Korea Institute for Future Strategies from 2003-2007. His publications include “Clash of Soft Power between China and Japan,” “A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy,” “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” “U.S. Global Defense Posture Review and its Implications on the U.S.-Korea Relations.” He co-authored The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security. Dr. Lee received his B.A. in political science from Seoul National University, and M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Jean Lee is a veteran foreign correspondent and expert on North Korea. Lee led the Associated Press (AP) news agency’s coverage of the Korean Peninsula as bureau chief from 2008 to 2013. In 2011, she became the first American reporter granted extensive access on the ground in North Korea, and in January 2012 opened AP’s Pyongyang bureau, the only U.S. text/photo news bureau based in the North Korean capital. She has made dozens of extended reporting trips to North Korea, visiting farms, factories, schools, military academies, and homes in the course of her exclusive reporting across the country. During Lee’s tenure, AP’s coverage of Kim Jong Il’s 2011 death earned an honorable mention in the deadline reporting category of the 2012 Associated Press Media Editors awards for journalism in the United States and Canada. Lee also won an Online Journalism Award in 2013 for her role in using photography, video, and social media in North Korea. Lee is a native of Minneapolis. She has a bachelor’s degree in East Asian Studies and English from Columbia University, and a master’s degree from the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism. She worked as a reporter for the Korea Herald in Seoul, South Korea, before being posted with AP to the news agency’s bureaus in Baltimore, Fresno, San Francisco, New York, London, Seoul, and Pyongyang. Lee served as a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and Global Fellow before joining the Asia Program as Korea Center program director. She has contributed commentary and feature stories to the New York Times Sunday ReviewEsquire magazine, the New Republic and other publications. She appears as an analyst for CNN, BBC, NPR, PRI, and other media, and serves frequently as a guest speaker on Korea-related topics. She is a member of the National Committee on North Korea, the Council of Korean Americans, the Asian American Journalists Association, and the Pacific Council. She serves on the World Economic Forum’s Global Futures Council on the Korean Peninsula. She is co-host of the Lazarus Heist podcast on the BBC World Service.

General (Ret.) Leem Ho-Young is the President of the Korea Association of Military Studies, a nonprofit think tank operating under the auspices of the ROK Ministry of National Defense. He is also the Vice Chairman of the Korea Defense Veterans Association and Vice President of the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation. Previously, General Leem was the Commander of the Ground Component Command and Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command from 2016 to 2017. General Leem has served as the ROK Army’s Director of Audit and Inspection and the Director of Strategy and Planning for the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has been a lifelong Infantry officer since his graduation from the Korea Military Academy, Class Number 38.

Ambassador Mark Lippert has had a distinguished career in the U.S. government that spanned approximately two decades and included a series of senior-level positions across multiple agencies. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea, based in Seoul. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (2013-2014) and as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2012-2013), the top official in the Pentagon for all Asia issues. Lippert also worked in the White House as chief of staff to the National Security Council in 2009. Lippert served in the uniformed military. An intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy, he mobilized to active duty from 2009 to 2011 for service with Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) Development Group that included deployments to Afghanistan and other regions. From 2007 to 2008, he deployed as an intelligence officer with Seal Team One to Anbar Province, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Earlier in his career, Lippert served as a staff member in the U.S. Senate, where he worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for then-Senator Obama; the Senate Appropriations Committee State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee for Senator Leahy, and for other members of the Senate. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal for his service in Iraq, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Basic Parachutist Badge. He is also the recipient of the Department of Defense’s Distinguished Public Service Award and the Department of the Navy’s Distinguished Public Service Award. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford University with a B.A. in political science and holds an M.A. in international policy studies from the same institution. He speaks Korean and also studied Mandarin Chinese at Beijing University.

Damien Ma is Managing Director and co-founder of MacroPolo, the Think Tank of the Paulson Institute. He is the author or editor of the books, In Line Behind a Billion People: How Scarcity Will Define China’s Ascent in the Next DecadeThe Economics of Air Pollution in China (by Ma Jun), and China’s Economic Arrival: Decoding a Disruptive Rise, published by Palgrave Macmillan. He is also adjunct faculty at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. Previously, Ma was a Senior Analyst at Eurasia Group, the political risk research and advisory firm. At Eurasia Group, he mainly focused on the China and East Asian markets, covering areas that spanned energy and commodities and industrial policy to elite politics and U.S.-China relations. He also led work on analyzing Mongolian politics and its mining sector. His advisory and analytical work served a range of clients from institutional investors and multinationals to the U.S., Japanese, and Singaporean governments. Prior to joining Eurasia Group, he was a manager of publications at the U.S.-China Business Council in Washington, D.C., where he was also an adjunct instructor at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Early in his career, he worked at public relations firm H-Line Ogilvy in Beijing, where he served multinational clients. In addition, Ma has published widely, including in The AtlanticNew York TimesForeign AffairsThe New RepublicForeign Policy, and Bloomberg, among others. He has also appeared in a range of broadcast media such as the Charlie Rose Show, BBC, NPR, and CNBC. In addition to media appearances, Ma has keynoted or spoken at various industry, investor, and academic conferences, including CLSA and Credit Suisse Latin America. Ma was named a “99under33” foreign policy leader by the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. He speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese.

Saher Naumaan is Principal Threat Intelligence Analyst at BAE Systems Applied Intelligence. She currently researches state-sponsored cyber espionage with a focus on threat groups and activity in the Middle East. Saher specialises in analysis covering the intersection of geopolitics and cyber operations, and regularly speaks at public and private conferences around the world, including SAS, Virus Bulletin, FIRST, and Bsides. Prior to working at Applied Intelligence, Saher graduated from King’s College London with a Master’s in Intelligence and Security, where she received the Barrie Paskins Award for Best MA dissertation in War Studies.

Alex O’Neill is Coordinator of the Korea Project and an Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is also a Co-Founder of the Belfer Center’s North Korea Cyber Working Group. As Coordinator, Alex helps oversee all Korea Project events and initiatives, including the annual Harvard Korean Security Summit. He previously worked as Research Assistant to Prof. Matthew Bunn at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom. Alex’s work focuses on North Korean financially motivated cyber operations, as well as links between North Korean and Russian-speaking criminals. His most recent research publication is “Cybercriminal Statecraft: North Korean Hackers’ Ties to the Global Underground.” Alex is a member of the Advisory Board of the International Refugee Assistance Project and of the Young Professionals Briefing Series at the Council on Foreign Relations. He speaks fluent Spanish and has advanced proficiency in Russian. Alex holds an M.Sc. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford and a B.A. in History from Yale University.

Tami Overby is Board Director for The Korea Society and Senior Director at McLarty Associates, where she advises clients on Asia and trade matters, with a particular focus on Korea. She has three decades of Asia work, including 21 years living and working in Seoul. Her most recent experience includes eight years leading the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Asia team while also serving as President of the U.S.-Korea Business Council. Ms. Overby’s extensive experience helps American companies compete and prosper in Asia. She attended many of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) negotiating rounds, often leading the American business delegation to help ensure U.S. firms’ priorities were well understood by the negotiating partners. She oversaw the U.S. Coalition for TPP, an alliance led by the U.S. Chamber, the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Farm Bureau, and the Emergency Committee for Trade.

David Park is a Senior Policy Advisor in the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC). He advises senior leadership on policies and strategies that utilize Treasury’s tools to compete against China in the national security context, including in the technology, economy, and military spheres. He is also responsible for developing polices and strategies that seek to counter Chinese illicit financing, money laundering, financial crimes, corruption, and human rights abuses to advance U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific. Previously, David was the first U.S. Treasury Representative to Korea. While there, he advised U.S. government (USG) senior officials and agencies on North Korea sanctions, economy, and illicit financing and sought ways to work cooperatively with ROK institutions to enhance the USG’s pressure campaign on North Korea. Before his assignment to Korea, David was Senior Advisor to the Acting Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for TFFC, advising her on countering terrorist financing, proliferation financing, money laundering, corruption, and financial crimes issues. David began his Treasury career as a Policy Advisor, responsible for developing Treasury’s strategy and policy to counter North Korean illicit financing, financial crimes, and sanctions evasion. Before Treasury, David served in the Office of U.S. Senator Joe Donnelly as a Defense and Foreign Affairs Legislative Staffer. In this role, he advised the Senator on his Senate Armed Services Committee work and advanced U.S. national interests through the annual National Defense Authorization Act. David began his public service career as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. In the Air Force, he served with service members from all the service branches, the ROK Air Force in Korea, and NATO nations in Belgium. David earned his B.A. with honors from the University of California, Berkeley, MPA from the University of Oklahoma, and MA from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Dr. Park Jin is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. He previously served four terms as a Member of the National Assembly (16th, 17th, 18th, 21st), including as a member of the Science, Technology, Information and Communication Committee (2002-2004), a ranking member of the National Defense Committee (2004-2006), a member of the Intelligence Oversight Committee (2004-2006), a member of the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee (2006-2010) and a ranking member of the Knowledge Economy Committee (2010-2012). He served as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs, Trade and National Unification Committee from 2008-2010. In that capacity, he passed the KORUS FTA, Korea-EU FTA, North Korea Human Rights Act, ODA Law and PKO Law. He was also actively involved in parliamentary diplomacy with the U.S., the U.K., China, Japan, ASEAN, Central Asia, Israel and the Middle East. He previously served as the Presidential Secretary for Press Affairs and later Political Affairs under the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998) before being elected parliamentary member in August 2002 in Seoul. During his private life, Dr. Park led the Asia Future Institute (AFI), an independent policy think-tank established in 2013 and designed to conduct research on economic, political and strategic issues in Asia and promote Korea’s role in the Asia-Pacific region. He also served as the Chairman of Korea-America Association (KAA), which was created in 1963 to promote mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation between Korea and the United States. He served as a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. from 2014 to 2021. Dr. Park also taught as an endowed Chair Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Previously he led the Korea-Britain Society as the Executive President (2007-2017). With great affection for the sea, he served in the Korean military as a Navy officer, Lieutenant JG (1980-1983) lecturing naval cadets in the Korean Naval Academy in Jinhae. Dr. Park graduated from the College of Law at Seoul National University (B.A.), Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (MPA), New York University Law School (LL.M.) and received a doctorate degree (D. Phil.) in politics from St. Antony’s College, Oxford University.

Dr. John Park is Director of the Korea Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is also a Faculty Member of the Committee on Regional Studies East Asia, an Associated Faculty Member of the Korea Institute, and a Faculty Affiliate with the Project on Managing the Atom. His core research projects focus on the political economy of the Korean Peninsula, nuclear proliferation, economic statecraft, Asian trade negotiations, and North Korean cyber operations. He previously worked at Goldman Sachs and The Boston Consulting Group. Dr. Park presented a TEDxPaloAlto talk in 2019 titled “How North Korea Inc. Evades Sanctions Through Innovation.” Dr. Park’s key publications include: “Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences,” (MIT Security Studies Program, 2016 – co-authored with Jim Walsh); “The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle,” The Washington Quarterly (Fall 2014); “Assessing the Role of Security Assurances in Dealing with North Korea” in Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford University Press, 2012); “North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activities” (USIP Working Paper, May 2009); and “North Korea’s Nuclear Policy Behavior: Deterrence and Leverage,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008). Dr. Park received his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, where he was a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellow. He completed his pre-doctoral and post-doctoral training at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center.

Nick Schifrin is the foreign affairs and defense correspondent for PBS NewsHour, based in Washington, D.C. He leads NewsHour’s foreign reporting and has created week-long, in-depth series for NewsHour from China, Russia, Ukraine, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, Cuba, Mexico, and the Baltics. The PBS NewsHour series “Inside Putin’s Russia” won a 2018 Peabody Award and the National Press Club’s Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence. In November 2020, Schifrin received the American Academy of Diplomacy’s Arthur Ross Media Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis of Foreign Affairs. Prior to PBS NewsHour, Schifrin was Al Jazeera America’s Middle East correspondent. He won an Overseas Press Club Award for his Gaza coverage and a National Headliners Award for his Ukraine coverage. From 2008-2012, Schifrin served as the ABC News correspondent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2011, he was one of the first journalists to arrive in Abbottabad, Pakistan, after Osama bin Laden’s death and delivered one of the year’s biggest exclusives: the first video from inside bin Laden’s compound. His reporting helped ABC News win an Edward R. Murrow Award for its bin Laden coverage. He has a Master of International Public Policy degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), with a concentration in Strategic Studies.

Dr. Sue Mi Terry is Director of the Asia Program and the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Dr. Terry served in a range of important policy roles related to both Korea and its surrounding region. Formerly a Senior Fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), she served as a Senior Analyst on Korean issues at the CIA (2001-2008), where she produced hundreds of intelligence assessments – including a record number of contributions to the President’s Daily Brief, the Intelligence Community’s most prestigious product. She received numerous awards for her leadership and outstanding mission support, including the CIA Foreign Language award in 2008. From 2008 to 2009, Dr. Terry was the Director for Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs at the National Security Council under both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. In that role, she formulated, coordinated, and implemented U.S. government policy on Korea and Japan, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania. From 2009 to 2010, she was Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council. In that position, she led the U.S. Intelligence community’s production of strategic analysis on East Asian issues and authored multiple National Intelligence Estimates. From 2010 to 2011, Dr. Terry served as the National Intelligence Fellow in the David Rockefeller Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Since leaving the government, Dr. Terry has been a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute (2011-2015), where she taught both graduate and undergraduate courses on Korean politics and East Asia. She holds a Ph.D. (2001) and an M.A. (1998) in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a B.A. in political science from New York University (1993).

Naomi Wilson serves as vice president of policy, Asia at the Information Technology Industry Council. Prior to joining ITI, Naomi served at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where she most recently held the position of acting director for Asia-Pacific. In that capacity, she played a leading role on cybersecurity, law enforcement, and customs cooperation issues related to Asia and served as a senior advisor to Secretary Jeh Johnson. During her tenure at DHS, Naomi led development and implementation of priority policy initiatives for DHS engagement with China, including secretarial engagements and agreements. She worked closely with interagency colleagues to negotiate and implement agreements stemming from the September 2015 State visit between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, including managing the U.S.China High-Level Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues for DHS. Prior to joining DHS, Naomi served as a staffer on the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs and as a research assistant at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Naomi holds a Bachelor’s degree in English and Master’s in International Affairs & National Security. In 2011, she completed intensive Chinese language training at Peking University. Naomi speaks advanced Mandarin and French and is a native of Connecticut.

Dr. Yoon Young-kwan served as the inaugural Senior Visiting Scholar with the Korea Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also served as the 2021 Kim Koo Visiting Professor at the Korea Institute at Harvard University. He is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea from 2003 to 2004. Before he joined the faculty of Seoul National University in 1990, he taught at the University of California at Davis. He served as Korea’s Eminent Representative to, and co-chair of, the East Asia Vision Group II from September 2011 to October 2012. He has published several books and some 70 articles in the fields of international political economy, Korea’s foreign policy, and inter-Korean relations, some of which appeared in World Politics, International Political Science Review, Asian Survey, and Project Syndicate. Dr. Yoon received his doctoral degree from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Consul General Kijun You serves in the Korean Consulate General in Boston. His previous positions in the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs include: Director-General for International Legal Affairs; Deputy Director-General for International Legal Affairs; Minister-Counsellor, Korean Embassy in the Republic of Kenya; Counsellor, Korean Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York; Director, Territory and Oceans Division, Treaties Bureau. Consul General You received his B.A. in French Language and Literature at Korea University, Master of Law from Korea University, LL.M. from the University of Edinburgh, and LL.M. from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Education and Word and Number Hidden Vagueness

These mini-essays help students of any age to re-understand education in a deeper and more connected way.

They look for “circum-spective” intelligence. (Not in the sense of prudential or cautious but in the sense of “around-looking.”)

One of the things to begin to see is that explaining things in schools is misleading “ab initio” (i.e., from the beginning).

Let’s do an example:

In basic algebra, you’re asked: what happens to (x2 – 1)/(x – 1) as x “goes to” (i.e., becomes) 1.

If you look at the numerator (thing on top), x2 is also 1 (since 1 times 1 is 1) and (1 – 1) is zero. The denominator is also (1 – 1) and zero.

Thus you get 0 divided by 0.

You’re then told that’s a no-no and that’s because zeros and infinities lead to all kinds of arithmetic “bad behavior” or singularities.

You’re then supposed to see that x2 – 1 can be re-written as (x – 1)(x + 1) and since “like cancels like,” you cancel the x – 1 is the numerator and denominator and “get rid” of it.

This leaves simply x + 1. So, as x goes to 1, x + 1 goes to 2 and you have a “legitimate” answer and have bypassed the impasse of 0 acting badly (i.e., zero divided by zero).

If you re-understand all this more slowly you’ll see that there are endless potential confusions:

For example: you cannot say that (x2 – 1)/(x – 1) = x + 1 since looking at the two sides of the equal sign shows different expressions which are not equal.

They’re also not really equivalent.

You could say that coming up with x + 1 is a workaround or a “reduced form” or a “downstream rewrite” of (x2 – 1)/(x – 1).

This reminds us of the endless confusions in high school science: if you combine hydrogen gas (H2) with oxygen gas (O2) you don’t get water (H2O). Water is the result of a chemical reaction giving you a compound.

A mixture is not a compound. Chemistry is based on this distinction.

Math and science for that matter, are based on taking a formula or expression (like the one we saw above) and “de-cluttering” it or “shaking loose” a variant form which is not identical and not the same but functionally equivalent in a restricted way.

A lot of students who fail to follow high school or college science sense these and other “language and number” problems of hidden vagueness.
School courses punish students who “muse” to themselves about hidden vagueness. This behavior is pre-defined as “bad woolgathering” but we turn this upside down and claim it is potentially “good woolgathering” and might lead to enchantment which then underlies progress in getting past one’s fear of something like math or science or anything else.

One is surrounded by this layer of reality on all sides, what Wittgenstein calls “philosophy problems which are really language games.”

Think of daily life: you say to someone: “you can count one me.” You mean trust, rely on, depend on, where count on is a “set phrase.” (The origin of the phrase and how it became a set phrase is probably unknowable and lost in the mists of time.)

“You can count on me” does not mean you can stand on me and then count something…one, two, three.

In other words in all kinds of language (English, say, or math as a language) one is constantly “skating over” such logic-and-nuance-and-meaning issues.

The genius Kurt Gödel (Einstein’s walk around buddy at Princeton) saw this in a deep way and said that it’s deeply surprising that languages work at all (spoken, written or mathematical) since the bilateral sharing of these ambiguities would seem deadly to any clarity at all and communication itself would seem a rather unlikely outcome.

You could also say that drama giants of the twentieth century like Pinter, Ionesco and Beckett, intuit these difficulties which then underlie their plays.

All of this together gives you a more “composite” “circum-spective” view of what is really happening in knowledge acquisition.

Education and the World’s Confusion

Students need to understand that the world and history and the mood of the moment are always a “confusing swirl,” as experience shows, and that implies the present intersection of world/history/mood is also such a confusing “opaque windshield.”

Take the example of Europe after World War I. Mussolini leaves his position at the left-wing paper Avanti! (English: “Forward”) and founds the bellicose Il Populo d’Italia (English: “The People of Italy”), which is nationalist and warlike.

Avanti! was an Italian daily newspaper, born as the official voice of the Italian Socialist Party, published since 25 December 1896. It took its name from its German counterpart Vorwärts, the party-newspaper of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Il Populo d’Italia, was an Italian newspaper which published editions every day with the exception for Mondays founded by Benito Mussolini in 1914, after his split from the Italian Socialist Party.

Mussolini was a complete tactical opportunist and his profound flip-flops indicate that “the winds” of mood and opinion were capricious and somewhat blind to its own twists and turns.

Take the case of the (later) famous anti-fascist Arturo Toscanini, the great music conductor. His trajectory is non-linear and as “jumpy” as Mussolini’s, going the other way:

“From the start Fascism was an eclectic movement and in its early days in 1919 it attracted a number of people who, including some, such as the great conductor Arturo Toscanini, who soon became its most determined opponents.”

(James Joll, Europe since 1870: An International History, Penguin Books, 1976, page 266)

Toscanini ran as a Fascist parliamentary candidate in Milan (1919) and this is a clue as to the tremendous disorientation in the wake of World War I.

In 1983, the outstanding Hebrew University scholar, Professor Sternhell, wrote Ni droite ni gauche. L’idéologie fasciste en France, which was translated to English three years later under the title, Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France. The title of this classic by Sternhell—“neither right nor left”—captures via its very title, the indeterminate fusion and hodge-podge quality of modern ideologies. If they’re neither right nor left, where are they?

We could say there’s a deep pattern: World War I (yielding communism and fascism and Nazism) and then World War II (with atomic weapons and Auschwitz) and the Cold War have all left very disorienting legacies and since people in 2022 are legatees of these three wars, outlooks are very foggy. As the world becomes extremely confusing, people react accordingly and veer from mood to mood and opinion to opinion.