Tag: government of Japan [日本国政府]

Japan Inc. Now Sells No Yen to Invest Abroad

Earnings on Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) reached 103% of new FDI in 2022–25. With dividends and retained earnings counted together, Japan Inc. now needs to sell little yen to invest abroad.

[by OKUBO Takuji]

Key takeaways

  • Foreign affiliates now earn about as much as Japan invests abroad each year. Reinvested earnings, dividends and interest together reached 103% of new outward FDI in 2022–25, against 48% in 1996–2000.
  • Dividends from foreign affiliates account for a growing share of Japanese corporate profit. We estimate that foreign affiliates contributed 13.4% of Japan Inc.’s earnings in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.
  • Corporate investment abroad now involves little net yen selling. After dividends and interest paid home, the estimated outflow has been close to zero since 2022, down from about ¥5 trillion a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s.

Japan’s FDI stock now earns 103% of new investment

It is often said that Japan’s ageing population and slow growth give its companies too few investment opportunities at home. A Japanese government report in 2024 included the following passages.

“Japan’s ageing and shrinking population depresses expected demand at home. Expected returns remain higher abroad, so Japanese companies have accelerated outward direct investment” (my translation). — MATSUBAYASHI Yōichi [松林 洋一], MOF PRI, chapter 8, p.136.

“Companies invested abroad because they saw no promising investments in Japan; they are unlikely to bring back every return. On a cash-flow basis, the external balance is in deficit and is one factor behind the weak yen” (my translation). — KARAKAMA Daisuke [唐鎌 大輔], MOF PRI, chapter 10, pp.178 and 175.

However, my review of recent data shows that while their premise of low growth prospects in Japan is probably still right, the direct investment Japan has accumulated abroad has reached a level where it earns enough to cover Japan’s new investment abroad. This changes the exchange-rate implication even if Japan keeps investing abroad.

As chart 1 shows, earnings on the accumulated investment stock rose from 48% of new outward FDI in 1996–2000 to 103% in 2022–25.

Chart 1

Overseas affiliates pay interest and dividends to their parent companies in Japan. Those dividends have become a sizable part of corporate Japan’s income: we estimate that they made up 13.4% of Japanese corporate profit in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.

When foreign affiliates retain their earnings on their balance sheets, Japan’s balance of payments statistics record them as FDI from Japan, even though no money crosses the border. While the companies receiving FDI dividends and the companies paying for new FDI are not necessarily the same, Japan Inc. as a whole is now financing its FDI almost entirely from the earnings of its overseas affiliates. At the current level of FDI, little new yen needs to be converted into foreign currencies as Japan goes about investing abroad.

In the rest of this report, I explain how foreign direct investment by Japanese companies evolved, and its near-term outlook. This report is the third in a series on the yen repatriation theme that I have published over the past few weeks, following “Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale”, on capital flows through Japan’s national pension funds, and “Mrs Watanabe No More”, on Japanese households’ assets invested abroad.

A strong yen helped drive Japan’s first outward FDI boom

Japan’s outward investment was heavily restricted after WWII, requiring case-by-case permission from the government. Approvals became more and more automatic over the years until outward investment became “free in principle” in 1980. Trade friction with the US-led Japanese carmakers to restrain their exports from 1981, pushing them to build factories abroad. The rapid appreciation of the yen was also a factor. The yen strengthened from ¥242 per dollar before the Plaza Accord in September 1985 to ¥121 by the end of 1987. Japanese producers had to move lower value-added work abroad. The strong yen also gave Japanese financial institutions sizable purchasing power for a while, until the stock and property bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991.

All of these factors contributed to a rapid increase in outward FDI through the 1980s and 1990s (chart 2).

Chart 2

Even after the bubble burst, the strong yen kept pushing manufacturers to move abroad. In 2005, manufacturers accounted for 60% of the FDI stock. As Japanese manufacturers expanded their supply chains abroad, Asia’s share of outward FDI rose from about 12% in FY1986–90 to 19% in FY1995–99, and Asia held 23% of the FDI stock by 2005 (chart 3).

Chart 3

Japan’s outward FDI stock rose to 56% of GDP

The next phase was sustained by a different pressure. With weak growth and low interest rates at home, Japan Inc. kept investing abroad, across a broader range of industries. Between 1995 and 2025, the stock of FDI rose from 9% of Japan’s GDP to 58% (chart 4). In 2025, it is as large as about 38% of the private sector’s domestic fixed capital, on our estimate.

Chart 4

By industry composition and by destination compositions changed over time. Manufacturing’s share of the FDI stock had fallen to 37% by 2025, giving Japan’s FDI more breadth. By destination, we are seeing a revival of FDI toward the United States. It accounted for 34% of the stock in 2025, Europe 29% and Asia 25% (see earlier chart 3).

Thus, after decades of overseas investment, Japan’s FDI stock is now large enough that its earnings are sufficient to finance new investment abroad, at least for now. In the next section, I consider whether this will continue, and in particular whether Japanese companies may bring an even larger share of their overseas earnings back to Japan, given the weak yen, higher borrowing costs in yen and possibly better investment opportunities at home.

The weak yen has slowed offshoring, not reversed it

The real depreciation of the yen over the past 15 years made production in Japan more competitive. There is some evidence that manufacturers are considering bringing production back to Japan. The 2023 manufacturing white paper found more firms shifting production back from China than moving there, and they named the weak yen as one reason. We see some signs of reshoring. Japanese manufacturers’ overseas production ratio rose from 18.0% in FY2011 to 27.2% in FY2023, but it may have started to decline or at least stabilize. The ratio fell to 26.7% in FY2024. A Cabinet Office survey of listed manufacturers puts the ratio at 24.5% in FY2025, and their plan for FY2030 is broadly unchanged at 24.7%. The weak yen seems to have stabilized the wave of offshoring, but I see no firm evidence of a move back onshore yet.

Domestic investment has grown slowly despite the weak yen

There are tentative signs that domestic capital spending is starting to grow again. For three decades it grew at a very low speed. In real terms, private business investment rose only 26% between FY1997 and FY2025, less than 1% a year. In comparison, capital spending grew by about 4% a year on average in the United States. In my view, a weak currency is only one of the factors manufacturers weigh in designing their global production chains. The weak yen makes production in Japan competitive today, but they have also seen the exchange rate swing violently within short periods. Japan also has a shrinking population problem. It started to address it by opening a door to immigration, but the door is only tentatively open. Overall, my view is that the weak yen alone is unlikely to give Japan Inc. sufficient incentive to bring its capital back to Japan and to the yen.

Economic security is bringing some production home

The government is pushing harder than the currency, mostly in the name of economic security, even before the Takaichi government came along. The government currently has a ¥250 trillion domestic investment target for FY2040 and named AI and semiconductors among its 17 strategic fields. Semiconductors are where the money has gone furthest. In November 2024, under the Ishiba government, Japan committed more than ¥10 trillion of public support to AI and semiconductors by FY2030, aiming to draw more than ¥50 trillion of public and private investment over ten years. Japan managed to lure a TSMC plant to Japan, backed by a sizable subsidy. Rapidus, a government-supported Japanese semiconductor maker, has received a sizable subsidy and is building a factory in Hokkaido. Japan’s production of integrated circuits and discrete semiconductors rose from ¥2.7 trillion in 2019 to ¥4.1 trillion in 2025.

Under the name of economic security, the Japanese government is promoting other industries such as batteries, shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals. Defence spending adds to the push. Japan’s defence budget rose from about ¥5 trillion in FY2022 to ¥9.0 trillion in FY2026. Some defence contractors, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, have doubled their defence revenue.

Japan’s industrial-policy record gives reason for caution

The Japanese government and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the key agency behind Japan’s industry policy, may claim some expertise in their industrial policies. Empirical studies in the past paint a poor track record, though. Rapidus, the most ambitious semiconductor project, has had no independent cost-benefit assessment (Negrine et al., 2025). While defence and economic security-driven policies have a different logic, I doubt that these industrial policies will succeed in bringing large-scale manufacturing investment back to Japan so long as macro factors such as Japan’s demography remain unfavourable.

FDI no longer appears to drive yen weakness

The weak yen and non-economic geopolitical factors do point to a halt in Japan’s four-decade offshoring trend, although it is a stabilization, rather than an economy-wide reversal of past offshoring. Japan Inc. will continue to invest more abroad, rather than within its borders. Given the sizable growth in the stock of cumulative FDI, Japan Inc. no longer needs to convert yen into overseas currency to keep investing abroad though. Net of dividends and interest paid home, Japan’s FDI sold about ¥5 trillion of yen a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s; since 2022 the net flow has been close to zero. There is also an interesting development in an effort to allow more share-exchange based M&A for cross-border deals that will further reduce the need for Japanese companies to spend their yen to purchase overseas assets. In my view, Japan Inc.’s FDI is no longer a factor to drive the yen weaker.

References

Japan-Watching: Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale

GPIF, one of the largest national pension funds in the world, is likely to rebalance its assets from non-yen bonds to yen bonds, signaling a big turn in Japan’s cross-border capital flows.

[from Japan Macro Advisors, 10 September, 2026]

Key takeaways

  • In 2013, GPIF’s investment committee, chaired by UEDA Kazuo [植田和男], now the BoJ governor, saw a fair chance of a JGB crash within five to ten years. Its CEO priced the crash as the 10-year rising from 0.5% to 3%. Subsequently, GPIF cut its target weight for domestic bonds from 60% to 25% as an emergency measure against abnormally low yields.
  • The 10-year is now at 3%. On my replication of GPIF’s own allocation rule, a real return on JGBs near zero points to a 50% weight in domestic bonds, against 25% today. I expect GPIF to raise the weight, if it has not already started in the September quarter.
  • How GPIF decides its asset allocation and communicates it publicly is a very delicate and political issue. But regardless of how it communicates it, a change in asset allocation is inevitable. In my view, it signifies a big turn in Japan’s cross-border capital flows.

Japan has one of the Largest Pension Funds in the World

Japan has the second largest public pension fund in the world. Norway’s is the biggest, although it is not strictly a pension fund. Canada’s pension funds, when all eight of its variants are added together, come a close third.

Japan set up its first national pension fund in 1961 and it has since gone through various reforms and reorganization over the last 65 years. Its current form is called the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF). As explained in a later section, GPIF has a few siblings, and when we add them together, Japan’s public pension funds can be said to be the largest in the world.

Chart 1

GPIF used to invest most of its asset into JGBs

GPIF used to invest the majority of its fund as loans to the national government and into Japanese government bonds (JGBs). At the end of FY2012, 62% of its assets consisted of domestic bonds. However, in 2014 it went through a radical asset reallocation and the target weight for domestic bonds was reduced from 60% to 35%, and then further down to 25% in 2020. Its current target allocation is a clean four-way 25% split into domestic bonds, domestic equity, foreign equity and foreign bonds.

As one of the largest pension funds in the world, its asset allocations attract market attention and there is speculation that it is about to raise its allocation into domestic bonds. In my view, there is indeed a very high chance that GPIF will be raising its allocation into domestic bonds, if it has not already started to do so in the current quarter ending in September 2026.

Chart 2

UEDA in 2013 Saw a Bond Crash Coming

To understand why GPIF is highly likely to raise its allocation into domestic bonds, we need to go back in history to 2013. Why 2013? Of course, it is the year the Bank of Japan (BoJ) started its massive quantitative easing. The 10-year JGB yield started 2013 at 0.8% and it fell to 0.3% by the end of 2015 before briefly hitting a negative rate of -0.3% in 2016. If you were the chairperson of the GPIF investment committee, you would have been concerned about the wisdom of continuing to invest in JGBs at such a policy-driven low rate. The actual chairperson was UEDA Kazuo [植田和男], the current BoJ governor. In the minutes for October 2013, UEDA said, “I think there is a fair chance that bonds will crash at some point in the next five to ten years [unofficial translation].”

The minutes were released only seven years later; otherwise the use of the word “crash” would have been controversial.

GPIF CEO Priced the Crash at 3% in 2014. We Are There Now

If you read through the GPIF minutes between 2013 and 2014, you would see that GPIF officials were increasingly conscious of the precariousness of investing in JGBs. Long story short, as this process was highly political and a sensitive subject, they decided to radically lower the target allocation weight for JGBs to 35% in 2014, presented it as the result of a philosophical change in the way GPIF is managed and how the concept of “risk” should be considered. Investment in JGBs was no longer considered low risk in real terms. The asset allocation for domestic bonds was further lowered to 25% in 2020. The following is what MITANI Takahiro [三谷隆博], the GPIF CEO at the time and an ex-BoJ senior official, said in the October 2014 GPIF minutes.

“Yields are just under 0.5% now, so a move to near 3% would mean a loss of about ¥25 trillion. (…). So I think the clearest way to explain it is that reducing the weight on JGBs to some degree is simply unavoidable [unofficial translation]”

The 2014 cut in the weight was partly an emergency escape

As I wrote earlier, the radical asset reallocation in 2014 was part a shift in the concept of risk from “nominal” to “real”, so that JGB is no longer risk free assets. But the change was also at least partly an emergency measure to escape the abnormally low-yield environment. Then the next natural question is, now that the JGB yields are no longer abnormally low, what should happen to its asset allocation? Pensions are paid in yen, so long-duration Japanese government bonds are a natural match, while GPIF should also be holding some non-yen assets and equities to diversify its assets and protect the overall balance sheet from inflation. In the next section, I will show you a simplified replication of how GPIF decides its asset allocation and what GPIF’s asset allocation could be now that JGB yields are normal.

How GPIF decides its weights

Put simply, GPIF’s target weights are the output of an optimizer with a few rules. Find the portfolio that, at the required real return, has the smallest average shortfall below wage growth in the years when it falls short, and round it to the nearest 5%.

When GPIF last decided to keep the current 25% weight for domestic bonds in 2025, JGBs were assumed to produce a nominal return of 0.5% against wage growth of 1.3%, so a real return of minus 0.8%. Exhibit 1 shows a simplified matrix of weights depending on expected nominal return on bonds and wage growth. The red box shows the assumption behind the 2025 weights decision mentioned above. If we use a higher wage growth assumption of 2.3%, an expected nominal return of 1.8% on bonds gives a weight of 35%. GPIF’s bond portfolio has an average maturity around 10 years, and the 10-year bond is yielding 3% now. A lot of thought and estimation is needed to form a view on the expected real return on domestic bonds, but in my view, it is clear that the minus 0.8% used in their last review is too low given where bond yields are.

Why GPIF kept the weight in 2025 and why circumstances changed

In late 2024 when the GPIF was reviewing the weight as part of its five-year plan, the BoJ was already in the process of exiting from QE and raising its policy rate. However, the JGB market was still in the process of adjustment and bond yields had a lot of room to rise. For example, the 10-year yield was 0.89% at the end of September 2024, rose to 2% by the end of 2025 and now, in September 2026, stands at 3%. You can understand why GPIF decided to keep its weight on domestic bonds unchanged as it would have incurred capital losses on bond purchases in 2025. But in my view, as I wrote in the report “The Long Climb in JGB Yields Is Nearly Over” [archived PDF], long bond yields are getting closer to a stability point. If the GPIF board shares my view, it is a good time to think about raising its target weight into domestic yen bonds.

The Whale Problem and the Washington Problem

How high should the new weight be for domestic bonds? The reality of determining appropriate weights and how to announce it is a lot harder than the simplified model I explained above. Other than forming a reasonable view on the expected real return on asset classes, there are a few factors that complicate the process.

Firstly, GPIF needs to think about how such an announcement would affect the market. GPIF is what financial market professionals call a whale, a massive investor whose investment decisions sway market prices. There is also a related argument that given the dominance of GPIF in the domestic market, GPIF should be increasing its asset weight abroad to reduce its impact on domestic asset markets.

Secondly, changing asset allocation weights carries political considerations. If GPIF decides to raise the target weight for domestic bonds, foreign bonds are the likely asset class whose weight will go down. More than 50% of its foreign bonds are in US dollars. With all the news circulating in the market now, Scott Bessent will not like a public announcement that one of the largest pension funds in the world is reducing its purchase of US treasuries. There are domestic political considerations as well, as the Takaichi government contemplates how best to fund its deficits.

These are the issues GPIF officials must be debating. How GPIF decides its asset allocation in the near future will be a revealing case study for those who want to study how policy-making works in Japan. Those who are interested in this topic should read the transcripts of an interesting government committee in 2014 that focused on how GPIF could shield itself from political meddling. Guess who chaired the committee? UEDA Kazuo [植田和男].

Whatever the near-term decision GPIF makes regarding its target weight, I think it is fairly clear that GPIF should be increasing its investment into domestic bonds. The following table shows how much GPIF could buy in net terms, depending on the eventual rise in the target weight.

How much GPIF buys: ¥32tn at 35%, ¥80tn at 50%

Domestic Bond TargetGPIF BuysWith the Sister Funds
30%¥16tn¥20tn
35%¥32tn¥20tn
40%¥48tn¥20tn
50%¥80tn¥20tn

Additional domestic-bond holdings from re-weighting the fund at 30 June 2026 (managed assets ·317.8tn). Foreign bonds sold first.
Source: GPIF, JMA.

Three things in this table matter for the market. GPIF is allowed to deviate its asset allocation by six points either side of 25% without any announcement, so 39% target is already possible without any public announcement. In 2014 GPIF moved inside its band first and announced the new portfolio afterwards, and I would expect the same sequence this time. Second, these are static figures, which do not account for the growth of the fund over time.

The sister funds move with the whale

As mentioned earlier, GPIF has a few siblings. The Pension Fund Association for Local Government Officials (¥35.5tn), the Federation of National Public Service Personnel Mutual Aid Associations, known as KKR (¥11.5tn), and the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan (¥4.9tn) manage the pension reserves of local government employees, national government employees and private-school teachers. These sisters run their funds on the same 25/25/25/25 model, and with the legacy reserves they also run, they hold a further ¥87tn on top of GPIF’s.

Conclusion

GPIF cut its domestic bond weight from 60% to 35% in 2014, and later to 25%, to safeguard its assets from the manipulated low JGB yields at the time and the eventual crash they foresaw. That crash, as GPIF’s CEO MITANI defined it in 2014, has now happened with the 10-year yield rising to 3%. In my view, JGB yields have largely normalized and there is no emergency reason to avoid domestic bonds. It is only natural that GPIF would raise its allocation into domestic bonds, although how GPIF communicates this publicly is a touchy issue they need to figure out. When GPIF raises its domestic bond allocation, foreign bonds are the likely asset class to take the hit. GPIF publishes quarterly results and the next publication for the end-September 2026 quarter, expected in early November 2026, will be closely watched. Judging from market movements in the last few weeks, the market has started to sense that what I described in this article is already happening and Japanese money is starting to come back to the yen. While it should be characterized as rebalancing, rather than a repatriation, it seems we are observing a big turn in Japanese cross-border capital flows.

Japan’s Deadliest Delicacy Is Getting More Dangerous

Rising sea temperatures are pushing pufferfish species together, spawning hybrids that even specialist chefs cannot safely prepare

[from South China Morning Post]

by Julian Ryall

Japan’s most dangerous delicacy is getting harder to prepare safely as warming seas push different pufferfish species into the same waters, where they are inbreeding to produce hybrids whose lethal toxins are not yet fully understood.

Fugu – the collective Japanese name for several species of edible pufferfish – is prized as much for the danger surrounding its preparation as for its subtle flavour.

Many species contain tetrodotoxin, a powerful neurotoxin with no known antidote that can cause paralysis, respiratory failure and death.

Since 1958, anyone wishing to prepare pufferfish for public consumption has had to obtain a licence first, a process that takes at least two years and defeats roughly two-thirds of those who attempt it.

A restaurateur shows off a “fugu”, or pufferfish, at a restaurant in Shimonoseki, Japan. Photo: AP

Chefs learn to strip out the fish’s liver, ovaries, eyes and skin – tissues where the poison concentrates – with the precision of a brain surgeon and the nerve of a bomb-disposal technician.

But that hard-won expertise is now being undermined by climate-induced interbreeding, as experts say Japan’s coastal waters are heating up at roughly twice the global average rate.

Spotted pufferfish, once largely confined to the Sea of Japan, have spent the past decade steadily pushing northward in search of cooler currents. Some slipped through the Tsugaru Strait – the channel separating Honshu from far northern Hokkaido – where they have met and mated with the region’s native pufferfish species.

The resulting hybrids now make up as much as 40 per cent of local catches, according to a recent study of fish caught off Fukushima and Ibaraki prefectures.

“We started seeing these spotted fugu on the Pacific coast in 2012 as temperatures in the Sea of Japan became too high for them,” said Professor Hiroshi Takahashi of the National Fisheries University in Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi prefecture.

Temperatures in the waters there were “among the fastest rising anywhere in the world”, he told This Week in Asia, adding that the changes in pufferfish had been happening just as fast.

Customers visit a seafood market in Japan’s Fukushima prefecture. Photo: AP

Some spotted pufferfish had ventured down the east coast as far south as Tokyo Bay, Takahashi said, only to be driven north again as those waters also warmed.

Tiger pufferfish had likewise moved north from their usual range to interbreed with common pufferfish in and around Tokyo Bay, he added.

The trouble is not that hybrids are more toxic than their ancestors, it is that nobody yet knows how interbreeding has affected the distribution of toxins.

Each species of pufferfish stores tetrodotoxin in a different combination of organs and Japan’s health ministry has not yet been able to establish which parts of the new hybrids are safe to eat and which are not.

Until it does, the government has banned the sale or consumption of hybrid fugu – but this ban is almost impossible to enforce.

“They are very hard to identify,” said Takahashi, whose team has developed a DNA test capable of distinguishing hybrid fish and hopes to make the technology commercially available to fishermen who currently have no reliable way of screening their catch.

Pufferfish, or “fugu”, sashimi prepared for eating at a restaurant in Japan. Photo: Shutterstock

Fatal attraction

None of this is likely to diminish fugu’s deadly mystique. The dish has been eaten in Japan for centuries, enjoyed despite – or because of – the risks involved.

Every year, new tales emerge of amateur anglers preparing the fish to eat against the advice of anxious relatives and not surviving the attempt.

Diners speak of a faint numbness in the lips as evidence of a narrow escape and the emperor of Japan is barred from eating fugu altogether, lest even a licensed chef makes a mistake.

Urban legend holds that chefs who do poison a customer are honour-bound to end their own life, with their own knife, in atonement – though this is a myth.

For their part, Japanese restaurateurs are, perhaps unsurprisingly, keen to play down the risks.

A spokeswoman for Miyawaki Fugu Club, an upscale restaurant in Tokyo’s Ginza district, said its chef works exclusively with farmed tiger pufferfish from a long-established supplier, which she insisted were “completely safe”.

James Reimer, a professor of marine biology at the University of the Ryukyus, said the fugu phenomenon fit a wider pattern of marine life relocating in response to global warming.

“What happens to marine ecosystems is one of the hot-button issues of the day, particularly in Japan, because the waters here are warming at twice the global average rate,” he said.

During fieldwork off the Izu peninsula, south of Tokyo, three years ago, local fishermen told him that they had lost virtually their entire kelp crop and that the abalone once abundant in those waters had vanished.

A sea turtles in waters off Japan’s Amami Islands. Turtles are increasingly venturing farther north, fishermen say. Photo: Shutterstock

In their place, they said they were seeing far more sea turtles, as well as large schools of brightly coloured fusiliers – the prefectural fish of Okinawa, some 1,400km (870 miles) to the south.

“Last year, our summer in Okinawa was 30 days longer than average, and we had 120 days when the water temperature was around 30 degrees Celsius (86 degrees Fahrenheit),” Reimer said.

He warns that the picture is not simply one of fish and other marine life swimming steadily north in search of more comfortable temperatures, however.

Global warming is also destabilising weather patterns, making them less predictable. Waters off Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s main islands, that might otherwise suit certain species are increasingly prone to temperature swings that could make them unsuitable after all.

Even so, the broader direction is unmistakable. Kyushu’s waters have seen a marked rise in shark sightings in recent years, including large tiger sharks – one more sign of the changes occurring beneath the surface of Japan’s seas.

Japan-Watching: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

First Meeting of the Study Group on Strengthening Japan-Africa Economic Partnership

At TICAD 9 held last August, Mr. ISHIBA Shigeru (石破 茂), then Prime Minister of Japan, announced the establishment of the “Study Group on Strengthening Japan–Africa Economic Partnership” as one of the concrete initiatives of the Japanese Government’s policy on Africa. The first meeting of this study group is scheduled for June 18 in a hybrid format.

Under the framework of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”, this study group will address African economic integration, a top priority for the African Union (AU). Through strengthening economic cooperation between Japan and Africa, the study group aims to support business expansion of Japanese companies in the African market. To this end, the study group will discuss various topics including measures to promote regional economic integration in Africa, review of trade and investment between Japan and Africa, and the strengthening of economic relations between Japan and Africa. The study group will prepare a report by the end of the fiscal year 2027, which will be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Reference 1) Japanese Members

Prof. WATANABE Yorizumi (渡邊 頼純), Professor Emeritus, Keio University; Dr. KIMURA Fukunari (木村 福成), President, JETRO Asian Economic Research Institute; Mr. FUJITA Ryoji (藤田 亮二), Executive Officer, Toyota Tsusho Corporation (Representative from Keidanren); WATANABE Tatsuro (渡邉 達郎), Managing Executive Officer, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (Representative from Keizai Doyukai); IGARASHI Katsuya (五十嵐 克也), Director and Head of International Department, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

(Reference 2) African Members

Mr. Lacina Koné, Director General and CEO, Smart Africa Alliance; Mr. Kulekani Mathe, CEO, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA); Dr. E. Olawale Ogunkola, Professor of Economics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; and representatives from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, and the African Union Commission (AUC).

(Note) In addition, relevant Ministries, agencies, and individuals with expertise are expected to attend depending on the agenda.

(Reference 3) Attachment

Establishment of the Study Group on Strengthening Japan-Africa Economic Partnership [Archived PDF]

G7 Evian Summit

Working Session on “Reviving a Balanced, Shared and Sustainable Economic Growth”

On June 17, commencing at 10:30 a.m. (local time. 5:30 p.m. on June 17, Japan time.) for approximately 120 minutes, Ms. TAKAICHI Sanae (高市 早苗), Prime Minister of Japan, attended the G7 Evian Summit Working Session on “Reviving balanced, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth for the benefit of all”. The overview of the session is as follows.

  1. Prime Minister TAKAICHI stated that the G7 and like-minded countries should maintain close communication to reduce uncertainty in the global economy.
    Prime Minister TAKAICHI also stated that it is a common challenge for many countries to promote self-sustaining growth, by addressing non-market policies and practices (NMPPs) and the resulting excess capacity which are drivers of widening global imbalances.
  2. Furthermore, Prime Minister TAKAICHI stated that G7 members and the countries participating in this session should also demonstrate their contribution to reducing imbalances for their own balanced growth as well as for the stability of the global economy and financial markets. Prime Minister TAKAICHI added that making use of data-driven, objective analyses and policy advice by the IMF and the OECD is extremely beneficial in advancing these efforts.
  3. Prime Minister TAKAICHI expressed her hope that the G7 and like-minded countries would lead the global economy through frank discussions. She also stated that she looked forward to discussions at the G20, chaired by President Donald Trump of the United States, on reducing uncertainty in the global economy and becoming stronger and more prosperous together.

Situation in Iran (Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran)

(Message from Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu [茂木 敏充])

On June 18 (Japan Standard Time), the United States and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding and the cessation of hostilities was declared. Japan once again welcomes the fruition of the diplomatic efforts made by the parties as well as the countries that played a role in mediation.

Hereafter, it is important that free and safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is swiftly reestablished through the steady implementation of this MoU by all parties. Japan also considers it of critical importance that vessels be able to transit the Strait of Hormuz without being subject to additional costs, as has been the case thus far.

Japan strongly hopes that a final agreement on matters such as Iran’s nuclear issue will be achieved as soon as possible through further negotiations between the United States and Iran. Japan will also support the peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue including through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After the conclusion of a final agreement, Japan intends to play an active role in the reconstruction and recovery of the region. Japan will also continue to make every diplomatic effort, in close coordination with the international community, toward the realization of peace and stability throughout the Middle East region.

Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs ERI’s Visit to the United States

From June 21 to June 24, Ms. ERI Arfiya (英利 アルフィヤ), Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, will visit New York, United States.

During her visit, Parliamentary Vice-Minister ERI will attend the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS and deliver a statement in the meeting. She will also hold meetings with representatives of international organizations.

(Reference) Schedule
June 21Departure from Tokyo
 Arrival at New York
June 22Participation in the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, etc.
June 23Meetings with representatives of international organizations, etc.
 Departure from New York
June 24Arrival at Tokyo

The 7th Japan-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue

On June 18, the 7th Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue was held in Tokyo, Japan.

  1. This whole-of-government meeting was co-chaired by Mr. MIYAKE Fumito (三宅 史人), Ambassador in charge of Cyber Policy and Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, and Ms. Jessica Hunter, Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia, with the participation of officials from, on the Japanese side, MOFA, National Cybersecurity Office (NCO), National Police Agency (NPA), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and on the Australian side, DFAT, Department of Industry and Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and Department of Home Affairs (DHA).
  2. At this dialogue, following the enactment of Japan’s Cyber Response Capability Strengthening Act and Necessary Arrangement of Relevant Acts last year, as well as the adoption of its new Cybersecurity Strategy, the two sides exchanged views on broad range of topics, such as each country’s respective cybersecurity strategy and policy, and cooperation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
  3. Furthermore, building on the “Japan–Australia Strategic Cyber Partnership” which Ms. TAKAICHI Sanae (高市 早苗), Prime Minister of Japan and the Hon. Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia concurred on launching at the Japan–Australia Summit Meeting in May of this year, the two sides exchanged views on efforts and cooperation in a wide range of areas including the defense and deterrence of cyber threats, capacity-building, public-private partnerships, and artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity.
  4. Both sides confirmed that they will continue to work closely together in the field of cyber, including through the Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue.

[from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18-19 June, 2026]