Taiwan Elections Show What the People Really Care About

China barely factors, as local issues like housing, employment and public safety drive voter choice

[by Tim Culpan, from Sinocism]

Tim Culpan is a journalist and 27-year Taipei resident. Tim worked for Bloomberg News as the Taipei technology correspondent and then opinion columnist until 2024, when he went independent and launched the excellent Culpium on Substack.

Good Evening from Taipei,

A few weeks ago I pitched to Bill the idea of writing a piece for Sinocism about the November 28 Taiwan municipal elections. City and county mayors will be elected, along with thousands of other local representatives. It’s not a nationwide poll.

“It’s a plebiscite on local issues,” I told him.

My reason for publishing through Sinocism, instead of my own outlet Culpium is that Sinocism is the premier foreign destination for discussion on China politics and policy. I could foresee that many people would mistake this local Taiwanese election as some kind of referendum on Taiwan’s China policy.

I recognize the irony of publishing a piece arguing that Taiwan’s election is not about China in a publication focused on China. But by explaining the nuances of Taiwanese domestic issues, my hope is that China watchers will understand how and why citizens in this democracy make decisions. Quite often these decisions appear counter to what outsiders feel should be the wise & logical choice vis-à-vis Beijing.

Sinocism readers seem like the perfect audience for such a discussion, and I am grateful to Bill for lending me your ears.

One Election; 11,000 Positions

Taiwan has 23 million people, 19.7 million voters, and 22 cities and counties. Candidates are vying for four-year terms and can serve a maximum of two terms. Victory is determined by a first-past-the-post system with no preferences and no postal or electronic voting. Whomever gets the most votes from in-person voting wins, even if it’s not a majority.

Among the seats to be filled are mayors (city), magistrates (county), and municipal councilors.

Yet Taiwan’s administrative divisions get even smaller, like Russian nesting dolls, all the way down to local villages and neighborhoods (also called wards or burroughs). All up, 11,051 seats are to be filled, and village chiefs (村長 – cunzhang) plus neighborhood captains (里長 – lizhang) will account for more than 7,700 of those positions.

The largest electorate to be served by this election is New Taipei City with 4 million residents, the smallest being Rongxin Village in Nantou County with just 36 souls.

My point is that this really is local. Super local. As a result, policy focus is on local rather than national issues.

All Politics is Local

What voters care about most varies by region. In the north (Taipei, Keelung, Taoyuan), housing and urban renewal is a key concern, alongside transport and public safety. In the center (Taichung, Changhua), food scandals and public health predominate. While in the south (Tainan, Kaohsiung), wages and flood control are particularly local topics.

This regional variation dilutes the value of national-level policies and reduces the importance of broad party platforms. As a result, the Kuomintang’s (KMT) perceived pro-business reputation carries less weight while the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) old-school social justice platform is getting fresh oxygen.

To be clear, it shouldn’t be taken as fact that the KMT is pro-business and the DPP is pro-social. There’s plenty of evidence to suggest the reverse is sometimes true. Yet, the basic ideological divide persists in the same way that the Tories and Labour occupy different sides of the UK political spectrum.

Taiwanese Taipei

Traditionally, Taichung in central Taiwan is seen as a “swing state” and barometer of changing political winds across the country. Taiwan’s geographical layout almost perfectly maps to its political layout. Taipei and New Taipei City in the North are deep blue (KMT) while Tainan and Kaohsiung in the South are deep green (DPP). These shades start to blend as you move toward Taiwan’s geographic center.

This year, however, something extraordinary is happening.

Taipei City, the national capital and seat of economic power, may change colors. The KMT’s Chiang Wan-an won the 2022 mayoral election, but there’s a high chance he’ll lose his post this election.

Instead, polling shows that it’s likely the DPP will take Taipei City Hall for the first time since Chen Shui-bian’s single four-year term which spanned 1994–1998. (The “whites,” led by independent populist Ko Wen-je, split the vote of the two major parties and took Taipei City from 2014 to 2022).

Surveys have them within a few points of each other, and the margin of error is such that I am not confident calling this race. Also, you won’t see new polls in the coming week because Taiwanese law prohibits them from being published in the 10 days leading up to an election.

Chiang is claimed to be a great-grandson of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek through an extra-marital affair, with his family name enjoying the cachet that comes with such a connection. To his credit, though, Chiang’s resume is impressive in its own right with academic credentials that culminate in a Juris Doctorate Degree (JD) from UPenn’s Carey Law School and admission to the California Bar.

City Vision

But voter’s adulation for Chiang is waning amid dissatisfaction over very local issues. Clean, efficient, and friendly on the surface, Taipei City is getting old. Vast tracts of its housing stock is over 30 years old with residential communities a stone’s throw from City Hall that are close to 50 years old (and which look every bit their age). At the same time, there’s a lack of new affordable housing coming on stream.

Urban renewal policies, which allow a building to be torn down and rebuilt if enough owners approve the measure, were supposed to ameliorate this problem. But the slow pace of new projects and the bureaucratic minefield involved with rehousing residents has caused great dissatisfaction among voters. Add to that a litany of small gripes like scooter parking, public smoking, traffic safety, and elder loneliness, and Chiang’s leadership has started to feel lacklustre in the eyes of many voters.

His challenger, Puma Shen of the DPP, has come out of the gate with a more polished vision for the city which he is pitching to voters under the slogan HEART (Habitat, Empower, Accompany, Resilience, Time). In truth, Shen’s policies aren’t vastly different to Chiang’s, but he’s successfully managed to stoke a renewed sense of pride among Taipei residents.

DPP’s Taipei Mayoral Candidate Puma Shen at a campaign rally with supporters, including President Lai Ching-te (immediately behind) and former president Tsai Ing-wen (behind, right). Photo: Puma Shen Campaign Office

Currently a national legislator, Shen is a former criminology professor who gained recognition for his research into Chinese disinformation and cognitive warfare against Taiwan. That career trajectory took him to founding Doublethink Lab, focused on cognitive warfare, and Kuma Academy, which conducts research and training into urban resilience (read: preparing for war).

Perhaps surprisingly, Shen’s China-focused background has barely featured in this campaign. Clumsily, though, Beijing has managed to burnish his credentials through a series of operations aimed at surveilling and curtailing him.

Local Matters Matter

Elsewhere in Taiwan, national issues like macroeconomic policy, defense, and China relations have also taken a backseat. In fact, political leaders have been excoriated for pandering too much to national interests over local issues.

Outgoing Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen, for example, was once seen as a rising star within the KMT for her leadership in the this important benchmark city. Instead, she received significant backlash over her handling of a tainted cooking oil scandal in July this year. That incident comes eight months after Lu admitted that her administration mishandled an outbreak of African Swine Fever. Critics claim she cared more about the KMT’s national exposure than the concerns of her local constituents.

Elder Care, Traditional Industry

In central and southern Taiwan, voters are honing in on specific issues, and candidates are adapting their policies to suit. Care for the elderly has become both an emotive and practical issue among families struggling to juggle work commitments with the burden of aged care. Wage disparity between traditional and tech industries is an acute problem outside the traditional tech belts (Hsinchu and Taipei) where old-school manufacturing industries dominate.

Because of the very local nature of each race, the results and implications of this nine-in-one local election will be difficult to parse. Although the ballot falls midway between the 2024 and 2028 presidential and legislative elections, this is not a mid-term election in the U.S. sense.

It’s absolutely true that hard-core DPP and KMT supporters will make their choice regardless of the candidate or policies. But that loyalty is far weaker at the local level, making this much more a plebiscite on policies than party.

National Implications

That said, there are national implications, and China policy is a good case study.

I’d argue that in the U.S., guns are an issue of ideology, not merely policy. And most voters do not choose a candidate based on ideology as long their ideologies are not vastly in conflict. Having the ‘correct’ position on guns won’t be enough to win a majority of votes, but having the ‘incorrect’ position might lose you an election. The best choice for a candidate is to just shut up and not talk about it.

However, the factional nature of democratic systems means that losing an election on policy necessarily hampers your ability to control the conversation on ideology. That’s unless some external force—a mass shooting or missile crisis—puts that ideological discussion back on the front page.

Chiang Wan-an campaign poster. Photo: Chiang campaign office.

Taiwanese views on relations with China fit into a similar paradigm. It matters, but it doesn’t occupy their daily thoughts unless reminded. Local candidates have largely been smart enough to not talk about China and instead focus on more relevant issues.

If Chiang Wan-an loses Taipei City, it won’t be because of his China policy, and ergo it shouldn’t be seen as a challenge to Beijing or its leader Xi Jinping (XJP). If you come across a headline in foreign media which says this Taiwan election is a rebuke to China, then I implore you to cancel your subscription.

Ideological Control

Yet a DPP win will help the ruling party control the ideological debate against a KMT that’s struggled on the national level to offer anything beyond “all the way with XJP.”

KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun doesn’t appear smart enough to understand this reality. Her cozy-up-to-China policy won her support within the party because its leadership is stacked with pro-China hardliners, but it has alienated most of Taiwan, including thousands of KMT voters.

Still, it appears to be the only policy Cheng has been able, or willing, to enunciate. In a briefing with the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club earlier this year, she waffled and dodged all manner of questions ranging from economics to semiconductor policy.

KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun speaks to the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club, 23 March 2026. Photo: Tim Culpan/Culpium

As a result of Cheng’s lack of policy depth in favor of stubbornly hewing to party ideology, some local KMT candidates have made the unusual decision of distancing themselves from the party Chair.

Like the GOP Losing Texas

It’s almost certain that Cheng will lose her Chairmanship should the KMT lose Taipei City because such a scenario would be akin to the GOP losing the Texas Governorship or Senate seat.

But her position is under threat even if Chiang holds on to Taipei City and the party loses other “safe” posts or simply loses ground across the more than 11,000 positions up for grabs. For example, the New Taipei City mayoralship which the KMT has held since 2005 has a very real chance of falling to the DPP.

If this happens, the ideological grasp which Cheng and her hardline supporters have over the KMT would weaken, ushering in a more conciliatory tone favored by younger party members. By this, I mean more readily embracing a Taiwan-first future for both the KMT and the nation, which would necessarily mean de-emphasising without fully abandoning its long-held China unification platform.

Beijing’s Finger on The Pulse

What this means for Xi Jinping and Beijing’s view of Taiwan, I can’t answer. Over the past 30 years, Taiwan has de-emphasized the unification vs. independence debate in favor of real meat-and-potatoes issues like economics, public welfare, and living standards. Yet it seems to me, from my seat in Taipei, the Chinese Communist Party has been unable to keep up with this changing tone.

For a while, during the Ma Ying-jeou era of 2008–2016, it looked like Beijing got it: the way to Taiwanese hearts was through their wallets, and offering the economic benefits of close ties to China was a somewhat winning strategy.

The Sunflower Movement of 2014, coupled with Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, and then the harshness of COVID, have taught Taiwanese to distrust Beijing. From there, we’ve seen a continued disinformation campaign both overseas and domestically aimed at painting Taiwan’s economic future as bleak and its security future as hopeless.

I think this election will show that Taiwanese are not falling for it. They have real gripes, and electoral candidates across both sides of the political rainbow have stepped up to address those concerns. And as long as Taiwanese believe that their leaders are listening, acting, and improving, then I think the constant barrage of disinformation will be increasingly ignored. I wish I could say the same for foreign observers who still cling to Beijing’s view of Taiwan.

Xi Jinping Thought

An interesting question I’d love to have answered is how Xi Jinping may act once he realises that Taiwanese are largely ignoring him as they focus on local issues. And that, my new Sinocism friends, is a topic I’ll let you all discuss.

Meanwhile, if you want to keep tabs on Taiwan, its technology sector, industrial development, and the Jensen Huang firestorm, then you’re welcome to come visit me over at Culpium.

Henry Huiyao Wang: A Xi-Trump-Putin summit in Shenzhen could kick-start peace in Ukraine

CCG’s President says there will be no diplomatic masterstroke in Ukraine’s absence, but serious consideration of a ceasefire can lay the groundwork for peace

[from the Center for China & Globalization, 31 October 2026]

Below is the latest opinion column by Henry Huiyao Wang [王辉耀], founder and President, Center for China and Globalization, published in the South China Morning Post.

At the recent Valdai Discussion Club, I asked Russian President Vladimir Putin if he would be open to meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Shenzhen. I also asked, more broadly, what role China could play in promoting peace in Ukraine, mediating and contributing to peacekeeping.

Putin was receptive, warmly welcoming the idea of a China-hosted meeting. Trump, too, has expressed a willingness to meet Xi and Putin. These expressions of openness offer an opportunity we must seize in pursuit of peace.

Some in the United States and Europe question the value of such a summit. They may fear restoring Putin’s standing or normalising the conflict without yielding any real progress towards an end to the war. That risk is still real but these largely Western fears must be tempered by the very real, very human cost of letting the war continue unabated.

From the very beginning of the war, I have been arguing that China has a constructive role to play. In March 2022, less than three weeks into Russia’s invasion, I wrote an article in The New York Times titled “It’s Time to Offer Russia an Offramp. China Can Help With That.”

In August last year, I extended that train of logic in Foreign Policy, where I proposed a seven-party format for peace negotiations and suggested that a peacekeeping force include troops from European and BRICS countries. A meeting of the three leaders in Shenzhen could help lay the groundwork for these broader diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts.

Without Ukraine’s participation, such a meeting is unlikely to produce a diplomatic masterstroke that ends the war. But the three leaders need not put the war to rest at a table in Shenzhen to make progress. Serious consideration of a ceasefire along the current line of contact—an approach Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has supported—could give peace efforts fresh momentum, leaving the final status of disputed territories for subsequent negotiations.

Further agreement could be sought on the protection of nuclear facilities, or a mutual end to strikes on energy infrastructure, new prisoner exchanges or improved humanitarian access. Of course, issues of sovereignty, security guarantees, Russia’s security concerns and Europe’s security commitments would remain. But these need not all be resolved at once before a ceasefire can begin.

Already, years of war have inflicted immense suffering on both Russia and Ukraine. Neither side achieved its objectives, and both need a dignified way out that protects their core interests. Thus, we must open a path towards peace without requiring either side to concede defeat. China could help bridge this gap by bringing Xi, Trump and Putin together in Shenzhen to explore how a ceasefire and wider negotiations involving Ukraine might work.

The United Nations could stand at the core of such an arrangement by monitoring any ceasefire and preventing a return to fighting by physical peacekeeping if the parties are so inclined.

For a broader negotiation on settlement, I find myself returning to a seven-party format that would bring together the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, Britain and the U.S.—alongside Ukraine and the European Union. An understanding reached in Shenzhen could give momentum to this broader negotiating process and free up the Security Council for action.

A peacekeeping force composed entirely of NATO or European troops might be unacceptable to Russia. Yet a mission without European participation would struggle to reassure Ukraine and its neighbours. Any workable arrangement would need to address both concerns.

In my Foreign Policy article, I proposed a peacekeeping force drawing troops from five European countries—Germany, France, Britain, Poland and Italy—and five members of the BRICS grouping, such as China, India and Brazil. And while the exact formulation, from the composition and mandate to the terms of deployment, would need to be negotiated with the consent of Russia and Ukraine, and the agreement of the contributing countries, the core idea remains sound.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the largest contributor of peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent members, China is well positioned to help. Its distinctive role in the global economy and dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, the U.S. and Europe, give it channels through which to coax the parties towards peace. But this process must begin somewhere, and that somewhere could be Shenzhen.

Nor should APEC be the end of the diplomatic effort. With an understanding reached by the leaders in Shenzhen, the Security Council may pick up the momentum by advancing ceasefire and peacekeeping proposals. The Group of 20 could then join the effort to rally support from major economies with an interest in maintaining the deal. Each would play a different role and would not be tasked with settling the entire conflict.

China’s role in the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in 2023 showed Beijing’s ability to open a door after years of enmity. The Ukraine war is different, and there can be no guarantee of a similar outcome. But diplomacy must begin somewhere, particularly when fighting has brought such destruction.

The central question is whether such a meeting could help bring the war to an end. In that light, any gain in prestige for an individual leader is almost irrelevant. And if the three leaders could agree on practical steps towards peace, they would give the United Nations and the wider international community a material basis upon which peace could be built.

Japan Inc. Now Sells No Yen to Invest Abroad

Earnings on Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) reached 103% of new FDI in 2022–25. With dividends and retained earnings counted together, Japan Inc. now needs to sell little yen to invest abroad.

[by OKUBO Takuji]

Key takeaways

  • Foreign affiliates now earn about as much as Japan invests abroad each year. Reinvested earnings, dividends and interest together reached 103% of new outward FDI in 2022–25, against 48% in 1996–2000.
  • Dividends from foreign affiliates account for a growing share of Japanese corporate profit. We estimate that foreign affiliates contributed 13.4% of Japan Inc.’s earnings in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.
  • Corporate investment abroad now involves little net yen selling. After dividends and interest paid home, the estimated outflow has been close to zero since 2022, down from about ¥5 trillion a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s.

Japan’s FDI stock now earns 103% of new investment

It is often said that Japan’s ageing population and slow growth give its companies too few investment opportunities at home. A Japanese government report in 2024 included the following passages.

“Japan’s ageing and shrinking population depresses expected demand at home. Expected returns remain higher abroad, so Japanese companies have accelerated outward direct investment” (my translation). — MATSUBAYASHI Yōichi [松林 洋一], MOF PRI, chapter 8, p.136.

“Companies invested abroad because they saw no promising investments in Japan; they are unlikely to bring back every return. On a cash-flow basis, the external balance is in deficit and is one factor behind the weak yen” (my translation). — KARAKAMA Daisuke [唐鎌 大輔], MOF PRI, chapter 10, pp.178 and 175.

However, my review of recent data shows that while their premise of low growth prospects in Japan is probably still right, the direct investment Japan has accumulated abroad has reached a level where it earns enough to cover Japan’s new investment abroad. This changes the exchange-rate implication even if Japan keeps investing abroad.

As chart 1 shows, earnings on the accumulated investment stock rose from 48% of new outward FDI in 1996–2000 to 103% in 2022–25.

Chart 1

Overseas affiliates pay interest and dividends to their parent companies in Japan. Those dividends have become a sizable part of corporate Japan’s income: we estimate that they made up 13.4% of Japanese corporate profit in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.

When foreign affiliates retain their earnings on their balance sheets, Japan’s balance of payments statistics record them as FDI from Japan, even though no money crosses the border. While the companies receiving FDI dividends and the companies paying for new FDI are not necessarily the same, Japan Inc. as a whole is now financing its FDI almost entirely from the earnings of its overseas affiliates. At the current level of FDI, little new yen needs to be converted into foreign currencies as Japan goes about investing abroad.

In the rest of this report, I explain how foreign direct investment by Japanese companies evolved, and its near-term outlook. This report is the third in a series on the yen repatriation theme that I have published over the past few weeks, following “Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale”, on capital flows through Japan’s national pension funds, and “Mrs Watanabe No More”, on Japanese households’ assets invested abroad.

A strong yen helped drive Japan’s first outward FDI boom

Japan’s outward investment was heavily restricted after WWII, requiring case-by-case permission from the government. Approvals became more and more automatic over the years until outward investment became “free in principle” in 1980. Trade friction with the US-led Japanese carmakers to restrain their exports from 1981, pushing them to build factories abroad. The rapid appreciation of the yen was also a factor. The yen strengthened from ¥242 per dollar before the Plaza Accord in September 1985 to ¥121 by the end of 1987. Japanese producers had to move lower value-added work abroad. The strong yen also gave Japanese financial institutions sizable purchasing power for a while, until the stock and property bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991.

All of these factors contributed to a rapid increase in outward FDI through the 1980s and 1990s (chart 2).

Chart 2

Even after the bubble burst, the strong yen kept pushing manufacturers to move abroad. In 2005, manufacturers accounted for 60% of the FDI stock. As Japanese manufacturers expanded their supply chains abroad, Asia’s share of outward FDI rose from about 12% in FY1986–90 to 19% in FY1995–99, and Asia held 23% of the FDI stock by 2005 (chart 3).

Chart 3

Japan’s outward FDI stock rose to 56% of GDP

The next phase was sustained by a different pressure. With weak growth and low interest rates at home, Japan Inc. kept investing abroad, across a broader range of industries. Between 1995 and 2025, the stock of FDI rose from 9% of Japan’s GDP to 58% (chart 4). In 2025, it is as large as about 38% of the private sector’s domestic fixed capital, on our estimate.

Chart 4

By industry composition and by destination compositions changed over time. Manufacturing’s share of the FDI stock had fallen to 37% by 2025, giving Japan’s FDI more breadth. By destination, we are seeing a revival of FDI toward the United States. It accounted for 34% of the stock in 2025, Europe 29% and Asia 25% (see earlier chart 3).

Thus, after decades of overseas investment, Japan’s FDI stock is now large enough that its earnings are sufficient to finance new investment abroad, at least for now. In the next section, I consider whether this will continue, and in particular whether Japanese companies may bring an even larger share of their overseas earnings back to Japan, given the weak yen, higher borrowing costs in yen and possibly better investment opportunities at home.

The weak yen has slowed offshoring, not reversed it

The real depreciation of the yen over the past 15 years made production in Japan more competitive. There is some evidence that manufacturers are considering bringing production back to Japan. The 2023 manufacturing white paper found more firms shifting production back from China than moving there, and they named the weak yen as one reason. We see some signs of reshoring. Japanese manufacturers’ overseas production ratio rose from 18.0% in FY2011 to 27.2% in FY2023, but it may have started to decline or at least stabilize. The ratio fell to 26.7% in FY2024. A Cabinet Office survey of listed manufacturers puts the ratio at 24.5% in FY2025, and their plan for FY2030 is broadly unchanged at 24.7%. The weak yen seems to have stabilized the wave of offshoring, but I see no firm evidence of a move back onshore yet.

Domestic investment has grown slowly despite the weak yen

There are tentative signs that domestic capital spending is starting to grow again. For three decades it grew at a very low speed. In real terms, private business investment rose only 26% between FY1997 and FY2025, less than 1% a year. In comparison, capital spending grew by about 4% a year on average in the United States. In my view, a weak currency is only one of the factors manufacturers weigh in designing their global production chains. The weak yen makes production in Japan competitive today, but they have also seen the exchange rate swing violently within short periods. Japan also has a shrinking population problem. It started to address it by opening a door to immigration, but the door is only tentatively open. Overall, my view is that the weak yen alone is unlikely to give Japan Inc. sufficient incentive to bring its capital back to Japan and to the yen.

Economic security is bringing some production home

The government is pushing harder than the currency, mostly in the name of economic security, even before the Takaichi government came along. The government currently has a ¥250 trillion domestic investment target for FY2040 and named AI and semiconductors among its 17 strategic fields. Semiconductors are where the money has gone furthest. In November 2024, under the Ishiba government, Japan committed more than ¥10 trillion of public support to AI and semiconductors by FY2030, aiming to draw more than ¥50 trillion of public and private investment over ten years. Japan managed to lure a TSMC plant to Japan, backed by a sizable subsidy. Rapidus, a government-supported Japanese semiconductor maker, has received a sizable subsidy and is building a factory in Hokkaido. Japan’s production of integrated circuits and discrete semiconductors rose from ¥2.7 trillion in 2019 to ¥4.1 trillion in 2025.

Under the name of economic security, the Japanese government is promoting other industries such as batteries, shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals. Defence spending adds to the push. Japan’s defence budget rose from about ¥5 trillion in FY2022 to ¥9.0 trillion in FY2026. Some defence contractors, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, have doubled their defence revenue.

Japan’s industrial-policy record gives reason for caution

The Japanese government and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the key agency behind Japan’s industry policy, may claim some expertise in their industrial policies. Empirical studies in the past paint a poor track record, though. Rapidus, the most ambitious semiconductor project, has had no independent cost-benefit assessment (Negrine et al., 2025). While defence and economic security-driven policies have a different logic, I doubt that these industrial policies will succeed in bringing large-scale manufacturing investment back to Japan so long as macro factors such as Japan’s demography remain unfavourable.

FDI no longer appears to drive yen weakness

The weak yen and non-economic geopolitical factors do point to a halt in Japan’s four-decade offshoring trend, although it is a stabilization, rather than an economy-wide reversal of past offshoring. Japan Inc. will continue to invest more abroad, rather than within its borders. Given the sizable growth in the stock of cumulative FDI, Japan Inc. no longer needs to convert yen into overseas currency to keep investing abroad though. Net of dividends and interest paid home, Japan’s FDI sold about ¥5 trillion of yen a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s; since 2022 the net flow has been close to zero. There is also an interesting development in an effort to allow more share-exchange based M&A for cross-border deals that will further reduce the need for Japanese companies to spend their yen to purchase overseas assets. In my view, Japan Inc.’s FDI is no longer a factor to drive the yen weaker.

References