Henry Huiyao Wang: A New Compact for China and Europe

CCG President outlines opportunities for China and Europe to deepen cooperation in trade, investment, climate action, and global governance.

[from the Center for China & Globalization, 7 November 2026]

Henry Huiyao Wang [王辉耀], Founder and President of the Center for China & Globalization (CCG), has published an article titled “A New Compact for China and Europe” in the Autumn 2026 issue (No. 36) of Horizons, a journal published by the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD).

BYD Dolphins on the line at the company’s plant in Rayong, Thailand, a step from “in China, for the world” toward “in the world, for the world”
Wikimedia Commons/iMoD Official

China and Europe possess almost everything needed for a consequential partnership. Their economies are deeply intertwined. They have no fundamental geopolitical disputes. And they share important interests in climate action, global development, and a functioning multilateral system. Yet the bilateral relationship is weaker than it could be. At its core is a commercial dispute over trade, which is turning what should be a fruitful relationship built on shared interests into one increasingly characterized by the language of industrial vulnerability and tariffs.

Trade has thus become a wedge issue that risks souring a mutually beneficial interdependence. And it comes at a poor moment. The international order is moving away from the unipolar era that followed the Cold War and into a new multipolar era, one in which multilateralism, and the defense of our shared global institutions, matter more than ever. Wars, tariff conflicts, technological fragmentation, and pressure on multilateral institutions are producing a world that is more multipolar but no more governable. Now more than ever, we need cooperation on global governance across a wide range of transnational issues, from climate change to artificial intelligence.

Europe in a Multipolar World

For much of the postwar period, the transatlantic alliance provided the central structure of European security. But the era of American hegemony, when diplomatic sleepwalking was permissible, is over. It seems clear that European policymakers have long since realized that formal alliances and shared values are no longer a substitute for independent judgment on geopolitical and economic questions, at a time when American policy is nakedly unilateral, transactional, and protectionist—and thus hostile to European interests.

Unwilling to be a passive participant in American power politics, or to be caught between the United States and China, Europe has already begun charting a course toward strategic autonomy, even if its exact shape is not yet settled. China, for its part, understands that asking Europe to “choose China” over the United States is not a palatable proposition—least of all now, when self-determination and strategic autonomy have become a clear European focus.

Instead, from China’s perspective, a break from “the West versus the rest” is victory enough, because it enables a shift away from alignment based on ideology toward a world of tactical cooperation based on the merits of each issue.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered a useful description of this at Davos this year, calling for “variable geometry”: different coalitions for different issues, built around shared interests rather than around values that are not firmly or equally upheld. In this framing, Europe can cooperate as closely as it wishes with the United States on defense, while still finding common cause with China on climate and trade reform, or with India on development. Such flexibility is increasingly the default in our plural world.

A cohesive Europe able to act independently is preferable to a divided continent whose China policy is increasingly shaped elsewhere. But that also means that policymakers in China must address European fears if they are to benefit from engagement and cooperation on shared interests.

The Changing Bargain

The core anxiety facing Europe, and the one undermining a merits-based relationship, is that the old, unspoken economic bargain—European technology and premium manufacturing in exchange for Chinese consumer goods and lower-cost production—is giving way to a more competitive relationship.

China now possesses broad industrial ecosystems, world-class infrastructure, skilled engineering talent, and the capacity for fast commercialization at scale. It no longer competes on wages alone. In electric vehicles, batteries, solar energy, machinery, telecommunications equipment, and, increasingly, advanced digital applications, Chinese firms can combine cost, speed, and technological capability.

But let us not get carried away with catastrophizing. The shared economic foundation between China and the EU remains immense. In 2025, two-way trade in goods and services exceeded €880 billion. Europe imported more than €570 billion in goods from China and exported about €200 billion, producing a large bilateral goods deficit. Yet this figure should be interpreted carefully. The European Union still recorded an overall goods surplus of approximately €128 billion in 2025, as well as a substantial current-account surplus. Nor are all imports finished products: Eurostat data shows that 57 percent of all extra-EU goods imports in 2025 were intermediate products, meaning that much of what Europe imports feeds into value-added production chains from which Europe itself benefits. Europe’s difficulty is that, while its industry remains broadly profitable, certain critical sectors are already under pressure, and the trend seems unlikely to reverse suddenly in favor of European manufacturing.

Europe is not facing this crisis in a vacuum, either. It is compounded by high energy costs, aging populations, fragmented capital markets, and chronic underinvestment. The result is a genuine fear of deindustrialization, with the attendant loss of skilled employment, supplier networks, technological capacity, and social cohesion. This worry is especially potent in the major European economies with large export-oriented manufacturing sectors, such as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, and it makes the debate over “overcapacity” deeply politically charged.

While the imbalance is a product of industrial excellence, it can also be attributed to weak domestic demand in China. Household consumption there remains around 40 percent of GDP, while families save heavily out of concern over housing, education, health care, and retirement. The 2025 consumption action plan addressed wages, pensions, health care, childcare, paid leave, and benefits for migrant and flexible workers, and China’s first five-year plan devoted specifically to consumption subsequently set a goal of approximately 60 trillion yuan in retail sales by 2030. But it is far too early to call the effort complete. Although per capita disposable income rose by 5 percent and consumption expenditure by 4.4 percent in 2025, the first half of 2026 was weaker, and overall consumption still lags behind where it should be. Stronger pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, childcare, and portable benefits for migrant workers will help reduce precautionary saving, and greater access for foreign goods and services would ensure that stronger Chinese demand creates opportunities for European producers. That transformation, however, is not yet complete.

Europe, for its part, should recognize that competitive success is not in itself an unfair subsidy. The International Energy Agency estimates that producing a battery-electric vehicle costs more than 30 percent less in China than in advanced economies, with only about one-third of the gap attributable to the battery; a similar cost gap exists for conventional vehicles. China’s earlier industrial policies undoubtedly helped establish this ecosystem, but important forms of direct support, including national EV purchase subsidies, have already been phased out.

Rhodium Group estimates that BYD enjoys a cost advantage of approximately $4,700 per vehicle over Tesla’s operations in China, of which grants account for only about $292, while vertical integration and lower research, administrative, and supplier costs explain at least three-quarters of the difference. BYD produces roughly 70 percent of its components in-house, including its batteries. Europe should investigate market-distorting support and is right to insist on transparency, but it should not define the ecosystem, technology, and efficiencies China has built as unfair.

Nor is China’s automobile sector insulated from competition. The number of Chinese electric-vehicle makers was reported at 487 in 2018; by 2025, consolidation had reduced the market to approximately 129 brands produced by about 50 manufacturers, and only 10 to 15 are expected to be profitable by 2030. China exported approximately 5.86 million of the more than 31 million vehicles it sold in 2024, meaning that the large majority were still absorbed at home. By comparison, Volkswagen delivered 9.03 million vehicles worldwide but only 1.12 million in Germany, while Toyota and Lexus sold 10.16 million worldwide and 1.44 million in Japan. Airbus, likewise, sells approximately 68 percent of its aircraft outside Europe. Producing for global markets is accepted as normal when established European or Japanese companies do it; it should not automatically become illegitimate when Chinese firms do the same.

China’s textile industry offers a further precedent. Even as wages rose and some production moved to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and elsewhere, China retained 37 percent of global textile exports and 34 percent of clothing exports in 2017, because supplier clusters, infrastructure, skills, and continual upgrading proved more durable than low labor costs alone.

Beyond economic competition, clearer rules are urgently needed on the securitization of critical industries. The dispute over Nexperia—the Chinese-owned semiconductor company placed under Dutch government control in 2025—rattled supply chains and deepened concern in China about investing abroad. Either the company should not have been sold in the first place, or a clearer regulatory environment might have avoided a quasi-nationalization that rapidly internationalized a corporate dispute, and that still hangs over the mutual investment relationship today.

Likewise, proposals for a European instrument modeled on the United States’ Section 301 powers may offer political reassurance, but Section 301 is a blunt unilateral instrument designed to authorize retaliation. Europe would be better served by an explicitly transitional mechanism. Where an import surge threatens to destabilize domestic markets, temporary safeguards can provide time for adjustment, but they should be evidence-based, reviewable, and subject to firm sunset clauses. Their purpose should be to facilitate adaptation and negotiation, not to turn emergency protection into a permanent wall.

An Industrial Compact for Shared Competitiveness

When I visited Jean Monnet’s house outside Paris this summer, I was reminded of the method that helped build modern Europe: begin with concrete achievements that create the basis for solidarity. That method matters especially now, when trade has become a wedge issue and trust and trade cannot be separated.

We must therefore build a new industrial compact: one that aligns Chinese industrial capacity with Europe’s need for investment, innovation, and employment, and that enables China and Europe to stand together in support of a world of free, fair, and open trade.

First, China should follow through on its ongoing shift from an export– and investment-heavy model toward consumption-led growth. Alongside the social measures described above, this requires reducing the barriers faced by private and foreign businesses, improving market access in services and public procurement, and applying regulation more transparently. European companies should be able to compete in China with confidence that they will receive equal treatment and can protect their intellectual property.

Second, Europe needs to draw a sharper distinction between trade in products that present a genuine security risk and investment that strengthens European productive capacity. Concerns about supply-chain resilience and security in defined strategic sectors are unavoidable, given increasing regionalization. But a presumption against Chinese investment would deprive Europe of capital, technology, competition, and jobs precisely when it needs them most. Instead, Europe could openly welcome investment that meets its requirements on governance, data protection, labor standards, and environmental performance, while increasing the local economic contribution such production provides.

This openness should be anchored by a renewed Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. The agreement reached in principle in 2020 was never implemented and the relationship has changed too much for it simply to be revived unchanged. China and Europe should instead negotiate a new CAI covering market access, national treatment, subsidy transparency, technology transfer, public procurement, and enforceable dispute resolution. It should give European companies more predictable access to China, while establishing clear and consistent conditions for Chinese market access and investment in Europe, with an eye to creating employment and supplier networks there.

China has already demonstrated the value it places on market access by extending tariff-free treatment to goods from 53 African countries, and it could move explicitly to align its standards more closely with Europe’s. Europe, for its part, should reconsider its technology and investment restrictions—especially those implemented specifically to protect U.S. interests, such as the restrictions preventing China from purchasing advanced semiconductor equipment from ASML. Working examples of Chinese investment in Europe already exist. Chinese companies are investing in battery and vehicle production in Hungary, Slovakia, Spain, and Serbia, while European manufacturers—including Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz—continue to deepen their research, production, and partnership networks in China. These investments should not be viewed as isolated commercial transactions. They can become the architecture of a more balanced relationship.

Third, localization must mean more than final assembly. Joint ventures and investment agreements can encourage local supplier development, worker training, research partnerships, and the sharing of production know-how, while respecting intellectual-property rights. Chinese industry was once buoyed by European know-how through joint ventures; in return, European industry can now benefit from Chinese advances. The goal should be a competitive ecosystem in which both Chinese and European firms have a stake.

Fourth, any trade measures should be targeted and temporary. If an import surge threatens serious injury, safeguards can buy time for adaptation. But they should have clear evidentiary thresholds, sunset clauses, and review procedures. Protection without a productivity strategy merely postpones decline and risks marginalization, rather than allowing a dynamic industrial sector to emerge. At the same time, Europe can and should complete its own agenda: lowering energy costs, deepening the single market, mobilizing investment, scaling up innovative companies, and improving infrastructure.

Here, China can become Europe’s “fitness partner.” The phrase may sound counterintuitive at a moment of industrial anxiety, but the underlying idea is important. Healthy competition from China can push European companies and governments to confront long-delayed reforms, reduce costs, and innovate faster. Shelter from competitive pressure does not create health; competition, by contrast, can serve as a yardstick for rebuilding strength. China, meanwhile, gains more from a prosperous and capable Europe than from a weakened market increasingly hostile to Chinese commerce.

Finally, the compact should look beyond the bilateral market. Chinese and European joint ventures could look abroad, toward the product and development needs of the Global South. Joint production for Global South markets could be a starting point, moving in time toward joint financing of development and infrastructure to accelerate green industrialization in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

This would represent the next stage of globalization: not simply Chinese companies “in China, for the world,” but “in the world, for the world.” It would spread productive capacity more widely, answer concerns about concentrated supply chains, and make development a shared undertaking rather than an arena for geopolitical competition.

From Commercial Trust to Strategic Cooperation

An industrial compact cannot by itself remove all political differences. But it would serve as a springboard, and a trust-building exercise, for deeper commitments and further work on shared interests.

Climate cooperation is the most obvious bridge. China’s manufacturing scale has lowered the global cost of solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles, in a very real way underwriting the transition away from fossil fuels. At the same time, Europe is suffering under the weight of an energy crisis born of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and, more recently, of upheavals in the Middle East around the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb. A natural alignment would be for China and Europe to build a green partnership that helps wean the world off volatile fossil fuels and address the climate crisis. The exact shape of such measures is not yet defined, but using joint ventures, cooperation, and technology exchange to tap Chinese expertise and cost advantages could benefit both sides while buoying the global green transition. A tariff spiral in clean technology, by contrast, would make the energy transition slower and more expensive for everyone.

More broadly, China and Europe share an interest in conflict resolution. China has always been clear that sovereignty and territorial integrity apply universally, that nuclear escalation is unacceptable, and that a negotiated settlement must provide credible security for all parties. But it can do more to ease the concerns of a Europe that feels threatened by a Russia now in its fifth year of fighting in Ukraine. Working together, Europe and China could help provide an off-ramp, each using its leverage to bring the negotiating positions closer together. A truly durable settlement, acceptable to both sides, may eventually require security guarantees involving both European and non-European countries, and China could contribute through reconstruction, nuclear safety, and peacekeeping. The Middle East is another region where common interests are greater than current policy coordination suggests. Continued conflict and volatility around the straits have not only given fresh impetus to the transition away from fossil fuels but also created a new area of shared interest. Together, Europe and China could support a peace architecture with wider international participation.

Artificial intelligence governance is another opportunity. China and Europe approach data, platforms, and regulation differently, but both reject a future in which a handful of private companies set global rules without public accountability. They can work together on safety testing, scientific exchange, interoperable standards, and the application of AI to health, climate, and development. Agreement will be difficult, but building a shared environment for rule-making would help hedge against fragmentation in this rapidly developing field.

Finally, China and the EU have both long advocated restoring the World Trade Organization. A revitalized WTO already contains tools to address subsidies and demonstrable injury. Boeing and Airbus were both found, in WTO disputes, to have benefited from improper support, and those cases were handled through multilateral proceedings rather than through an open-ended campaign against either side’s wider industrial success. The WTO’s dispute-settlement system must now be restored, its rules on subsidies and state enterprises updated, and its development functions strengthened. The United States weakened that system by blocking appointments to the Appellate Body after adverse rulings; but China and Europe are both major beneficiaries of an open trading system, and both can press for reform.

None of this will be sustainable without renewed contact between societies. Direct flights, student exchanges, tourism, university partnerships, city-to-city links, and think-tank dialogue all have their roles to play, for they are the infrastructure of mutual understanding.

China–Europe relations will not always be perfectly aligned, and they will likely continue to contain elements of cooperation, competition, and disagreement. But together, we can put to rest the prospect of weaponized interdependence and move instead toward win-win interdependence.

Europe does not need to become less European in order to cooperate with China, nor does China need to adopt European political mores for cooperation to succeed. Both are now free to cooperate selectively and on the merits of each issue. And a world in which China and Europe cannot find areas of deep mutual interest—despite their deep economic ties and their shared stake in multilateralism—is a world that is measurably poorer for it.

Japan-Watching: BoJ’s Koeda Points to a Longer Hiking Cycle

Her potential-growth example implies a neutral rate around 2.8%, above the Bank’s published 2.5% ceiling and well above today’s 1.25% policy rate.

[by OKUBO Takuji]

Key Takeaways

  • Koeda, probably the most influential swing vote on the board, seemed slightly more hawkish in her speech on October 15. She stopped just short of calling the 2% target achieved.
  • Her conceptual example of a neutral rate, potential growth plus 2%, points to a neutral rate well above 2%. While she is not in a hurry to push for hikes as the two hawks are, she seems open to a protracted hiking cycle.
  • I continue to think an October hike is out of the question. Koeda’s openness to a hike marginally raises the possibility of a December hike. I still consider it highly unlikely, though.

Why Koeda matters

On October 15, 2026, KOEDA Junko [小枝淳子] made her 3rd speech since she joined the BoJ policy board in 2025. She is an ex-IMF academic and yield curve specialist. She is probably the most important and influential swing vote in the current BoJ board. In her speech [archived PDF] and the following press conference (Japan Macro Advisors’ unofficial transcript), she sounded more open to continued rate increases than the three BoJ executives, although she was careful not to give any indication of the timing of the next move.

The board is balanced at both ends

As you can see in chart 1, the board is evenly balanced with two hawks at top-right and two doves at bottom-left (if you are unfamiliar with the BoJ-Policy Stance Indicator framework, please see the Japan Macro Advisors primer). That leaves KOEDA Junko [小枝 淳子] and MASU Kazuyuki [増 一行] between the two ends, sitting with the three BoJ executives: the Governor and two Deputy Governors. As BoJ executives tend to vote together, Koeda and Masu cast critical swing votes.

Chart 1

Koeda sounded more hawkish than before

In her speech [archived PDF] and the following press conference (see the Japan Macro Advisors unofficial transcript), she seemed slightly more hawkish than I anticipated. Koeda judges trend inflation to be already about 2% overall and increasingly well-anchored. She stopped just short of saying the 2% target has been achieved. She said:

“For about a year now I have described underlying inflation as roughly 2% on the whole, and I have kept checking how firmly it is taking hold. On the CPI, as I noted at Chart 11, broad-based price increases have continued for several years, and the distribution of year-on-year changes by item also suggests that this is becoming established. Wages, too, have shown stable increases overall. For these reasons, I think Japan’s inflation is becoming more persistently entrenched than before.” [Kumamoto speech, 15 October 2026, Japan Macro Advisors translation]

Koeda also offered a simplified concept of the neutral rate as the potential growth rate plus the 2% inflation target. As the Bank’s latest potential-growth estimate is about 0.8%, this could put the nominal neutral rate at 2.8%, exceeding the top of the Bank’s published nominal range of 1.1–2.5%. She did offer another version that put the neutral rate at a lower level, but it was clear that she wanted to give a higher version of a potential neutral rate.

To be clear, she did not endorse 2.8% as a policy-rate destination. At the press conference, she said the potential-growth rule does not always hold and declined to give a point estimate. But her intention was most likely to nudge the neutral rate range higher.

Koeda was clear in her message that she is open to a rate hike. She said: “I do not think we need to be overly cautious about raising rates.” [speech, Japan Macro Advisors translation]

But she was quite evasive regarding the timing of the next hike. In the press conference, reporters repeatedly asked for her view on a back-to-back rate hike, a veiled way of asking whether an October hike is possible. She was quite firm in repeating her stance that she does not have any particular pace in mind. This was an interesting contrast with Governor Ueda’s dismissive comment on the possibility of a successive or oversized rate hike (see the Japan Macro Advisors September 18 report). That does not mean she endorsed consecutive hikes. It means she left the option more open than Ueda did.

Conclusion: More open to multiple hikes

By choosing potential growth plus 2% as an example of the neutral rate, Koeda seems to be creating more space for the policy rate to eventually rise above 2%, in my view. In terms of the timing for the next hike, she was non-committal. I would still consider an October hike out of the question, but her non-committal attitude does marginally raise the possibility of a December hike, although I still consider it highly unlikely.

Japan-Watching: Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale

GPIF, one of the largest national pension funds in the world, is likely to rebalance its assets from non-yen bonds to yen bonds, signaling a big turn in Japan’s cross-border capital flows.

[from Japan Macro Advisors, 10 September, 2026]

Key takeaways

  • In 2013, GPIF’s investment committee, chaired by UEDA Kazuo [植田和男], now the BoJ governor, saw a fair chance of a JGB crash within five to ten years. Its CEO priced the crash as the 10-year rising from 0.5% to 3%. Subsequently, GPIF cut its target weight for domestic bonds from 60% to 25% as an emergency measure against abnormally low yields.
  • The 10-year is now at 3%. On my replication of GPIF’s own allocation rule, a real return on JGBs near zero points to a 50% weight in domestic bonds, against 25% today. I expect GPIF to raise the weight, if it has not already started in the September quarter.
  • How GPIF decides its asset allocation and communicates it publicly is a very delicate and political issue. But regardless of how it communicates it, a change in asset allocation is inevitable. In my view, it signifies a big turn in Japan’s cross-border capital flows.

Japan has one of the Largest Pension Funds in the World

Japan has the second largest public pension fund in the world. Norway’s is the biggest, although it is not strictly a pension fund. Canada’s pension funds, when all eight of its variants are added together, come a close third.

Japan set up its first national pension fund in 1961 and it has since gone through various reforms and reorganization over the last 65 years. Its current form is called the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF). As explained in a later section, GPIF has a few siblings, and when we add them together, Japan’s public pension funds can be said to be the largest in the world.

Chart 1

GPIF used to invest most of its asset into JGBs

GPIF used to invest the majority of its fund as loans to the national government and into Japanese government bonds (JGBs). At the end of FY2012, 62% of its assets consisted of domestic bonds. However, in 2014 it went through a radical asset reallocation and the target weight for domestic bonds was reduced from 60% to 35%, and then further down to 25% in 2020. Its current target allocation is a clean four-way 25% split into domestic bonds, domestic equity, foreign equity and foreign bonds.

As one of the largest pension funds in the world, its asset allocations attract market attention and there is speculation that it is about to raise its allocation into domestic bonds. In my view, there is indeed a very high chance that GPIF will be raising its allocation into domestic bonds, if it has not already started to do so in the current quarter ending in September 2026.

Chart 2

UEDA in 2013 Saw a Bond Crash Coming

To understand why GPIF is highly likely to raise its allocation into domestic bonds, we need to go back in history to 2013. Why 2013? Of course, it is the year the Bank of Japan (BoJ) started its massive quantitative easing. The 10-year JGB yield started 2013 at 0.8% and it fell to 0.3% by the end of 2015 before briefly hitting a negative rate of -0.3% in 2016. If you were the chairperson of the GPIF investment committee, you would have been concerned about the wisdom of continuing to invest in JGBs at such a policy-driven low rate. The actual chairperson was UEDA Kazuo [植田和男], the current BoJ governor. In the minutes for October 2013, UEDA said, “I think there is a fair chance that bonds will crash at some point in the next five to ten years [unofficial translation].”

The minutes were released only seven years later; otherwise the use of the word “crash” would have been controversial.

GPIF CEO Priced the Crash at 3% in 2014. We Are There Now

If you read through the GPIF minutes between 2013 and 2014, you would see that GPIF officials were increasingly conscious of the precariousness of investing in JGBs. Long story short, as this process was highly political and a sensitive subject, they decided to radically lower the target allocation weight for JGBs to 35% in 2014, presented it as the result of a philosophical change in the way GPIF is managed and how the concept of “risk” should be considered. Investment in JGBs was no longer considered low risk in real terms. The asset allocation for domestic bonds was further lowered to 25% in 2020. The following is what MITANI Takahiro [三谷隆博], the GPIF CEO at the time and an ex-BoJ senior official, said in the October 2014 GPIF minutes.

“Yields are just under 0.5% now, so a move to near 3% would mean a loss of about ¥25 trillion. (…). So I think the clearest way to explain it is that reducing the weight on JGBs to some degree is simply unavoidable [unofficial translation]”

The 2014 cut in the weight was partly an emergency escape

As I wrote earlier, the radical asset reallocation in 2014 was part a shift in the concept of risk from “nominal” to “real”, so that JGB is no longer risk free assets. But the change was also at least partly an emergency measure to escape the abnormally low-yield environment. Then the next natural question is, now that the JGB yields are no longer abnormally low, what should happen to its asset allocation? Pensions are paid in yen, so long-duration Japanese government bonds are a natural match, while GPIF should also be holding some non-yen assets and equities to diversify its assets and protect the overall balance sheet from inflation. In the next section, I will show you a simplified replication of how GPIF decides its asset allocation and what GPIF’s asset allocation could be now that JGB yields are normal.

How GPIF decides its weights

Put simply, GPIF’s target weights are the output of an optimizer with a few rules. Find the portfolio that, at the required real return, has the smallest average shortfall below wage growth in the years when it falls short, and round it to the nearest 5%.

When GPIF last decided to keep the current 25% weight for domestic bonds in 2025, JGBs were assumed to produce a nominal return of 0.5% against wage growth of 1.3%, so a real return of minus 0.8%. Exhibit 1 shows a simplified matrix of weights depending on expected nominal return on bonds and wage growth. The red box shows the assumption behind the 2025 weights decision mentioned above. If we use a higher wage growth assumption of 2.3%, an expected nominal return of 1.8% on bonds gives a weight of 35%. GPIF’s bond portfolio has an average maturity around 10 years, and the 10-year bond is yielding 3% now. A lot of thought and estimation is needed to form a view on the expected real return on domestic bonds, but in my view, it is clear that the minus 0.8% used in their last review is too low given where bond yields are.

Why GPIF kept the weight in 2025 and why circumstances changed

In late 2024 when the GPIF was reviewing the weight as part of its five-year plan, the BoJ was already in the process of exiting from QE and raising its policy rate. However, the JGB market was still in the process of adjustment and bond yields had a lot of room to rise. For example, the 10-year yield was 0.89% at the end of September 2024, rose to 2% by the end of 2025 and now, in September 2026, stands at 3%. You can understand why GPIF decided to keep its weight on domestic bonds unchanged as it would have incurred capital losses on bond purchases in 2025. But in my view, as I wrote in the report “The Long Climb in JGB Yields Is Nearly Over” [archived PDF], long bond yields are getting closer to a stability point. If the GPIF board shares my view, it is a good time to think about raising its target weight into domestic yen bonds.

The Whale Problem and the Washington Problem

How high should the new weight be for domestic bonds? The reality of determining appropriate weights and how to announce it is a lot harder than the simplified model I explained above. Other than forming a reasonable view on the expected real return on asset classes, there are a few factors that complicate the process.

Firstly, GPIF needs to think about how such an announcement would affect the market. GPIF is what financial market professionals call a whale, a massive investor whose investment decisions sway market prices. There is also a related argument that given the dominance of GPIF in the domestic market, GPIF should be increasing its asset weight abroad to reduce its impact on domestic asset markets.

Secondly, changing asset allocation weights carries political considerations. If GPIF decides to raise the target weight for domestic bonds, foreign bonds are the likely asset class whose weight will go down. More than 50% of its foreign bonds are in US dollars. With all the news circulating in the market now, Scott Bessent will not like a public announcement that one of the largest pension funds in the world is reducing its purchase of US treasuries. There are domestic political considerations as well, as the Takaichi government contemplates how best to fund its deficits.

These are the issues GPIF officials must be debating. How GPIF decides its asset allocation in the near future will be a revealing case study for those who want to study how policy-making works in Japan. Those who are interested in this topic should read the transcripts of an interesting government committee in 2014 that focused on how GPIF could shield itself from political meddling. Guess who chaired the committee? UEDA Kazuo [植田和男].

Whatever the near-term decision GPIF makes regarding its target weight, I think it is fairly clear that GPIF should be increasing its investment into domestic bonds. The following table shows how much GPIF could buy in net terms, depending on the eventual rise in the target weight.

How much GPIF buys: ¥32tn at 35%, ¥80tn at 50%

Domestic Bond TargetGPIF BuysWith the Sister Funds
30%¥16tn¥20tn
35%¥32tn¥20tn
40%¥48tn¥20tn
50%¥80tn¥20tn

Additional domestic-bond holdings from re-weighting the fund at 30 June 2026 (managed assets ·317.8tn). Foreign bonds sold first.
Source: GPIF, JMA.

Three things in this table matter for the market. GPIF is allowed to deviate its asset allocation by six points either side of 25% without any announcement, so 39% target is already possible without any public announcement. In 2014 GPIF moved inside its band first and announced the new portfolio afterwards, and I would expect the same sequence this time. Second, these are static figures, which do not account for the growth of the fund over time.

The sister funds move with the whale

As mentioned earlier, GPIF has a few siblings. The Pension Fund Association for Local Government Officials (¥35.5tn), the Federation of National Public Service Personnel Mutual Aid Associations, known as KKR (¥11.5tn), and the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan (¥4.9tn) manage the pension reserves of local government employees, national government employees and private-school teachers. These sisters run their funds on the same 25/25/25/25 model, and with the legacy reserves they also run, they hold a further ¥87tn on top of GPIF’s.

Conclusion

GPIF cut its domestic bond weight from 60% to 35% in 2014, and later to 25%, to safeguard its assets from the manipulated low JGB yields at the time and the eventual crash they foresaw. That crash, as GPIF’s CEO MITANI defined it in 2014, has now happened with the 10-year yield rising to 3%. In my view, JGB yields have largely normalized and there is no emergency reason to avoid domestic bonds. It is only natural that GPIF would raise its allocation into domestic bonds, although how GPIF communicates this publicly is a touchy issue they need to figure out. When GPIF raises its domestic bond allocation, foreign bonds are the likely asset class to take the hit. GPIF publishes quarterly results and the next publication for the end-September 2026 quarter, expected in early November 2026, will be closely watched. Judging from market movements in the last few weeks, the market has started to sense that what I described in this article is already happening and Japanese money is starting to come back to the yen. While it should be characterized as rebalancing, rather than a repatriation, it seems we are observing a big turn in Japanese cross-border capital flows.