Japan Inc. Now Sells No Yen to Invest Abroad

Earnings on Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) reached 103% of new FDI in 2022–25. With dividends and retained earnings counted together, Japan Inc. now needs to sell little yen to invest abroad.

[by OKUBO Takuji]

Key takeaways

  • Foreign affiliates now earn about as much as Japan invests abroad each year. Reinvested earnings, dividends and interest together reached 103% of new outward FDI in 2022–25, against 48% in 1996–2000.
  • Dividends from foreign affiliates account for a growing share of Japanese corporate profit. We estimate that foreign affiliates contributed 13.4% of Japan Inc.’s earnings in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.
  • Corporate investment abroad now involves little net yen selling. After dividends and interest paid home, the estimated outflow has been close to zero since 2022, down from about ¥5 trillion a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s.

Japan’s FDI stock now earns 103% of new investment

It is often said that Japan’s ageing population and slow growth give its companies too few investment opportunities at home. A Japanese government report in 2024 included the following passages.

“Japan’s ageing and shrinking population depresses expected demand at home. Expected returns remain higher abroad, so Japanese companies have accelerated outward direct investment” (my translation). — MATSUBAYASHI Yōichi [松林 洋一], MOF PRI, chapter 8, p.136.

“Companies invested abroad because they saw no promising investments in Japan; they are unlikely to bring back every return. On a cash-flow basis, the external balance is in deficit and is one factor behind the weak yen” (my translation). — KARAKAMA Daisuke [唐鎌 大輔], MOF PRI, chapter 10, pp.178 and 175.

However, my review of recent data shows that while their premise of low growth prospects in Japan is probably still right, the direct investment Japan has accumulated abroad has reached a level where it earns enough to cover Japan’s new investment abroad. This changes the exchange-rate implication even if Japan keeps investing abroad.

As chart 1 shows, earnings on the accumulated investment stock rose from 48% of new outward FDI in 1996–2000 to 103% in 2022–25.

Chart 1

Overseas affiliates pay interest and dividends to their parent companies in Japan. Those dividends have become a sizable part of corporate Japan’s income: we estimate that they made up 13.4% of Japanese corporate profit in FY2025, up from 1.7% in FY1996.

When foreign affiliates retain their earnings on their balance sheets, Japan’s balance of payments statistics record them as FDI from Japan, even though no money crosses the border. While the companies receiving FDI dividends and the companies paying for new FDI are not necessarily the same, Japan Inc. as a whole is now financing its FDI almost entirely from the earnings of its overseas affiliates. At the current level of FDI, little new yen needs to be converted into foreign currencies as Japan goes about investing abroad.

In the rest of this report, I explain how foreign direct investment by Japanese companies evolved, and its near-term outlook. This report is the third in a series on the yen repatriation theme that I have published over the past few weeks, following “Yen Repatriation Starts with the Whale”, on capital flows through Japan’s national pension funds, and “Mrs Watanabe No More”, on Japanese households’ assets invested abroad.

A strong yen helped drive Japan’s first outward FDI boom

Japan’s outward investment was heavily restricted after WWII, requiring case-by-case permission from the government. Approvals became more and more automatic over the years until outward investment became “free in principle” in 1980. Trade friction with the US-led Japanese carmakers to restrain their exports from 1981, pushing them to build factories abroad. The rapid appreciation of the yen was also a factor. The yen strengthened from ¥242 per dollar before the Plaza Accord in September 1985 to ¥121 by the end of 1987. Japanese producers had to move lower value-added work abroad. The strong yen also gave Japanese financial institutions sizable purchasing power for a while, until the stock and property bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991.

All of these factors contributed to a rapid increase in outward FDI through the 1980s and 1990s (chart 2).

Chart 2

Even after the bubble burst, the strong yen kept pushing manufacturers to move abroad. In 2005, manufacturers accounted for 60% of the FDI stock. As Japanese manufacturers expanded their supply chains abroad, Asia’s share of outward FDI rose from about 12% in FY1986–90 to 19% in FY1995–99, and Asia held 23% of the FDI stock by 2005 (chart 3).

Chart 3

Japan’s outward FDI stock rose to 56% of GDP

The next phase was sustained by a different pressure. With weak growth and low interest rates at home, Japan Inc. kept investing abroad, across a broader range of industries. Between 1995 and 2025, the stock of FDI rose from 9% of Japan’s GDP to 58% (chart 4). In 2025, it is as large as about 38% of the private sector’s domestic fixed capital, on our estimate.

Chart 4

By industry composition and by destination compositions changed over time. Manufacturing’s share of the FDI stock had fallen to 37% by 2025, giving Japan’s FDI more breadth. By destination, we are seeing a revival of FDI toward the United States. It accounted for 34% of the stock in 2025, Europe 29% and Asia 25% (see earlier chart 3).

Thus, after decades of overseas investment, Japan’s FDI stock is now large enough that its earnings are sufficient to finance new investment abroad, at least for now. In the next section, I consider whether this will continue, and in particular whether Japanese companies may bring an even larger share of their overseas earnings back to Japan, given the weak yen, higher borrowing costs in yen and possibly better investment opportunities at home.

The weak yen has slowed offshoring, not reversed it

The real depreciation of the yen over the past 15 years made production in Japan more competitive. There is some evidence that manufacturers are considering bringing production back to Japan. The 2023 manufacturing white paper found more firms shifting production back from China than moving there, and they named the weak yen as one reason. We see some signs of reshoring. Japanese manufacturers’ overseas production ratio rose from 18.0% in FY2011 to 27.2% in FY2023, but it may have started to decline or at least stabilize. The ratio fell to 26.7% in FY2024. A Cabinet Office survey of listed manufacturers puts the ratio at 24.5% in FY2025, and their plan for FY2030 is broadly unchanged at 24.7%. The weak yen seems to have stabilized the wave of offshoring, but I see no firm evidence of a move back onshore yet.

Domestic investment has grown slowly despite the weak yen

There are tentative signs that domestic capital spending is starting to grow again. For three decades it grew at a very low speed. In real terms, private business investment rose only 26% between FY1997 and FY2025, less than 1% a year. In comparison, capital spending grew by about 4% a year on average in the United States. In my view, a weak currency is only one of the factors manufacturers weigh in designing their global production chains. The weak yen makes production in Japan competitive today, but they have also seen the exchange rate swing violently within short periods. Japan also has a shrinking population problem. It started to address it by opening a door to immigration, but the door is only tentatively open. Overall, my view is that the weak yen alone is unlikely to give Japan Inc. sufficient incentive to bring its capital back to Japan and to the yen.

Economic security is bringing some production home

The government is pushing harder than the currency, mostly in the name of economic security, even before the Takaichi government came along. The government currently has a ¥250 trillion domestic investment target for FY2040 and named AI and semiconductors among its 17 strategic fields. Semiconductors are where the money has gone furthest. In November 2024, under the Ishiba government, Japan committed more than ¥10 trillion of public support to AI and semiconductors by FY2030, aiming to draw more than ¥50 trillion of public and private investment over ten years. Japan managed to lure a TSMC plant to Japan, backed by a sizable subsidy. Rapidus, a government-supported Japanese semiconductor maker, has received a sizable subsidy and is building a factory in Hokkaido. Japan’s production of integrated circuits and discrete semiconductors rose from ¥2.7 trillion in 2019 to ¥4.1 trillion in 2025.

Under the name of economic security, the Japanese government is promoting other industries such as batteries, shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals. Defence spending adds to the push. Japan’s defence budget rose from about ¥5 trillion in FY2022 to ¥9.0 trillion in FY2026. Some defence contractors, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, have doubled their defence revenue.

Japan’s industrial-policy record gives reason for caution

The Japanese government and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the key agency behind Japan’s industry policy, may claim some expertise in their industrial policies. Empirical studies in the past paint a poor track record, though. Rapidus, the most ambitious semiconductor project, has had no independent cost-benefit assessment (Negrine et al., 2025). While defence and economic security-driven policies have a different logic, I doubt that these industrial policies will succeed in bringing large-scale manufacturing investment back to Japan so long as macro factors such as Japan’s demography remain unfavourable.

FDI no longer appears to drive yen weakness

The weak yen and non-economic geopolitical factors do point to a halt in Japan’s four-decade offshoring trend, although it is a stabilization, rather than an economy-wide reversal of past offshoring. Japan Inc. will continue to invest more abroad, rather than within its borders. Given the sizable growth in the stock of cumulative FDI, Japan Inc. no longer needs to convert yen into overseas currency to keep investing abroad though. Net of dividends and interest paid home, Japan’s FDI sold about ¥5 trillion of yen a year, or about 1% of GDP, on average in the 2010s; since 2022 the net flow has been close to zero. There is also an interesting development in an effort to allow more share-exchange based M&A for cross-border deals that will further reduce the need for Japanese companies to spend their yen to purchase overseas assets. In my view, Japan Inc.’s FDI is no longer a factor to drive the yen weaker.

References

Japan-Watching: Economics in the Age of AI

A Thought Experiment Envisioning A “Fully Automated Society”

from REITI, by IKEUCHI Kenta [池内 健太], Senior Fellow (Policy Economist)

In a world where human labor has become unnecessary because of AI, what should be the focus of the study of economics? In the future, if AI and robots have become capable of producing all goods and services necessary for our society, what kind of economic problems could remain?

Of course, a fully automated society is not predicted for the near future. This article imagines such an extreme type of society as a thought experiment designed to consider economic systems in the age of AI. Here, a fully automated society refers not only to one in which corporate production is automated, but also to one in which the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of government are substantially supported—and in some cases automated—by AI.

I started thinking about this matter when I heard from a researcher acquaintance that a paper concerning AI’s impact on employment had caused quite a stir on X, and I decided to read it out of curiosity. The paper discussed the possibility that AI-driven job cuts could reduce workers’ incomes, weaken consumer demand, and ultimately backfire on firms themselves (Falk and Tsoukalas 2026). Companies may earn higher profits in the short term by taking advantage of AI to cut back on personnel costs. However, if most companies follow that same approach, overall market demand would weaken because workers are also consumers.

The purpose of this article is not to question the validity of that paper’s argument. Rather, the focus is on what economic problems would remain in a future society if AI not only partially replaces human labor but also produces most goods and services.

Scarcity Will Continue to Be a Problem

There has already been extensive research regarding the impact of AI on employment. For example, Acemoğlu and Restrepo (2019) argued that while automation may replace existing human jobs, it may also create new ones. Moreover, the possibility that technological advances could free humans from labor and greatly alleviate economic problems was discussed long ago by Keynes (1930).

If AI and robots become capable of producing goods and services on a sufficiently large scale, would economic problems disappear? That would not necessarily be the case. Even in a fully automated society, scarce resources such as land, location, natural environments, energy, and rare metals will remain limited. Moreover, social status, influence, and political decision-making power are deeply connected to human intentions and perception, and cannot simply be delegated to AI. More land will not become available simply because more people wish to live in convenient urban locations. Quiet natural environments, advanced healthcare resources, social attention, and political influence also cannot be maximized for everyone at the same time.

Therefore, even in a fully automated society, some economic problems will remain. However, the main focus will shift from the “problem of insufficient ordinary commodities” to “how to allocate fundamentally scarce resources.” As production capacity increases, the value of true scarcity only becomes clearer.

In that case, the roles of markets and prices will still exist. Prices are not merely figures that allow for corporate earnings; they convey information about which resources are scarce and to what extent, how much demand there is for those resources, and what supply constraints there are. That perspective connects to a classic argument made by Hayek (1945), who argued that prices function as a mechanism through which dispersed information can be aggregated.

However, if AI becomes deeply integrated into the market, the concept of price itself may change. At present, prices serve as one-dimensional signals representing the levels of various factors, such as scarcity, quality, demand, supply, environmental impact, and future risks, expressed in terms of a single metric, that is, monetary value. If AI agents become capable of processing large volumes of information on behalf of consumers and companies, it is possible that multi-dimensional market signals that convey information concerning all those various factors, including quality, environmental impact, congestion, delivery time, reliability and social impact may come into use. Narita (2025) also discussed the possibility that the roles of money and prices may change, with more diverse evaluation standards becoming involved in economic coordination.

For People to Enjoy Affluence

In a fully automated society, how people participate in the market and society will become more important than ever. If the premise that people earn income through labor becomes obsolete, it will be necessary to develop a mechanism whereby purchasing power is distributed to everyone. In this context, universal basic income (UBI) may be reframed not only as relief for the unemployed, but as a form of fundamental purchasing power used by people to express their preferences. Managi [馬奈木 俊介] (2025) also pointed out that governance over the equitable distribution of the benefits of AI is essential.

Moreover, UBI may not be limited to simple monetary payments. In the future, UBI may take the form of a system combining other benefits as well, including energy use quotas, rights of access to basic healthcare services and education, and rights to refuse or control the use of personal data. In a fully automated society, UBI would therefore be a matter not only of how much to provide, but also of what kinds of access to guarantee and over what time horizon.

Another important issue is whether it is appropriate to treat people merely as consumers. In a fully automated society, the need for people to work for a living may diminish. However, even without such a necessity, humans will likely still possess the desire to create or to be creative. It is human nature to try new things and to try to surprise or impress other people. The spirit of fun and curiosity, a desire for self-expression, an inquisitive mind, and an appetite for challenges are deeply and fundamentally connected to human nature. Therefore, when designing a future UBI system, it will be important to treat people not merely as consumers but as agents who can participate in creation and exploration.

Additionally, the question of who owns and controls AI systems, robots, foundation models, and computing infrastructure is also a major issue. Even if a certain level of income is distributed to everyone, there may remain a power gap between those who control AI systems and robots and those who merely have access to them, in place of the income gap that currently exists in society.

All of the above-mentioned points for debate are relevant to the study of economics. How scarce resources should be allocated, how to guarantee people’s range of choices, and how to design ownership and controlling rights are problems central to economics. A fully automated society is not a near-future prediction. However, this extreme thought experiment serves as a useful guide for considering economic systems in the age of AI. Economics in the age of AI is not about discarding the intellectual legacy of economics, but about inheriting it and extending it toward a new society.

References

June 12, 2026