Group of 20 (G20), Meta Intelligence

Japan-Watching: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

First Meeting of the Study Group on Strengthening Japan-Africa Economic Partnership

At TICAD 9 held last August, Mr. ISHIBA Shigeru (石破茂), then Prime Minister of Japan, announced the establishment of the “Study Group on Strengthening Japan–Africa Economic Partnership” as one of the concrete initiatives of the Japanese Government’s policy on Africa. The first meeting of this study group is scheduled for June 18 in a hybrid format.

Under the framework of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”, this study group will address African economic integration, a top priority for the African Union (AU). Through strengthening economic cooperation between Japan and Africa, the study group aims to support business expansion of Japanese companies in the African market. To this end, the study group will discuss various topics including measures to promote regional economic integration in Africa, review of trade and investment between Japan and Africa, and the strengthening of economic relations between Japan and Africa. The study group will prepare a report by the end of the fiscal year 2027, which will be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Reference 1) Japanese Members

Prof. WATANABE Yorizumi (渡邊頼純), Professor Emeritus, Keio University; Dr. KIMURA Fukunari (木村福成), President, JETRO Asian Economic Research Institute; Mr. FUJITA Ryoji (藤田亮二), Executive Officer, Toyota Tsusho Corporation (Representative from Keidanren); WATANABE Tatsuro (渡邉達郎), Managing Executive Officer, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (Representative from Keizai Doyukai); IGARASHI Katsuya (五十嵐克也), Director and Head of International Department, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

(Reference 2) African Members

Mr. Lacina Koné, Director General and CEO, Smart Africa Alliance; Mr. Kulekani Mathe, CEO, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA); Dr. E. Olawale Ogunkola, Professor of Economics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; and representatives from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, and the African Union Commission (AUC).

(Note) In addition, relevant Ministries, agencies, and individuals with expertise are expected to attend depending on the agenda.

(Reference 3) Attachment

Establishment of the Study Group on Strengthening Japan-Africa Economic Partnership [Archived PDF]

G7 Evian Summit

Working Session on “Reviving a Balanced, Shared and Sustainable Economic Growth”

On June 17, commencing at 10:30 a.m. (local time. 5:30 p.m. on June 17, Japan time.) for approximately 120 minutes, Ms. TAKAICHI Sanae (高市早苗), Prime Minister of Japan, attended the G7 Evian Summit Working Session on “Reviving balanced, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth for the benefit of all”. The overview of the session is as follows.

Prime Minister TAKAICHI stated that the G7 and like-minded countries should maintain close communication to reduce uncertainty in the global economy.
Prime Minister TAKAICHI also stated that it is a common challenge for many countries to promote self-sustaining growth, by addressing non-market policies and practices (NMPPs) and the resulting excess capacity which are drivers of widening global imbalances.
Furthermore, Prime Minister TAKAICHI stated that G7 members and the countries participating in this session should also demonstrate their contribution to reducing imbalances for their own balanced growth as well as for the stability of the global economy and financial markets. Prime Minister TAKAICHI added that making use of data-driven, objective analyses and policy advice by the IMF and the OECD is extremely beneficial in advancing these efforts.
Prime Minister TAKAICHI expressed her hope that the G7 and like-minded countries would lead the global economy through frank discussions. She also stated that she looked forward to discussions at the G20, chaired by President Donald Trump of the United States, on reducing uncertainty in the global economy and becoming stronger and more prosperous together.

Situation in Iran (Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran)

(Message from Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu [茂木敏充])

On June 18 (Japan Standard Time), the United States and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding and the cessation of hostilities was declared. Japan once again welcomes the fruition of the diplomatic efforts made by the parties as well as the countries that played a role in mediation.

Hereafter, it is important that free and safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is swiftly reestablished through the steady implementation of this MoU by all parties. Japan also considers it of critical importance that vessels be able to transit the Strait of Hormuz without being subject to additional costs, as has been the case thus far.

Japan strongly hopes that a final agreement on matters such as Iran’s nuclear issue will be achieved as soon as possible through further negotiations between the United States and Iran. Japan will also support the peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue including through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After the conclusion of a final agreement, Japan intends to play an active role in the reconstruction and recovery of the region. Japan will also continue to make every diplomatic effort, in close coordination with the international community, toward the realization of peace and stability throughout the Middle East region.

Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs ERI’s Visit to the United States

From June 21 to June 24, Ms. ERI Arfiya (英利アルフィヤ), Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, will visit New York, United States.

During her visit, Parliamentary Vice-Minister ERI will attend the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS and deliver a statement in the meeting. She will also hold meetings with representatives of international organizations.

(Reference) Schedule

June 21	Departure from Tokyo
	Arrival at New York
June 22	Participation in the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, etc.
June 23	Meetings with representatives of international organizations, etc.
	Departure from New York
June 24	Arrival at Tokyo

The 7th Japan-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue

On June 18, the 7th Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue was held in Tokyo, Japan.

This whole-of-government meeting was co-chaired by Mr. MIYAKE Fumito (三宅史人), Ambassador in charge of Cyber Policy and Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, and Ms. Jessica Hunter, Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia, with the participation of officials from, on the Japanese side, MOFA, National Cybersecurity Office (NCO), National Police Agency (NPA), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and on the Australian side, DFAT, Department of Industry and Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and Department of Home Affairs (DHA).
At this dialogue, following the enactment of Japan’s Cyber Response Capability Strengthening Act and Necessary Arrangement of Relevant Acts last year, as well as the adoption of its new Cybersecurity Strategy, the two sides exchanged views on broad range of topics, such as each country’s respective cybersecurity strategy and policy, and cooperation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
Furthermore, building on the “Japan–Australia Strategic Cyber Partnership” which Ms. TAKAICHI Sanae (高市早苗), Prime Minister of Japan and the Hon. Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia concurred on launching at the Japan–Australia Summit Meeting in May of this year, the two sides exchanged views on efforts and cooperation in a wide range of areas including the defense and deterrence of cyber threats, capacity-building, public-private partnerships, and artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity.
Both sides confirmed that they will continue to work closely together in the field of cyber, including through the Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue.

[from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18-19 June, 2026]

From ASEAN and G20 to APEC, as World Leaders Meet in Person Again, 3 Reasons to Root for Multilateralism

By Wang Huiyao | Founder of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Over the past two weeks, Asia has played host to the most intense sequence of multilateral summits since the pandemic began, as national leaders gathered for meetings organized by ASEAN, the G20 and APEC. Although overshadowed by geopolitical tensions, the meetings marked a welcome return to in-person summit diplomacy, and the better-than-expected outcomes show hope yet for multilateralism.

The conclaves began in Phnom Penh with the annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At the first of such in-person events in almost three years, ASEAN leaders took the positive step of agreeing in principle to admit East Timor as the 11th member of the organization.

As leaders moved on to Bali for the Group of 20 summit, expectations were low after ministerial meetings in the run-up had failed to produce consensus. Earlier in the year, given fractures in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was a question mark over whether the G20 could even go ahead or survive in its existing form.

In the end, the summit surpassed expectations by producing a joint declaration after intense negotiations, with leaders finding the compromises necessary to unite in declaring that “today’s era must not be of war” and pledging to uphold the multilateral system.

The summit also saw a positive face-to-face meeting between China’s President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden, their first as leaders, signaling a willingness to halt the downward trajectory of China-U.S. relations.

In Bangkok, the 21 leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum also pledged to uphold and strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system. Importantly, the group agreed on a multi-year work plan for an Asia-Pacific free trade area.

Reflecting on these three summits, three takeaways give reason for cautious optimism that multilateralism can yet be revived and play a major role in solving our challenges.

First, and perhaps most obviously, the return of in-person summit diplomacy is a welcome uplift for global cooperation. Virtual formats played a useful interim role at the height of the pandemic but were never a substitute for getting leaders in the same room. That is especially when it comes to interactions on the sidelines, often as important as the main event.

China’s return to diplomacy at the highest level was a further boost, both for the nation and the rest of the world.

In addition to Xi’s highly anticipated meeting with Biden, the Chinese leader met over a dozen other leaders at the G20 and APEC summits, including a warmer-than-expected first meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his first meeting with an Australian prime minister since 2016.

Leaders got to meet their new counterparts for the first time or build on existing relationships, which can only help global cooperation.

The second takeaway is that as grave as our challenges are, the threat of escalating conflict and severe economic pressures on all nations seem to be focusing minds and increasing the willingness to engage and cooperate—out of necessity if nothing else.

The G20 summit was the second major one this year to surpass expectations after the 12th World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in June surprised observers by agreeing on a plan to reform the organization and its dispute settlement mechanism. The G20 statement reiterated support for this WTO reform plan, which will be critical to get the free trade agenda back on track and provide a much-needed boost for the global economy.

Third, and perhaps most significantly for the long term, the recent summits marked an acceleration of the trend towards multi-polarization in international diplomacy, and in particular, the rising influence of non-aligned “middle powers” to shape multilateral outcomes.

The middle powers represented at ASEAN, the G20 and APEC have huge stakes in avoiding a bifurcation of the global economy that might result from a new cold war. They don’t want to be forced to pick sides and many show a growing willingness and ability to build bridges and restore positive momentum for multilateralism.

Indonesia is a prime example. The country’s strategic heft and non-aligned credibility make it well-placed to bridge different camps. President Joko Widodo made a big political bet on the success of the G20 and has won praise for the deft diplomacy that kept the organization alive and got it to a joint statement.

The Indian delegation reportedly also played a big role in achieving consensus on language in the statement, with the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—as well as Indonesia—turning out to be crucial swing voters in securing the joint statement. One Indian official said it was “the first [G20] summit where developing nations shaped the outcome.”

There is scope for this trend to continue next year as middle powers continue to rise in stature, and India and Indonesia take over the presidency of the G20 and ASEAN, respectively. Brazil will host the G20 the year after.

Over in Sharm el-Sheikh at the COP27 UN climate summit, another middle power—the host Egypt—also won praise for helping to shepherd a historic financing deal for poor countries affected by climate change. But the ultimate failure to reach a commitment to phase down fossil fuels was a sobering reminder of the huge difficulties that remain in forging the global consensus needed to overcome our shared challenges.

World-Watching: How the G20’s Succession of Developing Country Presidencies Could Help Re-shape the Global Economy

[from Asian Development Bank Institute]

Indonesia’s Group of 20 (G20) presidency in 2022 marks the start of three successive years in which the annual forum of the world’s largest economies will be hosted by developing countries, to be followed by India in 2023 and Brazil in 2024.

In this podcast, Pramod Bhasin, Chair of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), discusses India’s G20 presidency countdown and policy imperatives. He also describes the outlook for Indonesia, India, and Brazil’s G20 presidencies and their potential significance for the global economy.

[Archived podcast MP3]

Read the transcript. [Archived PDF]

View the full playlist of audio insights into ADBI’s ideas for developing Asia and the Pacific.

World-Watching: The Problem with the Current Russia Sanctions Regime

[from Project Syndicate, by Mohamed A. El-Erian]

There is much debate about the effectiveness of Western sanctions, the Ukraine war’s implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be. While there are few good options, some are clearly worse than others.

Cambridge — It has been five months since Europe and the United States imposed tough economic and financial sanctions on Russia, a G20 country that was the world’s eleventh-largest economy on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine. While the sanctions have been gradually strengthened in the intervening months, debate rages about their effectiveness, the war’s broader implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be.

On the first question, although the sanctions have been less effective than Europe and the U.S. had hoped, they also are proving more onerous than the Kremlin claims. Russia’s central bank expects GDP to contract by 8-10% this year, while other forecasters expect a larger fall, together with longer-lasting damage to growth potential. Imports and exports have been severely disrupted, and inflows of foreign investment have essentially stopped. Shortages are multiplying, pushing inflation higher. At this point, the country no longer has a properly functioning foreign-exchange market.

The sanctions would have bitten much harder had the West not opted for a carve-out of Russia’s energy sector, and had many more countries joined the U.S. and Europe in the effort. Because that didn’t happen, Russia has not felt nearly as much pressure as it would have. Moreover, it has been able to continue trading through various side and back doors that will likely become increasingly important as long as the sanctions regime, as currently designed, continues.

Nonetheless, it is only a matter of time before the Russian economy experiences a harder hit. Inventories of imported goods – including many critical technological and industrial inputs – are dwindling fast, and many sectors are becoming less resilient. The cumulative damage to Russia’s economy over time will be significant and long-lasting – a fact that has not yet been fully captured by consensus medium-term forecasts.

The second question concerns global spillovers from the war and the sanctions regime. Most observers agree that Russia’s invasion has increased not just energy insecurity but also food insecurity, highlighting the fallout from the war’s disruption to Ukrainian agricultural exports. But there is still much debate about the West’s use of the economic nuclear sanctions option: the curbs placed on Russia’s central bank and on Russia’s use of the international payments system.

These curbs are far more intrusive than the usual mix of restrictions on sanctioned government and private sector trade and on individuals’ financial dealings. Yet, because they are not subject to any internationally agreed standards, guidelines, or checks and balances, they fall outside the purview of relevant global-governance bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

In a time of war, such oversight might seem like a nicety. But some worry that the sanctions could significantly reduce the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and the U.S. financial system’s role as the primary global intermediary for other countries’ savings and investments. After all, a growing number of countries undoubtedly now feel more vulnerable to the reach of U.S. sanctions.

But it is impossible to replace something with nothing, which means that no significant loss of dollar or U.S. financial primacy will occur in the immediate future. Rather, the sanctions will lend further momentum to the gradual process of global economic fragmentation, which was also fueled a few years ago by the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. More countries now have even more of a reason to pursue greater financial resilience and inherently inefficient forms of self-insurance.

That brings us to the third debate. With no end in sight for the war, what should the West do next? Fearing the implications for energy prices and the supply of gas to Europe, many in the West are tempted to call for a moratorium on any new sanctions – or even for additional carve-outs. Others, however, favor additional measures to hold Russia accountable for its indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian civilians.

In any case, maintaining the current sanctions regime is not problem-free, owing to the twin objectives of pressuring Russia and limiting the economic disruption to Europe. Moreover, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently said, it feels as if Russia is “blackmailing” Europe by threatening to disrupt gas supplies at any moment. No wonder the Commission is urging member countries to cut consumption by 15%.

Under the current sanctions regime, the West risks falling between two horses. While easing sanctions could help alleviate concerns about Europe’s economic outlook, this option is a non-starter, given the atrocities that Russian forces are committing in Ukraine. But if the West is serious about pressuring Russia through truly crippling economic and financial sanctions, it needs to bite the bullet and eliminate the carve-outs for energy.

Doing so would undoubtedly have a severe short-term economic impact on European economies and the rest of the world, amplifying the “little fires everywhere” syndrome that I warned about in May. It is therefore critical that governments use their available fiscal space to provide targeted support to vulnerable segments of the population, as well as to fragile countries; and multilateral agencies must support developing countries through aid and a more operational debt relief framework. If done properly, this option would yield better outcomes in the medium and long term than the current strategy.

Muddling through risks bringing about the worst of all possible worlds. It is insufficient to dissuade Russia from continuing its illegal war; it is fueling deeper fragmentation of the international monetary system; and it is not even protecting Europe from a winter gas disruption.

Mohamed A. El-Erian, President of Queens’ College at the University of Cambridge, is a professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse (Random House, 2016).