Economics-Watching: FTC Action Leads to $18 Million in Refunds for Brigit Consumers Harmed by Deceptive Promises About Cash Advances, Hidden Fees, and Blocked Cancellation

[from the Federal Trade Commission]

Complaint alleges company violated FTC Act and ROSCA with false promises targeting consumers living paycheck-to-paycheck and by failing to deliver cash advances as advertised

The Federal Trade Commission is taking action against personal finance app provider Brigit, alleging that its promises of “instant” cash advances of up to $250 for people living paycheck-to-paycheck were deceptive and that the company locked consumers into a $9.99 monthly membership they couldn’t cancel.

Brigit, also known as Bridge It, Inc., has agreed to settle the FTC’s charges, resulting in a proposed court order that would require the company to pay $18 million in consumer refunds, stop its deceptive marketing promises, and end tactics that prevented customers from cancelling.

“Brigit trapped those consumers least able to afford it into monthly membership plans they struggled to escape from,” said Sam Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.  “Companies that offer cash advances and other alternative financial products have to play by the same rules as other businesses or face potential action by the FTC.”

According to the FTC’s complaint [archived PDF], Brigit advertised its cash advance service online, through social media and through broadcast ads with claims that customers who subscribed to the company’s service would have access to “instant” cash advances of up to $250 “whenever you need it,” and could cancel anytime. Consumers could only access the cash advance features when they signed up for the $9.99 per month “Plus” subscription.

The FTC’s complaint, however, charges that consumers were rarely able to get an advance for the promised $250, and in many cases, consumers were not able to receive a cash advance at all. Despite Brigit’s promises that advances would be available with “free instant transfers,” the complaint notes that the company began charging consumers a 99-cent fee for an instant transfer. Consumers who did not pay the fee had to wait up to three business days for their advances.

In addition, the complaint charges that while Brigit claimed to offer “non-recourse” advances with no fees or interest, the company prevented consumers who had an open advance from cancelling their subscription and continued to withdraw $9.99 monthly from their bank account until the advance was paid off. Such monthly charges created significant additional hardship for consumers already struggling to pay off a cash advance.

Even when consumers without an open cash advance attempted to cancel the paid subscription, the complaint charges that the company employed dark patterns—manipulative design tricks—to create a confusing and misleading cancellation process that prevented consumers from cancelling their subscriptions, instead of offering a simple mechanism to cancel, as required by the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA) [archived PDF].

The proposed settlement order [archived PDF], which must be approved by a federal judge before it can go into effect, would require Brigit to pay $18 million to the FTC to be used to provide refunds to consumers. In addition, the order would prohibit Brigit from misleading consumers about how much money is available through their advances, how fast the money would be available, any fees associated with delivery, and consumers’ ability to cancel their service. The order would also require the company to make clear disclosures about its subscription products and provide a simple mechanism for consumers to cancel.

The Commission vote authorizing the staff to file the complaint and stipulated final order was 3-0. The FTC filed the complaint and final order in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

NOTE: The Commission files a complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the named defendants are violating or are about to violate the law and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. Stipulated final orders have the force of law when approved and signed by the District Court judge.

The staff attorneys on this matter were Patrick Roy, Mark Glassman and James Doty of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

The Early Universe and the Future of Humanity/Xi Risks Losing the Middle Class

[from The Institute of Art and Ideas]

The Life and Philosophy of Martin Rees

An Interview with Martin Rees

Astronomer Royal and best-selling science author, Martin Rees pioneering early work led to evidence to contradict the Steady State theory of the universe and confirm the Big Bang. His influence then spread to the wider public—knighted in 1992, elevated to Baron in 2005, then giving the Reith Lectures in 2010. Most recently his attention has turned from the early universe to the future of humanity. In this interview, Lord Rees discusses the ideas and experiences which led to such an illustrious career.

Xi Risks Losing the Middle Class

The zero-COVID strategy has run its course

Kerry Brown | Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of Lau China Institute, King’s College London. He is the co-editor of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, and author of Xi: A Study in Power.

China is continuing with its tough zero-COVID policy. But the cracks in the economy and a discontent middle class mean that Xi’s Imperial-like governing style is under challenge, writes Kerry Brown.

China’s zero-COVID strategy operates in Chinese domestic politics a bit like Brexit does in the UK. Despite complaints from business networks and broader society about the negative impact on economic growth and citizens’ freedoms, it’s a policy commitment the government is sticking to no matter what.

Of course, no one voted for the draconian lockdowns implemented across China. And, unlike Brexit, the lockdowns are very much in line with expert advice in the country, rather than running against it. The Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC), the main governmental body advising the government over crisis response in this area, said in a weekly update last November that without comprehensive restraints on people’s movement and quarantines on anyone testing positive for the virus, the national health system would soon be overwhelmed with cases, and find itself in the same bind as those in the US or Europe did.

That the words of the experts have been taken so much in earnest is striking for a regime that previously hasn’t been shy to dismiss them. The Xi leadership may be confident in the way it speaks to the outside world, but it seems that it has the same profound wariness in the robustness of the country’s public health as everywhere else. Things have not been helped by clinical trials showing the Chinese vaccines – the only ones accepted in China – are not as effective as foreign ones where the length of protection is in question). On top of this, vaccine take-up by the elderly, the most vulnerable group, has been poor. It is easy to see therefore why the central government might be very cautious. What is harder to understand, however, is why the cautiousness has bordered on obsessiveness.

The Xi way of governing is increasingly almost imperial in style, with broad, high-level policy announcements made in Beijing, sometimes of almost Delphic succinctness.

One scenario is simply about the structures of decision-making in China. This was an issue right from the moment the variant started to appear in late 2019, and local officials in Wuhan stood accused of trying to hush the issue up, delaying reporting to the central authorities till things had already gone on too long. As a result of this, in February 2020 key officials in the city were sacked. But this is unlikely to change the fact that provincial officials are very risk averse under Xi, and that any central direction to manage the pandemic will be interpreted in the purest terms and executed to the letter.

This explains the completeness of the Xian government’s virtual incarceration of its 8 million population after just a few COVID cases at the end of 2021, the first of the more recent lockdowns. It also explains why the traditionally more free-thinking municipal authority of Shanghai and its similarly liberal approach was fiercely knocked back by Beijing last February, to make an example for any other provinces thinking of going their own way. The absolute prohibition on people moving from their homes there, in one of the most dynamic and lively cities of modern China, was perfect proof that if the government could bring about this situation there, it could do it anywhere.

This case study also reveals some important things about the Xi way of governing. It is increasingly almost imperial in style, with broad, high-level policy announcements made in Beijing, sometimes of almost Delphic succinctness, which are then handed down to various levels of government to do as they will. Exactly how and when the discussion amongst Xi and his Politburo colleagues on the best response to COVID happened is unclear. In a world where almost every political system seems to leak incessantly, the Chinese one is unique in maintaining its opacity and secretiveness – no mean achievement in the social media era.

The Communist Party is very aware of how relatively small incidents can mount up and then generate overwhelming force. It itself coined the Chinese phrase ‘a single spark can start a prairie fire.’

Rumors of clashes between Xi and his premier Li Keqiang on the effectiveness of the current response remain just that – rumors, with precious little hard evidence to back them up. Who in the current imperial system might dare to speak from the ranks and say that policy must change is unclear. Scientists should deal in hard facts – but we all know that science is susceptible to politicization. Experts in China have to offer their expertise in a highly political context. A declaration that the current approach is not fit for purpose can easily be reinterpreted as an attempt to launch an indirect attack on the core leader. With an important Congress coming up later this year, at which Xi is expected to be appointed for another five years in power, sensitivities are even more intense than normal. It is little wonder that the COVID strategy status quo settled on last year has not shifted.

Things, however, may well change, and change quickly. China is moving into tricky economic territory. The impact of the pandemic on global supply chains, along with the various stresses domestically on the housing market, and productivity, have shrunk expectations for growth. A predicted 6% in the earlier part of the year now looks overly ambitious. There is a real possibility China might experience a recession. At a moment like this, the government, which after all operates as a constant crisis and risk management entity, might do what it does best and prompt rapid, and dramatic, changes.

The handling of COVID-19 might look like further proof that Chinese politics under Xi is repressive and zero-sum. But even in an autocratic state like the current People’s Republic, the pandemic will not leave politics unchanged.

This doesn’t mean that China’s COVID-19 bind gets any easier. Like the country’s serious demographic challenges, with a rapidly aging population, the only thing the government will be picking an argument with is reality as it proceeds into the future. As with Europe and the US, being more liberal about facing COVID-19 will involve accepting some of the harsh consequences – rising fatalities, particularly for the elderly and vulnerable, and health systems put under enormous stress. In such a huge, complex country, and of enormous geopolitically importance, a misstep could easily lead to huge and unwanted consequences, generating discontent and triggering mass protests in a way reminiscent of 1989. The Communist Party is very aware of how relatively small incidents can mount up and then generate overwhelming force. It itself coined the Chinese phrase ‘a single spark can start a prairie fire.’ One such spark – the introduction of Marxism into China in the 1910s – led to its gaining of power three decades later.

The handling of COVID-19 might look like further proof that Chinese politics under Xi is repressive and zero-sum. But I suspect that even in an autocratic state like the current People’s Republic, the pandemic will not leave politics unchanged. In particular, the middle classes in cities like Shanghai have had their patience tested in recent months. This is the key group for Xi, the heart of his new innovative, more self-dependent, higher-quality service sector workers in an urbanized economy. Their support remains crucial if Xi is able to steer China towards the moment when it hopes it will become the world’s largest economy. Policies to try to placate them by addressing imbalances, critical environmental issues and improving public health are likely to only increase. Delivery however will be key.

Faced with a potentially life-threatening infectious disease, the Party can throw out injunctions and claim it has been the victim of bad luck. But an ailing economy and no clear signs of the government knowing how to manage this will prove a toxic mixture for it. Xi and his third term in office will be all about delivery. The question is whether, even with the formidable suite of powers he has, he can do this. Governing China has always been the ultimate political challenge. COVID-19 has made that even harder.

World-Watching: China Globalization Conference

[from the Center for China and Globalization]

The Center for China and Globalization is proud to announce the full program of their upcoming 8th edition of CCG annual China and Globalization Forum 2022 to be held in online-offline hybrid format in Beijing. Everyone is cordially invited to join the events open to public virtually. All sessions open to public will be broadcast live. You will be able to access the sessions on Zoom:

Tuesday, June 21st

09:00-10:00—Forum Special Online Program I: Advancing the 2030 Agenda in Uncertain Times: Sustainability and the Quest for ChinaU.S. Cooperation – Fireside Chat with Sec. Henry M. Paulson, Jr. and Mr. WANG Shi (王石)

10:30-12:30—Ambassadors’ Roundtable: Global Recovery in Post-Pandemic Times: Trends, Challenges, and Responses

14:00-16:00ChinaEurope Roundtable: ChinaEurope Economic Cooperation: Moving Forward with the Global Quest for Sustainability

17:30-18:30—Forum Special Online Program II: History at a Turning Point: Pandemic, Ukraine, and the Changing Relations between China, Europe, and the United States–Dialogue with Historian Niall Ferguson

20:00-21:30—Forum Special Online Program III: Realigning the U.S.China Trade and Economic Relationship: Inflation, Tariffs, and the Way Forward – ChinaU.S. Think Tank Dialogue

Zoom:
Webinar ID: 894 5641 9097
Passcode: 566991

Once you’re admitted into the Zoom meeting, your camera and audio will remain off. Simultaneous interpretation of both English and Chinese languages will be available by selecting the language pane.

Agenda

Monday, June 20th

09:00-10:00—Forum Special Online Program I: Advancing the 2030 Agenda in Uncertain Times: Sustainability and the Quest for ChinaU.S. Cooperation – Fireside Chat with Sec. Henry M. Paulson, Jr. and Mr. WANG Shi (王石)

Host

WANG Huiyao (王辉耀), CCG President, Vice Chairman of China Association for International Economic Cooperation (CAFIEC)

Speakers

Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Founder and Chairman of the Paulson Institute
WANG Shi (王石), CCG Senior Vice President, Founder and Honorary Chairman of China Vanke Co., Ltd., Founder of C-Team

This program will also be livestreamed on the web via the Baidu links and social media platforms below:

English language
Chinese language

Social Media
Youtube
Twitter
Facebook

10:30-12:30—Ambassadors’ Roundtable: Global Recovery in Post-Pandemic Times: Trends, Challenges, and Responses

Chair

WANG Huiyao (王辉耀), CCG President, Vice Chairman of China Association for International Economic Cooperation (CAFIEC)

Opening remarks

LONG YongtuCCG Chairman; former Vice Minister of Commerce
LIN Songtian, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa
Siddharth Chatterjee, UN Resident Coordinator, United Nations in China

Participants

(in alphabetic order by country): 
Rahamtalla M. Osman
, Permanent Representative of African Union to China
Graham Fletcher, Ambassador of Australia to China 
Paulo Estivallet de Mesquita, Ambassador of Brazil to China 
Nicolas Chapuis, Ambassador of European Union to China 
Laurent Bili, Ambassador of France to China 
Djauhari Oratmangun, Ambassador of Indonesia to China 
Luca Ferrari, Ambassador of Italy to China 
Raja Dato Nushirwan Zainal Abidin, Ambassador of Malaysia to China 
Clare Fearnley, Ambassador of New Zealand to China 
Signe Brudeset, Ambassador of Norway to China 
Moin ul Haque, Ambassador of Pakistan to China 
Luis Quesada, Ambassador of Peru to China 
José Augusto Duarte, Ambassador of Portugal to China 
James Kimonyo, Ambassador of Rwanda to China 
Alenka Suhadolnik, Ambassador of Slovenia to China 
Siyabonga Cwele, Ambassador of South Africa to China 
Bernardino Regazzoni, Ambassador of Switzerland to China 
Arthayudh Srisamoot, Ambassador of Thailand to China 
Ali Obaid Al Dhaheri, Ambassador of UAE to China

14:00-16:00ChinaEurope Roundtable: ChinaEurope Economic Cooperation: Moving Forward with the Global Quest for Sustainability

Chair

Andy MokCCG Senior Fellow

Participants

(in alphabetic order)
Joseph Cash
, Policy Analyst, China–Britain Business Council (CBBC)
CUI Hongjian, CCG Non-Resident Senior Fellow and Director of the Department of European Studies at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
Vivian Ding, CCG Senior Council Member, Founder and CEO of WeBrand Global
FENG Zhongping, Director of Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Allan Gabor, President of Merck China
Archil Kalandia, Ambassador of Georgia to China
LENG Yan, CCG Senior Council Member; Executive Vice President of Daimler Greater China
LIU Chang, Vice President of Knorr-Bremse Asia Pacific
Steven Lynch, Managing Director, BritCham China
Dario Mihelin, Ambassador of Croatia to China
Leena-Kaisa Mikkola, Ambassador of Finland to China
MIN Hao, CCG Senior Council Member; Founder, Chairman, and CEO of the Nanjing Easthouse Electric Ltd.
SUN Yongfu, CCG Senior Fellow; former Director-General of MOFCOM Department of European Affairs
Joerg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China
ZHOU YanliCCG Advisor; Former Vice Chairman of China Insurance Regulatory Commission
Helen Zhu, CCG Senior Council Member; Vice President of Sanofi China

This program will also be livestreamed on the web via the Baidu links and social media platforms below:

English language
Chinese language

Social Media
Youtube
Twitter
Facebook

17:30-18:30—Forum Special Online Program II: History at a Turning Point: Pandemic, Ukraine, and the Changing Relations between China, Europe, and the United States–Dialogue with Historian Niall Ferguson

Speakers

Niall Ferguson, Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University
WANG Huiyao (王辉耀), CCG President, Vice Chairman of China Association for International Economic Cooperation (CAFIEC)

20:00-21:30—Forum Special Online Program III: Realigning the U.S.China Trade and Economic Relationship: Inflation, Tariffs, and the Way Forward – ChinaU.S. Think Tank Dialogue

Moderator

WANG Huiyao (王辉耀), CCG President, Vice Chairman of China Association for International Economic Cooperation (CAFIEC)

Speakers

(in alphabetic order)
Craig Allen
, President, US-China Business Council (USCBC)
Wendy Cutler, Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; former Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
JIN Xu, President, China Association of International Trade (CAIT)
Adam Posen, President, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Jeremie Waterman, President of China Center and Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
YI Xiaozhun, former Deputy Director-General of World Trade Organization, former Vice Commerce Minister

Tuesday, June 21st

09:30-12:30China Globalization 30 Roundtable Experts Roundtable: China and Globalization in the 21st Century (Chinese language livestream, not available on Zoom)

Chair

Mabel MiaoCCG Secretary-General

Discussants

(in alphabetic order)
CHEN Zhiwu, Director of Asia Global Institute, Professor of Business School, Hong Kong University
DA Wei, Professor and Director of Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University
DONG Guanpeng, Vice President of China Public Relations Association, Dean of School of Government and Public Affairs, Communication University of China
GE Jianxiong, Director of Institute of Chinese Historical Geography, Fudan University
GU Xuewu, Director of Center for Globalization, University of Bonn
HU Biliang, Executive Director of the Belt and Road Institute and the Institute of Emerging Markets, Beijing Normal University
LI Xiangyang, Director of Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
LIU Guoen, Dean of Institute for Global Health and Development, BOYA Distinguished Professor, Peking University
LIU Junhong, Director of Globalization Center, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
SU Hao, Director of Center for Strategy and Peace Studies, China Foreign Affairs University
XIE Tao, Dean of School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University
XUE Lan, Dean of Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University
WANG Huiyao (王辉耀), President of Center for China and Globalization; Dean of Development Research Institute, Southwest University of Finance and Economics
WANG Ning, Zhiyuan Chair Professor, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Foreign Member of the European Academy of Sciences
WANG Yiwei, Professor of School of International Relations, Renmin University of China
WANG Yong, Director of Center for International Political and Economic Studies, Peking University
WU Xinbo, Dean of Institute of International Studies, Director of Center for American Studies, Fudan University
WU Zhicheng, Vice President of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, Party School of the Central Committee of CPC (National Academy of Administration)
YANG Xuedong, Senior Professor of Political Science, Tsinghua University
ZHANG Shuhua, Director of Institute of Political Science, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
ZHANG Xudong, Professor of Comparative Literature & East Asian Studies, NYU
ZHANG Yunling, Member of Presidium of Academic Divisions of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

This session will also be livestreamed on the web accessible via this Baidu link (Chinese language only, no simultaneous interpretation).

India-Watching

ICRIER Working Paper № 407

India’s Platform Economy and Emerging Regulatory Challenges

by Rajat Kathuria, Mansi Kedia and Kaushambi Bagchi

Abstract

The phenomenal rise of the platform economy has reshaped how economies operate across the world. The importance of digital platforms has never been more evident than in combatting the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Even with the threat of a global recession looming large, technology companies are witnessing a surge in demand for their services. Platforms distinguish themselves from traditional markets by demonstrating speed and scale of innovation and fostering efficient and productive interaction between buyers and sellers. Enterprises using platform-based business models have expanded beyond social media, travel and entertainment to sectors like financial services, healthcare, logistics and transportation. With the objective of building evidence for policy-making in this sector, this study undertakes an in-depth analysis of the impact generated by the platform economy in India, by estimating consumer surplus from the use of platforms, analyzing its impact on traditional businesses either by transformation or disruption. The estimated consumer surplus is Rs. 438.75 per individual per month, amounting to a collective annual surplus of Rs. 3620 billion for India. At current exchange rates this would amount to $47 billion. 

The growth of platforms has also been accompanied by global concern against their anti-competitive practices, the spread of fake news and harmful content, political bias, etc. The paper discusses regulatory changes and areas of concern for market competition, labour and employment, fake news and misinformation, consumer protection, counterfeit goods and data privacy in India.

[Read full article, archived PDF]

[Executive summary, archived PDF]

Essay 116: Reports of Rising Police-Society Conflict in China

Interview with Suzanne Scoggins (November 25, 2019)

China is facing a rising tide of conflict between the nation’s police officers and the public. While protest events receive considerable media attention, lower-profile conflicts between police officers and residents also make their way onto the internet, shaping perceptions of the police. The ubiquity of live events streamed on the internet helps illuminate the nature of statesociety conflict in China and the challenges faced by local law enforcement.

Simone McGuinness spoke with Suzanne Scoggins, a fellow with the National Asia Research Program (NARP), about the reports of rising policesociety conflict in China. Dr. Scoggins discusses how the Chinese Communist Party has responded to the upsurge, what channels Chinese citizens are utilizing to express their concerns, and what the implications are for the rest of the world.

What is the current state of police-society relations in China?

Reports of police violence have been on the rise, although this does not necessarily mean that violence is increasing. It does, however, mean that the media is more willing to report violence and that more incidents of violence are appearing on social media.

What we can now study is the nature of that violence—some are big events such as riots or attacks against the police, but there are also smaller events. For example, we see reports of passengers on trains who get into arguments with transit police. They may fight because one of the passengers is not in the right seat or is carrying something prohibited. Rather than complying with the officer, the passenger ends up getting into some sort of violent altercation. This kind of violence is typically being captured by cellphone cameras, and sometimes it makes the news.

The nature of the conflict matters. If somebody is on a train and sitting in a seat that they did not pay for, then it is usually obvious to the people reading about or watching the incident that the civilian is at fault. But if it is chengguan (城管, “city administration”) telling an elderly woman to stop selling her food on the street and the chengguan becomes violent, then public perceptions may be very different. It is that second type of violence that can be threatening to the state. The public’s response to the type of conflict can vary considerably.

What are the implications for China as a whole?

Regarding what this means for China, it’s not good for the regime to sustain this kind of conflict between street-level officers or state agents and the public. It lowers people’s trust in the agents of the government, and people may assume that the police cannot enforce public security. There are many state agents who might be involved in a conflict, such as the chengguan, the xiejing (auxiliary officer), or the official police. The type of agent almost doesn’t matter because the uniforms often look similar.

When information goes up online of state agents behaving poorly, it makes the state a little more vulnerable. Even people who were not at the event might see it on social media or in the news and think, “Oh, this is happening in my community, or in my province, or across the nation.” This violates public expectations about how the police or other state agents should act. People should be able to trust the police and go to them when they have problems.

How has the Chinese government responded to the increase in reporting violence?

There is a twofold approach. The first is through censorship. When negative videos go up online or when the media reports an incident, the government will go in and take it down. We see this over time. Even while collecting my research, some of the videos that were initially available online are no longer accessible simply because they have been censored. The government is removing many different types of content, not only violence. Censors are also interested in removing any sort of misinformation that might spread on social media.

If step one is to take the video or report down, step two is to counteract any negative opinion by using police propaganda. This is also referred to as “public relations,” and the goal is to present a better image of the police. Recently, the Ministry of Public Security put a lot of money and resources into their social media presence. Many police stations have a social media account on WeChat or Weibo (微博, “microblogging”) and aim to present a more positive, friendly image of the police. The ministry also teamed up with CCTV to produce television content. This has been going on for some time, but recently shows have become more sophisticated.

There is one program, for example, called Police Training Camp. It is a reality show where police officers are challenged with various tasks, and the production is very glossy. The ministry also produces other sorts of specials featuring police who are out in the field helping people. It shows the police officers working really long shifts, interacting positively with the public, and really making a difference in people’s lives. In this way, the government is counteracting negative opinions about police violence or misconduct.

In general, I will say that it is difficult for people in any society to get justice with police officers because of the way legal systems are structured and the power police hold in local government politics. In China, one of the things people are doing beyond reaching out to local governments or pursuing mediation is calling an official hotline.

This is a direct channel to the Ministry of Public Security, and all these calls are reviewed. There is not a whole lot that citizens can do about specific corruption claims. But if somebody has a particular goal, then the hotline is slightly more effective because it allows citizens to alert the ministry. However, many people do not know about the hotline, so the ministry is trying to increase awareness and also help staff the call center so that it can more effectively field calls.

As for how much relief people feel when they use these channels, this depends on what their goal is. If the goal is to get somebody fired, then the hotline may not work. But if someone is looking to air their grievances, then it may be helpful.

What are the implications of increased police-society conflict in China for the rest of the world? What can the United States or other countries do to improve the situation?

These are really sticky issues that are difficult to solve. When discussing policesociety conflict, it is important to step back and think about who the police are—the enforcement agents of the state. So by their very nature, there will be conflict between police and society, and that is true in every country. In China, it really depends on where and what type of police climate we are talking about.

Xinjiang, for instance, has a very different police climate than other regions in China. There is a different type of policing and police presence. Chinese leaders certainly do not want any international intervention in Xinjiang. They see this as an internal issue. While some governments in Europe and the United States might want to intervene, that is going to be a nonstarter for China.

As for police problems more generally, I would say that if China is able to reduce some of the policesociety conflict in other areas of the country, then this is good for the international community because it leads to a more stable government. We also know that there is a fair amount of international cooperation between police groups. China has police liaisons that travel and learn about practices and technology in different countries. The police in these groups attend conferences and take delegates abroad.

There are also police delegations from other nations that go to China to learn about and exchange best practices. But that work will not necessarily address the underlying issues that we see in a lot of the stations scattered throughout China outside the big cities like Beijing (北京) or Shanghai (上海). Those are the areas with insufficient training or manpower. Those issues must be addressed internally by the Ministry of Public Security.

How is the Chinese government improving its policing capabilities?

Recently, the ministry has tried to overcome manpower and other ground-level policing problems by using surveillance cameras and artificial intelligence. Networks of cameras are appearing all over the country, and police are using body cameras for recording interactions with the public. This type of surveillance is not just in large cities but also in smaller ones. Of course, it is not enough to just put the cameras up—you also need to train officers to use that technology properly. This process takes time, but it is one way that the ministry hopes to overcome on-the-ground problems such as the low number of police per capita.

How might the Hong Kong protests influence or change policing tactics in China?

The situation in Hong Kong is unlikely to change policing tactics in China, which are generally more aggressive in controlling protests than most of what we have seen thus far in Hong Kong. It is more likely that things will go in the other direction, with mainland tactics being used in Hong Kong, especially if we continue to observe increased pressure to bring the protestors in check.

Suzanne Scoggins is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Clark University. She is also a 2019 National Asia Research Program (NARP) Fellow. Dr. Scoggins holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and her book manuscript Policing in the Shadow of Protest is forthcoming from Cornell University Press. Her research has appeared in Comparative Politics, The China Quarterly, Asian Survey, PS: Political Science and Politics, and the China Law and Society Review.

This interview was conducted by Simone McGuinness, the Public Affairs Intern at NBR.