Tag: import

Economics-Watching: SF FedViews: September 4, 2025

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco]

Andrew Foerster, senior research advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, shared views on the current economy and the outlook from the Economic Research Department as of September 4, 2025.

While economic activity in the United States has remained resilient, recent data show some softening in the labor market. Swings in net exports affected GDP in the first half of 2025, with imports surging in the first quarter followed by imports declining in the second quarter. Inflation remains above the Fed’s 2% goal, and a near-term rise from tariffs appears likely. Job gains in recent months have slowed. Downward revisions for recent job growth estimates have been large, but the magnitudes of these revisions are not out of line with historical values. Job growth estimates remain reliable despite data collection challenges. With the balance of risks surrounding the Fed’s dual mandate now shifting, market participants are projecting an easing of monetary policy in coming months.

Read the full article [archived PDF].

World-Watching: USDA GAIN Reports from 19 August 2025

[from the United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service: Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN)]

Australia: Stone Fruit Annual

Stone fruit production in Australia is forecast to decline in marketing year (MY) 2025/26, primarily due to the Bureau of Meteorology’s (BOM) projection of a wetter-than-average spring. If realized, these conditions are expected to negatively affect both yields and fruit quality. Cherry production is forecast to fall by ten percent, while peach and nectarine production is expected to drop by seven percent. Growing conditions to date have been favorable, with excellent winter chill hours supporting strong bud burst and production potential. However, the anticipated shift to wet spring weather is likely to undermine these early-season advantages. As a result, cherry exports are forecast to decrease by nine percent and peach and nectarine exports by seven percent. Imports, though starting from a low base, are projected to rise modestly in MY 2025/26.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

Chile: Stone Fruit Annual

Post projects exports of Chilean cherries to grow significantly in the coming years, driven by strong international demand, particularly from China. Post estimates cherry production in marketing year (MY) 2024/25 to reach 730,000 metric tons (MT), a 6.7 increase over MY 2024/25. Chilean cherry exports will increase by 7.2 percent reaching 670,000 MT. In MY 2024/25, Post estimates nectarine and peach production to total 205,000 MT, a 3.4 percent increase over MY 2024/25. Peach and nectarine exports will increase by 3.4 percent totaling 146,000 metric tons. This growth reflects the continued expansion of nectarine planting, which offsets the decline in fresh peach area planted.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

China: Call for Domestic Comments on 30 National Food Safety Standards

On August 1, 2025, the Chinese government announced a public comment period for 30 national food safety standards, open until September 26, 2025, via the national standards management system. The standards have not yet been notified to the WTO. This report includes an unofficial translation of the announcement and the list of standards, and stakeholders are advised to review the regulations for potential market or regulatory impacts.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

China: New CCP Regulation Expands Anti-Corruption and Frugality Measures

On May 18, 2025, the Chinese Communist Party and State Council issued a revised regulation on “Strict Economy and Opposing Waste by Party and Government Organs.” The regulation bans drinking alcohol at public receptions and events and discourages other forms of consumption that could be seen as extravagant. The FAS China offices are monitoring the potential impact on high-value U.S. agricultural products.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

China: Revised National Food Safety Standard for Paddy Rice Notified

On July 25, 2025, China notified a National Food Safety Standard for Paddy Rice to the WTO under G/TBT/N/CHN/2091. This national food safety standard includes mandatory requirements for quality, testing, inspection, packaging, and labeling of domestic and imported commercial paddy rice. This report provides an unofficial translation of the notified standard. Comments may be submitted to the China’s TBT National Notification and Enquiry Center at tbt@customs.gov.cn until August 24, 2025.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

Guatemala: Retail Foods Annual

Guatemala boasts a young population with a median age of 26 years and a growing middle class, driving increased demand for modern retail formats. However, traditional markets and informal retail remain prevalent across the country. In 2024, the United States exported $1.9 billion in agricultural and related products to Guatemala, with $886 million attributed to consumer-oriented goods. Key export categories included red meats, poultry, dairy products, fresh fruits, and processed vegetables.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

India: Cotton and Products Update

FAS Mumbai estimates MY 2025/26 India cotton production at 24.5 million 480-lb bales from 11.2 million hectares, down two percent from the previous estimate as farmers shift to higher-return crops like paddy, pulses, and cereals; kharif sowing decreased 2.4 percent from last year (as of August 1). An eight percent increase in the minimum support price (MSP) for medium- and long-staple cotton, effective October 1, is pushing fiber prices higher, encouraging mills to increase imports. Mill consumption is forecast at 25.7 million 480-lb bales, supported by steady yarn and apparel demand in key export markets and a potential export surge following ratification of the U.K.-India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).

Read the full article [archived PDF]

Japan: Stone Fruit Annual

Japan’s fresh cherry production for the 2025/26 marketing year (MY) is projected to be 12,500 tons. This forecast is a result of production losses caused by high temperatures during the pollination period in the country’s largest cherry-producing region. While this represents an 8.7 percent increase compared to the previous year’s historically poor harvest, it is expected to be a low yield year with a 25 percent decrease from the average production year. Due to the poor domestic production, demand for U.S. cherries is expected to remain strong for the 2025/26 MY, continuing the trend from the previous year. For peach production in Japan, the absolute number of fruits is anticipated to be equivalent to the previous year; however, the total production volume by weight is forecasted to decrease by approximately 10 percent because of high temperatures and low rainfall during the critical fruit growing period.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

Nicaragua: Nicaragua Peanut Report Annual

Nicaragua’s peanut farmers are expected to reduce harvested areas by at least five percent in marketing year (MY) 2025/26 in anticipation of lower prices due to increased Brazilian peanut production. FAS Managua expects farmers to be more rigorous in selecting production areas based on historical yields in MY 2025/26, excluding marginal lands with less fertile soil. Even with fluctuating market prices and adjustments to planted areas, Nicaragua is expected to remain a stable peanut producer in the region, with exports of shelled peanuts exceeding 70,000 metric tons annually.

Read the full article [archived PDF]

For more information, or for an archive of all FAS GAIN reports, please visit gain.fas.usda.gov.

Economics-Watching: Why Businesses Say Tariffs Have a Delayed Effect on Inflation

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 8 August, 2025]

by R. Andrew Bauer, Renee Haltom and Matthew Martin

Regional Matters

Ever since new tariffs were enacted in early 2025, a key policy question has been what is the extent to which businesses will pass tariff costs through to prices, and when? The effects of a tariff are rarely straightforward, given, among other things, competitive dynamics and the challenges of implementation, but the historically large and changing nature of these tariffs have created additional levels of uncertainty over the effects.

In uncertain times, anecdotal evidence from businesses can be especially insightful. We are learning how businesses are reacting to tariffs through the Richmond Fed’s business surveys as well as through hundreds of one-on-one conversations with Fifth District businesses since the start of 2025.

These conversations showcase that navigating tariffs is a complex and sometimes protracted process for firms, particularly when there is uncertainty. Firms describe several reasons they may not have experienced the full impact of proposed tariffs yet (even when goods and countries they deal with are subject to them), as well as reasons that even when they have incurred tariff-related cost increases, there can be a delayed impact on pricing decisions.

Reasons Firms May Not Have Incurred Tariffs Yet

Business contacts describe several strategies or circumstances that can delay or reduce the tariffs on inputs or other imported items. These include the following:

As our monthly business surveys have found, many firms report deploying more than one strategy to delay tariffs. Notably, many of these delays are only temporary.

Reasons Tariffs May Have a Delayed Impact on Prices

Even when firms have incurred tariffs, they give several reasons why tariffs may not be immediately reflected in the prices they charge for their products. These include the following:

  • Waiting for tariff policy to clarify. Higher prices could reduce demand for goods and services and/or lead firms to lose market share, so many firms said they are hesitant to increase prices until they’re sure tariffs will remain in place. For example, a large national retailer said if tariffs are finalized at a sufficiently low level, they’ll absorb what they’ve incurred to date, but if high tariffs stick, they’ll have to raise prices. A steel fabricator for industrial equipment described being reluctant to raise prices on the 10 percent cost increases they’d seen thus far but would have to raise prices should the increases reach 12 to 13 percent. A grocery store chain was reluctant to raise prices and instead might reduce margins, which had recovered in recent years, to maintain their customer base. Some firms explicitly noted a strategy to both raise prices over time and pursue efficiency gains to cut costs and completely restore margins within a year or two.
  • Elasticity testing. Firms reported testing across goods whether consumers will accept price increases. A furniture manufacturer said he’s seen competitors pass along just 5 percentage points of the tariffs at a time so it isn’t such a huge shock to customers, though in that sector, “We all end in the same place which is the customer bearing most of it.” A national retailer said most firms are doing a version of stair-stepping tariffs through, e.g., raising prices a small amount once or twice to see if consumer demand holds, and if so, trying again two months later. This retailer said prices were going up very marginally in early summer, would increase more in July and August, and would be up by 3 to 5 percent by the end of Q4 and into 2026. Another national retailer said they would start testing the extent to which demand falls with price increases, e.g., when the first items that were subject to tariffs—in this case back to school items—hit shelves in late July.
  • Blind margin. Some firms reported attempting to pass through cost in less noticeable ways. While any price increase to consumers will be captured in measures of aggregate inflation, the fact that price increases may occur on non-tariffed goods might make it difficult to directly relate price increases to tariffs. An outdoor goods retailer said, “Unless it’s a branded item where everyone knows the price, if something goes for $18, it can also go for $19.” A national retailer plans to print new shelf labels with updated pricing, which will be less noticeable for consumers compared to multiple new price stickers layered on top. This takes time (akin to a textbook “menu cost” in economics), so it will not be reflected in prices until July and August. A grocery store said their goal was to increase average prices across the store but focus on less visible prices.
  • Selling out of preexisting inventory: Many firms noted they still have production inventory from before tariffs were announced, so they do not need to raise prices as long as they still sell these lower cost goods. A national retailer noted they have at least 25 weeks of inventory on hand for most imported products. A firm that produces grocery items said they will decide how much to raise prices as they get closer to selling tariff-affected products. Similarly, retailers order seasonal items quarters in advance. Many were receiving items for fall and winter when the new tariffs were going into effect in the spring. They paid the tariff then, but we won’t see the price increase until those items hit the shelves in the fall or winter. One retailer speculated that seasonal décor items will look the most like a one-time increase.
  • Pre-established prices. Many firms face infrequent pricing due to factors like annual contracts or pre-sales. For example, a dealer of farm equipment gets half its sales through incentivized pre-sales to lock in demand and smooth around crop cycles. They noted that while it would be difficult to retroactively ask those customers to pay for part of the tariff, they will pass tariffs directly through on spare parts. A steel fabricator for industrial equipment has a contract for steel through Q3, so they haven’t been impacted yet by price increases. However, they will face new costs once that contract expires.

In general, compared to small firms, large firms have more ability to negotiate with vendors, temporarily absorb costs, burn cash, wait for strategic opportunity, and test things out. This matters because large firms often lead pricing behavior among firms, so these strategic choices may influence the response of inflation to tariffs more generally. Even within firm size, one often hears that negotiations on price vary considerably by relationship and item.

Conclusion

A key question surrounding tariffs is whether any effects on inflation will resemble a short-lived price increase—as in the simplest textbook model of tariffs—or a more sustained increase to inflation that may warrant tighter Fed monetary policy. When asked in May what will determine the answer, Fed Chair Jerome Powell cited three factors [archived PDF]: 1) the size of the tariff effects; 2) how long it takes to work their way through to prices; and 3) whether inflation expectations remain anchored. The insights shared above suggest the process from proposed tariffs to the prices set by firms is far from instantaneous or clear-cut, particularly when tariff policy is changing.

Sensing from businesses suggests that the impact of tariffs on their price-setting [archived PDF] has been lagged, but it is starting to play out. Nonetheless, it remains highly uncertain how tariffs will impact consumer inflation. The discussion above makes clear that firms are nimble and innovative in the face of challenge, and they are concerned about losing customers in the current environment, particularly consumer-facing firms. We will continue to learn from our business contacts and share their insights.

Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.

World-Watching: U.S. Greenlighted H20 Chips Export on Its Own Initiative, China Says

Beijing clarifies its deal with Washington didn’t include NVIDIA’s 4th-best AI chip, disputing widely-reported comments by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick

by Zichen Wang, from Pekingnology

The U.S. greenlighted NVIDIA’s China-specific Artificial Intelligence chip, known as the H20, for export to China on its own initiative, China said on Friday.

In a statement dedicated to the recent U.S. approval of the semiconductor giant’s 4th-best Artificial Intelligence chip, China’s Ministry of Commerce said on its website that in early July, the U.S. had already lifted restrictions on China under the agreement reached between the two countries in London.

“We have taken note that Washington has now taken the initiative to announce it will authorize sales of NVIDIA’s H20 chips to China,” the trade ministry added.

Beijing’s clarification stands in stark contrast to widely reported public comments earlier this week by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who told Reuters on Tuesday that “We put that in the trade deal with the magnets,” referring to the agreement made to restart Chinese rare earth shipments to U.S. manufacturers. He did not provide additional details, according to Reuters.

NVIDIA’s H20 was designed to be technologically inferior. The company also sells three other chips that far surpass the H20’s power.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick echoed NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang’s view of why a U.S. company should sell chips to China. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

On Monday, July 14, the Silicon Valley company announced in a blog post that the U.S. government had approved the sale of the H20, three months after the Donald Trump administration shut down NVIDIA’s artificial intelligence chip sales to China, after CEO Jensen Huang met President Trump in Washington D.C., and before he departed for Beijing.

Huang dominates Chinese headlines this week with his speech at an industry conference and public events with Chinese AI leaders. He visited China’s Ministry of Commerce and was received by Wang Wentao, the minister, on Thursday.

商务部新闻发言人就美批准对华销售英伟达H20芯片有关情况答记者问

MOFCOM Spokesperson Responds to Questions on the U.S. Approval of NVIDIA H20 Chip Sales to China

2025-07-18 13:43

Question:

U.S. officials have recently stated that Washington’s decision to approve sales of NVIDIA’s H20 chips to China is part of China–U.S. economic and trade negotiations. They also claimed that Chinese firms, including Huawei, are already producing equivalent chips domestically and that the United States does not want China to achieve full import substitution. How does the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) view this?

Answer:

Following the China–U.S. economic and trade consultations in London, the two sides have maintained close communication, finalized the “London framework,” and moved forward with implementation. China, in accordance with its laws and regulations, approves export applications for controlled items that meet the necessary criteria. In early July, the United States reciprocally lifted the restrictions on China that had been discussed during those talks.

We have taken note that Washington has now taken the initiative to announce it will authorize sales of NVIDIA’s H20 chips to China. Beijing believes the United States should abandon a zero-sum mentality and continue to roll back a range of unwarranted trade and technology restrictions on China.

Cooperation and mutual benefit are the only viable path; suppression and containment lead nowhere. In May, the United States issued new export-control guidelines targeting Huawei’s Ascend chips, tightening restrictions on Chinese semiconductor products under unfounded pretexts. By wielding administrative power to distort fair market competition, these measures severely undermine the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies. China has made its position clear and firmly opposes such actions.

We look forward to the United States working with China in a spirit of equality to correct these erroneous practices, foster a sound environment for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries’ enterprises, and jointly safeguard the stability of global semiconductor supply chains.

India: Deep History

In his lectures, Professor Amartya Sen, the Harvard Nobel Prize in Economics winner, mentions Sir Mortimer Wheeler, Director-General of the Archaeological Survey of India. Wheeler wrote, while reporting on the excavation of the Indus Valley Civilization (of India), that the plumbing and sewerage were advanced, in some ways surpassing modern equivalents.

Sen’s larger point is that history is characterized by phases of rise and fall and not just classes and class struggles à la Marx.

Consider the following depiction of the East India Company, from The Anarchy: The Relentless Rise of the East India Company (also subtitled The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of an Empire) by William Dalrymple.


On 28 August 1608, Captain William Hawkins, a bluff sea captain with the Third Voyage, anchored his ship, the Hector, off Surat, and so became the first commander of an EIC vessel to set foot on Indian soil.

India then had a population of 150 million — about a fifth of the world’s total — and was producing about a quarter of global manufacturing; indeed, in many ways it was the world’s industrial powerhouse and the world’s leader in manufactured textiles. Not for nothing are so many English words connected with weaving — chintz, calico, shawl, pyjamas, khaki, dungarees, cummerbund, taffetas — of Indian origin. It was certainly responsible for a much larger share of world trade than any comparable zone and the weight of its economic power even reached Mexico, whose textile manufacture suffered a crisis of ‘de-industrialisation’ due to Indian cloth imports. In comparison, England then had just 5 per cent of India’s population and was producing just under 3 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods. A good proportion of the profits on this found its way to the Mughal exchequer in Agra, making the Mughal Emperor, with an income of around £100 million,* by far the richest monarch in the world.

The Mughal capitals were the megacities of their day: ‘They are second to none either in Asia or in Europe,’ thought the Jesuit Fr Antonio Monserrate, ‘with regards either to size, population, or wealth. Their cities are crowded with merchants, who gather from all over Asia. There is no art or craft which is not practised there.’ Between 1586 and 1605, European silver flowed into the Mughal heartland at the astonishing rate of 18 metric tons a year, for as William Hawkins observed, all nations bring coyne and carry away commodities for the same’. For their grubby contemporaries in the West, stumbling around in their codpieces, the silk-clad Mughals, dripping in jewels, were the living embodiment of wealth and power — a meaning that has remained impregnated in the word ‘mogul’ ever since.

By the early seventeenth century, Europeans had become used to easy military victories over the other peoples of the world.

* Over £10,000 million today.

Think of the larger point: what you just read is the story of Indian de-industrialization and its negative results. Ask yourself whether American de-industrialization is something of an echo of this, as manufacturing is offshored.

“De-Globalization?”

The classic study of the “swirl of processes and events” that ended previous globalization episodes is the theme of Princeton Professor Harold James’ 2002 book, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression.

“Globalization” is here. Signified by an increasingly close economic interconnection that has led to profound political and social change worldwide, the process seems irreversible. In this book, however, Harold James provides a sobering historical perspective, exploring the circumstances in which the globally integrated world of an earlier era broke down under the pressure of unexpected events.

James examines one of the great historical nightmares of the twentieth century: the collapse of globalism in the Great Depression. Analyzing this collapse in terms of three main components of global economics—capital flows, trade and international migration—James argues that it was not simply a consequence of the strains of World War I, but resulted from the interplay of resentments against all these elements of mobility, as well as from the policies and institutions designed to assuage the threats of globalism.

Could it happen again? There are significant parallels today: highly integrated systems are inherently vulnerable to collapse, and world financial markets are vulnerable and unstable.

While James does not foresee another Great Depression, his book provides a cautionary tale in which institutions meant to save the world from the consequences of globalization—think WTO and IMF, in our own time—ended by destroying both prosperity and peace.

Legitimate fears about “globalization reversal” have been well put by Zakaria:

Davos, Switzerland —

President Trump’s speech here at the World Economic Forum went over relatively well. That’s partly because Davos is a conclave of business executives, and they like Trump’s pro-business message. But mostly, the president’s reception was a testament to the fact that he and what he represents are no longer unusual or exceptional. Look around the world and you will see: Trump and Trumpism have become normalized.

Davos was once the place where countries clamored to demonstrate their commitment to opening up their economies and societies. After all, these forces were producing global growth and lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. Every year, a different nation would become the star of the forum, usually with a celebrated finance minister who was seen as the architect of a boom. The United States was the most energetic promoter of these twin ideas of economic openness and political freedom.

Today, Davos feels very different. Despite the fact that, throughout the world, growth remains solid and countries are moving ahead, the tenor of the times has changed. Where globalization was once the main topic, today it is the populist backlash to it. Where once there was a firm conviction about the way of the future, today there is uncertainty and unease.

This is not simply atmospherics and rhetoric. Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley Investment Management points out that since 2008, we have entered a phase of “deglobalization.” Global trade, which rose almost uninterruptedly since the 1970s, has stagnated, while capital flows have fallen. Net migration flows from poor countries to rich ones have also dropped. In 2018, net migration to the United States hit its lowest point in a decade.

The shift in approach can best be seen in the case of India. In 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to Davos to decry the fact that “many countries are becoming inward focused and globalization is shrinking.” Since then, his government has increased tariffs on hundreds of items and taken steps to shield India’s farmers, shopkeepers, digital companies and many others from the dangers of international competition. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative recently called out India for having the highest tariffs of any major economy in the world.

Indian officials used to aggressively court foreign investment, which was much needed to spur growth. Last week, with India’s economy slowing badly, Jeff Bezos announced a $1 billion investment in the country. (Bezos owns The Post.) But the minister of commerce and industry scoffed at the move, saying Amazon wasn’t “doing a great favor to India” and besides was probably engaging in anti-competitive, “predatory” practices. Often, protectionist policies help favored local producers. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad recently criticized some of Modi’s policies toward Muslims. The Indian government effectively cut off imports of Malaysian palm oil. In a familiar pattern, one of the chief beneficiaries was a local billionaire long associated with Modi.

The Economist notes that Europe, once one of the chief motors for openness in economics and politics, is also rediscovering state intervention to prop up domestic industries. And if you think the Internet is exempt from these tendencies, think again. The European Center for International Political Economy tracks the number of protectionist measures put in place to “localize” the digital economy in 64 countries. It has been surging for years, especially since 2008.

It’s important not to exaggerate the backlash to globalization.

As a 2019 report by DHL demonstrates, globalization is still strong and, by some measures, continues to expand. People still want to trade, travel and transact across the world. But in government policy, where economic logic once trumped politics, today it is often the reverse. Economist Nouriel Roubini argues that the cumulative result of all these measures — protecting local industries, subsidizing national champions, restricting immigration — is to sap growth. “It means slower growth, fewer jobs, less efficient economies,” he told me recently. We’ve seen it happen many times in the past, not least in India, which suffered decades of stagnation as a result of protectionist policies, and we will see the impact in years to come.

Nevertheless, today, nationalism and protectionism prevail.

This phase of deglobalization is being steered from the top. The world’s leading nations are, as always, the agenda-setters. The example of China, which has shielded some of its markets and still grown rapidly, has made a deep impression on much of the world. Probably deeper still is the example of the planet’s greatest champion of liberty and openness, the United States, which now has a president who calls for managed trade, more limited immigration and protectionist measures. At Davos, Trump invited every nation to follow his example. More and more are complying.

“The world is de-globalizing. Trump set the example.” The Washington Post, Fareed Zakaria

Students should sense that while history does not repeat itself, it sometimes rhymes and this is a major danger. It also might imply that coping with climate change will be all the harder because American-led unilateralism everywhere would mean world policy paralysis.

World-Watching: The Problem with the Current Russia Sanctions Regime

[from Project Syndicate, by Mohamed A. El-Erian]

There is much debate about the effectiveness of Western sanctions, the Ukraine war’s implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be. While there are few good options, some are clearly worse than others.

Cambridge — It has been five months since Europe and the United States imposed tough economic and financial sanctions on Russia, a G20 country that was the world’s eleventh-largest economy on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine. While the sanctions have been gradually strengthened in the intervening months, debate rages about their effectiveness, the war’s broader implications for markets and the global economy, and what the West’s next steps should be.

On the first question, although the sanctions have been less effective than Europe and the U.S. had hoped, they also are proving more onerous than the Kremlin claims. Russia’s central bank expects GDP to contract by 8-10% this year, while other forecasters expect a larger fall, together with longer-lasting damage to growth potential. Imports and exports have been severely disrupted, and inflows of foreign investment have essentially stopped. Shortages are multiplying, pushing inflation higher. At this point, the country no longer has a properly functioning foreign-exchange market.

The sanctions would have bitten much harder had the West not opted for a carve-out of Russia’s energy sector, and had many more countries joined the U.S. and Europe in the effort. Because that didn’t happen, Russia has not felt nearly as much pressure as it would have. Moreover, it has been able to continue trading through various side and back doors that will likely become increasingly important as long as the sanctions regime, as currently designed, continues.

Nonetheless, it is only a matter of time before the Russian economy experiences a harder hit. Inventories of imported goods – including many critical technological and industrial inputs – are dwindling fast, and many sectors are becoming less resilient. The cumulative damage to Russia’s economy over time will be significant and long-lasting – a fact that has not yet been fully captured by consensus medium-term forecasts.

The second question concerns global spillovers from the war and the sanctions regime. Most observers agree that Russia’s invasion has increased not just energy insecurity but also food insecurity, highlighting the fallout from the war’s disruption to Ukrainian agricultural exports. But there is still much debate about the West’s use of the economic nuclear sanctions option: the curbs placed on Russia’s central bank and on Russia’s use of the international payments system.

These curbs are far more intrusive than the usual mix of restrictions on sanctioned government and private sector trade and on individuals’ financial dealings. Yet, because they are not subject to any internationally agreed standards, guidelines, or checks and balances, they fall outside the purview of relevant global-governance bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

In a time of war, such oversight might seem like a nicety. But some worry that the sanctions could significantly reduce the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and the U.S. financial system’s role as the primary global intermediary for other countries’ savings and investments. After all, a growing number of countries undoubtedly now feel more vulnerable to the reach of U.S. sanctions.

But it is impossible to replace something with nothing, which means that no significant loss of dollar or U.S. financial primacy will occur in the immediate future. Rather, the sanctions will lend further momentum to the gradual process of global economic fragmentation, which was also fueled a few years ago by the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. More countries now have even more of a reason to pursue greater financial resilience and inherently inefficient forms of self-insurance.

That brings us to the third debate. With no end in sight for the war, what should the West do next? Fearing the implications for energy prices and the supply of gas to Europe, many in the West are tempted to call for a moratorium on any new sanctions – or even for additional carve-outs. Others, however, favor additional measures to hold Russia accountable for its indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian civilians.

In any case, maintaining the current sanctions regime is not problem-free, owing to the twin objectives of pressuring Russia and limiting the economic disruption to Europe. Moreover, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently said, it feels as if Russia is “blackmailing” Europe by threatening to disrupt gas supplies at any moment. No wonder the Commission is urging member countries to cut consumption by 15%.

Under the current sanctions regime, the West risks falling between two horses. While easing sanctions could help alleviate concerns about Europe’s economic outlook, this option is a non-starter, given the atrocities that Russian forces are committing in Ukraine. But if the West is serious about pressuring Russia through truly crippling economic and financial sanctions, it needs to bite the bullet and eliminate the carve-outs for energy.

Doing so would undoubtedly have a severe short-term economic impact on European economies and the rest of the world, amplifying the “little fires everywhere” syndrome that I warned about in May. It is therefore critical that governments use their available fiscal space to provide targeted support to vulnerable segments of the population, as well as to fragile countries; and multilateral agencies must support developing countries through aid and a more operational debt relief framework. If done properly, this option would yield better outcomes in the medium and long term than the current strategy.

Muddling through risks bringing about the worst of all possible worlds. It is insufficient to dissuade Russia from continuing its illegal war; it is fueling deeper fragmentation of the international monetary system; and it is not even protecting Europe from a winter gas disruption.

Mohamed A. El-Erian, President of Queens’ College at the University of Cambridge, is a professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse (Random House, 2016).

WANG Huiyao: To Save Global Trade, Start Small

[from the Center for China and Globalization]

by WANG Huiyao (王辉耀), Founder of the Center for China and Globalization

The global economy is being rocked by war, sanctions and spiraling commodity prices—not to mention the ongoing strain of the pandemic, geopolitical tensions and climate change. These compounding risks present a serious challenge to the system of open trade that the World Trade Organization was designed to uphold. But it also offers a chance for the beleaguered organization, which is holding its first ministerial conference since 2017, to prove its continuing relevance.

The WTO has traditionally focused on combating protectionism—measures designed to insulate producers from international competition. Now, though, the biggest threats to free trade come from policies meant to safeguard national security and protect citizens from risks, such as those related to health, the environment or digital spaces.

Former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has called this growing use of export controls, cybersecurity laws, investment blacklists, reshoring incentives and the like “precautionism.” It’s been on the rise since the start of the pandemic, when many countries moved to restrict exports of medical supplies and other essentials. COVID-19 has also raised concerns about the vulnerability of supply chains, particularly those dependent on geopolitical rivals.

The world’s two biggest trading nations, the United States and China, have both engaged in precautionism. The U.S. is actively pursuing a policy of “friend-shoring”—shifting trade flows from potentially hostile countries to friendlier ones. China’s “dual circulation” strategy aims in part to reduce dependence on foreign imports, especially technology, while its government has long imposed limits on data flows in and out of the country.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the momentum toward friend-shoring has grown. Meanwhile, food shortages and surging prices have triggered another round of precautionary measures: Since the war began, 63 countries have imposed a more than 100 export restrictions on fertilizer and foodstuffs.

While the impulse driving such policies is understandable, the trend could cause great harm if allowed to run unchecked. It will increase inflation and depress global growth, especially if it involves costly redeployment of supply chains away from efficient producers such as China. A recent WTO study estimated that decoupling the global economy into “Western” and “Eastern” blocs would wipe out nearly 5% in output, the equivalent of $4 trillion.

As a recent study by the International Monetary Fund points out, the way to make global value chains more resilient is to diversify, not dismantle them. Turning away from open trade will only make states more vulnerable to economic shocks such as war, disease or crop failures.

The WTO is an obvious vehicle to rally collective action on these issues. However, like other global institutions, it has been weakened by years of deadlock. At this week’s meeting, countries should start to build positive momentum with some small but symbolically significant breakthroughs to show the WTO can still mobilize joint action.

Given current threats to food security, at the very least members should agree not to restrict exports of foodstuffs purchased for the World Food Programme. A step further would be a joint statement calling on members to keep trade in food and agricultural products open and avoid imposing unjustified export restrictions. There should also be closer coordination to smooth supply chains and clogged logistics channels.

Another low-hanging fruit is finally securing a  waiver covering intellectual property rights for COVID-19-related products. This proposal has languished for over 18 months but has now been redrafted to address concerns from the U.S. and European Union. Signing it would go some way to expanding global access to vaccines, which are still sorely needed in many parts of the world.

Beyond this week, the WTO secretariat and members need to develop a work program to reform the organization. This should include developing a framework to ensure that if states do take precautionary measures, they do so in a transparent, rules-based manner that does not slide into more harmful forms of protectionism.

Reviving the WTO’s defunct dispute settlement mechanism is a clear priority. Twenty-five members have agreed to an interim arrangement that would function in a similar way. More members should join this agreement, ideally including the U.S., and start negotiating the full restoration of a binding mechanism. They should also set clear criteria for carveouts for legitimate precautionary measures related to national security, healthcare and environmental issues.

No one should expect big breakthroughs in Geneva. But practical agreements on immediate priorities such food security and vaccines would at least help to reassert the WTO’s relevance and show that the world’s trading partners are not simply going to give up on multilateralism. At this dangerous moment, even small victories are welcome.

Short-Term Energy Outlook

U.S. Energy Information Administration
November 13, 2019 Release

Highlights

Global liquid fuels
  • Brent crude oil spot prices averaged $60 per barrel (b) in October, down $3/b from September and down $21/b from October 2018. EIA forecasts Brent spot prices will average $60/b in 2020, down from a 2019 average of $64/b. EIA forecasts that West Texas Intermediate (WTI) prices will average $5.50/b less than Brent prices in 2020. EIA expects crude oil prices will be lower on average in 2020 than in 2019 because of forecast rising global oil inventories, particularly in the first half of next year.
  • Based on preliminary data and model estimates, EIA estimates that the United States exported 140,000 b/d more total crude oil and petroleum products in September than it imported; total exports exceeded imports by 550,000 b/d in October. If confirmed in survey-collected monthly data, it would be the first time the United States exported more petroleum than it imported since EIA records began in 1949. EIA expects total crude oil and petroleum net exports to average 750,000 b/d in 2020 compared with average net imports of 520,000 b/d in 2019.
  • Distillate fuel inventories (a category that includes home heating oil) in the U.S. East Coast—Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD 1)—totaled 36.6 million barrels at the end of October, which was 30% lower than the five-year (2014–18) average for the end of October. The declining inventories largely reflect low U.S. refinery runs during October and low distillate fuel imports to the East Coast. EIA does not forecast regional distillate prices, but low inventories could put upward pressure on East Coast distillate fuel prices, including home heating oil, in the coming weeks.
  • U.S. regular gasoline retail prices averaged $2.63 per gallon (gal) in October, up 3 cents/gal from September and 11 cents/gal higher than forecast in last month’s STEO. Average U.S. regular gasoline retail prices were higher than expected, in large part, because of ongoing issues from refinery outages in California. EIA forecasts that regular gasoline prices on the West Coast (PADD 5), a region that includes California, will fall as the issues begin to resolve. EIA expects that prices in the region will average $3.44/gal in November and $3.12/gal in December. For the U.S. national average, EIA expects regular gasoline retail prices to average $2.65/gal in November and fall to $2.50/gal in December. EIA forecasts that the annual average price in 2020 will be $2.62/gal.
  • Despite low distillate fuel inventories, EIA expects that average household expenditures for home heating oil will decrease this winter. This forecast largely reflects warmer temperatures than last winter for the entire October–March period, and retail heating oil prices are expected to be unchanged compared with last winter. For households that heat with propane, EIA forecasts that expenditures will fall by 15% from last winter because of milder temperatures and lower propane prices.
Natural gas
  • Natural gas storage injections in the United States outpaced the previous five-year (2014–18) average during the 2019 injection season as a result of rising natural gas production. At the beginning of April, when the injection season started, working inventories were 28% lower than the five-year average for the same period. By October 31, U.S. total working gas inventories reached 3,762 billion cubic feet (Bcf), which was 1% higher than the five-year average and 16% higher than a year ago.
  • EIA expects natural gas storage withdrawals to total 1.9 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) between the end of October and the end of March, which is less than the previous five-year average winter withdrawal. A withdrawal of this amount would leave end-of-March inventories at almost 1.9 Tcf, 9% higher than the five-year average.
  • The Henry Hub natural gas spot price averaged $2.33 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in October, down 23 cents/MMBtu from September. The decline largely reflected strong inventory injections. However, forecast cold temperatures across much of the country caused prices to rise in early November, and EIA forecasts Henry Hub prices to average $2.73/MMBtu for the final two months of 2019. EIA forecasts Henry Hub spot prices to average $2.48/MMBtu in 2020, down 13 cents/MMBtu from the 2019 average. Lower forecast prices in 2020 reflect a decline in U.S. natural gas demand and slowing U.S. natural gas export growth, allowing inventories to remain higher than the five-year average during the year even as natural gas production growth is forecast to slow. 
  • EIA forecasts that annual U.S. dry natural gas production will average 92.1 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 2019, up 10% from 2018. EIA expects that natural gas production will grow much less in 2020 because of the lag between changes in price and changes in future drilling activity, with low prices in the third quarter of 2019 reducing natural gas-directed drilling in the first half of 2020. EIA forecasts natural gas production in 2020 will average 94.9 Bcf/d.
  • EIA expects U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to average 4.7 Bcf/d in 2019 and 6.4 Bcf/d in 2020 as three new liquefaction projects come online. In 2019, three new liquefaction facilities—Cameron LNG, Freeport LNG, and Elba Island LNG—commissioned their first trains. Natural gas deliveries to LNG projects set a new record in July, averaging 6.0 Bcf/d, and increased further to 6.6 Bcf/d in October, when new trains at Cameron and Freeport began ramping up. Cameron LNG exported its first cargo in May, Corpus Christi LNG’s newly commissioned Train 2 in July, and Freeport in September. Elba Island plans to ship its first export cargo by the end of this year. In 2020, Cameron, Freeport, and Elba Island expect to place their remaining trains in service, bringing the total U.S. LNG export capacity to 8.9 Bcf/d by the end of the year.
Electricity, coal, renewables, and emissions
  • EIA expects the share of U.S. total utility-scale electricity generation from natural gas-fired power plants will rise from 34% in 2018 to 37% in 2019 and to 38% in 2020. EIA forecasts the share of U.S. electric generation from coal to average 25% in 2019 and 22% in 2020, down from 28% in 2018. EIA’s forecast nuclear share of U.S. generation remains at about 20% in 2019 and in 2020. Hydropower averages a 7% share of total U.S. generation in the forecast for 2019 and 2020, down from almost 8% in 2018. Wind, solar, and other non-hydropower renewables provided 9% of U.S. total utility-scale generation in 2018. EIA expects they will provide 10% in 2019 and 12% in 2020.
  • EIA expects total U.S. coal production in 2019 to total 698 million short tons (MMst), an 8% decrease from the 2018 level of 756 MMst. The decline reflects lower demand for coal in the U.S. electric power sector and reduced competitiveness of U.S. exports in the global market. EIA expects U.S. steam coal exports to face increasing competition from Eastern European sources, and that Russia will fill a growing share of steam coal trade, causing U.S. coal exports to fall in 2020. EIA forecasts that coal production in 2020 will total 607 MMst.
  • EIA expects U.S. electric power sector generation from renewables other than hydropower—principally wind and solar—to grow from 408 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2019 to 466 billion kWh in 2020. In EIA’s forecast, Texas accounts for 19% of the U.S. non-hydropower renewables generation in 2019 and 22% in 2020. California’s forecast share of non-hydropower renewables generation falls from 15% in 2019 to 14% in 2020. EIA expects that the Midwest and Central power regions will see shares in the 16% to 18% range for 2019 and 2020.
  • EIA forecasts that, after rising by 2.7% in 2018, U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will decline by 1.7% in 2019 and by 2.0% in 2020, partially as a result of lower forecast energy consumption. In 2019, EIA forecasts less demand for space cooling because of cooler summer months; an expected 5% decline in cooling degree days from 2018, when it was significantly higher than the previous 10-year (2008–17) average. In addition, EIA also expects U.S. CO2 emissions in 2019 to decline because the forecast share of electricity generated from natural gas and renewables will increase, and the share generated from coal, which is a more carbon-intensive energy source, will decrease.

Past and Present Thinking

History is “forever new” and we keep asking “what’s new?” but the past is “forever suggestive” and so we inquire here as to whether the past gives us interesting echoes of the more recent.

Specifically, we juxtapose the “closing of the gold window” in August 1971 (Nixon) and the British gold standard gyrations between 1925 and 1931, when England left gold (i.e., September 1931).

At the time, under Nixon, the U.S. also had an unemployment rate of 6.1% (August 1971) and an inflation rate of 5.84% (1971).

To combat these problems, President Nixon consulted Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Burns, incoming Treasury Secretary John Connally, and then Undersecretary for International Monetary Affairs and future Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.

On the afternoon of Friday, August 13, 1971, these officials along with twelve other high-ranking White House and Treasury advisors met secretly with Nixon at Camp David. There was great debate about what Nixon should do, but ultimately Nixon, relying heavily on the advice of the self-confident Connally, decided to break up Bretton Woods by announcing the following actions on August 15:

Speaking on television on Sunday, August 15, when American financial markets were closed, Nixon said the following:

“The third indispensable element in building the new prosperity is closely related to creating new jobs and halting inflation. We must protect the position of the American dollar as a pillar of monetary stability around the world.

“In the past 7 years, there has been an average of one international monetary crisis every year …

“I have directed Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold or other reserve assets, except in amounts and conditions determined to be in the interest of monetary stability and in the best interests of the United States.

“Now, what is this action—which is very technical—what does it mean for you?

“Let me lay to rest the bugaboo of what is called devaluation.

“If you want to buy a foreign car or take a trip abroad, market conditions may cause your dollar to buy slightly less. But if you are among the overwhelming majority of Americans who buy American-made products in America, your dollar will be worth just as much tomorrow as it is today.

“The effect of this action, in other words, will be to stabilize the dollar.”

Britain’s own experience in the twenties is explained like this:

“In 1925, Britain had returned to the gold standard.

(editor: This Churchill decision was deeply critiqued by Keynes.)

“When Labour came to power in May 1929 this was in good time for Black Friday on Wall Street in the following October.

“After the Austrian and German crashes in May and July 1931, Britain’s financial position became critical, and on 21st September she abandoned the gold standard.

“London was still the world’s financial capital in 1931, and the British abandonment of the gold standard set off a chain of reactions throughout the world.

“Strangely enough Germany and Austria maintained the gold standard…”

(Europe of the Dictators, Elizabeth Wiskemann, Fontana/Collins, 1977, page 92-93)

Nixon’s policies gave us the demise of Bretton Woods, while the economic gyrations of 1925-1931 were part of the lead-up to World War II.

The setting is both “infinitely different” across the decades but the feeling of “flying blind” applies to both cases: U.S.A. “closing the gold window,” August 1971 and Britain’s overturning Churchill’s 1925 return to the gold standard, by 1931. One gets the sense of “concealed turmoil” and a lot of “winging it” in both cases. Policy-makers disagreed and they all saw the world of their moments “through a glass, darkly.”