China to Sustain Top-Down, Debt-Fueled Investment in Major Projects and Security Capacities, Ex-Official Says

Dong Yu, now at Tsinghua, says via state media that Beijing-decreed, central govt bond-backed construction will continue into the next five years.

[from the Center for China & Globalization’s Pekingology]

by Zichen Wang, 10 August, 2025

The key concept in today’s newsletter is 国家重大战略实施和重点领域安全能力建设, in abbreviation in Chinese as 两重 liǎng zhòng.

In English, it is translated officially as the implementation of major national strategies and building up security capacity in key areas, hereinafter referred to as “Two Major Undertakings.”

The concept first appeared in official policy documents in the Chinese Premier’s Report on the Work of the Government [archived PDF] in March 2024.

To systematically address funding shortages facing some major projects for building a great country and advancing national rejuvenation, it is proposed that, starting this year and over each of the next several years, ultra-long special treasury bonds be issued. These bonds will be used to implement major national strategies and build up security capacity in key areas. One trillion yuan of such bonds will be issued in 2024.

By the end of the year, the yuan tag, despite being approved by the national legislature, had changed by 300 billion. The People’s Daily newspaper reported in December 2024.

As of now, the 700 billion yuan in ultra-long-term special treasury bonds allocated for the “two major undertakings” has been distributed in three batches to specific projects.

In 2025, the following year, the Report on the Work of the Government [archived PDF] says,

A total of 1.3 trillion yuan of ultra-long special treasury bonds will be issued, 300 billion yuan more than last year.

735 billion yuan will be earmarked in the central government budget for investment. We will put ultra-long special treasury bonds to good use, increase ultra-long-term loans and other types of financing support, and strengthen top-down organization and coordination to ensure greater support for the implementation of major national strategies and security capacity building in key areas.

A simultaneous Finance Ministry budget plan [archived PDF] rounds up the overall central government spending for the Two Major Undertakings to 800 billion yuan in 2025.

In yuan terms, the much-touted new government subsidies to households pale in comparison with the two major undertakings.

Also from the 2025 Report on the Work of the Government [archived PDF]:

Ultra-long special treasury bonds totaling 300 billion yuan will be issued to support consumer goods trade-in programs. This represents an increase of 150 billion yuan over the previous year.

This week, China announced this week that the phased free preschool education policy will cover all children in their final year of kindergartens, saving families 20 billion yuan. Childcare subsidies unveiled in July amount to 90 billion yuan

As Joe Biden repeated over the years,

Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.

The National Development and Reform Commission said last month:

In 2025, a total of 800 billion yuan has been allocated for the “two major undertakings,” supporting 1,459 projects in key areas such as ecological restoration in the Yangtze River Basin, major transportation infrastructure along the Yangtze River, the New Western Land–Sea Corridor, high-standard farmland, major water conservancy projects, urban underground pipeline networks, the “Three-North” shelterbelt program, and the renovation of hospital wards.

Now that the 2025 money has been spent by July and China is drawing up its next Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, will there be more such projects in the future?

In a column for the state-run China News Service this week, Dong Yu, previously Deputy Director-General of the Second Economic Bureau of the Office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission and, before that, an official at China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), pointedly said,

In the next step, during the formulation and implementation of the 15th Five-Year Plan, the “two major undertakings” will continue to occupy an important place, be organically incorporated into the new five-year plan, and form close alignment and sustained momentum with major national strategies, major plans, major projects, and key initiatives…

…Such a major strategy will be pursued with persistence—it will not remain rhetorical, nor will it be reversed abruptly.

He did not cite a source of information in his article.

Continuing with his lecturing style, Dong, now Executive Vice Director of China Institute for Development Planning, Tsinghua University, rebuked some unspecified market analysis that had observed the investments just were a one-time boost shot.

Some market institutions once analyzed that when China’s economy was facing short-term difficulties and challenges, the launch of the “two major undertakings” was mainly aimed at expanding investment in the short term to stabilize growth. Such a view clearly lacks a professional understanding of the decision-making intentions and logic, fails to properly grasp the relationship between the short term and the medium-to-long term, as well as between objectives and means, and inverts the proper order of priorities—a misconception that needs to be pointed out and corrected.

Dong also highlighted what he said was the unusual nature of the “strategic move,” including that central government debts fueled the investments, and they were selected “top-down,” rather than primarily relying on local government proposal or input.

The two undertakings were formally submitted for deliberation at the 2024 National People’s Congress after the central leadership made its decision and arrangements…

The central authorities have shown firm determination in this work, adopting the ultra-long-term special treasury bond—a macro policy tool that has rarely been used. Compared with several past issuances of special treasury bonds, the funding arrangement for the “two major undertakings” spans a longer cycle, has a broader scope of application, and will continue to advance in the next stage. It can be said that the scale and intensity are unprecedented. In 2024, a total of 700 billion yuan in ultra-long-term special treasury bonds was allocated, and in 2025, the figure is 800 billion yuan, all of which have now been fully disbursed.

The organization of the “two major undertakings” construction is top-down, completely different from the past practice in the investment sector where projects were determined through bottom-up applications. The purpose is to facilitate the smoother downward transmission of the needs of major national strategies. Relevant [central] government departments, by identifying shortcomings and weaknesses, specifying key areas, and refining project requirements, have ensured that the project list is no longer a collection of fragmented local items. Instead, projects are planned in an integrated manner by category and sector, with strengthened guidance for key regions, more targeted measures, and clearer standards.

Although an exhaustive list of the 1,459 projects does not appear to be available to the public, the “security capacity” build-up in the two major undertakings should be understood in broad terms, and Dong claims the investments put China on a sounder footing globally now that Donald Trump rules America again.

In recent years, the central authorities have emphasized security awareness and bottom-line thinking in development planning, a shift closely related to changes in the international situation. The closer China’s economy becomes intertwined with the global economy, the more comprehensive its considerations must be regarding issues such as food security, energy security, industrial security, and ecological security. The second “undertaking” in the “two major undertakings”—the strengthening of security capabilities in key areas—is precisely a forward-looking arrangement. The dramatic changes in the international environment since the beginning of 2025 have further underscored and confirmed the necessity of enhancing security capabilities, fully demonstrating that the central authorities’ thinking and deployment have been prescient and ahead of the curve.

Dong’s article via China News Service is fully translated below.

中央这一先手棋很不寻常

This Strategic First Move by the Central Authorities Is Highly Unusual

by Dong Yu, Executive Vice President, Institute for China Development Planning, Tsinghua University

The issuance of ultra-long-term special treasury bonds to support the implementation of major national strategies and the building of security capacities in key areas (hereinafter referred to as the “two major undertakings”) has become one of the hottest topics in China’s economy in recent years. Any observation of China’s present and future economic trajectory must include research and analysis of these two undertakings. More than a year has passed since the initiative was launched, making it both necessary and timely to evaluate its effectiveness, understand its operating mechanisms, and look ahead to its prospects.

The “Two Major Undertakings” Are by No Means Ordinary Policy Measures

In terms of decision-making background and process, as well as policy intensity and scope, the launch and implementation of the two major undertakings stand out from other policies. They represent a top-level design initiative.

Understanding a policy starts with its background. From the sequence of events leading to the proposal, this was a proactive, historic choice. The two undertakings were formally submitted for deliberation at the 2024 National People’s Congress after the central leadership made its decision and arrangements. The timing was significant: the 20th Communist Party of China National Congress had laid out a series of major long- and medium-term strategic initiatives that needed concrete engineering projects to push forward. China was midway through two Five-Year Plans, yet strategic advancement could not wait. The central leadership thus introduced the two major undertakings as a groundbreaking initiative.

Strategically, the undertakings directly address the needs of advancing long-term objectives. From the outset, they have been aimed squarely at the goals of Chinese modernization. By breaking down these goals into specific tasks and identifying the most difficult bottlenecks, the undertakings found their points of focus. Some of these tasks might take decades for other countries to achieve, but China has chosen not to delay—tackling them head-on at the starting stage of the new journey toward modernization. This model is uniquely Chinese and has been proven by history to be a key factor in China’s remarkable development successes.

The undertakings are also highly forward-looking—a “first move” by the central leadership. In recent years, national development planning has placed greater emphasis on security and on guarding the bottom line, in response to changes in the international environment. The closer China’s economy is linked to the global economy, the more comprehensive its considerations must be on food security, energy security, industrial security, and ecological security, and other issues. The second “major” in the initiative—security capacity building in key areas—is an arrangement made in anticipation of future challenges. The sharp changes in the international environment since 2025 have only highlighted and validated the necessity of strengthening security capacities, demonstrating that the central leadership’s thinking and arrangements were ahead of the curve.

The undertakings also have a strong overall and systemic quality, constituting a key move in macroeconomic governance. They focus on areas of outstanding importance to economic and social development and have a high degree of relevance to the overall development landscape. The policy toolkit they employ integrates investment, fiscal, science and technology, education, social, and ecological policies. This comprehensive package embodies the use of systems thinking to drive development and will significantly impact all aspects of the economy and society.

A Manifestation of Central Will

Extraordinary measures are for extraordinary tasks. The strategic objectives of Chinese modernization are long-term undertakings, and the two major undertakings provide the foundational support through systematic design and substantial funding.

The central leadership has committed to this initiative by adopting the rarely used macroeconomic tool of ultra-long-term special treasury bonds. Compared with previous special bond issuances, the funding for the two undertakings spans a longer cycle and serves a wider range of purposes, with plans for continued implementation. In both scale and intensity, this is unprecedented: 700 billion yuan in 2024 and 800 billion yuan in 2025, all of which has already been allocated.

In terms of priorities, it vividly reflects the principle of “concentrating resources to accomplish major undertakings.” The focus areas include urban–rural integration, regional coordination, high-quality population development, food security, energy and resource security, ecological security, and self-reliance and strength in science and technology—all crucial to building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation. These require coordinated planning and advancement. In just over a year, the high-level requirements have been translated into batches of concrete projects, reflecting the efficiency of implementation.

Project selection is guided by the principle that only the central government can resolve these issues. Some involve urgent development bottlenecks with significant obstacles that cannot be overcome by conventional means, such as scientific and technological breakthroughs, high-standard farmland construction, and upgrading the quality of higher education. Others are long-desired but previously unachievable projects that lack local willingness or capacity to implement, such as major cross-regional infrastructure, cross-basin wastewater treatment, and urban underground utility upgrades.

The organization of the “two major undertakings” construction is top-down, completely different from the past practice in the investment sector where projects were determined through bottom-up applications. The purpose is to facilitate the smoother downward transmission of the needs of major national strategies. Relevant [central] government departments, by identifying shortcomings and weaknesses, specifying key areas, and refining project requirements, have ensured that the project list is no longer a collection of fragmented local items. Instead, projects are planned in an integrated manner by category and sector, with strengthened guidance for key regions, more targeted measures, and clearer standards.

A Combination of “Hard” and “Soft” Measures

From the start, the undertakings were designed not only to fund “hard” engineering projects but also to include comprehensive arrangements for “soft” institutional and policy measures—an important innovation.

The emphasis on soft measures is pragmatic. Given the high importance and public nature of the projects, long-term mechanisms must be designed to ensure smooth progress during construction and sustainable operation thereafter. This includes drafting specialized plans to provide strategic guidance, introducing targeted policies to improve funding efficiency, and innovating institutional arrangements to safeguard implementation.

The implementation process is thus also a process of improving the investment and financing system, updating project management approaches, and enhancing investment effectiveness. In some sectors, soft-measure experiments have had positive impacts, creating healthy interaction with hard investments.

For example, the healthy operation of urban underground pipelines depends on sound maintenance mechanisms. Some local governments have attracted long-term institutional funds into major pipeline projects through debt or equity investment plans, stabilizing private sector returns via operational rights, government subsidies, and tax incentives. Others have introduced province-wide upstream–downstream gas price linkage, set reasonable water supply return rates based on market profits, and advanced the marketization of gas and water prices—reducing losses for public utilities and encouraging private investment.

Similarly, in the quality undergraduate expansion program, mechanisms play a guiding role: schools effectively implementing expansion plans receive increased support, while those performing poorly see reduced support; universities without expanded undergraduate admission plans are generally excluded from special bond funding. Disciplines and programs are adjusted dynamically to align talent training with economic and societal needs.

Directly Relevant to Everyone

The nature of the undertakings is not determined by project size but by their strategic objectives and significance. As long as they align with major national strategies, they are included—whether as large standalone projects, such as high-speed rail along the Yangtze River, or as “project packages,” such as Yangtze River wastewater treatment composed of multiple treatment facilities. This flexible, problem-oriented approach allows better alignment with public needs.

As projects break ground and enter operation, their benefits to people’s livelihoods will become increasingly evident. Observers should not see the undertakings as distant from daily life; they will bring tangible improvements to everyone’s quality of life.

For example:

  • Urban underground pipelines: Upgrades to gas, water, and heating systems will greatly improve safety and resilience. Renovation of old gas pipelines is nearing completion, reducing accident rates by over 30%. Eliminating hidden risks in unseen places increases residents’ sense of security.
  • Food security: Gradually converting all permanent basic farmland into high-standard farmland will stabilize grain output and enhance food safety. Higher standards mean safer products, so people will eat with greater confidence.
  • Yangtze River protection: Building or upgrading over 60,000 kilometers of sewage pipelines in the Yangtze Economic Belt will greatly improve the river’s ecological environment and resolve long-standing public concerns.
  • Transportation: Creating the shortest ShanghaiChengdu high-speed rail corridor (approx. 1,900 km) will connect the Yangtze River Delta, the middle Yangtze region, and the ChengduChongqing area more quickly, cutting travel time nearly in half and boosting east–west connectivity.
  • Ecological security: Implementing the “Three-North” shelterbelt project over 130 million mu (93 million hectares), with good survival rates for trees, shrubs, and grasses, will safeguard northern ecological security and create new income opportunities.
  • Higher education: “Double First-Class” universities will see markedly improved conditions, with over 500,000 new standard dorm beds. Quality undergraduate enrollment will rise by 16,000 in 2024 and over 20,000 in 2025, giving more students access to quality education and ensuring basic living needs for those from low-income families.
A Bold Stroke in the History of Development

The two major undertakings are a major decision by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, aimed at the overall strategy of building a strong country and achieving national rejuvenation. They play an irreplaceable role in advancing Chinese modernization.

They are not short-term measures but focus on medium- to long-term development. Some market institutions once analyzed that when China’s economy was facing short-term difficulties and challenges, the launch of the “two major undertakings” was mainly aimed at expanding investment in the short term to stabilize growth. Such a view clearly lacks a professional understanding of the decision-making intentions and logic, fails to properly grasp the relationship between the short term and the medium-to-long term, as well as between objectives and means, and inverts the proper order of priorities — a misconception that needs to be pointed out and corrected.

Since implementation began, the undertakings have provided important support for economic stability. Although their starting point was not short-term growth, the resulting investment has boosted employment and consumption, helping to expand domestic demand and stabilize growth. In the next step, during the formulation and implementation of the 15th Five-Year Plan, the “two major undertakings” will continue to occupy an important place, be organically incorporated into the new five-year plan, and form close alignment and sustained momentum with major national strategies, major plans, major projects, and key initiatives.

They will also bolster the country’s core competitiveness. As foundational support for Chinese modernization, they will strengthen factor security and resolve long-term bottlenecks, with far-reaching significance for shaping China’s development prospects. In an era of intensifying major-power competition, they will provide stable expectations and significantly enhance China’s capacity to manage international uncertainty. Such a major strategy will be pursued with persistence—it will not remain rhetorical, nor will it be reversed abruptly.

Though implementation has only recently begun, the undertakings’ historic role will continue to grow over time. In the future, looking back, they will surely stand as an important part of the “China story” and leave a bold stroke in the history of the People’s Republic’s development.

Reports of Rising Police-Society Conflict in China

Interview with Suzanne Scoggins (November 25, 2019)

China is facing a rising tide of conflict between the nation’s police officers and the public. While protest events receive considerable media attention, lower-profile conflicts between police officers and residents also make their way onto the internet, shaping perceptions of the police. The ubiquity of live events streamed on the internet helps illuminate the nature of statesociety conflict in China and the challenges faced by local law enforcement.

Simone McGuinness spoke with Suzanne Scoggins, a fellow with the National Asia Research Program (NARP), about the reports of rising policesociety conflict in China. Dr. Scoggins discusses how the Chinese Communist Party has responded to the upsurge, what channels Chinese citizens are utilizing to express their concerns, and what the implications are for the rest of the world.

What is the current state of police-society relations in China?

Reports of police violence have been on the rise, although this does not necessarily mean that violence is increasing. It does, however, mean that the media is more willing to report violence and that more incidents of violence are appearing on social media.

What we can now study is the nature of that violence—some are big events such as riots or attacks against the police, but there are also smaller events. For example, we see reports of passengers on trains who get into arguments with transit police. They may fight because one of the passengers is not in the right seat or is carrying something prohibited. Rather than complying with the officer, the passenger ends up getting into some sort of violent altercation. This kind of violence is typically being captured by cellphone cameras, and sometimes it makes the news.

The nature of the conflict matters. If somebody is on a train and sitting in a seat that they did not pay for, then it is usually obvious to the people reading about or watching the incident that the civilian is at fault. But if it is chengguan (城管, “city administration”) telling an elderly woman to stop selling her food on the street and the chengguan becomes violent, then public perceptions may be very different. It is that second type of violence that can be threatening to the state. The public’s response to the type of conflict can vary considerably.

What are the implications for China as a whole?

Regarding what this means for China, it’s not good for the regime to sustain this kind of conflict between street-level officers or state agents and the public. It lowers people’s trust in the agents of the government, and people may assume that the police cannot enforce public security. There are many state agents who might be involved in a conflict, such as the chengguan, the xiejing (auxiliary officer), or the official police. The type of agent almost doesn’t matter because the uniforms often look similar.

When information goes up online of state agents behaving poorly, it makes the state a little more vulnerable. Even people who were not at the event might see it on social media or in the news and think, “Oh, this is happening in my community, or in my province, or across the nation.” This violates public expectations about how the police or other state agents should act. People should be able to trust the police and go to them when they have problems.

How has the Chinese government responded to the increase in reporting violence?

There is a twofold approach. The first is through censorship. When negative videos go up online or when the media reports an incident, the government will go in and take it down. We see this over time. Even while collecting my research, some of the videos that were initially available online are no longer accessible simply because they have been censored. The government is removing many different types of content, not only violence. Censors are also interested in removing any sort of misinformation that might spread on social media.

If step one is to take the video or report down, step two is to counteract any negative opinion by using police propaganda. This is also referred to as “public relations,” and the goal is to present a better image of the police. Recently, the Ministry of Public Security put a lot of money and resources into their social media presence. Many police stations have a social media account on WeChat or Weibo (微博, “microblogging”) and aim to present a more positive, friendly image of the police. The ministry also teamed up with CCTV to produce television content. This has been going on for some time, but recently shows have become more sophisticated.

There is one program, for example, called Police Training Camp. It is a reality show where police officers are challenged with various tasks, and the production is very glossy. The ministry also produces other sorts of specials featuring police who are out in the field helping people. It shows the police officers working really long shifts, interacting positively with the public, and really making a difference in people’s lives. In this way, the government is counteracting negative opinions about police violence or misconduct.

In general, I will say that it is difficult for people in any society to get justice with police officers because of the way legal systems are structured and the power police hold in local government politics. In China, one of the things people are doing beyond reaching out to local governments or pursuing mediation is calling an official hotline.

This is a direct channel to the Ministry of Public Security, and all these calls are reviewed. There is not a whole lot that citizens can do about specific corruption claims. But if somebody has a particular goal, then the hotline is slightly more effective because it allows citizens to alert the ministry. However, many people do not know about the hotline, so the ministry is trying to increase awareness and also help staff the call center so that it can more effectively field calls.

As for how much relief people feel when they use these channels, this depends on what their goal is. If the goal is to get somebody fired, then the hotline may not work. But if someone is looking to air their grievances, then it may be helpful.

What are the implications of increased police-society conflict in China for the rest of the world? What can the United States or other countries do to improve the situation?

These are really sticky issues that are difficult to solve. When discussing policesociety conflict, it is important to step back and think about who the police are—the enforcement agents of the state. So by their very nature, there will be conflict between police and society, and that is true in every country. In China, it really depends on where and what type of police climate we are talking about.

Xinjiang, for instance, has a very different police climate than other regions in China. There is a different type of policing and police presence. Chinese leaders certainly do not want any international intervention in Xinjiang. They see this as an internal issue. While some governments in Europe and the United States might want to intervene, that is going to be a nonstarter for China.

As for police problems more generally, I would say that if China is able to reduce some of the policesociety conflict in other areas of the country, then this is good for the international community because it leads to a more stable government. We also know that there is a fair amount of international cooperation between police groups. China has police liaisons that travel and learn about practices and technology in different countries. The police in these groups attend conferences and take delegates abroad.

There are also police delegations from other nations that go to China to learn about and exchange best practices. But that work will not necessarily address the underlying issues that we see in a lot of the stations scattered throughout China outside the big cities like Beijing (北京) or Shanghai (上海). Those are the areas with insufficient training or manpower. Those issues must be addressed internally by the Ministry of Public Security.

How is the Chinese government improving its policing capabilities?

Recently, the ministry has tried to overcome manpower and other ground-level policing problems by using surveillance cameras and artificial intelligence. Networks of cameras are appearing all over the country, and police are using body cameras for recording interactions with the public. This type of surveillance is not just in large cities but also in smaller ones. Of course, it is not enough to just put the cameras up—you also need to train officers to use that technology properly. This process takes time, but it is one way that the ministry hopes to overcome on-the-ground problems such as the low number of police per capita.

How might the Hong Kong protests influence or change policing tactics in China?

The situation in Hong Kong is unlikely to change policing tactics in China, which are generally more aggressive in controlling protests than most of what we have seen thus far in Hong Kong. It is more likely that things will go in the other direction, with mainland tactics being used in Hong Kong, especially if we continue to observe increased pressure to bring the protestors in check.

Suzanne Scoggins is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Clark University. She is also a 2019 National Asia Research Program (NARP) Fellow. Dr. Scoggins holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and her book manuscript Policing in the Shadow of Protest is forthcoming from Cornell University Press. Her research has appeared in Comparative Politics, The China Quarterly, Asian Survey, PS: Political Science and Politics, and the China Law and Society Review.

This interview was conducted by Simone McGuinness, the Public Affairs Intern at NBR.