Economics-Watching: Why Businesses Say Tariffs Have a Delayed Effect on Inflation

[from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 8 August, 2025]

by R. Andrew BauerRenee Haltom and Matthew Martin

Regional Matters

Ever since new tariffs were enacted in early 2025, a key policy question has been what is the extent to which businesses will pass tariff costs through to prices, and when? The effects of a tariff are rarely straightforward, given, among other things, competitive dynamics and the challenges of implementation, but the historically large and changing nature of these tariffs have created additional levels of uncertainty over the effects.

In uncertain times, anecdotal evidence from businesses can be especially insightful. We are learning how businesses are reacting to tariffs through the Richmond Fed’s business surveys as well as through hundreds of one-on-one conversations with Fifth District businesses since the start of 2025.

These conversations showcase that navigating tariffs is a complex and sometimes protracted process for firms, particularly when there is uncertainty. Firms describe several reasons they may not have experienced the full impact of proposed tariffs yet (even when goods and countries they deal with are subject to them), as well as reasons that even when they have incurred tariff-related cost increases, there can be a delayed impact on pricing decisions.

Reasons Firms May Not Have Incurred Tariffs Yet

Business contacts describe several strategies or circumstances that can delay or reduce the tariffs on inputs or other imported items. These include the following:

As our monthly business surveys have found, many firms report deploying more than one strategy to delay tariffs. Notably, many of these delays are only temporary.

Reasons Tariffs May Have a Delayed Impact on Prices

Even when firms have incurred tariffs, they give several reasons why tariffs may not be immediately reflected in the prices they charge for their products. These include the following:

  • Waiting for tariff policy to clarify. Higher prices could reduce demand for goods and services and/or lead firms to lose market share, so many firms said they are hesitant to increase prices until they’re sure tariffs will remain in place. For example, a large national retailer said if tariffs are finalized at a sufficiently low level, they’ll absorb what they’ve incurred to date, but if high tariffs stick, they’ll have to raise prices. A steel fabricator for industrial equipment described being reluctant to raise prices on the 10 percent cost increases they’d seen thus far but would have to raise prices should the increases reach 12 to 13 percent. A grocery store chain was reluctant to raise prices and instead might reduce margins, which had recovered in recent years, to maintain their customer base. Some firms explicitly noted a strategy to both raise prices over time and pursue efficiency gains to cut costs and completely restore margins within a year or two.
  • Elasticity testing. Firms reported testing across goods whether consumers will accept price increases. A furniture manufacturer said he’s seen competitors pass along just 5 percentage points of the tariffs at a time so it isn’t such a huge shock to customers, though in that sector, “We all end in the same place which is the customer bearing most of it.” A national retailer said most firms are doing a version of stair-stepping tariffs through, e.g., raising prices a small amount once or twice to see if consumer demand holds, and if so, trying again two months later. This retailer said prices were going up very marginally in early summer, would increase more in July and August, and would be up by 3 to 5 percent by the end of Q4 and into 2026. Another national retailer said they would start testing the extent to which demand falls with price increases, e.g., when the first items that were subject to tariffs—in this case back to school items—hit shelves in late July.
  • Blind margin. Some firms reported attempting to pass through cost in less noticeable ways. While any price increase to consumers will be captured in measures of aggregate inflation, the fact that price increases may occur on non-tariffed goods might make it difficult to directly relate price increases to tariffs. An outdoor goods retailer said, “Unless it’s a branded item where everyone knows the price, if something goes for $18, it can also go for $19.” A national retailer plans to print new shelf labels with updated pricing, which will be less noticeable for consumers compared to multiple new price stickers layered on top. This takes time (akin to a textbook “menu cost” in economics), so it will not be reflected in prices until July and August. A grocery store said their goal was to increase average prices across the store but focus on less visible prices.
  • Selling out of preexisting inventory: Many firms noted they still have production inventory from before tariffs were announced, so they do not need to raise prices as long as they still sell these lower cost goods. A national retailer noted they have at least 25 weeks of inventory on hand for most imported products. A firm that produces grocery items said they will decide how much to raise prices as they get closer to selling tariff-affected products. Similarly, retailers order seasonal items quarters in advance. Many were receiving items for fall and winter when the new tariffs were going into effect in the spring. They paid the tariff then, but we won’t see the price increase until those items hit the shelves in the fall or winter. One retailer speculated that seasonal décor items will look the most like a one-time increase.
  • Pre-established prices. Many firms face infrequent pricing due to factors like annual contracts or pre-sales. For example, a dealer of farm equipment gets half its sales through incentivized pre-sales to lock in demand and smooth around crop cycles. They noted that while it would be difficult to retroactively ask those customers to pay for part of the tariff, they will pass tariffs directly through on spare parts. A steel fabricator for industrial equipment has a contract for steel through Q3, so they haven’t been impacted yet by price increases. However, they will face new costs once that contract expires.

In general, compared to small firms, large firms have more ability to negotiate with vendors, temporarily absorb costs, burn cash, wait for strategic opportunity, and test things out. This matters because large firms often lead pricing behavior among firms, so these strategic choices may influence the response of inflation to tariffs more generally. Even within firm size, one often hears that negotiations on price vary considerably by relationship and item.

Conclusion

A key question surrounding tariffs is whether any effects on inflation will resemble a short-lived price increase—as in the simplest textbook model of tariffs—or a more sustained increase to inflation that may warrant tighter Fed monetary policy. When asked in May what will determine the answer, Fed Chair Jerome Powell cited three factors [archived PDF]: 1) the size of the tariff effects; 2) how long it takes to work their way through to prices; and 3) whether inflation expectations remain anchored. The insights shared above suggest the process from proposed tariffs to the prices set by firms is far from instantaneous or clear-cut, particularly when tariff policy is changing.

Sensing from businesses suggests that the impact of tariffs on their price-setting [archived PDF] has been lagged, but it is starting to play out. Nonetheless, it remains highly uncertain how tariffs will impact consumer inflation. The discussion above makes clear that firms are nimble and innovative in the face of challenge, and they are concerned about losing customers in the current environment, particularly consumer-facing firms. We will continue to learn from our business contacts and share their insights.


Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.

World-Watching: Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee — Copom

272nd Meeting – July 29-30, 2025

[from the Central Bank of Brazil, 5 August, 2025]

  1. Update of the economic outlook and the Copom’s scenario1
    1. The global environment is more adverse and uncertain due to the economic policy and economic outlook in the United States, mainly regarding its trade and fiscal policies and their effects.
    2. Therefore, the behavior and the volatility of different asset classes have been impacted, altering global financial conditions. This scenario requires particular caution from emerging market economies amid heightened geopolitical tensions.
    3. Regarding the domestic scenario, the set of indicators on economic activity has shown some moderation in growth, as expected, but the labor market is still showing strength.
    4. In recent releases, headline inflation and measures of underlying inflation remained above the inflation target. Inflation expectations for 2025 and 2026 collected by the Focus survey remained above the inflation target and stand at 5.1% and 4.4%, respectively.
  2. Scenarios and risk analysis
    1. The inflation outlook remains challenging in several dimensions. Copom assessed the international scenario, economic activity, aggregate demand, inflation expectations, and current inflation. Copom then discussed inflation projections and expectations before deliberating on the current decision and future communication.
    2. The global environment is more adverse and uncertain. If, on the one hand, the approval of certain trade agreements, along with recent inflation and economic activity data from the U.S., could suggest a reduction in global uncertainty, on the other hand, the U.S. fiscal policy—and, particularly for Brazil, the U.S. trade policy—make the outlook more uncertain and adverse. The increase of trade tariffs by the U.S. to Brazil has significant sectoral impacts and still uncertain aggregate effects that depend on the unfolding of the next steps in the negotiations and the perception of risk inherent to this process. The Committee is closely monitoring the potential impacts on the real economy and financial assets. The prevailing assessment within the Committee is the increased global outlook uncertainty, and, therefore, Copom should maintain a cautious stance. As usual, the Committee will focus on the transmission mechanisms from the external environment to the domestic inflation dynamics and their impact on the outlook.
    3. The domestic economic activity outlook has indicated a certain moderation in growth, while also presenting mixed data across sectors and indicators.
    4. Overall, some moderation in growth is observed, supporting the scenario outlined by the Committee. This moderation, necessary for the widening of the output gap and the convergence of inflation to the target, is aligned with a contractionary monetary policy. Monthly sectoral surveys and more timely consumption data support a gradual slowdown in growth.
    5. At turning points in the economic cycle, it is natural to observe mixed signals from economic indicators—some leading, others lagging—as well as from comparisons between markets, such as the credit and labor markets.
    6. The credit market, which is more sensitive to financial conditions, has shown clearer moderation. A decline in non-earmarked credit granting and an increase in interest and delinquency rates have been observed. Moreover, regarding household credit, there has been an increase in the household debtservice ratio and a deepening of the negative credit flow—that is, households repaying more debt than taking on. It was emphasized during the discussion that some recent measures, such as private payroll-deducted loans, have had less impact than many market participants expected. Given the implementation agenda in this credit line, as well as the effects of introducing and removing taxes on other credit modalities, the Committee believes it should closely monitor upcoming credit data releases.
    7. In contrast to the credit market, the labor market remains dynamic. Both from the perspective of income—with real gains consistently above productivity—and employment—with a significant decrease in the unemployment rate to historically low levels—the labor market has greatly supported consumption and income.
    8. Thus, the Committee assesses that the signals from demand and economic activity so far suggest that the scenario is unfolding as expected and is consistent with the current monetary policy. The Committee reiterates that the aggregate demand slowdown is an essential element of supplydemand rebalancing in the economy and convergence of inflation to the target.
    9. Fiscal policy has a short-term impact, mainly through stimulating aggregate demand, and a more structural dimension, which has the potential to affect perceptions of debt sustainability and influence the term premium in the yield curve. A fiscal policy that acts counter-cyclically and contributes to reducing the risk premium favors the convergence of inflation to the target. Copom reinforced its view that the slowdown in structural reform efforts and fiscal discipline, the increase in earmarked credit, and uncertainties over the public debt stabilization have the potential to raise the economy’s neutral interest rate, with deleterious impacts on the power of monetary policy and, consequently, on the cost of disinflation in terms of activity. The Committee remained firmly convinced that policies must be predictable, credible, and countercyclical. In particular, the Committee’s discussion once again highlighted the need for harmonious fiscal and monetary policy.
    10. Inflation expectations, as measured by different instruments and obtained from various groups of agents, remained above the inflation target at all horizons, maintaining the adverse inflation outlook. For shorter-term horizons, following the release of the most recent data, there has been a decline in inflation expectations. For longer-term horizons, conversely, there has been no significant change in inflation expectations between Copom meetings, even though measures of breakeven inflation extracted from financial assets have declined. The Committee reaffirmed and renewed its commitment to re-anchoring expectations and to conducting a monetary policy that supports such a movement.
    11. De-anchored inflation expectations is a factor of discomfort shared by all Committee members and must be tamed. Copom highlighted that environments with de-anchored expectations increase the disinflation cost in terms of activity. The scenario of inflation convergence to the target becomes more challenging with de-anchored expectations for longer horizons. When discussing this topic, the main conclusion obtained and shared by all members of Copom was that, in an environment of de-anchored expectations—as currently is the case—greater monetary restriction is required for a longer period than would be otherwise appropriate.
    12. The inflation scenario has continued to show downside surprises in recent periods compared with analystsforecasts, but inflation has remained above the target Industrial goods inflation, which has already been showing weaker wholesale price pressures, continued to ease in the more recent period. Food prices also displayed slightly weaker-than-expected dynamics. Finally, services inflation, which has greater inertia, remains above the level required to meet the inflation target, in a context of a positive output gap. Beyond the changes in items, or even short-term oscillations, the core inflation measures have remained above the value consistent with the target achievement for months, corroborating the interpretation that inflation is pressured by demand and requires a contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.
    13. Copom then addressed the projections. In the reference scenario, the interest rate path is extracted from the Focus survey, and the exchange rate starts at USD/BRL 5.552 and evolves according to the purchasing power parity (PPP). The Committee assumes that oil prices follow approximately the futures market curve for the following six months and then start increasing 2% per year onwards. Moreover, the energy tariff flag is assumed to be “green” in December of the years 2025 and 2026.
    14. In the reference scenario, four-quarter inflation projections for 2025 and for 2026 are 4.9% and 3.6%, respectively (Table 1). For the relevant horizon for monetary policy—2027 Q1—the inflation projection based on the reference scenario extracted from the Focus survey remained at 3.4%, above the inflation target.
    15. Regarding the balance of risks, it was assessed that the scenario of greater uncertainty continues to present higher-than-usual upside and downside inflation risks to the inflation outlook. Copom assessed that, among the upside risks for the inflation outlook and inflation expectations, it should be emphasized (i) a more prolonged period of de-anchoring of inflation expectations; (ii) a stronger-than-expected resilience of services inflation due to a more positive output gap; and (iii) a conjunction of internal and external economic policies with a stronger-than-expected inflationary impact, for example, through a persistently more depreciated currency. Among the downside risks, it should be noted (i) a greater-than-projected deceleration of domestic economic activity, impacting the inflation scenario; (ii) a steeper global slowdown stemming from the trade shock and the scenario of heightened uncertainty; and (iii) a reduction in commodity prices with disinflationary effects.
    16. Prospectively, the Committee will continue monitoring the pace of economic activity, which is a fundamental driver of inflation, particularly services inflation; the exchange rate pass-through to inflation, after a process of increased exchange rate volatility; and inflation expectations, which remain de-anchored and are drivers of future inflation behavior. It was emphasized that inflationary vectors remain adverse, such as the economic activity resilience and labor market pressures, de-anchored inflation expectations, and high inflation projections. This scenario prescribes a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target.
  3. Discussion of the conduct of monetary policy
    1. Copom then discussed the conduct of monetary policy, considering the set of projections evaluated, as well as the balance of risks for prospective inflation.
    2. Following a swift and firm interest rate hike cycle, the Committee anticipates, as its monetary policy strategy, continuity of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to observe the effects of the cycle already implemented. It was emphasized that, once the appropriate interest rate is determined, it should remain at a significantly contractionary level for a very prolonged period due to de-anchored expectations. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to proceed with the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.
  4. Monetary policy decision
    1. The Committee has been closely monitoring with particular attention the announcements regarding the imposition by the U.S. of trade tariffs on Brazil, reinforcing its cautious stance in a scenario of heightened uncertainty. Moreover, it continues to monitor how the developments on the fiscal side impact monetary policy and financial assets. The current scenario continues to be marked by de-anchored inflation expectations, high inflation projections, resilience on economic activity, and labor market pressures. Ensuring the convergence of inflation to the target in an environment with de-anchored expectations requires a significantly contractionary monetary policy for a very prolonged period.
    2. Copom decided to maintain the Selic rate at 15.00% p.a., and judges that this decision is consistent with the strategy for inflation convergence to a level around its target throughout the relevant horizon for monetary policy. Without compromising its fundamental objective of ensuring price stability, this decision also implies smoothing economic fluctuations and fostering full employment.
    3. The current scenario, marked by heightened uncertainty, requires a cautious stance in monetary policy. If the expected scenario materializes, the Committee foresees a continuation of the interruption of the rate hiking cycle to examine its yet-to-be-seen cumulative impacts, and then evaluate whether the current interest rate level, assuming it stable for a very prolonged period, will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target. The Committee emphasizes that it will remain vigilant, that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and that it will not hesitate to resume the rate hiking cycle if appropriate.
    4. The following members of the Committee voted for this decision: Gabriel Muricca Galípolo (Governor), Ailton de Aquino Santos, Diogo Abry Guillen, Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan, Izabela Moreira Correa, Nilton José Schneider David, Paulo Picchetti, Renato Dias de Brito Gomes, and Rodrigo Alves Teixeira.
Table 1

Inflation projections in the reference scenario
Year-over-year IPCA change (%)

Price Index202520262027 Q1
IPCA4.93.63.4
IPCA market prices5.13.53.3
IPCA administered prices4.44.03.9
Footnotes

1 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this update considers changes since the June Copom meeting (271st meeting).

2 It corresponds to the rounded value of the average exchange rate observed over the ten working days ending on the last day of the week prior to the Copom meeting, according to the procedure adopted since the 258th meeting.

Meeting information
Date: July 29-30 2025
Place: BCB Headquarters’ meeting rooms on the 8th floor (7/29 and 7/30 on the morning) and 20th floor (7/30 on the afternoon) – Brasilia – DF – Brazil
Starting and ending times:
July 29: 10:07 AM – 11:37 AM; 2:17 PM – 5:51 PM
July 30: 10:10 AM – 11:13 AM; 2:37PM – 6:34 PM
In attendance:
Members of the Copom
Gabriel Muricca Galípolo – Governor
Ailton de Aquino Santos
Diogo Abry Guillen
Gilneu Francisco Astolfi Vivan
Izabela Moreira Correa
Nilton José Schneider David
Paulo Picchetti
Renato Dias de Brito Gomes
Rodrigo Alves Teixeira
Department Heads in charge of technical presentations (attending on July 29 and on the morning of July 30)
André de Oliveira AmanteOpen Market Operations Department
Euler Pereira Gonçalves de MelloResearch Department (also attending on the afternoon of 7/30)
Fábio Martins Trajano de ArrudaDepartment of Banking Operations and Payments System
Luís Guilherme Siciliano PontesInternational Reserves Department
Marcelo Antonio Thomaz de AragãoDepartment of International Affairs
Ricardo SabbadiniDepartment of Economics
Other participants (attending on July 29 and on the morning of July 30)
Alexandre de CarvalhoOffice of Economic Advisor
André Maurício Trindade da RochaHead of the Financial System Monitoring Department
Angelo Jose Mont Alverne DuarteHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Licensing and Resolution (attending on the mornings of 7/29 and 7/30)
Arnaldo José Giongo GalvãoPress Office Advisor
Cristiano de Oliveira Lopes CozerGeneral Counsel
Edson Broxado de França TeixeiraHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Supervision
Eduardo José Araújo LimaHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Economic Policy
Fernando Alberto G. Sampaio C. RochaHead of the Department of Statistics
Isabela Ribeiro Damaso MaiaHead of the Sustainability and International Portfolio Investors Unit (attending on the mornings of 7/29 and 7/30)
Julio Cesar Costa PintoHead of Office of the Governor
Laura Soledad Cutruffo CompariniDeputy Head of the Department of Economics
Leonardo Martins NogueiraHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy
Marcos Ribeiro de CastroDeputy Head of the Research Department
Mardilson Fernandes QueirozHead of the Financial System Regulation Department
Olavo Lins Romano PereiraDeputy Head of the Department of International Affairs
Renata Modesto BarretoDeputy Head of the Department of Banking Operations and Payments System
Ricardo da Costa MartinelliDeputy Head of the International Reserves Department
Ricardo Eyer HarrisHead of Office of the Deputy Governor for Regulation
Ricardo Franco MouraHead of the Prudential and Foreign Exchange Regulation Department
Rogerio Antonio LuccaExecutive Secretary
Simone Miranda BurelloAdvisor in the Office of the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy

The members of Copom analyzed the recent performance and prospects for the Brazilian and international economies, under the monetary policy framework, whose objective is to comply with the inflation targets established by the National Monetary Council. This document represents Copom’s best effort to provide an English version of its policy meeting minutes. In case of inconsistency, the Portuguese version prevails.

Economics-Watching: Kuwait: GDP Returns to Growth in Q1 2025 as Impact of Oil Output Cuts Fades

[from NBK Economic Research, 21 July, 2025]

by Mohammad Al-Shehri, Assistant Economist & Omar Al-Nakib, Head of MENA Research

Preliminary official figures show GDP expanding 1% y/y in Q1 2025 following seven consecutive quarters of contraction, helped by a less severe downturn in oil output. With the negative effects of earlier voluntary oil production cuts beginning to fade, oil GDP recorded only a marginal decline, the softest since Q2 2023. Growth in non-oil activity remained positive though eased, weighed by a moderation in the manufacturing, real estate, and transport sectors. The near-term outlook for GDP is one of positive growth, lifted by rising oil production after Kuwait started to restore 135 kb/d of oil output cuts between April and September 2025, while the non-oil sector should also register further steady gains.

Non-oil GDP growth softens in Q1 2025 after strong performance in Q4 2024

Growth in the non-oil sector weakened in Q1 2025, slowing to 2% y/y compared to 4% recorded in the prior quarter. (Chart 1.) The softer expansion in non-oil activity reflected, among other things, a moderation in the manufacturing sector, where activity grew at a still-solid 4.3% despite a decline in refined petroleum products output but slowed notably from the 12.2% reading registered in Q4 2024. Growth in other sectors including real estate, wholesale & retail trade, transport, and education also slowed. Offsetting the slowdown was stronger expansion in the non-oil economy’s largest segments: public administration and defense as well as financial intermediation and insurance, which grew 1% and 3.2% y/y, respectively. (Chart 2.)

Chart 1: Real GDP growth

Chart 2: Growth at sub-sector level (1Q25)

Oil sector logs marginal contraction, set to return to growth in Q2

The contraction in oil GDP eased significantly to -0.3% y/y from -5.7% y/y in Q4 2024, registering the softest rate of decline since Kuwait embarked on cutting oil production in Q2 2023 after participating in the voluntary cuts scheme with 7 other OPEC+ members. (Chart 4.) Kuwait’s oil production averaged 2.415 mb/d in Q1 2025, a 0.7% decline from the same quarter last year, according to OPEC secondary sources. However, oil sector fortunes are set to shift in Q2 2025 and thereafter, after the OPEC-8 member alliance started unwinding the 2.2 mb/d voluntary cut tranche in April 2025. Originally planned to be unwound over the course of 18 months, OPEC+ has accelerated the pace of supply hikes with output now on a path to be fully restored in September, a full year ahead of schedule. For Kuwait, crude production rose by 0.5% q/q in Q2 to 2.426 mb/d and is set to accelerate further to average 2.533 mb/d in H2 2025. With the oil market so far able to absorb the additional OPEC and global supply and oil prices currently holding near $70/bbl, an upside risk to our oil sector outlook involves the potential unwinding of the outstanding OPEC-8 voluntary cuts (1.66 mb/d), of which Kuwait’s share is 128 kb/d.

Growth heading back into positive territory in 2025

Growth in total GDP is set to remain on a positive trajectory in the near term, buoyed by further steady expansion in non-oil economic activity and increased oil production. Non-oil GDP is set to benefit from the government’s reform drive which includes the recent passing of the debt law that could catalyze the implementation of key development projects and the potential approval of the ‘mortgagelaw later in 2025, which could spur higher household borrowing and consumer spending. Economic indicators for Q2 2025 pointed to a healthy pace of non-oil economic activity. The key ‘output’ and ‘new orders’ balances in the non-oil private sector PMI gauge both averaged a very robust 57+ in Q2 2025, real estate activity continued to expand at a robust pace with earlier price falls in the residential sector abating, while credit growth stood at a healthy 5.5% y/y in May, and could benefit in coming months if interest rates are reduced further.

Nonetheless, there are also downside risks to the outlook. Local consumer spending growth (according to central bank card transactions data) turned negative in Q1 2025, extending the weakening trend now observed for more than a year. The government’s ongoing fiscal consolidation push will also weigh on wage and job growth. Overall, we see GDP growing 1.9% this year, boosted by expansions in both the oil and non-oil sectors of 1.2% and 2.5%, respectively.

Chart 3: Contribution to non-oil growth

Chart 4: Oil production and oil GDP

Read this article as an archived PDF.